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Introduction 
 
“Am I doing this thing right?” and, more fundamentally, “am I doing the 
right thing?” are questions most people ask themselves from time to 
time. And, indeed, they should: asking such questions leads to learning 
and improvement. In peacebuilding, they are particularly important, as 
the potential price of doing the wrong thing is high and renewed fighting 
could ultimately be the result. However, these questions are not easy to 
answer. Doing so entails an open mind and a willingness to question 
previous decisions and ideas and even admit mistakes – something 
which in a context affected by conflict is particularly difficult because of 
the implications this may have. More practically, it is hard to obtain the 
knowledge needed to answer the questions in a satisfactory way. This 
would require research, reflection and exchange, all of which are 
difficult in a conflict-affected and resource-deprived context. In 
addition, not all actors have equal influence in discussions over policy 
directions, nor are all able to decide for themselves whether they can do 
research or take time for learning. Structural factors, such as the policies 
of donor agencies, shape the extent to which peacebuilders can develop 
and share their knowledge. 
 
This study aims to map these elements and find out how peacebuilders 
can become more effective learners. It centres on two elements: 
knowledge, embodied by the owl in the title, and peacebuilding, 
symbolised by the dove. The dove represents the range of activities by 
civil society organisations that aim to end and prevent violent conflict 
and establish and sustain peace in the societies in which they work. It 
also represents an aim, an overall goal of these organisations and the 
people working in them: the goal of peace. The owl is the knowledge – 
experiences, lessons learned, research outcomes – that may improve the 
efforts of peacebuilders and bring them closer to their aim of peace. 
Knowledge can be an end in itself, but in this context it is considered 
primarily as a means to an end: peace. In order for peacebuilding work 
to be successful, it is important that it is based on existing relevant 
knowledge – knowledge, for example, about the context, the actors and 
their cultures, the capabilities and constraints of people and 
communities, and the effect of particular working methods. 
 
An approach currently dominant in development – a field of which, 
when it comes to funding flows and the practical organisation of work, 
peacebuilding is often a part – sees development almost as a service 
industry, producing a set of measurable deliverables. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which were agreed upon by the United 
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Nations (UN) member states in 2000, are a good example of that 
approach. However, reality is less easy to grasp. In essence, 
development is not about constructing wells or hospitals. It is about 
helping develop capabilities of people to use such facilities. In that 
sense, development is really about knowledge. This does not only 
include the knowledge of development workers coming to train local 
people. It is at least as important to mobilise the knowledge of locals. 
Development “is a process which cannot happen, […] unless it is based 
both on a good understanding of the particular socio-economic reality 
that the ‘development’ is intended to change and, just as importantly, on 
an appreciation of the perceptions of local populations as to their options 
in that reality. Without such ‘knowledge’, interventions fail, as we have 
seen time and time again.” (Powell 2006: 519, emphasis in original) The 
decisive factor then becomes to “successfully link […] the range of 
knowledge components necessary to achieve your aim” (ibidem). 
 
In countries affected by conflict both the need to find locally appropriate 
solutions and the difficulty in obtaining and using these are even more 
profound. In ‘postconflict’ countries large-scale violence has ceased but 
the underlying grievances, contradictions and structures that caused the 
conflict are usually still present. As a result the threat of renewed 
warfare looms large. Peacebuilding organisations employ a wide range 
of activities to prevent this from happening by addressing the causes of 
conflict, working for reconciliation and stimulating the development of 
peaceful structures and institutions. But they do so in difficult 
circumstances. Local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
conflict-torn countries find themselves in rapidly changing contexts. 
This calls for flexibility and the capacity to learn from one’s actions. 
Indeed, as the potential cost of making mistakes is high – it may even 
cost lives – the need to ‘get it right’ is particularly pressing. Learning 
from one’s own work and from the experiences of others is therefore a 
priority.  
 
The characteristics of violent conflicts have changed significantly since 
the end of the Cold War, as is reflected by the term ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor 
2006). Better learning about this new and changing context of conflict, 
and about the strategies that do and do not work as organisations work to 
transform this context, is needed. A recent study found that “NGOs best 
equipped to deal with security threats were those which [...] had a strong 
analysis of the context” (Goodhand 2006: 107). Similarly, another study 
of nine successful South Asian NGOs showed that “the success of these 
NGOs was in part attributable to their willingness to embrace new 
learning and invest in developing their capacity as ‘learning NGOs’” 
(Hailey and James 2002: 398). However, learning is difficult in conflict 
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settings. NGO staff work in a context of urgency, have action-oriented 
working styles, and as a result often find it difficult to create time and 
space for reflection and learning. In conflict-torn societies, competition 
and distrust hamper knowledge sharing, and the content of knowledge 
itself is often contested. In addition, structural inequalities constrain the 
opportunities for learning and reflection that local Southern NGOs 
(SNGOs) have: the low research capacity of Southern knowledge 
institutions, a lack of recognition of indigenous knowledge, and the 
imposition of Northern policy priorities as part of the way the funding of 
NGOs is organised. All these issues contribute to a lack of opportunities 
for Southern peacebuilders to systematically reflect on the place of their 
activities in the wider spectrum of peacebuilding, to analyse the effect of 
their interventions and ask whether they are doing the right thing, to 
study the needs and priorities of beneficiaries and collect existing ideas 
and methodologies of peacebuilding, and to document and share lessons 
learned. Given these difficulties, this study explores ways in which 
peace practitioners may learn and reflect.  
 
The knowledge strategies of organisations are a relatively new field of 
analysis, which originated in the business sector in the early 1990s, 
reflecting an increasing emphasis on the ‘knowledge economy’. Some 
years later, the development sector began to take up the issue as well. 
However, this body of thinking remains largely confined to internal 
learning mechanisms and knowledge flows inside organisations in the 
global North. From a study of British development organisations, 
Ramalingham (2005: 26) concludes that these organisations’ 
“focus on internal knowledge work belies the fact that [they rely] on 
activities in the South as a key source of their most valued knowledge, 
and that eventually, all knowledge that is ‘value generating’ must by 
necessity be tied back to a level of [knowledge sharing] with those in 
the South. […] Learning between agencies, between agencies and 
Southern partners, and between agencies and beneficiaries, is a clear 
gap in the knowledge and learning strategies [of international 
development organisations]”.  
 
In order to contribute to filling that gap, The Owl and the Dove focuses 
on the knowledge processes in which local peacebuilding organisations 
engage as they work in postconflict settings in the global South. It 
further develops the theory on knowledge and learning in the field of 
development and peacebuilding, adding elements relevant to peace 
NGOs in the South. Like the field of organisational learning, 
peacebuilding and postconflict development are relatively young fields 
of study. Drawing these together leads to a new picture of the specific 
characteristics and challenges of knowledge and learning in conflict 
  
22 
settings. This study also uses the outcomes of over a hundred interviews 
with primarily Southern peacebuilders and analyses case studies of 
initiatives aiming to improve the knowledge base and processes of these 
actors and their organisations. 
 
In response to the difficulties that constrain their learning, Southern 
peacebuilders identify a need to find ways that better enable them to 
extract, use and disseminate their own implicit knowledge and the 
knowledge that exists in the communities in which they work. This 
would make more locally relevant knowledge available in conflict areas 
and achieve a more equitable balance between Northern and Southern 
contributions to the development of theory in the field of peacebuilding. 
In line with this, the much-used concepts of ‘capacity building’ and 
‘knowledge transfer’ are conceived as two-way processes. In the study 
ideas and initiatives are examined that aim at achieving this. The aim of 
the study, then, is to shed light on the difficulties and opportunities for 
NGOs in conflict regions in their efforts to become more effective in 
peacebuilding processes through their participation in learning and 
knowledge sharing processes. The book centres on the following 
research question: What are the challenges and opportunities Southern 
peace NGOs are confronted with in accumulating, mobilising and 
disseminating the knowledge that is needed to make optimal policy 
decisions, carry out activities in an effective way and adjust to 
continuously changing circumstances?  
 
In order to address this question, this study maps the structural factors 
that shape the possibilities for learning and knowledge exchange and 
analyses past and present initiatives in this light. Lessons learned from 
knowledge experiments are documented and placed in the context of 
theories about knowledge management, learning and networking. The 
study focuses not on the ‘hardware’ of technical knowledge 
management solutions, but on the more difficult ‘software’, or people, 
side of the story. This reflects the current shift in focus in thinking about 
learning and knowledge exchange from technological solutions to the 
human and social constellations that make learning possible.1  
 
The research question posed above leads to a number of more specific 
questions.  
• What is the role and place of local NGOs in contemporary 
peacebuilding processes, and what does their position in the 
wider field of actors and processes mean for the knowledge on 
which they base their work and the learning they engage in?  
                                                 
1 See 3.2.2. 
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• What forms does knowledge of peace and conflict take?  
• What are general characteristics of organisational learning 
processes, and how can these be applied to Southern peace 
NGOs? What characterises the learning processes of Southern 
peace NGOs? 
 
 
Theory and conceptualisation 
 
Relevant theoretical discussions that are drawn upon revolve around the 
following concepts.   
• Civil society and peacebuilding. A few recent publications look 
at the roles that civil society organisations play or potentially 
may play in the prevention or transformation of violent conflict 
and the building of structures for a sustainable peace (Barnes 
2006, Kaldor 2003, Goodhand 2006, Anderson and Olsen 
2003). One of the findings from this literature is that civil 
society and NGOs2 often neglect to think explicitly about the 
way in which their projects go together with those of others and 
contribute to the wider aim of sustainable peace. The reasons for 
this are usually not analysed in any depth. Based on 
conversations with NGO staff, this study explores some of these 
reasons, such as inter-organisational competition and the lack of 
funds for analysis and long-term planning. It also asks whether 
organisational learning strategies have the potential of 
improving NGOs’ reflection on their place in the wider field.  
• Knowledge and types of knowledge in development and 
peacebuilding. This literature distinguishes between explicit, 
readily available knowledge, and tacit knowledge inside 
people’s heads (Sauquet 2004). Other discussions relate to 
distinctions between academic and practitioner knowledge and 
between external and indigenous knowledge (Rip 2001, De la 
Rive Box 2001, RAWOO 2000). Applying these types of 
knowledge explicitly to the field of peacebuilding, and 
examining the implications for learning processes, has not been 
done so far. This book will do so in chapter two. 
• Learning and cycles of learning. Theories about learning 
emphasise the learning cycle that was described briefly in the 
introduction, and distinguish between superficial and deeper 
learning processes, whereby deeper learning requires 
questioning the assumptions and theories on which one’s entire 
                                                 
2 See chapter one for a discussion of the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘NGOs’. 
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mode of operation may be based (Boonstra 2004, Argyris 2004a 
and 2004b). Chapter three looks at these processes and connects 
them to the learning processes of NGOs. 
• Knowledge management and organisational learning. There is a 
large body of literature in these fields (Sauquet 2004, 
Nooteboom 2002). Most of this literature originates in the field 
of business and business studies. However, recently publications 
have begun to appear that look at organisational learning 
specifically for the international development-oriented sector 
(Ramalingham 2005, 2006; Britton 2005). So far, these 
publications have almost exclusively focused on Northern-based 
organisations, and a gap in the literature exists both when it 
comes to organisational learning by SNGOs, and knowledge 
interactions between Northern and Southern actors. Chapter 
three signals this gap, while the remainder of the study 
contributes to filling it.   
• Bridging research and policy. In the development sector as well 
as in other fields of work a body of literature has come into 
existence about ways to bridge the divide between researchers 
and policymakers (Court and Young 2003, Carden and Neilson 
2005, Stone 2002). However, this literature is somewhat limited 
as it mostly starts from the angle of the researcher and focuses 
on influencing policy with one’s findings. It also largely leaves 
out the practitioner: the person who implements policies and 
from whom new research findings often originate. This study 
aims to fill that gap by adopting the perspective of practitioners 
and looking at their knowledge needs, the way they use 
available knowledge, and the knowledge they have to offer. 
Most explicitly this is done in chapter five. 
• Knowledge sharing. Publications on knowledge sharing ask, for 
example, what the best strategies are for bringing out and 
sharing tacit knowledge, or what the restraints are that keep 
people from sharing openly (O’Dell et al. 1998, Ballantyne 
2001, Baud 2002). These publications are relatively few. 
Interview findings regarding knowledge sharing among 
Southern peace NGOs are used in chapters five, six, seven and 
eight to provide further empirical data that develop the thinking 
about knowledge sharing. These data also shed light on the 
particular difficulties that knowledge sharing encounters in a 
context of conflict, distrust, and few resources. 
• Networking. One prominent and much-used knowledge sharing 
tool is networking, although the aims of networking may be 
somewhat broader than knowledge exchange alone: action-
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oriented networks work together to implement programmes or 
influence policy, for example. The literature on networking 
analyses various forms of networks and collects lessons learned 
on what works and what does not (Stone and Maxwell 2005, 
Van Deventer 2004, Benner et al. 2004). Much of the literature 
treats networking as a technical and neutral activity, while the 
study of North-South and Southern peace networks in chapters 
six and seven shows that it is in fact an activity shaped by 
politics and conflict.  
• Capacity building. Capacity building has become a buzzword in 
the development sector, although many people are unclear about 
what it actually means. Most definitions include some element 
of knowledge transfer, making the concept relevant to this 
study. Some publications exist, mostly from the development 
sector itself, that attempt to clarify the concept and define 
strategies for capacity building (James and Wrigley 2006, Groot 
and Gerwen 2004). However, a gap exists between the 
conceptualisation and the actual practice of capacity building. 
Most agencies strive for optimal ownership of peace and 
development strategies by Southern partners, and conceptualise 
capacity building in this light. But the reality of the funding and 
accountability chain means that genuine ownership and 
partnership often do not exist. Thus, in chapters three and four 
this study compares the theory and practice of capacity building 
and asks whether capacity building programmes are interactive 
learning processes, or one-way knowledge transfers. In doing 
so, the concept of capacity building is placed more explicitly in 
the context of thinking about learning and knowledge transfer.  
• Discourse and knowledge systems. Publications in various fields 
shed light on developments in discourse, the dominance of some 
discourses over others, and the ways in which this shapes 
knowledge recognised as ‘valid’. At an even deeper level, the 
literature about different knowledge systems in different parts of 
the world, and the ways in which particular systems have gained 
ground over others, provide a background for current-day 
inequalities in who generates knowledge and what knowledge is 
recognised (Hilhorst 2003, Mawdsley et al. 2002, Mudimbe 
1988, Grasdorff 2005). This book (particularly chapter four) 
discusses the implications of these important discussions for 
donor-recipient relations and the knowledge and learning 
strategies used by local peace NGOs.   
• Donor regimes. Related to the discussion about discourse, a 
body of literature on donor relations and the way these shape the 
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radius of action of SNGOs also sheds light on the ways in which 
power and knowledge are intertwined in practice (Edwards and 
Hulme 1996, Ferguson 1994, Krieger 2004). This issue emerged 
from the interviews with SNGO staff as vitally important in 
order to understand their knowledge and learning processes. 
Bringing in this literature, and further adding to it using the 
findings from the interviews, serves to highlight the political 
dimension of knowledge processes in the world of 
peacebuilding. This is significant because in the knowledge and 
learning literature mentioned earlier, these processes are often 
described as ‘flat’ (rather than hierarchical) and ‘neutral’ (rather 
than political). Chapter four discusses these issues. 
 
 
Approach 
 
As none of the sources have a direct bearing on the subject of the study, 
the approach chosen for the treatment of the theory is that of an 
explorative or heuristical analysis. In such an approach, a model is 
created from various theories and concepts. This model is not used as a 
fixed framework that is applied to the data, but it continues to evolve 
throughout the study according to the empirical findings. Information 
gathered in interviews alters and furthers it. In this way, theory and 
empirical findings reciprocally influence one another and lead to the 
gradual development of new theory.  
 
The research question is operationalised by taking local peace NGOs 
and networks in developing, conflict-affected countries as the main unit 
of analysis. The focus on indigenous NGOs in the South is important, as 
their experiences constitute a gap in the literature on the knowledge 
processes of NGOs. These organisations are studied using a variety of 
methods. A central place is given to interviews with strategically placed 
staff members of these organisations – mostly NGO directors or 
programme coordinators. In addition, conversations with, and 
publications by, representatives of international NGOs that engage in 
cooperation with, and capacity building of, Southern partners, serve to 
complement the picture painted by SNGO staff.  
 
The reason why, in addition to individual NGOs, NGO networks were 
also analysed relates directly to the nature of the issues under study. 
Interactive learning and knowledge exchange by NGOs often takes place 
in networks – or at least, networks are set up with knowledge sharing as 
their aim. Thus, networks constitute an interesting unit of analysis when 
looking at the knowledge strategies of NGOs and processes. Several 
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networks were studied in detail: the Global Partnership for the 
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and its regional NGO networks 
in Southeast Asia, East Africa, West Africa and Central Asia, and two 
national-level networks in Sierra Leone and Liberia that are part of the 
West African GPPAC network, which is called the West Africa Network 
for Peacebuilding (WANEP). In addition, various other networks were 
encountered and studied in less detail. In many cases, NGO staff 
members were interviewed both as representatives of individual NGOs 
and as members of one of the networks, and were asked questions on 
their organisation’s knowledge processes as such, and their participation 
in networks.  
 
The main regional areas in which interviews have been carried out are 
West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and Southeast Asia (the 
Philippines and Cambodia). These regions were chosen because of 
several factors. First, the spread over two continents makes it possible to 
compare between very different regional and cultural contexts and 
increases the applicability of findings. Second, the four countries have 
all experienced civil war and witness the proliferation of peacebuilding 
initiatives, making them suitable for a study of Southern peace NGOs. 
Third, civil society peacebuilding work in all four countries includes 
knowledge strategies such as networking and joint learning from 
practice. Particularly in the Philippines and the West African countries 
many peace networks are active, while in Cambodia an action research 
programme is being implemented. These initiatives provide material for 
the third and fourth Parts of this book, which focus on the knowledge 
and learning strategies of Southern peace NGOs.  
 
In addition to these two focus regions, travel in the context of other 
projects made it possible to conduct interviews in East Africa and 
Central Asia. In Nairobi, Kenya, during a visit in the context of a 
consultancy project, peace NGO staff from Kenyan, Sudanese, and 
Rwandese organisations were interviewed for this study. The visit to 
Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) was undertaken in the 
framework of a review of GPPAC (the case study in chapter seven) and 
did not cover the range of issues discussed with interviewees in the 
aforementioned regions. That said, the Central Asian interviews yielded 
relevant results beyond the GPPAC case study alone, particularly with 
regard to knowledge exchange and networking, and the experiences of 
local peace NGOs with regard to these strategies. These insights have 
been particularly useful for chapters five and six, which deal with 
knowledge sharing and networking. They also have broader implications 
for other chapters, as issues such as the role of civil society in 
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peacebuilding (chapter one), donor relations and capacity building 
(chapter four) were discussed.   
 
 
Structure of the book 
 
Part One sketches the context of peacebuilding, including the 
background and nature of current-day wars, and the role of NGOs in that 
context. In addition, Part One discusses the role of knowledge and 
learning processes in peacebuilding. It does so by drawing on the 
various bodies of literature outlined above. Chapter one addresses civil 
society, knowledge, and peacebuilding. The chapter looks at the nature 
and roles of civil society organisations (CSOs) working for peace. It 
pays attention to the concepts of civil society and peacebuilding, gives 
an overview of the range of CSO activities, and places these in the 
broader perspective of peacebuilding as an overall aim. Chapter two 
looks at the concept of knowledge and relates it to the peacebuilding 
field, addressing different types and sources of knowledge. Exactly what 
kind of knowledge are we talking about in this study? What knowledge 
do peacebuilders need for improved practice? Chapter three outlines 
various processes, actors and relationships that contribute to, or form 
part of, the learning processes of NGO staff, and zooms in on the 
knowledge strategies of NGOs as they appear in the literature. All this 
leads to a first rudimentary model of the knowledge processes of peace 
NGOs. The remainder of the book uses the outcomes of conversations 
with staff of Southern peace NGOs as well as case studies and additional 
literature to refine and further develop the model. This process is guided 
by a number of additional questions emerging from Part One. At the end 
of Part One the methodology used in answering these questions is 
outlined.   
 
Part Two introduces the element of inequality and North-South 
differences and interactions into the picture more explicitly. Chapter 
four looks at structural factors that shape and constrain knowledge 
generation, access, and dissemination of Southern peace NGOs. 
Developments in discourse, inequalities in the extent to which different 
types of knowledge are recognised, and the role of donor agencies in 
determining the knowledge that is used and produced all shape the 
extent to which Southern organisations are able to generate and 
disseminate knowledge. Developing the ability of NGOs to do research 
and to consciously learn from practice emerges in this context as a 
capacity building priority. Having outlined the structural framework in 
which Southern peacebuilding organisations operate, in chapter five the 
book moves on to analyse the knowledge strategies these organisations 
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engage in in practice. Chapter six zooms in on networking as a 
particular strategy peace NGOs use to improve their knowledge base as 
well as their contribution to the knowledge of others. 
 
Part Three of the study presents two case studies that further illuminate 
the interaction between the strategies addressed until then. In chapter 
seven, building on the discussion in chapter six of networking as a tool 
for knowledge exchange, a global network of peacebuilding CSOs is 
analysed: the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC). In chapter eight, a practitioner-oriented Master programme is 
described that is offered in several conflict-affected regions with an 
intensive interaction between the regional programmes: the action 
research-centred Applied Conflict Transformation Studies (ACTS) 
programme.   
 
Combining the findings presented and discussed, the concluding chapter 
revises the model of knowledge processes, actors, and relationships 
drawn up at the end of Part One, further developing it into a new model 
that may serve as a tool for analysis and improvement of the knowledge, 
learning, and knowledge exchange of Southern peace NGOs. The 
chapter discusses ways to overcome the structural inequalities that limit 
the learning of Southern NGOs and their contribution to global 
discussions about conflict and peace, giving a number of 
recommendations to various actors involved.  
 
Although the field of peacebuilding in developing, conflict-torn societies 
presents a number of specific challenges that increase both the urgency 
of learning and the difficulty of doing so, the processes that are 
elaborated in this study have a wider bearing than on the peacebuilding 
field alone. Many of the findings and recommendations are relevant to 
NGOs working in other sectors as well.  
 
 
Use of terms: North and South 
 
Throughout the book, the terms ‘North’ and ‘West’ are used almost, but 
not entirely interchangeably. In discussions on donors and recipients of 
development aid, I use the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’. Here, the ‘North’ 
also includes a country like Japan. ‘North’ and ‘South’ may be 
considered synonyms to the terms ‘developed world’ and ‘developing 
world’. In discussions on culture, the term ‘West’ is used as opposed to 
‘non-Western’ regions and cultures. Here, ‘West’ refers more 
specifically to Europe and the United States.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART  I.  CIVIL SOCIETY, KNOWLEDGE AND  
  PEACEBUILDING 
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Part One of this book sketches the field of peacebuilding, including the 
background and nature of current-day wars, and the role of NGOs in that 
context. It pays attention to the role and place of local NGOs in 
contemporary peacebuilding processes, asking what their position in the 
wider field of actors and processes means for the knowledge on which 
they base their work and the learning they engage in. In addition, Part 
One develops an initial rudimentary model of the knowledge processes 
of local peace organisations based on literature about learning, 
knowledge management, and knowledge sharing of NGOs, as well as on 
some findings from the interviews done with local peace NGO staff, 
particularly regarding their knowledge demand and supply.  
 
Having introduced the field of peacebuilding, its context, and the role 
NGOs play in it in chapter one, chapter two looks at the concept of 
knowledge in relation to peacebuilding. What is peacebuilding 
knowledge and where does it come from? Next, in chapter three the 
general characteristics of organisational learning processes are explored 
and applied to peace and development NGOs. An initial model that 
outlines the knowledge processes of local peace NGOs, interactions and 
relationships ensues at the end of chapter three. This model will be 
further developed as the book unfolds, taking into account the specific 
characteristics, opportunities and constraints that peace organisations 
face. At the end of Part One, the methodology used in collecting this 
information will be discussed. 
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Chapter 1. Pieces of peace 
Civil society and peacebuilding 
 
This chapter addresses the following questions in order to set the stage 
for the remainder of the book. In doing so the chapter aims to contribute 
to a better understanding of the role and place of NGOs in contemporary 
peacebuilding processes and the constraints which they face. This helps 
to contextualise the discussion of the knowledge processes of local 
peace NGOs that follows in the next chapters.  
 
• What is the position of NGOs within civil society and vis-à-vis 
non-civil society actors?  
• What does peacebuilding entail, and what is the role of NGOs in 
this field?  
• What kind of conflicts do they strive to solve or change?  
• What are the specific characteristics of peace NGOs and what 
makes them different from other NGOs?  
• What kinds of activities do peace NGOs engage in, and what are 
their aims?  
• Which discussions take place about the role and limits of civil 
society actors when it comes to peacebuilding?  
 
 
1.1 Civil society and NGOs 
 
The term civil society is usually used to refer to those parts of society 
that are organised and that exist outside of government and the private 
sector. The non-governmental and organised nature of civil society is 
important because it means that – at least ideally – civil society can act 
as a check or balance on governmental action. As a watchdog of citizen 
interests civil society is an indispensable element of democracy. At the 
global level civil society may be especially important since citizens do 
not relate to institutions of global governance through elections; thus 
global civil society may be seen as organisations facilitating a “process 
through which individuals debate, influence and negotiate an ongoing 
social contract or set of contracts with the centres of political and 
economic authority” (Kaldor 2003, 79). 
 
The width of the concept depends on the observer. Some see civil 
society as including political parties, media, sports associations, group 
interest organisations, idealistic non-governmental organisations, 
religious organisations, and private corporations. Particularly with 
regard to the inclusion of political parties, media, and the private sector 
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there is discussion. The media are often considered another important, 
but separate, element of democracy and check on government. Political 
parties are usually seen as semi-governmental institutions and therefore 
not part of civil society. Businesses have their own relation to 
government and do not organise civilians around public issues or have a 
representative function towards government. The way in which the 
concept of civil society is mostly used, then, is as a sphere of organised 
society apart from government that includes non-governmental 
organisations, interest groups, and religious organisations. (Diamond 
1992, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Kaldor 2003, Barnes 2001, 
Pishchikova 2006) 
 
This study zooms in on one important element of civil society: the non-
governmental organisation or NGO. In its broadest sense, an NGO is an 
organisation that is not part of the structure of government. In that sense 
it is synonymous with a civil society organisation (CSO). However, in 
the context of the current field of analysis, the term NGO tends to be 
used somewhat more narrowly to refer to humanitarian or otherwise 
idealistic non-profit organisations. NGOs can be distinguished from 
organisations which represent their own members, such as sports 
organisations, interest groups and church organisations. In developing 
countries such organisations tend to be called community-based 
organisations (CBOs). NGOs do not in the first place represent their 
own members; they work on behalf of people other than themselves. 
(Usually these are people considered to be marginalised and in need of 
support.) They are usually formally registered and include voluntary 
associations, charities, foundations, and professional societies. NGOs do 
not make profits. CBOs are not part of this more narrow definition but 
are covered by the broader concept of CSO.  
 
The first well-known international NGOs were the Anti-Slavery Society 
(1839) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (1863). 
Globalisation during the 20th century gave rise to the importance of 
international NGOs. International treaties and organisations such as the 
World Trade Organisation were perceived as being too centred on the 
interests of private enterprises. In an attempt to counterbalance this 
trend, NGOs emphasised humanitarian values, development cooperation 
and environmental issues.3 A concern with such ‘public’ affairs 
characterises NGOs, and professional associations that try to advance 
the interests of their members therefore do not really qualify as NGOs. 
 
                                                 
3 www.wikipedia.org, accessed 1 December 2006; Kaldor 2003, 87-90. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s the number of NGOs grew dramatically. 
International NGOs registered with governments and international 
organisations numbered 13,206 by the end of the 1990s, although the 
actual number of internationally operating NGOs is estimated at around 
40,000. National numbers are even higher and vary considerably 
depending on the country. The United States has an estimated 2 million 
NGOs, most of them formed in the past 30 years. Russia has 4,000 
NGOs. India has 2 million NGOs. In Kenya, some 240 NGOs come into 
existence every year.4  
 
Civil society in general, and NGOs in particular, are considered an 
important element of democracy5. By organising citizens civil society 
facilitates their ability to act as a check on government officials, holding 
them accountable for their actions also in between elections. NGOs are 
said to stimulate participation in public affairs, help people develop 
organisational and public debating skills, and foster norms of trust, 
moderation, and accommodation. (Pishchikova 2006: 43) This applies 
not only to organisations playing an active role vis-à-vis government, 
but for any organisation that brings people together for a common cause 
beyond their own immediate private sphere – including, for example, 
sports clubs. Such organisations are considered important elements of 
civil society because they contribute to social capital. (Putnam 1993)  
 
Social capital, a concept made famous by Robert Putnam, consists of 
relations of trust and reciprocity that are the result of interaction by 
citizens outside the political sphere. In a study of Italy, Putnam found 
that social capital is important for democracy because it creates 
connectedness and common interest and because interaction in civilian 
organisations stimulates political skills and a sense of citizenship. 
(Putnam 1993) The concept of social capital has found its way into the 
discourse of policy makers in development, most notably the World 
Bank which termed it ‘the missing link’ in development (Harriss 2001). 
This has led to increased attention to civil society development in 
developing countries as part of strategies for democratisation, 
development and peacebuilding. The creation and consolidation of 
NGOs has come to be seen as an indispensable part of strategies for 
post-conflict democratisation and peacebuilding (Barnes 2001, Pouligny 
2005: 498). “Local  civil societies […] are often seen to carry the best 
hopes for a genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, 
economic exploiters and warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-
                                                 
4 www.wikipedia.org, accessed 1 December 2006; Kaldor 2003, 87-90. 
5 See for example Tocqueville 1998, Diamond 1992, Putnam 1993, and O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986. 
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ridden weak or failed states, and may even capture the electoral process” 
(Pouligny 2005: 498) 
 
Over the past two decades, donor agencies have focused increasingly on 
the development and support of civil society in developing countries as a 
way to build democracy, peace and economic progress. In the process, 
the concept of civil society has become ‘instrumentalised’ towards 
fulfilling a specific set of donor priorities (Pishchikova 2006: 44). 
Mostly this has taken the form of the creation or support of professional 
NGOs that may implement the policies of donors with organisational 
structures ensuring accountability for their activities towards donors. 
This form of organisation is relatively new to many societies. Pre-
existing, more locally grounded civil society groups such as church 
organisations, councils of elders, or even individual activists are not 
eligible for donor support unless they become organised as professional 
NGOs. As a result, “the gap between home-grown civic groups and 
NGOs that are mainly provided for by Western assistance agencies is 
disturbingly big” (Pishchikova 2006: 79)6. Pouligny (2005: 500) 
sketches the issue as follows: 
“When working in non-Western contexts, most outsiders tend to look 
for structures representative of a ‘civil society’, i.e. something which 
corresponds, in reality, to the form it has taken in modern western 
societies – NGOs, trade unions, etc. […]. Either they do not find this 
representation of society and thus create one (as [the UN mission] 
UNTAC did in Cambodia during the peace process in the early 1990s) 
or they may find groups mirroring western society that suddenly 
emerge and claim this label. But such groups are far from covering the 
range of different modalities of a collective organization (Afghanistan 
offers many examples). Moreover, these groups (often limited to a few 
individuals) have difficulty in establishing links with other existing 
arrangements, especially at the community level.” 
 
Rather than play a political role as social movements or checks on 
government, the new NGOs are treated as technical organisations 
implementing a specific policy or delivering a service. As a result, the 
use of the concepts of civil society and social capital by powerful actors 
in development is seen by some as part of an effort to ‘depoliticise’ 
development: social capital and civil society are seen to be “clever ideas 
which suit the interests of global capitalism [...] because they represent 
problems that are rooted in differences of power and in class relations as 
                                                 
6 Pishchikova adds that “[g]iven such failures to acknowledge home-grown theories and practices of 
civil society, most donors were initially driven by the assumption that civil society had to be built 
afresh and reserved for themselves the privilege of deciding what kind of civil society was to be 
built and how. Since NGOs were indeed non-existent, the success of civil society programs was, 
and still is, evaluated on the basis of quantitative growth of NGOs.” (Pishchikova 2006: 79) 
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purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the political arena” 
(Harriss 2001, 2-3). In this way, development has become an “anti-
politics machine” (Ferguson 1994). In line with this, Kaldor refers to 
NGOs as “tamed” social movements. Where social movements 
(especially prevalent in the 1980s and before) aim to transform society, 
NGOs, more institutional and professional than movements, began to 
proliferate increasingly from the 1980s onwards. (Kaldor 2003: 86) In 
sections 1.5.1, 1.5.4, and 4.4, I return to the debate about the 
depoliticisation of civil society in development, discussing what it 
means for the organisations and issues under study.   
 
Kaldor (2003: 90-92) identifies several ways of distinguishing among 
NGOs: 
• Northern versus Southern NGOs. Many Northern NGOs 
(NNGOs) are set up to assist people in the South. In achieving 
their objectives they often work together with Southern NGOs 
(SNGOs). The latter are often seen as small, informal 
‘grassroots’ or ‘community-based’ organisations, but some 
SNGOs are actually very large and many are based in large 
cities. To further complicate the picture, NNGOs that operate 
internationally often have offices in Southern countries, largely 
staffed by local employees.   
• Advocacy versus service provision. Service provision includes 
emergency relief, health care, non-formal education, legal 
services, the provision of micro-credit, and in the field of 
peacebuilding, activities like the organisation of dialogues, 
trauma counselling and the training of community mediators. 
Advocacy includes lobbying and the organisation of public 
campaigns to draw attention to an issue or group that needs 
assistance.  
• Organisational forms. NGOs’ forms of organisation differ 
widely. Some NGOs are membership organisations, while 
others are governed by boards. In addition, the meaning of 
membership varies. In Amnesty International the members are 
the owners of the organisation and determine its decision-
making. By contrast, the members of organisations such as 
Greenpeace and War Child are supporters passively donating 
money.  
 
In this study the focus is on SNGOs in the field of peacebuilding that 
have various organisational forms and engage in both advocacy and 
service provision.  
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1.2 The context: war and peace in the 21st century 
 
1.2.1 Present day wars7  
 
War between states and their regular armies, as it was fought during the 
First and Second World War, has become rare. During the Cold War, 
wars largely took place within states, usually between government 
armies or government-supported militias on the one hand and rebel 
groups on the other. Often both sides were supported by one of the Cold 
War’s great powers. After the Cold War this trend of within-country 
warfare – but with international linkages – has continued.  
 
Rebels and governments are no longer able to turn to one of the Cold 
War superpowers for support, but to some extent the ‘War on Terror’ 
has replaced the old dichotomy. During the Cold War warring parties 
would clothe their grievances in either Marxist or anti-communist 
language in order to gain support. Similarly, current-day groups may 
gain international support either by adopting an Islamist cloth, as the 
Chechnyan independence fighters have done, or by branding one’s 
opponents as terrorists, as the Russian government does. The first 
strategy is likely to lead to an inflow of foreign mujahedin and of money 
from Islamic foundations. The second strategy may result in financial 
support from the United States, or at least it may silence American 
criticism of human rights violations.  
 
However, international linkages are by no means limited to ‘War on 
Terror’-related support by Islamic groups or the United States to a 
government or rebel force that is a party to a civil war. In many cases, 
civil wars have a regional dimension and conflicts in neighbouring 
countries are intimately tied to one another. In the African Great Lakes 
region, Hutu genocidaire groups from Rwanda play an important role in 
the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a war in which at least 
nine different countries have been involved at one point or another: 
Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, Libya, Sudan, Uganda 
and Rwanda. The current conflict in Darfur is spreading to Chad and the 
Central African Republic. And in West Africa, the erstwhile Liberian 
president Charles Taylor, an important figure in that country’s civil war, 
has recently been indicted by a Sierra Leonean special court for his 
active role in fuelling the civil war there, a war that can in some ways be 
seen as an expansion of the Liberian conflict.  
 
                                                 
7 This section draws on publications such as Kaldor (2000, 2006), Duffield (2001), Berdal and 
Malone (2001), Mair (2003), and Collier (2000, 2003, and 2006). 
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International diaspora groups add another external element to current-
day ‘internal’ conflicts. Diaspora communities often play an active role 
in conflicts back home, for example by financing conflict groups or 
lobbying Western governments to intervene. People who have left their 
country and have built up an existence abroad can afford to be radical as 
they do not have to live with opposing groups or with the consequences 
of conflict on a daily basis. Given the size of the remittances they send 
home, the ‘long-distance nationalism’ of diaspora groups can affect 
conflicts significantly. However, some try to counter this trend by 
organising dialogues among diasporas from opposing sides.  
 
Transnational criminal networks provide another international link to 
today’s predominantly internal wars. The smuggling of arms and drugs 
are profitable businesses in war areas. In addition, conflicts create 
instable and untransparent environments with little rule of law. Such 
circumstances are suitable for all sorts of illegal activities, such as for 
example the trade in ‘blood’ diamonds from Sierra Leone. Such 
economic endeavours create groups of people with an interest in 
continued instability and war. For some, illegal activity stops being a 
means to finance rebellion and becomes a profitable end in itself, with 
war the means to achieve it. As a result, distinguishing between greed 
and grievances (Collier 2000, 2003, 2006; Berdal and Malone 2001) and 
between rebels, warlords and criminals (Mair 2003) becomes 
increasingly difficult. Many groups combine elements of ‘justified’ rebel 
movements with characteristics of criminal gangs.  
 
The distinction between civilians and fighters has also decreased 
enormously in comparison to the ‘classic’ wars of the first half of the 
twentieth century. Indeed, the Holocaust started a trend in which the 
majority of war casualties nowadays are civilians. Common terror 
tactics, as seen today in Darfur, include rape, plunder, maiming and 
killing civilians, and burning down houses. The reasons behind these 
tactics are not always clear and lead to considerable speculation. An 
element of it seems to be to scare local people into submission to 
militias. These groups also use them to control their own members: for 
example, children abducted to become soldiers are forced to hurt their 
own communities to prevent them from trying to return. In any case, it is 
clear that the use of such tactics has dramatically increased the costs of 
conflict for ordinary people. Civilian deaths are estimated to make up 75 
per cent of all war casualties nowadays. (Barnes 2006: 18) 
 
Particularly in Africa, the phenomenon of ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states has 
contributed to conflicts. Africa’s history of the slave trade pitted African 
traders against victims of the trade. It was followed by colonisation 
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which drew artificial borders, used divide-and-rule tactics and appointed 
particular groups to rule over others. This led to governments that 
enjoyed little legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. After 
independence these governments were somewhat artificially propped up 
by the support of superpowers, but when this ended after the Cold War 
they weakened further. The governments’ lack of resources led to them 
becoming increasingly indebted to international financial institutions, 
which demanded particular conditions in return. One of these conditions, 
privatisation and the related shrinking of state expenditures, further 
weakened Southern governments, which became increasingly unable to 
regulate and control their societies and prevent conflicts.   
 
Southern, and particularly African, governments continue to be weak. In 
situations of weak governance and resulting low security, people fall 
back on small groups for their sense of security and belonging. Kinship, 
tribe and ethnicity become important organising factors. In addition, 
weak governments tend to employ patronage strategies to remain in 
power. In this way, culture ties in with responses to state weakness to 
create tit-for-tat style governance systems. Democracy in these countries 
mainly entails voting for one’s patron or ethnic kinsman in return for 
profitable positions and favours. What Western observers may consider 
corruption is really a functioning mode of governance. However, it 
means that controlling the government becomes a way to extract 
resources from supporters. Problematically, a rule of law tends to be 
absent. The close interrelation between political power and material 
wealth raises the stakes in the political game. It makes such power 
something to fight for. 
 
 
1.2.2 Conflict, peace and development 
 
Conflict, peace and development are very much connected. The 
developing world has faced a wave of violent conflicts during the last 
two decades. Civil wars have thwarted development efforts in which 
vast amounts of human energy and money had been invested. The main 
feature of countries in the wake of armed conflict is the very real danger 
of a resumption of the fighting. The best predictor of future conflict is 
past conflict: in 44 per cent of all post-conflict situations, war starts 
again in the first five years after the violence has stopped (World Bank 
2004: 8), and about 50 percent of post-conflict countries revert back to 
war in the first decade of ‘peace’. (World Bank 2003: 7) With every 
violent conflict, a society loses part of its capacity to handle future 
conflicts in a peaceful way (Miall 2001: 15), endangering future 
development efforts as well as present ones. 
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Organisations involved in peacebuilding therefore argue for a shift in 
emphasis (and financial means) from development projects to peace 
building and conflict prevention, since a relatively small effort that 
would help to avoid violent conflict could save large investments in 
development and prevent enormous expenditures for peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, and the alleviation of dramatic humanitarian problems 
that result from large scale violent conflict. The realisation, made public 
by Mary Anderson in her book Do No Harm (1999), that emergency 
help and long-term development programmes can unintentionally 
contribute to conflict has stimulated the notion that development efforts 
should consciously take into account the conflict factor. (Boyce 1996, 
Ball 1996, Carbonnier 1998, Addison 2003, Moore 2000, Junne and 
Verkoren 2004) 
 
At the same time, it is argued that peace needs development just as 
much as development needs peace, as rising living standards and 
employment opportunities, as a result of economic development, are 
considered to be effective conflict preventors. The fact that most warfare 
takes place in the developing world is considered proof of that idea. 
(World Bank 2003: ix) More and more analysts consider the degree of 
economic and social development that is achieved, and the fair 
distribution of its fruits over different groups of the population, to be 
crucial determinants of whether the shooting and looting starts again. 
The World Bank notes that “countries affected by conflict face a two-
way relationship between conflict and poverty – pervasive poverty 
makes societies more vulnerable to violent conflict, while conflict itself 
creates more poverty.” (World Bank 2004: 14) Indeed, economic 
development gives different groups something to work on together. 
Orientation may change from looking at the past toward focusing on the 
future. An interesting job is not only an alternative to fighting, but could 
also give rise to new professional identity. If people see another 
perspective than continuous fighting, they may be more resistant to 
renewed manifest conflict. There will be fewer fighters to pick up their 
arms, and there will be stronger efforts to stop those who do.  
 
This line of reasoning does not hold true in all cases: sometimes, some 
economic ‘development’ can be the precondition for the resumption of 
fighting. If the decline of military activity was mainly due to the 
exhaustion of the conflicting parties and a lack of means to continue, 
then ‘development’ may take these constraints away, and with a ‘culture 
of conflict’ unabated, violent conflict may resume. Therefore, it is not 
just economic growth which is important, but a specific economic 
development which addresses the grievances of different groups, allows 
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compromise between contending factions, and offers sufficiently 
attractive alternatives to the main opponents.  
 
However, this is more easily said than done. The number of developing 
countries that have recently been the scene of civil strife is such that 
post-conflict development has become the norm rather than the 
exception. Moreover, the pursuance of traditional development 
strategies may have contributed to the increase of violent conflicts rather 
than preventing it (Anderson 1999). With a large share in state income 
in the poorest countries, development aid given to governments may 
incite opposition groups to fight for their share of the cake. Moreover, 
‘structural adjustment’ programmes have been criticised for reducing the 
capacity of states to respond to the needs of their population, increasing 
general dissatisfaction with the government and intensifying the struggle 
for the remaining sources of income. (Rapley 2004) 
 
 
1.2.3 Conflict and peace in West Africa and Southeast Asia 
 
This study concentrates on (post)conflict areas in West Africa and 
Southeast Asia. More specifically, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and 
the Philippines are the focus areas of the study. This section briefly 
describes the conflicts in these countries in order to illustrate the current-
day wars introduced above and sketch the context in which to place the 
findings presented in subsequent chapters.  
 
Liberia8  
In 1989, the relatively peaceful state of the West African region (not 
counting numerous coups d’état) ended with the outbreak of civil war in 
Liberia. In that year, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led 
by Charles Taylor entered Liberia from Ivory Coast to fight the 
dictatorship of Samuel Doe whose Krahn tribe had begun attacking 
other tribes. After Taylor had invaded Nimba County the Liberian Army 
retaliated against the whole population of that region, attacking unarmed 
civilians and burning villages. Many left as refugees for Guinea and 
Ivory Coast. Soon after, Taylor’s army split when his ally Prince 
Johnson formed his own militia, based on the Gio tribe. Taylor's NPFL 
soon controlled much of the country, while Johnson took most of the 
                                                 
8 This section is based largely on Richards 2005, Adebajo 2002, www.wikipedia.org (accessed on 1 
December 2006), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=64  
(International Crisis Group country page Liberia; accessed on 20 December 2006), and 
conversations with people in and outside Liberia. 
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capital, Monrovia, and killed president Doe. The war continued among 
all groups as both Taylor and Johnson claimed power.  
 
A peacekeeping force of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), called the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), intervened and negotiated a 
treaty between the NPFL, Johnson, and Doe’s remaining supporters. A 
coalition government was formed in August 1993, but instability 
continued. In April 1996 particularly destructive fighting flared up in 
Monrovia. Many international NGOs left and parts of the city were 
destroyed. In a new accord the parties agreed to demobilise their fighters 
and organise elections in 1997. These were won by Charles Taylor, who 
went from warlord to president.  
 
Low-intensity warfare continued, however, escalating around the turn of 
the century with the formation of new anti-Taylor groups, supported by 
the government of neighbouring Guinea. By the summer of 2003, 
Charles Taylor's government controlled only a third of the country. 
Monrovia was besieged by the rebel group Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), whose shelling of the city 
resulted in the deaths of many civilians. Thousands of people fled. 
 
The United States, historically tied to Liberia, sent a small number of 
troops to defend its embassy in Monrovia, which had come under attack. 
The United States (US) also stationed a Marine unit offshore, while 
Nigeria sent in peacekeepers as part of another ECOMOG force. 
President Taylor resigned in August 2003 as part of a peace agreement 
and went into exile in Nigeria. A transitional government was installed 
until technocrat Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected the new president in 
early 2006. Sirleaf’s immediate steps to fight corruption fill many 
Liberians with hope, although she still faces the power blocs of warlords 
in parliament and local government.  
 
Sierra Leone9 
Just a few years after it had begun, the Liberian war expanded into 
neighbouring, diamond-rich Sierra Leone with the rise of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) supported by Charles Taylor. Since 
its independence from the United Kingdom Sierra Leonean history had 
been characterised by authoritarian rule and a series of military coups. 
                                                 
9 This section is based largely on Reno 2003, Keen 2003, Richards 2005, Adebajo 2002, 
www.wikipedia.org (accessed on 1 December 2006), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=96  
(International Crisis Group country page Sierra Leone; accessed 20 December 2006), and 
conversations with people in and outside Sierra Leone. 
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From 1985 onwards, the dictator had been Joseph Momoh, who 
increasingly abused his power. In 1991, the RUF began to attack 
villages in Eastern Sierra Leone on the Liberian border. Soon it gained 
control of the diamond mines in the Kono district and began pushing the 
Sierra Leone army towards the capital Freetown. In 1992, a group of 
young military officers launched a military coup that sent Momoh into 
exile.  
 
However, the new military government was not able to effectively 
counter the RUF. By 1995 the rebels held much of the countryside and 
approached Freetown. In response, the government hired several 
hundred mercenaries from the South African private firm Executive 
Outcomes, who drove RUF fighters back to Sierra Leone’s borders. 
Elections were held in 1996, but the winner, UN diplomat Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah, was overthrown a year later by a group of militaries that 
formed a junta jointly with the RUF. Another year later, ECOMOG 
intervened to reinstate Kabbah, and the RUF resumed its military 
resistance.  
 
In January 1999 there was severe fighting in Freetown, leaving 
thousands dead and wounded. ECOMOG forces drove back the RUF 
attack several weeks later. Later that year, president Kabbah and RUF 
leader Foday Sankoh negotiated a peace accord. The accord made 
Sankoh vice-President and gave other RUF members positions in the 
government. In addition it called for a UN peacekeeping force, which 
was deployed soon after. Almost immediately, however, the RUF began 
to violate the agreement, most notably by holding hundreds of UN 
personnel hostage in 2000. Soon, Sankoh and other senior members of 
the RUF were fired from their government positions and arrested. 
However, violence continued and even escalated to such an extent that 
British troops were deployed in May 2000. They succeeded in 
stabilising the situation and enforced a lasting ceasefire. 
 
Since 2001, the process of demobilisation and disarmament of fighters 
has gathered momentum, although their reintegration into communities 
still presents difficulties. In 2002 president Kabbah and his party won 
the presidential and legislative elections. The RUF political wing failed 
to win a single seat in parliament. In the same year, the UN mission 
began a gradual reduction of its presence and completed the withdrawal 
of all troops on January 1st, 2006. A Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and a Special Court for Sierra Leone have been established 
to deal with the perpetrators and victims of atrocities committed during 
the war.  RUF-leader Foday Sankoh was indicted but he died in prison 
from a heart attack before he could be tried. In addition, the Special 
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Court indicted former Liberian president Charles Taylor for his role in 
fuelling the Sierra Leonean war. It was agreed that he would be tried not 
in Freetown but in The Hague, where he is currently imprisoned.  
 
Even though intra-state conflicts began relatively late in West Africa 
compared to other parts of the continent, they were extremely brutal. 
There was widespread use of child soldiers. Rape and cutting off limbs 
were common actions in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars. In Sierra 
Leone the illicit trade in diamonds turned from a means to finance 
rebellion to an end in itself. There the distinction between government 
soldiers and rebels was increasingly difficult to make. With the 
government unable to pay its soldiers’ salaries, many turned to looting 
and illicit diamond mining as a means of survival. Fighters variously 
joined whichever group provided the most profits. Some turned into 
sobels: soldiers during the day, rebels at night (Reno 2003: 58; Keen 
2003: 81-86; Adebajo 2002: 79-110). 
 
Political power play and the greed of leaders triggered the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean conflict, but the root causes are also found at the level of 
the individuals joining the war effort. These were mainly marginalised 
and discontented youth, who had little opportunities in life because of 
exploitative and corrupt political and economic structures. There were 
increasing land shortages due to increased diamond mining, soil erosion, 
and population growth, and there was (and is) high unemployment. 
Disputes with local chiefs over the allocation of land and NGO funds 
also played a role. Richards (2005) reports that many young men in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone expressed grievances about chiefs’ use of local 
systems of land tenure and marriage payments as instruments of 
exploitation. Chiefs impose heavy fines on youth for minor or fabricated 
offences, and make them do hard labour for years in an almost slave-like 
fashion in order to pay these fines. In other cases, young men are forced 
to marry (as punishment for being seen with a girl or as a way to obtain 
land) but cannot afford the dowry, which forces them to work for their 
wives’ families. 
 
The Philippines10  
Mindanao, the Southernmost part of the Philippines, has been a conflict 
region for decades - or even centuries. The most high-profile conflict in 
Mindanao revolves around the “Bangsamoro issue”. The Bangsamoro, 
or Moro, people are Muslims who either came from Malaysia or were 
                                                 
10 This section is largely based on Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005, Stankovitch 1999, 
www.wikipedia.org (accessed on 1 December 2006), and conversations with people in and outside 
The Philippines. 
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influenced by Malaysian traders in the thirteenth century. The Spanish 
colonisers in later centuries did not manage to penetrate Mindanao as 
much as they did the rest of the Philippines, and the Moro people - as 
well as other indigenous groups, generally termed Lumad - were able to 
retain their religion and culture.  
 
In the nineteenth century however, the central Philippine government in 
Manila began a policy of sending settlers from other parts of the country 
to live in Mindanao. These predominantly Christian ‘settlers’ (they are 
still called this by Moro and Lumad even though most of them have 
lived in Mindanao for generations) acquired positions of power over the 
other Mindanawan groups, sowing the seeds for violent rebellion and 
conflict. An important issue in the conflict is that of the ‘ancestral 
domains’: Moro groups demand control over the territory that used to 
belong to their ancestors. They aim at a Bangsamoro homeland, 
sufficient control over economic resources in their ancestral territory, 
and a structure of governance that will allow Moros to govern 
themselves in ways that they consider to be consonant with their culture. 
The difficulty, however, is that these ‘ancestral domains’ now include 
significant non-Moro groups (Christian Filipinos) who do not want to be 
governed under Bangsamoro autonomy. In 1990, the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao was created, but in a referendum provinces 
with majority or large non-Moro populations voted to stay out of this 
region and as a result only a few provinces are currently included.  
 
After the Philippine government concluded a peace agreement with the 
Mindanao National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996, another rebel 
movement, the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which seeks 
to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao, became active. 
Presently, peace negotiations with the MILF are ongoing. Abu Sayyaf is 
the smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups in 
Mindanao11. The group appears to enjoy little popular support in the 
area. Another armed conflict in Mindanao, as well as in other parts of 
the Philippines, is that between the government and the communist 
National Democratic Front (NDF). In Mindanao this conflict is 
concentrated in the Northern part of the island. The NDF, which has 
fought for social justice for many decades, is also negotiating with the 
government.  
 
The Philippine government has established a Presidential Office for the 
Peace Process, which engages with the rebel groups and with civil 
society groups from Mindanao to try and find a lasting solution to the 
                                                 
11 It has appeared in the Western media because of kidnappings of Western nationals. 
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conflicts. At the same time, however, government forces continue to 
clash frequently with rebels in Mindanao.  
 
Cambodia12 
Cambodia is usually considered to be a post-conflict country in the sense 
that large-scale armed conflict ended in the mid-to late-1990s with the 
demise of the Khmer Rouge, who had brutally ruled the country in 
1975-1979 until they were ousted from power by a Vietnamese invasion. 
The conflict dates back to at least 1970, when a military coup was 
staged and the Khmer Rouge began their uprising in the context of the 
wider Indochina war and heavy American bombings of the Cambodian 
countryside believed to harbour Viet Cong fighters. The bombings and 
civil war in the period between 1970 and 1975 took up to a million lives.  
 
Despite American support for the military government, the Khmer 
Rouge, supported by China, won the civil war in 1975 and established a 
revolutionary government that aimed to establish a rural utopia. The 
regime cleared out the cities and sent the entire population into rural 
communities where they were forced to do heavy agricultural work to 
meet increasingly unrealistic production targets while being underfed. 
Hundreds of thousands died from these conditions, while others were 
murdered because they were considered urban intellectuals or potential 
traitors from the Khmer Rouge’s own ranks. The total number of 
casualties of the Khmer Rouge period is estimated at between one and 
two million people.  
 
Towards the end of its rule the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, increasingly 
paranoid, began attacking neighbouring Vietnam, which finally 
retaliated with an invasion that ended Khmer Rouge rule and established 
a puppet government that essentially lasted until 1991. The Khmer 
Rouge, meanwhile, had retreated to the jungle area bordering Thailand 
where they regrouped and formed an alliance with other anti-
government groups. The coalition was supported by China and the 
United States, which was ready to side with any group in order to 
counter Vietnam and its backer, the Soviet Union. Illicit trading of 
timber across the Thai border further helped finance the Khmer Rouge’s 
continued resistance.  
 
Only after the end of the Cold War did the Great Powers support peace 
negotiations, which led to an agreement in 1991. The agreement 
                                                 
12 This section is based on literature such as Vickery 1984, Shawcross 1985 and 2000, Chanda 
1986, Chandler 1991, Doyle 1995, Findlay 1995, Hendrickson 1998, Hughes 2002, and Verkoren 
2004, as well as various interviews and visits to Cambodia. 
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stipulated the disarmament and demobilisation of all groups, to be 
carried out by a UN mission. This mission, the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was a new phenomenon 
in international history as its mandate was broad and included many 
civil tasks, including the organisation of elections. The elections, held in 
1993, were considered to be a success, and the UN mission withdrew 
soon after. However, other aspects of the mission, most importantly the 
demobilisation process, had been less successful and this allowed for 
continued warfare after the elections. Moreover, a weak rule of law 
enabled the elected government to quickly descend into 
authoritarianism. In 1998 fighting came to an end. However, many 
challenges remain, including poverty, corruption, weak legal and 
regulatory institutions, a lack of democracy, and traumas and distrust 
that are remnants of the conflict. The risk of renewed revolution and 
conflict in Cambodia is prevalent and may even be growing stronger 
given increasing inequality between rich and poor and city and 
countryside, issues which played an important role in causing the Khmer 
Rouge revolution in the 1970s.  
 
After many years of negotiations between the Cambodian government 
and the UN, a mixed international-Cambodian tribunal began operating 
in 2006 to try the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders for their role in the 
1975-1979 genocide. However, questions are raised about the political 
independence of the tribunal, which contains a majority of Cambodian 
judges, many of whom have close ties to the government. 
 
The conflicts compared 
Summarising some of the main characteristics of the conflicts described, 
the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts are very much intertwined, while 
the Cambodia and Mindanao conflicts are not only separate but very 
different in nature. Ethnicity and religion play a significant role in 
Mindanao but not in Cambodia; in West Africa ethnic tensions are part 
of the conflict but do not emerge as chief causes. Poverty, exploitation 
and marginalisation of groups – whether a specific ethnic group such as 
in Mindanao, marginalised youth in general in West Africa, or the rural 
population in Cambodia – are important factors in all the conflicts. State 
weakness and corruption play a role as well, particularly in Cambodia 
and West Africa.  
 
In all four countries these factors have not yet been addressed to the 
extent that the risk of renewed fighting has faded. In Mindanao peace 
negotiations are ongoing. In the other countries peace agreements have 
already been reached and demobilisation efforts have been undertaken 
with varying degrees of success. Those who have been demobilised still 
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face poverty and high unemployment, making it difficult for them to 
reintegrate into society. The conclusion of a peace agreement in 
Mindanao is likely to lead to a flow of money for reconstruction and 
peacebuilding, as it did in Cambodia and the West African countries. 
The difficulty, however, is that at such an early stage local and national 
institutions have little capacity to spend these funds in a meaningful 
way. As such capacity develops, as it may slowly be doing now in 
Liberia, the availability of funds decreases as donors move to other 
crisis areas. 
 
The most positive atmosphere was encountered in Liberia, which I 
visited soon after the elections that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to 
power. Although she faces difficult structural constraints, her energetic 
tackling of corruption has given many people hope. In Sierra Leone, by 
contrast, the political situation has stagnated and it is hoped that the 
2007 elections may bring change to this situation. Cambodia’s political 
situation has not changed much over the past years; although there are 
regular elections, major issues such as the intimidation of opponents and 
the government’s hold over the judicial system remain.  
 
Both Cambodia and Sierra Leone currently witness tribunals that try the 
chief human rights violators of the conflicts in those countries. One 
challenge for civil society is to relate to these tribunals and help 
disseminate information about them in order to raise awareness about 
the significance of the trials. Like Liberia, Sierra Leone has also 
established a truth and reconciliation commission to deal with lower 
cadres that were often victims and perpetrators at the same time and to 
bring out the truth about what happened. Here too, civil society has a 
role to play – in gathering information, making suggestions for the best 
approach, and raising awareness among the population. 
 
 
1.3 Peacebuilding 
 
In this book I use the term peacebuilding as short-hand for a broad field 
of intervention activity by NGOs, states, and international organisations. 
Other terms used to describe the field include ‘conflict transformation’ 
and ‘violence prevention’.  Peacebuilding includes what is called 
peacemaking (negotiation to reach a settlement between warring parties 
or military action to enforce peace) and peacekeeping (military missions 
that keep warring parties apart) but goes beyond those interventions as it 
strives for lasting solutions that address the underlying causes of a 
conflict. Similarly, conflict transformation is an activity that goes 
beyond conflict management (regulation, mitigation, or containment of 
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violent conflict) and conflict resolution (mediation or negotiation to 
reach a mutually acceptable settlement) to include structural issues such 
as the inequalities between parties and the role of external players.  
 
Conflict transformation aims not only at a settlement that ends the 
violence but at a ‘just’ or ‘positive’ and thereby sustainable peace. 
Conflict transformation does not see conflict as a negative thing. On the 
contrary, conflict is the source of change and progress. Even if this were 
desirable, it is impossible to end or prevent conflict because conflict is 
omni-present. Instead, the aim of conflict transformation is to reduce the 
negative, harmful expressions of conflict – violence – and enable people 
to conflict constructively and peacefully – as happens, for example, in a 
democracy in which all interests ideally have equal representation.    
  
Peacebuilding is synonymous to conflict prevention, or more accurately, 
violence prevention, in that it aims to prevent violence either from 
beginning in the first place or from resurging after it has ended. The 
latter is a serious risk given that half of all civil wars take place in post-
conflict situations and forty per cent of post-conflict countries fall back 
into civil war within a decade (Collier 2006). Peacebuilding includes 
activities at various levels of society, or ‘tracks’. ‘Track One’ 
interventions aim at the leaders of the warring parties. Track One 
activities may include state diplomacy or high-level mediation to 
prevent or end warfare. Track One is largely the realm of states and 
international organisations, but NGOs are sometimes also involved. For 
example, the Carter Center of former US president Jimmy Carter has 
been involved in mediation activities at a high level in various parts of 
the world. Recently, the Dutch branch of the NGO Pax Christi became 
closely involved in peace negotiations in Northern Uganda. As the NGO 
had long worked in the area and had built up relations of trust with the 
various sides it was invited to play a mediatory role (Te Velde 2006). 
After a settlement has been reached, Track One peacebuilding focuses 
on building institutions and structures that strengthen the government 
and make it accountable to its citizens. Strengthening government 
legitimacy and building up the judicial system, army, and police forces 
are all generally considered elements of a long-term peacebuilding 
strategy.  
 
Too often, high-level peace agreements have failed to be implemented 
because they lacked societal support and failed to address deep-seated 
grievances and issues. Therefore, ‘Track Two’ initiatives aim at drawing 
important societal figures into a peace process in the hopes of giving it a 
broader base. Track Two peacebuilding involves high-profile, influential 
societal figures in a conflict region, such as leaders of political parties, 
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journalists, interest groups, local government leaders, or religious 
organisations. It may include consultations, workshops and dialogues in 
which representatives of different sides in a conflict are involved. In 
addition, Track Two strategies involve institutional development of local 
NGOs, media, and other potential checks and balances. NGOs often 
work at this level, sometimes in cooperation with international 
organisations like the UN. (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 26) 
 
‘Track Three’ peacebuilding, finally, focuses on ‘ordinary people’: the 
communities at the ‘grassroots’. It focuses on the causes and 
consequences of conflict at the level of the individual citizen. These 
causes and consequences (often difficult to separate from one another) 
may include inter-communal hatred, discrimination, unequal 
opportunities, poverty, and trauma. Track Three interventions are 
usually carried out by NGOs, sometimes in conjunction with local or 
national government. These interventions are varied and many, and 
include development work, peace education, the training of community 
mediators, the organisation of dialogues, strategies to reduce the 
availability of small arms, the reintegration of former (child) combatants 
and of refugees, and psycho-social work. The NGOs that are part of this 
study carry out activities in all tracks, but mainly tracks two and, 
particularly, three. We will now look in some more detail at the kinds of 
work they engage in. 
 
 
1.4 NGOs and peacebuilding 
 
Many people are familiar with the role played in peacebuilding by 
institutions like the United Nations, regional organisations, and 
individual governments. The role of NGOs is much less known. This 
section sheds some light on the range of activities undertaken by NGOs 
in the field of peacebuilding. As little was been written in the literature 
about this, the section uses findings from my field research as well as 
literature on the subject.  
 
 
1.4.1 Positioning peace work in relation to other NGO activities 
 
One may wonder to what extent peace and conflict NGOs are different 
from others working in developing countries. In many respects they are 
similar: they tend to be part of the same policy chain that stretches from 
policymakers in Northern governments and international organisations 
such as the World Bank and the UN via international NGOs to local 
partner NGOs in developing countries. Being part of this chain has 
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various major consequences for the activities and knowledge of SNGOs. 
This is the case for development NGOs as well as for peace 
organisations – at least for those peacebuilding organisations that are 
financed from development cooperation budgets, as the majority of 
NGOs studied are. Northern – or international – NGOs receive funds 
from national development cooperation budgets and spend these via 
their partner NGOs in the South. In this way they finance ‘regular’ 
development work such as infrastructure and health care development, 
but they also have peace and security departments that support 
peacebuilding work through, or together with, the local NGOs studied in 
this book. In this sense, peacebuilding is part of the wider field of 
development and the chain of relationships (and knowledge flows) is 
similar.  
 
There are also differences. First of all, not all peace work is organised 
and financed through the development chain. Some 
Northern/international peace organisations, such as the recently merged 
Dutch organisation Interchurch Peace Council – Pax Christi Netherlands 
(IKV-Pax Christi), have a church background. They receive only part of 
their funding from official development budgets, being financed also 
through the churches that founded them. This gives these organisations 
more independence vis-à-vis official policy. Another difference, 
emphasised particularly by ‘pure’ peace organisations and less so by 
development organisations that do peacebuilding only as part of their 
work, lies in the nature of partnerships. The chain model with its 
emphasis on transferring responsibilities to Southern partners with the 
aim of creating their capacity to function independently from Northern 
aid, does not always work in peacebuilding. In that field, external 
partners sometimes continue to be necessary, whether as neutral 
interveners in conflict and negotiation processes or as channels to help 
bring locals’ issues to the attention of international public opinion and 
policymakers in the North. (Barakat et al. 2006) That said, for nearly all 
of the organisations visited the chain is very much a reality and it shapes 
their functioning and knowledge processes.  
 
Another difference between peace work and other development 
activities relates to the nature of the outcomes of such work. Peace is an 
elusive concept that is difficult to measure. Understandably, agencies 
funding the work of local NGOs ask them to show concrete results of 
their projects. But the results of peacebuilding are hard to pin down. 
They are part of a long-term process and often cannot be captured after a 
short project cycle. Peacebuilding is a process rather than a set of 
deliverables. This is different for at least some other development 
activities; the outcome of building wells for example is easily measured. 
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Peace projects can often give numerical information about the number 
of people trained or the number of meetings organised, but have 
difficulty showing the impact of these activities. This has led to many 
discussions and organisations struggle to find ways of measuring results 
while leaving space for open-ended and flexible processes. We will 
return to this in chapter five. 
 
 
1.4.2 Lasting peace as the ultimate aim 
 
The ultimate aim of the peacebuilding activities of NGOs is twofold: 
first, to end violence and destructive conflicts, and second, to build just 
and sustainable peace. The first is a more immediate goal that ends 
direct violence while clearing the ground for the more long-term and 
difficult task of creating the structures and circumstances for a lasting 
peace. Such a lasting peace is usually considered to require some form 
of social justice and legal, political, social and economic equality 
between groups and individuals. In many cases, a strengthened rule of 
law, democratic institutions, free media and a strong civil society are 
seen to be part of that. These elements enable conflict to be managed 
peacefully rather than through violent means. 
 
Many practitioners include these ultimate aims in their visions and 
mission statements. When it comes to their concrete programmes, the 
goals of NGOs are more specific: “to change people’s view of the other 
side by bringing them together in a dialogue”, “to reduce the likelihood 
that these people will be killed”, or “to educate children about how to 
resolve conflicts without violence”. However, the connection between 
such specific programme goals and the ultimate aims of ending violence 
and building peace is usually left implicit and is not systematically 
thought through. (Anderson and Olsen 2003: 11-12) Most practitioners 
agree that the ultimate aims cannot be met through any single 
programme or organisation and require actions by various players. But 
few people have integrated visions about how the pieces of the puzzle fit 
together and about how their own activities relate to the broader effort of 
peacebuilding.  
 
This does not mean that NGOs should pretend they are able to build 
sustainable peace on their own. What they can do is think more 
explicitly about what their role is and how it relates to the roles and 
activities of others – other NGOs but also governments, military actors, 
and international organisations. Being more aware of one’s role in the 
bigger picture of peacebuilding not only implies more thorough 
reflection on the part of individual organisations, but also coordination 
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among actors in conflict and peacebuilding. The knowledge strategies 
described in Parts Two and Three strive to achieve both. 
 
 
1.4.3 The added value of NGOs in peacebuilding 
 
For peace to be sustainable, peacebuilding cannot only be a top-down 
process. ‘Track two’ and ‘track three’ strategies are needed as well. 
NGOs are well placed to engage at these levels. Compared with 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies, they are closer to the 
communities in which peace ultimately needs to take root and can 
enable ordinary people to articulate their needs and make their voices 
heard. Civilians – individual citizens, families and communities – have 
increasingly found themselves directly affected by the intra-state wars of 
recent times and the targeting of civilians by armed parties has increased 
the cost of conflict for ordinary people. In conflicts such as those in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and the Southern Philippines, 
“violence often penetrates through the social fabric, involving a large 
array of armed actors”. (McKeon 2005: 567) As we saw, in current day 
wars high-level political dynamics combine with grassroots-level 
grievances and animosities to create “a complex tapestry of 
interconnected and self-sustaining conflict dynamics at the community 
level” (ibidem). As a result, ordinary people, living alongside the armed 
actors and greatly affected by them, have both an interest and a potential 
in contributing to the building of peace. Civil society organisations - at 
least in theory - consist of and represent these ordinary people and are 
therefore well placed to engage in peacebuilding. In the words of 
Goodhand (2006: 115):  
“they are mid-level actors with linkages upwards to political leadership 
and downwards to communities; they have the potential to play a 
bridging role between identity groups in contexts characterized by 
extreme horizontal inequalities; they have the ability to work across 
lines and gain access to communities living on the wrong side of a 
conflict; [and] they [..] can work in high-risk environments.”  
 
In addition, NGOs are often considered to be more “flexible, adaptive 
and innovative” than governmental and intergovernmental institutions 
(ibidem). Indeed, the study of local peace NGOs has shown that they are 
relatively unbureaucratic and decision-making structures are flat in that 
all staff members tend to have easy access to leaders and are consulted 
over policy. That said, the flexibility and innovativeness of NGOs are 
limited by two issues: the constraints created by their place in the 
international policy chain, which will be discussed extensively further 
on in this book, and, partly related, their often limited learning capacity. 
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In order to adapt to either changing circumstances or to increase 
effectiveness requires the capacity to study the circumstances as well as 
the effectiveness of one’s work, to reflect on the outcomes of such 
study, and to adapt activities as a result. This is what the concept of 
learning capacity refers to. In the next chapter and beyond, it is explored 
further. 
 
Moving on to other ways in which NGOs potentially add value to peace 
processes, another unique aspect relates to their own values:  
“[t]hey do not only seek to get things done, they embody a particular 
set of values or way of thinking about the world. Therefore, just as 
material resources interact with the political economy of conflict, 
NGOs’ values and ways of thinking interact with ideational and 
discursive aspects of war and peace. Individual peace entrepreneurs 
[…] play an important role in the diffusion of ideas and the generation 
of social energy that can transform social structures and social 
relations. […] An example of this […] is the use of the media to 
broadcast messages of peace and reconciliation and to counteract pro-
war propaganda.” (Goodhand 2006: 121-122) 
 
More generally, a strong civil society, of which local NGOs are a part, is 
an important element of “the capacity of societies to manage conflict 
peacefully” (Barnes 2006: 21). As discussed in section 1.1, people 
coming together in associations and organisations and taking part in the 
public sphere create what has been called “social capital” (Putnam 
1993): networks of interaction, mutual assistance and trust that give a 
sense of common identity and foster civic engagement and democracy. 
This is particularly important from a peacebuilding perspective.  
 
 
1.5 Activities of the NGOs visited 
 
This section aims to give an idea of the range of activities that local 
peace NGOs engage in. As there is hardly any literature available on 
this, the section draws on my own field research and is based mainly on 
the activities mentioned by NGOs visited as they described their own 
work. Table 3.5 in the methodology section (3.10) provides an overview 
of the activity areas in which NGOs consulted for this study engage. 
Most NGOs are active in more than one of the areas described. There 
are variations in the nature and work of peace NGOs in different parts of 
the world. However, it is quite striking how similar the range of 
activities is when compared between countries. This once more draws 
attention to the consequences of being part of the same funding chain. 
As will be discussed in Part Two of this book, funding agencies often 
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present a range of activities they are willing to support, and in many 
cases local NGOs have few options but to choose from such lists.  
 
However, the picture is a little more complex than that. In part it is a 
matter of the language used – local NGOs have become adept at using 
the ‘right’ terms in their project proposals, but this does not necessarily 
mean that their actual activities are the same. The extent to which these 
differ has been difficult to establish due to the nature of the research 
undertaken. NGO staff members interviewed tended to use the same 
‘international development language’ in our conversations, and although 
in some cases it was possible to move beyond that discourse, in most 
cases I was not able to observe their actual activities in the communities.  
 
 
1.5.1  Types of activities 
 
The NGOs visited focused on one or more of the following types of 
activities. 
 
Dialogue and reconciliation programmes are widespread among peace 
NGOs. Reconciliation includes a wide range of activities that include 
promoting reconciliation through support to Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions; initiating joint reconciliation rituals and symbolic acts; 
the use of art, sports and theatre to deal with traumas and animosities; 
and targeted reconstruction or economic development efforts that 
involve representatives from different groups. In addition many local 
organisations focus on bringing representatives of divided communities 
together for dialogue. At a higher political level, some NGOs facilitate 
unofficial negotiation channels among political leaders from different 
sides to a conflict. They also employ advocacy to apply pressure on 
parties to start a peace process. The Mindanao People’s Council, the 
grassroots NGO network that was also active in the establishment of 
peace zones, contributed to forging a ceasefire agreement through a 
large demonstration of mainly internally displaced people who formed a 
human chain on a highway.13 
 
Peace education programmes include creating awareness of the 
common ground between groups and training people in conflict analysis, 
peace skills, or non-violent activism. Such education takes place inside 
schools as well as in communities. In addition, supporting the 
development of “peace media” stations to foster objective reporting or to 
counter pro-war propaganda is an increasingly common activity. 
                                                 
13 Interview with staff member of Mindanawan NGO network. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
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Civilian mediation programmes train community members basic conflict 
resolution skills in order to mediate in conflicts that may arise in the 
community. Some of these programmes focus on influential community 
members, such as chiefs or elders, and train them as mediators. Others 
focus on women. Still other community mediation programmes focus on 
school children, who are trained to mediate within the schools. In some 
cases this is linked to peace education activities. “Our organisation has 
set up peace clubs in schools in response to an increase in violence in 
schools. The peace club members are trained to become mediators and 
animators. In the last training cycle of two years, 509 people were 
trained. They use drama, music, lectures, and workshops to promote 
peace in their schools.”14 To some extent, civilian mediators even fill the 
gap left by official court systems that are lacking or being developed. In 
some cases, mediators from different communities form committees that 
meet regularly to share experiences.15 
 
Peace zones and civilian peacekeeping are activities in which NGOs 
mobilise civilians to protect those vulnerable to violence. Peace zones, 
such as the ones created in Mindanao, are areas the warring parties 
promise not to attack. This is achieved through NGO pressure and 
negotiation. Peace zones create space for NGOs to start much-needed 
humanitarian, peacebuilding and development projects in order to start 
building sustainable peace. Civilian peacekeeping can entail the 
monitoring of a ceasefire by representatives of civil society or the 
accompaniment by volunteers of human rights activists or others in 
danger of attack.  
 
Box 1.1: The Pikit space for peace16 
 
The Pikit space for peace came into existence in response to the wish of local groups to 
start rebuilding communities in Mindanao, addressing the visible (socio-economic and 
physical rehabilitation) and invisible (restoring relationships) effects of the war. 
However, such activities proved impossible due to ongoing violence. In order to proceed 
with the rehabilitation the NGO Mindanao People’s Caucus asked the main active rebel 
group, the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Frond (MILF), and the army to treat the Pikit 
area as a space for peace. The parties agreed and peacebuilding programmes began to be 
implemented. After this success, the ‘space for peace’ concept expanded to seven other 
villages. The chairman of the MPC, who is also pastor of Pikit parish and who played an 
important role in this initiative, thinks the reason why the soldiers cooperated was that 
they were approached as human beings who are basically good, rather than as ‘bad 
guys’.  
                                                 
14 Interview with staff members of Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 
2006. 
15 Interview with staff members of Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
16 Interview with chairman of the Mindanao People’s Caucus. Marbel, Philippines, 16 May 2006. 
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Representing a particular group: Many NGOs work to increase the role 
of women or youth in peace processes and in society more generally. In 
West Africa in particular youth are of central importance because the 
large numbers of unemployed young men with little social opportunities 
present a huge conflict potential. In Cambodia as well, the population is 
very young and the opportunities of youth are an important agenda item. 
Indeed, in all four of the focus countries youth organisations are active 
in the peacebuilding field, as are women’s groups. Others work to 
empower an ethnic, religious or socially marginalised group whose 
emancipation is considered necessary for long-term peacebuilding. The 
Bangsamoro in Mindanao are an example of this; a number of NGOs in 
the region work for their empowerment which they see as an integral 
part of any strategy for sustainable peace. Partly in relation to this, it 
deserves mentioning here that many religious organisations such as 
churches and church umbrella organisations are active in the field of 
peacebuilding. In addition to activities such as those described 
elsewhere in this list, they focus on religion as a source of tolerance and 
inspiration and often organise inter-religious dialogues.  
 
Organisational development, training and networking: Larger, city-
based NGOs often work to support grassroots, community-based 
partners to strengthen and develop their organisations. This set of 
activities includes giving training, providing advice and helping 
organisations to find donors and to write funding proposals. Some 
NGOs engage in research to find out more about the needs and 
conditions of beneficiaries as well as possible methodologies for 
meeting these needs. A related set of activities is networking with other 
NGOs at home and abroad and with governments and regional and 
international organisations in order to extend the reach of an individual 
organisation, exchange knowledge, and undertake joint advocacy and 
other activities.  
 
Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) 
of former fighters is another set of activities in which NGOs participate. 
Usually the DDRR process is led by a United Nations mission or 
government and NGOs carry out supporting activities at the grassroots 
level. These activities often entail helping ex-combatants find alternative 
means of living to prevent them from picking up arms once again. To 
help former fighters find alternative employment, skills training (such as 
computer proficiency) and vocational education (for example in car 
garages or tailoring shops) are prominent NGO areas of work within the 
range of DDRR-related projects. In some cases reintegration activities 
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are combined with rehabilitation and development work. An example is 
a farming project in Liberia’s Nimba province.  
“Farmers who fled during the war work together in teams to clear the 
land that has become overgrown, plant, and harvest. Over fifty per cent 
of the farmers and their family members involved are former 
combatants. Some youngsters have been disarmed but because of their 
remote location, difficult to reach during the rainy season, they did not 
benefit from national rehabilitation programmes. These kids are easily 
recruited to fight in neighbouring Ivory Coast. Our organisation tries 
to prevent this by involving these kids in programmes such as the 
farming one.”17 
 
Early warning for early response has recently been getting increasing 
attention in recognition of the fact that preventing violence is better than 
responding to it. Civil society organisations are often socialised into the 
areas in which they work and have access to information about rising 
tensions and impending events. The problem lies often in getting those 
who can act on such warning signs to do so, highlighting again the 
importance of linking up with other actors as well as the difficulty of 
doing so. 
 
Addressing broader structural issues of democracy, human rights and 
development is another broad area of activity of NGOs. Organisations 
strive to contribute to the strengthening of democracy at local and 
national levels. They do so, for example, by lobbying and advocating for 
increased transparency and accountability and by organising training 
sessions for parliamentarians and government employees. A related set 
of activities concerns human rights advocacy, which includes gathering 
information on abuses and making this available to various channels and 
institutions. Lobby and advocacy is also done in other areas, for example 
to draw attention to issues affecting the peace or the plight of a 
particular group. Many NGOs consider lobby and advocacy necessary 
activities that complement community work in order to address the 
larger political framework in which civil society’s peacebuilding work 
takes place. Local and national governments, governments in the North, 
and regional and international organisations are addressed in order to put 
issues on their agenda. In addition, ‘regular’ development work is 
sometimes carried out by peace organisations based on the recognition 
that sustainable peace requires socio-economic progress and an 
equitable division of wealth. The reverse is also true (development 
requires peace) and therefore development organisations increasingly 
have peacebuilding divisions.  
                                                 
17 Interview with staff members of Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 
2006. 
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1.5.2  The countries compared 
 
Before making an attempt to further categorise the various activities and 
find out whether there are important gaps in the practices of NGOs as 
they work towards their ultimate goals of ending violence and building 
peace, I will first take a quick look at the character and activities of 
NGOs in West Africa and Southeast Asia in order to show the extent to 
which variations exist among countries within the relatively similar 
range of activities described above.  
 
The Philippines 
The Philippines, including Mindanao, are characterised by a strong and 
vibrant civil society. The country’s activist tradition goes back to the 
opposition movement during President Marcos’ dictatorship in the 
1970s. NGOs there tend to be rather political - both in terms of their 
activist focus and of their connections to political parties and groups. 
Many NGOs originated from a political party or rebel group or are still 
closely related to it, even though this is not always clear to the outside 
observer.  
 
Interestingly for this study, Philippine NGOs are also characterised by 
the fact that they have formed many networks; some even say too many. 
One interviewee in Mindanao sighed, “after each conference a network 
is created. This results in many names and abbreviations, but usually it 
is the same people who make up these networks. Often the new 
organisational forms only add to the workload. If the activities aimed at 
could as well be carried out within one or more of the organisations 
involved then there is no need to create a separate network or 
organisation.” However, most people see mostly advantages in the fact 
that the Philippine peacebuilding community is so well networked: 
people know one another and are familiar with each other’s activities, 
which stimulates cooperation and prevents duplication. There are also 
some notable networking successes. The Mindanao People’s Caucus 
(MPC) for example contributed to forging the ceasefire agreement 
between the MILF and the government through a huge demonstration of 
mainly internally displaced people who blocked the traffic on a 
highway. The MPC also initiated and carries out a civil ceasefire 
monitoring mission. As the MPC is a network of grassroots 
organisations it has been able to mobilise more people than an individual 
organisation could have done18.    
 
                                                 
18 See also Box 1.1. 
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Typically, the peacebuilding activities of Philippine NGOs and networks 
include advocacy, lobbying, building the capacity of grassroots 
organisations, promoting the emancipation of the Moro people, and 
monitoring ceasefires and peace zones. In addition, many NGOs engage 
in what are perhaps more conventional peacebuilding NGO activities, 
such as peace education and the organisation of community dialogues. 
 
Cambodia 
Civil society in Cambodia is significantly weaker than in the 
Philippines. NGOs often have low capacity and civil society as a whole 
is less organised and networked than in the Philippines. Language is 
more of an issue when dealing with international actors and materials, as 
NGO staff are much less fluent in English than their Philippine 
counterparts. The relative weakness of Cambodian civil society is a 
consequence of its very different history. Civil society was non-existent 
during the Khmer Rouge years, operated under very difficult conditions 
in the succeeding Vietnamese period, and was only able to grow during 
and after the UN mission in 1991-1993, which it did exponentially. Not 
all NGOs that were founded during that period had good intentions 
beyond profiting from the fact that many funds had suddenly become 
available, and those that did did not necessarily have the capacity to 
work effectively. Although this is difficult to know for certain, it also 
seems that Cambodian NGOs are generally more externally driven and 
less rooted in local communities than Philippine ones. 
 
Cambodian peace NGOs tend to focus less on activism than Philippine 
ones, and more on building relations and establishing connections. Some 
Cambodian interviewees suggest that this is due in part to Buddhist 
culture which is deemed to be less confrontational. Cambodian 
peacebuilding NGOs engage mainly in peace education, community 
dialogues, capacity building of grassroots actors, advocacy and lobby. 
With varying success, they have also formed networks.   
 
Liberia and Sierra Leone 
NGO activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone are relatively similar. The 
general character of civil society can be compared to the Philippines in 
one way and to Cambodia in another. Like in the Philippines, the culture 
or style of NGOs is relatively direct and sometimes confrontational. On 
the other hand, like in Cambodia, the capacity of NGOs is low and they 
have few resources. The extent to which they represent, and are rooted 
in, local constituencies, may also be doubted at least for some of these 
organisations. As we will see in this study, Northern donors often set 
their priorities of practice.  
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The activities of West African NGOs represent the whole range 
presented above, with a particular emphasis on organising community 
dialogues, training mediators, facilitating the reintegration of former 
fighters, and promoting the role of youth in peacebuilding and in society 
more generally. The latter activity is related to the facts that the 
populations of Liberia and Sierra Leone are very young, that young 
people have few opportunities for social advancement, and that young 
people as a result have played a large part in the wars of the region.  
 
 
1.5.3 Categorising the activities  
 
It is not always clear how NGOs decide which activities to engage in. 
Sometimes they are inspired by the work of other organisations. Often 
they are stimulated by international partners to look at a particular area 
of work, or are trained to do so. In some cases an analysis of the needs 
of the community in which they want to work informs such a decision. 
For example, prior to the founding of the West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP), the founders toured the region talking to 
various members of civil society about the needs for peacebuilding. But 
this does not happen regularly. Often (would-be) NGOs simply decide to 
focus on what they are best placed to do given their skills, connections, 
and region of work.  
 
Most NGOs focus on more than one set of activities and run various 
projects at once. When they decide to prioritise one theme or project 
over another this seems often to be largely determined by factors outside 
their direct influence – in particular, the security situation in a particular 
region or the availability of funding for particular projects. 
Organisations regularly grow and shrink in size depending on whether a 
particular grant has been secured and staff can be hired temporarily to 
carry out a project. 
 
One way to categorise the various activities of NGOs is according to the 
diagram below, developed by Anderson and Olsen based on the 
outcomes of a three-year project called Reflecting on Peace Practice that 
involved over two hundred peace NGOs. The horizontal axis represents 
a difference in strategies ranging from activities aimed at involving as 
many people as possible to activities aimed at a limited number of key 
people. “More people” strategies want peacebuilding activities to be as 
broad-based as possible and to have people from all interest- and 
conflict groups take part in them. In cases where the risk of participating 
in peace activities is high, this may mean moving incrementally towards 
involving more and more individuals. In other cases “more people” 
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strategies might entail organising public campaigns or mass protests. 
Peace education and the training of community mediators fall into the 
“more people” category. “Key people” strategies by contrast aim at 
those people who are considered to be in positions in which they can 
make a difference, affecting the larger political or economic framework 
in which peacebuilding efforts take place. These may be people in 
government, powerful civic leaders, or representatives of international 
organisations. Lobbying is a “key people” strategy, as is negotiation to 
create peace zones or efforts to facilitate dialogue among leaders. 
(Anderson and Olsen 2003: 48-49) 
 
The vertical axis shows two other dimensions of peacebuilding work. 
Activities aimed at the individual or personal level strive to start 
building peace by changing people’s attitudes and perceptions. Peace 
education is a good example of this. Socio-political level strategies aim 
at systemic, institutional change at the level of society as a whole. 
Strategies to strengthen democracy and activities to further socio-
economic development both fit within this category. (Anderson and 
Olsen 2003: 48-49) If we start filling in the above-mentioned activities 
in the quadrants of the diagram, it might look as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Categorising NGOs’ activities in peacebuilding19 
 
Fitting their activities into such a figure may help NGOs to better 
understand how strategically they are placed. It can stimulate reflection 
on the relationship between activities and final aims. For example, if an 
NGO works mostly at the individual, key people level, how does it 
                                                 
19 adapted from Anderson and Olsen 2003: 48 
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expect this work to trickle down to the more people level - and who and 
what are needed to make that happen? Alternatively, when an 
organisation focuses its activities in several parts of the quadrant, do 
these different areas of work strengthen one another, and how? The next 
section shows most local peace NGOs have not explicitly done such 
thinking, but voice a need for more reflection on their place, role, 
strategy, and results.  
 
 
1.6 Discussions about the role of NGOs in peacebuilding 
 
This section touches upon the debates relating to the role and limits of 
NGOs in peacebuilding. Each will be further elaborated later on as it 
relates more explicitly to the subject matter of this study, and is 
therefore introduced only briefly here. I will start by discussing a 
number of limits and gaps in the practice of local peace NGOs. Next, I 
will mention discussions relating to the following issues: the reduced 
political role of NGOs, accountability and legitimacy, neutrality in 
conflict, and the possible contribution of NGOs to the weakening of 
states.  
 
 
1.6.1 Limits and gaps in the practice of peace NGOs 
 
It has become clear by now that although NGOs usually mean well and 
often are able to report local-level achievements such as numbers of 
community mediators trained, many organisations do not explicitly 
consider how their programmes and achievements contribute to progress 
towards the bigger picture: the ultimate aims of ending violence and 
building lasting peace or about how the projects of a single organisation 
complement those of other institutions (including, for example, state 
actors). As a result, some observers feel that “[a]ll of the good peace 
work being done should be adding up to more than it is. The potential of 
these multiple efforts is not fully realized. Practitioners know that, so 
long as people continue to suffer the consequences of unresolved 
conflicts, there is urgency for everyone to do better.” (Andersen and 
Olsen 2003: 10) One of the strategies for realising the joint potential of 
organisations is to have contact and relationships with others in order to 
think together about the division of labour. Many groups recognise this, 
which explains why networking is such a popular strategy among 
peacebuilders. However, as we will see further on in this book, 
networking in a context of conflict is not always easy, and people are 
still looking for the best ways to interact in a network.  
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Asked about the limits of NGO work and the gaps in their activities, 
staff members sometimes find it disheartening for them to realise that 
NGOs are only small players who can make only small differences. 
Civil society peacebuilders often wish they could do more, but they feel 
dwarfed by the actions of major political players within as well as 
outside the country in which they work. A Bangsamoro organisation in 
Mindanao might for years be working incrementally for the recognition 
of Moro rights when suddenly the ‘War on Terror’ takes off and they are 
branded as semi-terrorists. A Cambodian NGO could be advocating for 
the establishment of a fair trial for Khmer Rouge leaders that includes a 
truth and reconciliation component for lower cadres, until it finds out 
that the government has negotiated a compromise with the UN 
establishing a tribunal that does not meet these requirements.  
 
Another limitation of the peace work of NGOs relates to the difficult 
concept of effectiveness. Naturally, people like to know whether their 
interventions are having the intended effect; in other words, whether 
they contribute to overall peace. NGOs are also under pressure from 
donor agencies to show the impact (another difficult concept) of their 
work. The problem is that peace is difficult to measure. And even if 
progress towards peace can be discerned, then it is usually impossible to 
determine whether this was due entirely, or at least in part, to a 
particular intervention or whether other factors and activities have 
played a role. As will be elaborated further in chapter five, all peace 
NGOs struggle with these issues and are trying to find innovative ways 
to assess the contribution of their programmes to peace in the area in 
which they work.  
 
Two gaps in peacebuilding practice have been found the afore-
mentioned Reflecting on Peace Practice project. First of all, peace 
NGOs have a bias toward people that are easy to reach. For example, 
many programmes focus on women and children because these are 
deemed non-political and are often willing to cooperate. These groups 
are often non-belligerents. Although working with them certainly has a 
lot of value, targeting the (potential) war makers is also important, and 
this is done less. (Anderson and Olsen 2003: 50) Another bias that the 
Reflecting on Peace Practice project identified is one “toward doing 
good versus stopping bad”. Most organisations see their work as 
“building the positive preconditions for peace”. But they tend not to 
address the systems or individuals that “promote or perpetuate war”, 
even though it would appear that doing so is a precondition for building 
positive peace. Because of this lack of regard for the negative 
characteristics of conflict-torn countries, organisations’ objectives may 
be unrealistic: “the benchmarks for such positive-focused peace practice 
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are highly idealized conditions of social harmony that do not exist even 
in most countries that are at peace!” (Anderson and Olsen 2003: 50-51)  
 
This observation is related to Anderson and Olsen’s first one about non-
belligerents as NGOs’ main target groups. Again, the organisations 
visited in the framework of this study suggest that the situation is not as 
one-sided as Anderson and Olsen describe it. In part, their observed bias 
towards “doing good” is related to the earlier described issue that the 
missions and visions of organisations tend to be abstract and idealised 
and the links with their actual activities are not everywhere so well 
elaborated. These idealistic visions may explain the disregard for the 
actual negative characteristics of conflict countries that Anderson and 
Olsen mention.  
 
A limit to the debate is that the project largely leaves out the possibility 
that not all activities fall in the realm of NGOs. Just because a particular 
area of work is not done by NGOs does not mean that it is not done at 
all. Other actors, such as states or international organisations, may be 
better placed to carry them out. Of course, the need to think more 
explicitly about such divisions of labour and be less random in the 
determination of strategy remains. This relates back to the lack of 
thinking on the place of strategies vis-à-vis the larger aims of building 
peaceful societies. However, local NGOs face various constraints in 
doing such thinking. The limitations described in this paragraph with 
regard to impact assessment, reflection, and longer term action all play a 
role, as do the larger issues of the civil society policies of donors. The 
next section raises the question of how these policies contribute to a 
reduced political role for NGOs. 
 
 
1.6.2 Reduced political role 
 
NGOs have been facing an increasing need for resources. Competition 
for funds becomes stronger because of the internationalisation of the 
field, in which NGOs based in one place compete with others all over 
the world, and because of the rapid growth of the number of NGOs and 
other agents operating in the market, such as consulting firms. Another 
development has been that donor money is increasingly channelled 
through NGOs rather than through governments in developing countries. 
In 2004 24.6 per cent of Dutch development aid was channelled through 
NGOs. Although the Dutch spending of aid via NGOs is exceptionally 
high, other governments have also developed co-financing schemes in 
which large NNGOs become vehicles for spending donor money in 
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cooperation with partner NGOs in the South. This has changed the 
position of NGOs vis-à-vis the state.  
 
As a result of both developments, NGOs have become increasingly 
dependent on state funds. According to some20, this has brought them 
too close to the governments they used to check and criticise. 
Government funding has come with increased conditionality, forcing 
NGOs to work in particular countries and demanding an increased focus 
on poverty reduction – at the expense of other social change goals 
(Mitlin et al. 2005: 2). NGOs have grown more distant from social 
movements as they became closer to government agencies as a result of 
their increased dependence on official subsidies. Thus, from 
organisations working for social change NGOs increasingly become 
project deliverers for donors. As a result NGOs may become less 
pronounced and more similar to one another. Goodhand found from a 
comparative study of NGO activities in conflict areas that “NGOs, 
because of their dependence on official funding, were reluctant or 
unable to lobby for changes in donor policies and practices.” (Goodhand 
2006: 145) 
 
As discussed in 1.1, civil society support programmes do not promote an 
independent and political role for civil society in democratisation or 
peacebuilding, but tend to be more technocratic and in support of a 
particular model of social organisation – the professional NGO. In a 
context of conflict this can be an issue. Conflict is after all inherently 
political. Sustainable peacebuilding usually requires the transformation 
of social relations and power structures and the ‘empowerment’ of 
marginalised groups. Peacebuilding is therefore political in nature - at 
least when it comes to addressing the larger, structural issues preventing 
peace. However, few of the NGOs encountered actually work on such 
more structural issues – political oppression, unaccountable governance, 
and national and international inequality. This is because political work 
is sensitive, not only domestically but also with regard to the policies of 
international supporters.  
 
Domestic obstacles are clearly seen in Central Asia where political 
authoritarianism is a major issue and NGOs emphasise the importance 
of maintaining friendly relations with governments to avoid being shut 
down. In most cases, this means that NGOs can only focus on the more 
technical, micro-level activities and not on macro-level, political ones. 
Such difficulties could, and sometimes are, be addressed by NGOs 
creating international coalitions with civil society actors elsewhere, 
                                                 
20 Such as Edwards and Hulme 1996, Krieger 2004, Mawdsley et al. 2002, and Mitlin et al. 2005. 
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which may pressure their own governments to speak out or intervene. 
This can be an important role of civil society networks, and some indeed 
do try to perform such a function21. However, this is not facilitated by 
the international issues described in this section that reduce the political 
role of NGOs. Donors often require CSOs to be neutral and unpolitical 
to be financed (Pishchikova 2006). There is some basis for this, 
particularly in conflict contexts, as some CSOs are tied to specific 
conflict parties or interest groups and do not always work in the best 
interest of peace as a whole (see 1.6.4 below). So indiscriminately 
supporting CSOs just because they are locally grounded is not a good 
option. International civil society support is grounded in values, and 
should be. But this does not preclude a recognition that peacebuilding 
may entail change in the balance of power, or that critical, autonomous 
civil society groups are an important part of democracy.  
 
Although development is not an unpolitical project (and this is now 
increasingly recognised22), it may be argued that peacebuilding (like the 
related fields of human rights and democratisation) is even more 
political. However, much of the work of the organisations visited is 
supported through the regular development funding and policy chain. 
There are exceptions; in particular NNGOs focusing exclusively on 
peacebuilding tend to emphasise more of a political role for their 
Southern partners. However, even these organisations are increasingly 
dependent on state funds.  
 
 
1.6.3 Legitimacy 
 
An important question to ask regarding NGOs is who they represent. 
Unlike democratic governments, the leaders of NGOs have not been 
elected. So how legitimate are they? Usually peace NGOs claim to work 
on behalf of the communities whose conditions they aim to improve. 
But in practice they account for their actions not to these communities, 
but to their donor agencies in the North. It is those agencies that demand 
and obtain evidence of efficient and effective action, not the intended 
beneficiaries of projects. Another aspect of the legitimacy of NGOs is 
the way they are governed internally. Not all NGOs are necessarily 
democratically governed. “[H]ailed as the exemplars of grassroots 
democracy in action, many NGOs are, in fact, decidedly undemocratic 
and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent”. (Simmons 
1998, cited in Pishchikova 2006: 46) 
                                                 
21 For example, the careful activities of the Action Asia network with local partners in Burma. 
22 See for example Pronk 2007. 
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NGOs are becoming increasingly aware of this issue as they try to 
involve staff more in policy-making and to develop participatory 
planning and evaluation methods together with the people for whom 
they are supposed to work. However, there are also NGOs whose reality 
is different from the picture they are trying to paint and who really serve 
mainly their own organisational survival. It is not surprising that in 
conflict and postconflict situations, in which often large amounts of 
donor money are available, some organisations are founded primarily in 
order to gain access to these funds. For some, it is a way of generating 
an income in very difficult economic conditions. Needless to say, such 
organisations usually do not primarily act on behalf of those they claim 
to represent.23 The trouble is that for external actors it can be difficult to 
find out whether this is the case.  
 
A more fundamental aspect of this issue is the lack of local constituency 
of NGOs created with outside money (see 1.1). Writing about Ukraine, 
Pishchikova states that “the majority of foreign-supported NGOs are 
almost unanimously accused of lacking a grassroots constituency; they 
also fail to establish and maintain cooperative relations with other civic 
groups.” She adds that “[s]cholars increasingly talk about the 
“ghettoized” position of NGOs in the former Soviet Union in the sense 
that they are closer to their donors and other transnational partners than 
to their government or society”. (Pishchikova 2006: 80-81) The scope 
and approach of my study, which has taken place mainly using the 
perspective of local NGO staff, make it difficult to come up with 
meaningful conclusions regarding the constituencies of their 
organisations in the countries visited. However, it is good to keep the 
issue in the back of our minds and I will return to it in chapter four and 
beyond. In any case, it is important to realise that, particularly in conflict 
settings, “being representative of a certain constituency and sustainable 
still does not directly translate into democratic effects. It is therefore 
important to neither demonize the externally supported initiatives nor 
romanticize the local ones regardless of their substance.” (Pishchikova 
2006: 81) 
 
Questions of legitimacy are also tied to the issue of effectiveness 
mentioned under 1.4.3. If NGOs can prove that their activities have a 
positive impact on the situation of their intended beneficiaries and 
contribute to the overall aims of ending violence and building peace, 
                                                 
23 Some organisations are even accused of having bribed their way through the government’s 
accreditation process for NGOs (source: Interview with director of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, 
Liberia, 8 February 2006). 
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then they legitimise themselves in that way. The quest for better 
methods of assessing impact is thus relevant from the perspective not 
only of accountability toward donor agencies but also of legitimacy in 
the eyes of staff, communities, governments, and other organisations. 
And, as is discussed in chapter five, it is also highly relevant from the 
perspective of learning and improvement of work. 
 
 
1.6.4 Neutrality in conflict 
 
Local NGOs are part of the society in which they live and work. As a 
result, they are also a part of the conflict situation. Notwithstanding their 
aims of building peace, they may be affiliated more closely with one 
conflict group than with others. Armed groups “are usually supported by 
elements of civil society that champion the cause and view armed 
struggle as legitimate” (Barnes 2006: 21). In the worst case, a 
peacebuilding NGO may 
“simultaneously be a vehicle for the political ambitions of its leaders 
and fundraisers for peace may in reality raise funds for warfare. The 
most notorious example is Rwanda, where despite its extremely high 
civil society density, genocide occurred partly because civil society 
actors turned out to have stronger loyalties to their government and 
ethnicity than to their principles […]. Rwanda stands out as the 
ultimate nightmare of a naïve support of civil society, but multiple 
realities of organisations always exist and are usually more innocent, 
as in the case of service NGOs whose informal objective is to generate 
job security for their staff.” (Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005: 556) 
 
In any case, “[n]o matter how well-meaning organisations may be, in 
environments where mistrust and rumours abound, they are highly liable 
to attract the reputation of being partisan, rendering them ineffective as a 
consequence.” (Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005: 557) A Sudanese 
organisation whose headquarters I visited in Nairobi for example 
mentioned being regularly accused of aligning with the South Sudanese 
rebel movement24, while an NGO network visited in Mindanao is seen 
by some as aligned too closely to terrorists25. 
 
Aside from the embeddedness of NGOs in conflict structures, their 
projects may have unintended impact on a conflict as well. Even 
‘technical’ development projects can contribute to conflict or peace. 
Decisions on what local staff to hire and which areas to target risk 
                                                 
24 Interview with staff member of a Sudanese NGO. Nairobi, Kenya, 28 November 2005. 
25 Interview with Secretary General of a Mindanawan NGO consortium. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 
May 2006. 
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deepening cleavages by supporting one conflict group over another. 
Food or materials may inadvertently end up in the hands of fighting 
parties. Armed personnel hired to safeguard staff travelling to dangerous 
zones could be running warlord-related protection rackets. Even peace 
dialogues run the risk of branding participants as belonging to one 
conflict group when in reality their identities may be much more 
complex. 
 
 
1.6.5 Weakening states 
 
One reason why donor money is increasingly channelled through NGOs 
rather than through governments in developing countries is that many of 
these countries are plagued by weak or bad governance. Corruption is 
often high, so donor agencies cannot be sure whether their money will 
end up in someone’s Swiss bank account. However, channelling funds 
through the above-described chain of Northern and Southern NGOs 
risks weakening these states even further. After all, what these NGOs do 
is to set up structures of service provision in fields such as health care 
and education that are parallel to government ministries. This competing 
structure weakens rather than strengthens such ministries.  
 
The parallel structures of NGOs are funded not by tax income but by 
Northern donors, which makes them highly aid dependent. In addition, 
the local branches of NNGOs tend to offer high salaries and draw 
talented personnel away from government agencies, thus further 
weakening these. What does this mean for local NGOs in developing 
countries? How can they prevent inadvertently contributing to 
weakening their governments? Again we are confronted with the 
importance of coordination with other actors, in this case governments. 
NGO-government coordination and cooperation would avoid the 
creation of parallel structures and help build the capacity of government 
agencies. However, the extent to which this is possible depends on the 
type of government an NGO is dealing with. Oppressive governments or 
governments that are a party to conflict may be better served by more 
oppositional NGO strategies. 
 
 
1.6.6 Is it really that bad? On constraints and results 
 
The above summary of gaps in, limits of, and discussions about the 
work of NGOs may leave some readers with little hope for anything 
positive to arise out of their work. The problems and limitations that 
NGO peacebuilders encounter are partly integral to their work, which 
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after all is done in the midst or aftermath of hugely destructive conflict. 
Weak or unresponsive governments are often a feature of such conflict 
and are but one of the countervailing forces that are largely beyond the 
control of NGOs. All this sometimes makes observers wonder why 
NGOs continue to work almost against all odds. The question may be 
raised whether the predominant focus of local peace NGOs on micro-
level, relatively uncontroversial issues and not on larger, structural 
issues means that their activities amount to ‘mopping the floor while the 
tap is still open’, as a Dutch expression puts it. Is there any use in doing 
micro-level peace work if larger structures continue to promote conflict?  
 
I would argue that there is. Although more attention for political issues 
is called for, local peace work has an integral value and may help build a 
‘peace constituency’ from the bottom up. Individual stories about small, 
local-level changes give hope about the work of peace NGOs. Civil 
ceasefire monitoring in Mindanao, the training and employment of 
community mediators in Kenya, Liberian women’s sit-in protests for the 
resignation of president Taylor, and the establishment of a West Africa 
Network for Peacebuilding liaison office at the regional organisation 
ECOWAS are just some examples of positive results of local NGOs’ 
peace work. The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) has 
published two books filled with such positive stories (ECCP 1999; Van 
Tongeren et al. 2005).  
 
The trouble with such achievements is that they are often difficult to 
measure. Peacebuilding is a long-term process engendering gradual 
changes in attitudes, perceptions and relationships. To a degree this is 
something that external parties – donor agencies, Northern and Southern 
governments, international organisations – may just have to accept. 
Simply trusting local organisations to do the right thing without always 
being able to show concrete results appears to be the way to go in some 
cases. However, this is not the whole story. Local organisations do need 
to think better about ways to show impact. After all, only if they do so 
will they be able to elaborate the links between their activities and the 
bigger picture of peace.  I will return to the issue of impact assessment 
in more detail in chapter five. 
 
In many of the countries visited the larger political issues are at least to 
some extent being addressed by state actors and UN missions. The 
activities of NGOs in such contexts may be seen as complementing this 
kind of work. However, two issues remain in such situations. First, more 
explicit thinking about how the activities of NGOs complement those of 
other actors would be desirable. Second, an independent civil society 
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playing a role in the political arena remains important with an eye on the 
longer term sustainability of peace and democracy.  
 
 
1.7 Concluding remarks 
 
Chapter one has sketched the context in which to place the discussion 
that will follow. It is an unstable and rapidly changing context of which 
observers are struggling to make sense. It is also a context that differs 
from one country, or even village, to another. That said, as we have 
seen, there are patterns to be discerned in the aims of NGOs and the 
ways they describe their activities when it comes to peacebuilding. A 
global community of peacebuilders exists to the extent that similar 
concepts and methodologies are used in different parts of the world.  
 
What do the issues discussed in this chapter mean for the challenges and 
opportunities Southern peace NGOs are confronted with in 
accumulating, mobilising and disseminating the knowledge that is 
needed to make optimal policy decisions, carry out activities in an 
effective way and adjust to continuously changing circumstances, as I 
put it in the research question posed at the start of the book? More 
precisely, what can be said at this point in response to the first sub-
question - what is the role and place of local NGOs in contemporary 
peacebuilding processes, and what does their position in the wider field 
of actors and processes mean for the knowledge on which they base 
their work and the learning they engage in?  
 
Two main points emerge from this chapter in relation to this question. 
First, there is a need for local peace NGOs to make space for reflection, 
analysis, and learning. There are several reasons for this: 
• Because of their size and organisation, NGOs have the potential 
to be more flexible, adaptive and innovative than other actors. 
Such flexibility could be of high significance in fluid conflict-
affected situations.  
• An increased ability to do research in communities about the 
needs existing there would increase the legitimacy of local 
NGOs and make projects more locally relevant and grounded. 
What we have not yet looked at is what research is done at 
present, and by whom, and what the knowledge and discourse is 
that the potential knowledge output of local NGOs has to 
compete with. Chapter two will examine these issues. In 
addition, the case study in chapter eight looks at an initiative 
that aims to strengthen both the research and learning capacity 
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of local peace NGOs and their contribution to the wider 
intellectual field. 
• NGOs need to know more about the impact of, and linkages 
between, activities. This requires time and space for research of 
the context, analysis of the results of one’s own projects, and 
interaction with other actors – NGOs as well as others – about 
the way in which different activities contribute to the larger aim 
of peace. Such interaction is also important in order to prevent 
duplication of activities and, in the case of coordination and 
cooperation with government agencies, to prevent contributing 
to state weakness. 
 
Second, the knowledge processes of local NGOs are complicated by the 
constraints they face due to the policy and funding chain in which they 
are embedded. These constraints take several forms: 
• Even if local NGOs are able to research the needs of the 
communities in which they work, they cannot independently 
determine their operating priorities. International agencies that 
finance their activities come with their own priorities for action, 
making local organisations more implementers of international 
policy than independent actors. Further on in this book, 
particularly in chapter two and in Part Two, we will look at the 
knowledge side of this story. In other words, what knowledge 
and discourse informs the priorities that are set in this way, and 
how is it different from local NGOs’ own knowledge? 
• As will be discussed in more detail later on, short-term project 
funding and an emphasis on activities with direct results leave 
little room for reflection, research, and exchange. This is 
compounded by the context in which peace NGOs work, which 
calls for direct, concrete action and gives staff members a high 
sense of urgency. We have now only touched upon these issues, 
which are worth exploring further. This will be done in the next 
chapters. 
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Chapter  2. Recipes for peace? 
Peacebuilding knowledge 
 
Mobilising indigenous knowledge, learning from practitioner 
experience, and drawing on academic research are activities that have 
the potential of making peacebuilding more successful. In the words of 
Kofi Annan, “we realise more and more that knowledge is what makes 
the difference: knowledge in the hands of those who need it, and of 
those who can make best use of it” (cited in Clarke and Squire 2005: 
110). Although knowledge is less tangible than material resources, it has 
an impact on developments by shaping policy and practice. As Keynes 
wrote, 
“[t]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believed themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years 
back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated 
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.” (Keynes 1957: 
383-384) 
 
The fact that knowledge is itself a resource receives increasing attention 
in the development field.26 Following developments in the private 
sector, ‘knowledge management’, ‘learning’ and ‘networking’ are the 
new buzzwords in the world of development organisations.  
“[E]conomic improvement is largely a result of the application of 
knowledge in productive activities and the associated adjustment in 
social institutions. [E]conomic growth [can be attributed to] interactive 
learning involving government, industry, academia, and civil society. 
It focuses on the importance of learning or continuous improvement in 
the knowledge base and institutional arrangements for development.” 
(Juma and Lee 2005: 15) 
 
This chapter conceptualises knowledge and links it to the practice of 
NGOs working in the peacebuilding field. In doing so, it looks at the 
question: what forms does knowledge of peace and conflict take? In 
other words, based on what ideas do peacebuilding organisations work, 
and where do they get these ideas? The chapter looks at different types 
of knowledge that can be distinguished, the knowledge demand (and 
supply) of local civil society peacebuilders, and the content and sources 
of available peacebuilding knowledge. Drawing on relevant literature, 
                                                 
26 See for example World Bank Operations Evaluation Department 2003 and RAWOO 2005.  
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section 2.1 distinguishes between different types of knowledge: tacit, 
explicit and implicit knowledge, and academic and practitioner 
knowledge. 2.2 links this to peacebuilding, offering some reflections 
about what conflict and peace knowledge mean. Next, in 2.3, different 
sources of peacebuilding knowledge are discussed: first, the academia 
and second, the dichotomy of external versus indigenous knowledge. 2.4 
places that dichotomy in the context of traditional and modern 
knowledge systems. 2.5 offers some reflections about the extent to 
which knowledge is context-specific (something with implications for 
knowledge sharing), and finally, 2.6 gives an overview of the 
implications of all this for the content and use of peacebuilding 
knowledge.  
 
 
2.1 Types of knowledge 
 
What kind of knowledge are we talking about in this study? What 
characterises knowledge of peace and development processes? 
‘Knowledge’ is a broad concept that is used in many different ways. It 
includes ‘information’ but goes beyond that concept: it also includes the 
meaning that is allocated to information. Knowledge is subjective: ‘I 
know what a terrible person you are’. Unlike information, knowledge 
can also be an experience or skill: ‘I know the best way to do this’. 
There are different types of knowledge. Knowledge can be available in 
written form (explicit) or locked inside someone’s head (tacit). It can be 
theoretical (academic) or based on practical experience. This section 
pays attention to different types of knowledge and discusses their 
implications for learning and knowledge exchange processes.  
 
 
2.1.1 ‘If only we knew what we know’27: Explicit, tacit and implicit 
 knowledge 
 
A distinction is often made between explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge, where explicit knowledge can be processed in a way that 
makes it accessible to others and tacit knowledge cannot, or less easily. 
Explicit knowledge can be codified or written down. It may consist of 
anything from the formal procedure for application to a European Union 
fund to the way a copy machine works. As it can be recorded, it may be 
passed onto others who may add it to their own body of knowledge. The 
challenges concerning explicit knowledge relate to codification and 
recording processes (processing knowledge in such a way that it is of the 
                                                 
27 Title of a book by O’Dell et al. (1998) 
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most use to others) as well as dissemination (ensuring that knowledge 
reaches the people who might need it). The two facets are interrelated: in 
order to be able to reach the intended recipient, the knowledge has to be 
recorded in such a way as to make it attractive and accessible to this 
recipient.  
 
The term tacit knowledge refers to knowledge based on a person’s 
unique experience: knowing how to do something. In the field of 
peacebuilding, this may be experience-based knowledge of what makes 
a community dialogue run well. According to some, tacit knowledge can 
be shared through communication. It may be possible to codify or write 
down part of it, for example in a manual or report, thus turning it into 
explicit knowledge. But there are also components of tacit knowledge 
that cannot be exchanged in written form. The intricacies of interacting 
with various community members and of sensing the difficulties they 
may have can never be recorded entirely. It may be possible to transfer 
such knowledge through face-to-face interaction: during a discussion at 
a training session, or when colleagues accompany one another during a 
community dialogue project.  
 
This type of knowledge is like knowing how to ride a bicycle. Although 
it might be possible to write down some principles, it is only through 
direct interaction that the skill can be taught. Another important way of 
transferring tacit knowledge is through personal observation or shared 
experience. Thus, accompanying an experienced colleague during a field 
visit can be a powerful way of learning (Smit 2006: 12). Such 
interaction is also important because often the person possessing tacit 
knowledge does not realise that he has it at all, or does not recognise it 
as a valuable commodity for others because it seems natural to him. A 
granddaughter may not know there is anything special about the way she 
speaks to her grandmother who suffers from Alzheimer’s - until 
someone points out to her that she has unconsciously developed a skill 
that others may benefit from.  
 
There are also forms of tacit knowledge that cannot be transferred at all 
because they are too closely related to their possessor’s unique set of 
experiences and perspectives. Told to another person, this knowledge 
does not make sense. (Polanyi, cited in Sauquet 2004: 377) This draws 
attention to the fact that knowledge is subjective and the words allocated 
to a particular piece of knowledge may mean different things to different 
people. People may have diverging associations and allocate different 
meanings when they hear the label ‘a difficult person’, based on their 
own past experiences. To transfer knowledge from one person to another 
often requires translation and explanation; when knowledge transfer 
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crosses borders of language and culture, the translation process becomes 
even more complex. Something that can be helpful in this regard is a 
third category of knowledge: implicit knowledge.  
 
Implicit knowledge refers to knowing what is socially and culturally 
appropriate in a given circumstance. “[I]t is knowledge of shared beliefs, 
values and expectations (e.g. knowing that it is inappropriate to 
undermine colleagues in public)” (Ramalingham 2005: 4). Such implicit 
knowledge is particularly relevant to our field of analysis because it 
represents implicit codes of behaviour that are often not universal but 
culturally specific – whether to an organisational culture or a national or 
regional one. In that sense, implicit knowledge represents the cultural 
aspect of interactions and learning processes and as such it will be 
referred to in various places of this book28. An NGO staff member 
experienced in running projects in a particular community may have 
developed personal relations and silent habits of interaction with local 
people, which a colleague could never simply copy.  
 
We have seen that tacit knowledge consists of both translatable and 
untranslatable kinds of knowledge. It is on the first kind that I will focus, 
as translatable knowledge can be meaningfully shared with others and 
be the starting point of learning processes. Untranslatable tacit 
knowledge does not really constitute a challenge for us because there is 
no way for us to access it, nor is it likely to have any value in a different 
context from the one in which it originates. Translatable tacit 
knowledge, on the other hand, presents various challenges, the most 
obvious one being the translation process itself. How can we codify and 
record tacit knowledge in such a way that it becomes useful to others? 
And if it cannot be codified and recorded, how can we put people in 
touch with each other so that the knowledge can be transferred directly? 
If a person does not realise that she possesses valuable knowledge, the 
only way for it to come to the surface is through interaction with people 
who might need it. But how can others know that this person possesses 
knowledge of value to them? Enabling the ‘right’ people to get together 
presents a formidable challenge and it is impossible to access and 
mobilise all valuable tacit knowledge, even if it is translatable. Some 
types of tacit knowledge may be of such a specialised character that it is 
important mainly for people to know where it is located, in case they 
need to draw on this knowledge and obtain specialist advice. This type 
of knowledge takes the form of ‘I know that you know more about x’.  
 
                                                 
28 Particularly in  2.4, 4.4, 4.5, 5.6.6 and 8.4.4 
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The following figure helps to categorise the different kinds of tacit 
knowledge. The knowledge in the top left hand box is already shared, 
common knowledge. It is also possible that it has not yet been shared 
but at least I as well as others know that I have it and therefore everyone 
knows where it can be found in case it is needed. The knowledge in the 
lower right hand box cannot be shared, because I don’t know that I 
possess it – and neither do others. If, by chance and through an 
interaction between myself and the others, we find out that I know 
something of value, we move out of this ‘black’ box and into the top left 
hand corner. The box in the lower left hand corner contains knowledge 
that I know I possess, while others don’t realise this. I might identify 
people who could benefit from my knowledge and offer it to them, in 
which case the knowledge moves to top left hand box. Finally, although 
I am unaware of the existence or relevance of my knowledge inside the 
box on the top right hand side of the figure, others recognise it and may 
point it out to me if they need it. In that case, it again moves to the top 
left hand side.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Recognising tacit knowledge 
 
This leads to the following possibilities and questions with regard to the 
mobilisation and exchange of tacit knowledge: 
• Regarding the two movements shown by black arrows in the 
figure, from top right to top left and from bottom left to top left: 
how can we transfer it in a meaningful way? What is the best 
way to get in touch with people who might have knowledge that 
I want, and what is the best way to get in touch with someone 
who might benefit from my knowledge?  
• Concerning the movement shown by the dashed arrow, from 
bottom right to top left: how can we create the optimal 
circumstances for interactions that enable people to discover, 
and delve into, previously unknown knowledge resources? 
 
Unknown 
to others 
Known 
to others 
Unknown to 
self 
Known to 
self 
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2.1.2 ‘Nothing more practical than a good theory’. Academic versus 
practitioner knowledge 
 
Another distinction is often made between academic and practitioner 
knowledge. Drawing on Gibbons (1994), De la Rive Box distinguishes 
between different modes of knowledge creation. The first mode 
corresponds with what is called academic knowledge generation. It takes 
place in the traditional context of the scientific profession, along 
disciplinary lines. The setting is a homogeneous academic community, 
with a hierarchical structure and its own specific interests. (De la Rive 
Box 2001) This community is accountable largely to itself, setting the 
standards of ‘sound scientific practice.’ Science engages itself with 
drawing together data from different contexts into a body of generalised 
knowledge. In most cases its starting point is concrete, context-specific 
information. Taking different contextual factors into account, and 
comparing the information with data from other contexts, lead to 
knowledge that is considered universally applicable and scientifically 
valid. A next and difficult step is the re-application of this knowledge in 
other specific contexts. Combining academic knowledge with concrete 
experiences leads to a modification of this knowledge, and the process 
starts again. (Rip 2001: 14).  
 
The generalisation of knowledge in an academic context is accompanied 
by the use of a particular language shared by scientists in an academic 
discipline. Particular concepts are used to order the information and 
make it understandable for a broader academic public. This distinctive 
language enables results from different production sites to be compared 
and coordinated. At the same time it makes generalised scientific 
knowledge abstract in the eyes of practitioners, who have difficulty 
applying it in practice. Practitioners often view academics as people 
occupying an ‘ivory tower’ in which more attention is paid to scientific 
reputation than to the practical applicability of research findings. To an 
extent, this view is probably correct. The measure of success for 
scientists is often determined not by the practical application of the 
knowledge they generate but by peer reviews. Competence and 
performance standards are set by colleagues. The distinctive language of 
academic disciplines reduces lay participation in assessment of 
contributions. In other words, a scientific field has ‘a standardised skills 
and symbols system which monopolises the communication of results 
and the means of obtaining reputations’ (Whitley 1984: 32). 
 
According to De la Rive Box, there is a second mode of knowledge 
creation that takes place in a context of application. It often involves a 
trans-disciplinary approach by practitioners from various backgrounds. 
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It starts when there is a broad community of people interested in solving 
a problem. Accountability is not to the academic community, but to the 
people affected by the problem to be solved. Thus, this second mode of 
knowledge generation is characterised by social rather than academic 
accountability, and by user review rather than peer review. Not global 
models but local problems are the starting point for this kind of 
knowledge creation. (De la Rive Box 2001) Needs assessments and 
evaluations carried out by peacebuilding organisations or their donors 
are examples of this ‘mode two’ knowledge creation. However, such 
practitioner-generated knowledge, recorded in reports or existing in the 
form of tacit knowledge, is often viewed by academics as insufficiently 
valid in scientific terms because it does not comply with scientific 
standards of knowledge creation. Evaluations and lessons learned 
reports often do not take into account contextual factors and 
comparisons with other cases in the way that academic research does, 
and are therefore considered less universally applicable.  
 
All scientific knowledge in some way has its basis in practice. It can 
also be the basis for new practice: “there is nothing more practical than a 
good theory”.29 Most practitioners consciously or unconsciously apply 
insights that originated in academia. For example, the outcome 
document of a seminar of practitioners on ‘learning for social change’ 
notes that academic knowledge is helpful because “it lends itself to 
building a ‘big picture’ of historical change and can offer a great range 
of alternative understandings about why and how societal change 
happens” (Taylor et al. 2006: 17). However, the processes linking the 
academic and practitioner worlds of knowledge generation are hampered 
by the gap that exists between them. It is widely agreed that changes and 
mechanisms are needed in order to bridge this gap. Knowledge networks 
may be one such mechanism. Indeed, in addition to the two modes of 
knowledge creation mentioned, De la Rive Box identifies knowledge 
networks as a third mode, a middle ground. ‘Mode three’ knowledge 
creation stresses the horizontal exchange of information. It emphasises 
the complementarity between the academic- and practitioner-led 
approaches and the exchange among them in dynamic knowledge 
networks. (De la Rive Box 2001) This study takes up networks as a way 
of knowledge exchange and joint knowledge generation, specifically in 
chapters six and seven. 
 
 
                                                 
29 This quotation is variously attributed to Kurt Lewin, Ludwig Boltzmann, James C. Maxwell, and 
Rudie van Lier. 
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2.2 Knowledge, conflict and peace 
 
2.2.1 Types of knowledge applied 
 
The previous section distinguished between several types of knowledge. 
One distinction was between tacit, explicit and implicit knowledge, 
another between academic and practitioner knowledge. What meaning 
do these types of knowledge have in the peacebuilding field? Tacit 
knowledge of conflict and peacebuilding includes the practical 
experience of peace workers with various methods, people, and 
institutions. Through their work they have developed a feeling for what 
works and what does not that is often not written down in any explicit 
way. Through conversations and other forms of direct exchange, this 
knowledge may become available to others, who might be able to use it 
in their own work. Some of this tacit knowledge is made explicit in the 
process of transferring it. Explicit knowledge takes the form of academic 
publications, project reports, and databases containing information about 
partner organisations and projects.  
 
Implicit knowledge, understood as social and cultural norms, plays an 
important role in this field that is characterised by cross-cultural 
interactions30. These interactions are often characterised by 
misunderstandings and confusion, caused by cultural differences and 
diverging social norms. Implicit knowledge is also of significance in 
carrying out peace projects in local communities, where building on 
local traditions and norms can yield better results than merely 
introducing pre-established ideas and methodologies. The interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge raises the importance of a two-way 
exchange, which as we will see in chapter five is emphasised by 
Southern peacebuilders. Such an exchange is needed because explicit 
knowledge needs to be linked to the tacit knowledge of the recipient in 
order to have meaning – and, as we have seen, tacit knowledge is only 
transferred through direct interaction. Implicit knowledge is related to 
the discussion of different knowledge systems in section 2.4. However, 
as we will see there, the issue of different ‘knowledges’ that is discussed 
there goes deeper than implicit norms alone and applies to all types of 
knowledge. The issue of academic versus practitioner knowledge is 
essentially about knowledge sources. In the field of development and 
peacebuilding a particularly important distinction in that regard is that 
between indigenous and external knowledge, to which I return further on 
in this chapter.  
 
                                                 
30 for example between staff of international and local organisations 
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2.2.2 Knowledge of conflict and knowledge for peace 
 
In order to do peacebuilding work, knowledge of conflict is required. 
This may include general knowledge of theories and research findings 
with regard to conflict causes and dynamics, such as might be taught in 
training programmes or academic conflict studies courses. Statistical 
studies about correlations between conflict and factors such as poverty, 
the presence of natural resources, and ethnic diversity give an idea of 
where to look when trying to explain a particular conflict. Ideas about 
conflict stages and steps in a process of escalation may help an 
organisation decide when and where to intervene. Theory with regard to 
the roles of various actors in causing and prolonging the conflict may 
offer NGOs insights about which groups or individuals to engage with in 
order to meet particular goals. However, knowledge of a conflict is 
never neutral. The history and characteristics of a conflict are always 
contested. Knowledge is part of conflict: “competition over ‘the right to 
truth’ is an inherent part of war” (Lammers 2006: 104). Conflicts are 
characterised by conflicting visions of past and future. Information 
about the conflict is never external or objective to people’s experiences. 
Lammers writes that for refugees in Kampala the   
“political context is anything but an abstract, external given. […] 
[They] not only find themselves in a political field, but […] they 
become part of it, and ultimately contribute to constructing it. In 
Kampala, where people’s minds were jammed with memories of 
wartime violence, suspicion and fear were their daily companions. [It] 
is hard to overestimate how intricately sensitive everything – every 
appearance, every comment, every visit – is in such a situation. This 
reality raises questions about truth and the level of objectivity in 
refugees’ testimonies.” (Lammers 2006: 102, emphasis in original).  
 
In a conflict most people identify to a greater or lesser extent with one of 
the sides, leading to bias. In addition, people have a need to justify the 
role they have played or are playing, and the information they give is 
influenced by that need. People may have a personal or political interest 
in hiding or exaggerating facts. As a further complication, trauma also 
tends to warp people’s memories and perceptions. Even what appear to 
be neutral facts – the numbers of people killed or the size of the area 
controlled by a rebel group – are in fact stakes in a political struggle. As 
data are difficult to obtain in a context of instability and violence, 
different statistics usually circulate, and estimates given often depend on 
the political programme of those providing them. After a battle has been 
fought, the two sides almost invariably give widely differing estimations 
of the number of victims. 
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Even when people agree about the raw data, discussions arise about how 
to interpret them. In Central Asia, for example, national politicians strive 
to frame violence as radical Islamist or terrorist activity, while others 
call it a legitimate struggle over access to land and decision-making. A 
similar dynamic is visible within conflict countries. Local or private 
conflicts that may be unrelated to the wider conflict are often cast in the 
language of that conflict in order to gain support. As a result, looking at 
macro-level causes and motivations alone will not explain the level and 
nature of violence used at the local level: “first, actions ‘on the ground’ 
often seem more related to local or private issues than to the war’s 
driving (or ‘master’) cleavage; second, individual and local actors take 
advantage of the war to settle local or private conflicts often bearing 
little or no relation to the causes of the war or the goals of the 
belligerents.” (Kalyvas 2003: 475-476)  
 
Peacebuilding activities are designed to limit manipulations of 
information and limit the divergence of interpretations. Working 
together on a common ‘truth’ about the conflict is seen as an important 
step towards peaceful coexistence. Truth and reconciliation 
commissions are increasingly popular forms of doing this after a 
conflict. They aim to start a national discussion about what happened, 
provide accountability on the part of those involved in the violence, and 
contribute to reconciliation. People also share experiences and try to 
make sense of them in other shared venues: newspapers, public squares, 
history books. Part of the effort to establish some kind of ‘truth’ is the 
collection of data: “[t]he details of history, the careful mining of all 
resources – from letters to computer files to court records to artefacts 
and newspapers – provide a focus for questions and both open the 
imagination to possibilities and deny it the freedom to lie against the 
facts” (Culbertson and Pouligny 2006: 8). After the collection of data 
comes the discussion about how to interpret it. Knowledge of conflict is 
not merely a matter of statistics or events. In large part it is about giving 
meaning to events. People want to know: ‘how could this happen?’ 
Blaming is often a part of that. Conflict is at least partly about people’s 
perceptions of one another. When it comes to the interpretation of facts, 
the redevelopment of history curricula is often an important but highly 
contested activity in the postconflict phase. Civil society initiatives try to 
stimulate dialogue around parties’ diverging interpretations of history.  
 
Having discussed the characteristics of conflict knowledge, we may now 
raise the question, what is peace knowledge? One way to look at peace 
knowledge is as individual and collective visions of a peaceful future; in 
other words, of the goal of peacebuilding and social change. This is 
closely tied to knowledge of what happened during the conflict, and 
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relates at least in part to backward-looking processes of justice, 
reconciliation, truth-telling, and confession. Knowing what peace entails 
requires knowing the individual, social and cultural realities that, if not 
taken into account, hamper efforts at the development of markets, 
governance, and civil society. This requires dialogue. (Culbertson and 
Pouligny 2006: 2-3) Arriving at joint visions of peace is important and 
may be seen as a next step after truth commission-type processes have 
been completed. However, this step has not received much attention up 
to now. As we saw in chapter one, even NGOs whose daily job it is to 
work for peace often lack an integrated vision of the kind of situation 
they are aiming to contribute to.  
 
A final aspect to emphasise in relation to knowledge and peacebuilding 
is that increasing one’s knowledge can also contribute to peace more 
directly by changing perceptions and attitudes, countering 
misinformation, and empowering people through knowledge. 
Knowledge, particularly through formal education, also gives people 
more opportunities for advancement and provides access to ways of 
income other than fighting or other war-related activities. In fact, one 
study shows that each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by 
around twenty per cent (Collier et al. 2001, cited in Lopes and Theisohn 
2003: 49).  
 
 
2.3  Sources of peacebuilding knowledge  
 
This section examines what the literature has to say about sources of 
knowledge for peacebuilders. First, it looks at developments and 
discussions regarding the academic discipline of peace and conflict 
studies and its relationship to the practice. Next, it discusses the 
relationship between indigenous and external knowledge. 
 
 
2.3.1 Peace and conflict studies as an academic field  
 
This section briefly sketches the way the field of peace and conflict 
studies has evolved until today, before moving on to look at its 
relationship with practice. Although developments in other disciplines 
preceded it31, peace studies as a more or less coherent academic field is 
                                                 
31 Developments in the 1930s and 1940s in the field of peace and conflict studies include work by 
Sorokin, Richardson and Wright in the interwar years which showed that rigorous scientific 
methodology could be applied to the causes of war, and by implication, the conditions of peace. 
Their efforts were referred to as polemology. In the same period there were also developments in 
psychology, politics and international relations, and new research into organisational behaviour and 
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considered to have come out of the threat of atomic destruction at the 
end of the Second World War. Conflict resolution and the prevention of 
war became central to the research agenda of many, including Kenneth 
Boulding and his group at the University of Michigan, who founded the 
Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957 (Miall et al. 1999: 42-3). Their 
main concern was the prevention of large-scale nuclear war between 
states. In the 1960s, researchers recognised the importance of smaller-
scale armed conflicts as well, and the study of conflict and peace 
broadened to include intra-state conflicts. While the early editions of the 
Journal of Peace Research, founded by Johan Galtung, focus mainly on 
topics relating to disarmament and public opinion on the Cold War, soon 
civil war and revolution and their causes became topics for research as 
well.32 
 
Galtung also introduced a distinction between direct violence, structural 
violence and cultural violence, as well as between negative peace (the 
absence of direct violence) and positive peace (the absence of structural 
violence). Inequality played a central role in this type of thinking as a 
cause of structural violence. North American academics rejected this 
broad definition of conflict and peace and a “struggle” ensued “between 
European structuralists and North American pragmatists to define the 
peace research and conflict resolution agenda”, resulting in an “uneasy 
compromise”. (Miall et al. 1999: 44)  The difference in emphasis still 
exists, with much of American research directed at conflict management 
or conflict resolution, which takes place between relatively equal parties 
and within a given structure, and much of European research aiming at 
conflict transformation in asymmetric conflicts that require radical 
changes in the very structure of relations among the parties. In the 
United States, peace and conflict studies have traditionally focused not 
so much on the analysis of conflicts or the theory of peace, but more on 
practical negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution skills, which 
were then applied to conflicts and interactions at all levels. Harvard Law 
School introduced the soon very popular concept of problem-solving 
negotiation in which the parties work together to find solutions that are 
optimal – or at least satisfactory - for all involved. (Fisher and Ury 
1983) 
 
A recent development in the field of peace and conflict studies is its 
attempts to connect better to the field of development studies. Duffield 
(2001: 1), for example, notes that “development concerns have become 
                                                                                                            
labour management introduced a mutual gains approach to negotiation. The ideas put forward by 
Gandhi were also widely read and built upon. (O’Connell and Whitby 1995; Miall et al. 1999: 40) 
32 Journal of Peace Research archive: http://jpr.sagepub.com/archive/. Accessed on 24 May 2004. 
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increasingly important in relation to how security is understood” and 
vice versa33. Although little has so far been written about how to 
translate these ideas into practice34, the new conflict-development nexus 
receives increasing attention. Various terms are used to describe it, such 
as ‘human security’, ‘conflict-sensitive development’, and ‘post-conflict 
development’ (Anderson 1999, Carbonnier 1998, Addison 2003, Junne 
and Verkoren 2004). This emerging field of study entails a combination 
of development and conflict theory, although the reconciliation of these 
two strands of theory is only just starting to occur. Research is not only 
undertaken by academics but by agencies from the practice of 
peacebuilding and development, such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well, and much of the 
research actually goes on in this ‘grey circuit’ of policy reports and the 
like. This leads us to the relationship between academia and practice in 
the peacebuilding field. 
 
 
2.3.2 Academia and practice in the peacebuilding field 
 
Adam Curle, the first professor at the Bradford School of Peace Studies, 
formulated Bradford’s mission and that of the whole field of peace 
studies as follows: 
• to identify and analyse unpeaceful relationships 
• to find out about the economic, political and social conditions in 
which relationships might tend to be more or less peaceful  
• to devise means of changing unpeaceful relationships into 
peaceful ones. (O’Connell and Whitby 1995: 4-5)  
 
This use of a broad definition of violence and peace at Bradford resulted 
in criticism that its courses were too diffuse, too abstract and 
insufficiently applied. Under pressure from the students the department 
then made efforts to make the curriculum more focused and problem-
oriented. With a growing emphasis on practice by the faculty, however, 
the tension between those in favour of activism and those stressing the 
academic dimension again came to the surface. (O’Connell and Whitby 
1995: 6) Most researchers agreed that the field should include elements 
of both engagement and academic distance, but discussions revolved 
around where the balance between the two should be. A related debate 
was about whether the discipline could be value-free, and if not, what 
                                                 
33 It is “now generally accepted that international organisations should be aware of conflict and, 
where possible, gear their work towards conflict resolution and helping to rebuild war-torn societies 
in a way that will avert future violence” (Duffield 2001: 1). 
34 “[T]he new development-security terrain remains underresearched and its study has yet to 
establish its own conceptual language” (Duffield 2001: 9). 
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values should be a part of it. In Bradford, these discussions also played 
out in disagreements about whether the department should engage in 
activism. In the end, the applied nature of peace studies at Bradford 
became restricted to the department’s policy-oriented research 
(O’Connell and Whitby 1995: 7-8).  
 
Similar questions have been asked recently by Louk de la Rive Box 
(2006) about the broader field of development: “how relevant is our 
understanding of development for the management of social change? 
[…] Has development studies grown into a field of studies that is only to 
be judged by the academic standards it has set for itself? By, for 
example, the number of publications in respected international (read: 
North American and British) journals? Or do we judge our relevance by 
the value of our contributions to those engineering social change 
through enterprises, civil society organisations and public 
administration? If so, what is the opinion of those colleagues in the 
global South that we aim to assist?” De la Rive Box’s answer is not 
mild: “our discipline may […] be on the verge of irrelevance”. In his 
view, development studies have contributed little to global debates and 
are too much inward-focused. Ultimately it is the notion of development 
itself that is to blame, as it “implies a paternalistic conception of 
managed social change based on post - [Second World War] Northern 
optimism regarding newly independent countries”. De la Rive Box 
concludes that development studies need to “open up [..] to novel global 
realities” and “move beyond the discourse of development” in order to 
maintain their relevance. Some directions in which to move may be to 
substitute the North-South dichotomy by a focus on transnational, 
informal networks, to pay more attention to non-State actors and 
movements, and to recognise and analyse new forms of global 
interdependence among all actors involved. (De la Rive Box 2006)   
 
The new security-development field, however, appears to be one in 
which the connection to policy and practice is made relatively well. The 
nature of most publications in this field is predominantly prescriptive 
and policy-oriented. Few publications aim at developing the theory of 
the new “development-security terrain” (Duffield 2001) at an abstract 
level, and no significant attempts have been made to set the research 
agenda or develop standards for evaluating results. Instead, researchers 
engage in evaluating field activities and drawing concrete and applicable 
lessons from them. In addition, certain non-scientific knowledge is taken 
up by academics. The World Bank is an important player in post-
conflict development research. Its publications are often quoted in other 
studies in the field. (Boyce 1996, Ball 1996, Addison 2003, Moore 
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2000, Junne and Verkoren 2004). In some cases it is even difficult to 
distinguish between academic and non-academic literature35.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that academic knowledge is always 
taken up by practitioners in the peacebuilding field, who have trouble 
making the time to read and apply scientific publications. The format of 
most formal research (long books and refereed journal articles full of 
jargon) does not easily lend itself to application in the field. As in other 
fields, academics tend to set their own research agendas rather than 
respond to needs in the field. As a result, “the gap between academic 
theory and NGO practice is still a wide one”, and “policy is often 
determined by organizational mandates, past practice and politics, with 
little reference to the findings and prescriptions of academic 
researchers.” (Goodhand 2006, 178) Some popular peacebuilding 
concepts have found their way into NGO handbooks, but academic-
practitioner interactions are not continuous. Within some international 
NGOs thematic departments have been created that aim to make better 
use of research findings from outside the organisation – but the trouble 
lies in connecting these thematic departments to the operational, often 
regionally organised, departments of these organisations.36 
 
Interestingly, policymakers and practitioners in the field of 
peacebuilding and development increasingly take on the task of research 
themselves in order to be certain that the research done is practice-
oriented and answers their specific demands for knowledge. In addition 
to large multilateral institutions, NNGOs also try to develop more 
research capacities. For example, Search for Common Ground has set up 
a research and development division that “aims to research and develop 
advancements in evaluation approaches and peacebuilding practice for 
the benefit of Search for Common Ground and the conflict resolution 
field.”37 Although this is in itself a positive development, contributing to 
the output and application of useful research results, it does not 
necessarily complement, and interact with, the research done at 
universities – in the North and especially in conflict-affected developing 
countries themselves.  
 
                                                 
35 For example, Paul Collier, who plays a prominent role in debates about the causes of current-day 
conflicts, has done work both in the capacity of director of the World Bank’s Development 
Economics Research Group and as professor at Oxford University. Whether his World Bank 
publications are any less academic than his Oxford ones is difficult to say. 
36 During a University of Amsterdam course on learning processes in Dutch NGOs for Master 
students and NGO staff, which I co-taught during the spring of 2007, this issue emerged repeatedly 
in the discussions and research projects of the participants. 
37 www.sfcg.org. Search for Common Ground. Accessed on 18 September 2004.  
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Much has been written about linking research to policy in the 
development field. For example, Court and Young (2003, 2005) of the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) draw from fifty case studies a 
number of observations about the impact of research on the development 
policies that are made by (donor) governments, international 
organisations, and other influential actors. They note that literature on 
the link between research and policy is moving away from a linear view, 
focusing on ways to ensure that research results reach policymakers, 
towards a more complex view that emphasises a two-way process 
between research and policy, “shaped by multiple relations and 
reservoirs of knowledge” (Court and Young 2005: 21). They find that 
three elements play an important role in determining to what extent 
research results are used: 
• The political context, including “political structures/processes, 
institutional pressures, prevailing concepts, [and] policy streams 
and windows” 
• The evidence, particularly its “credibility, methods, use, [and 
way in which] the message is packaged and communicated”  
• Links “between policy makers and other stakeholders, 
relationships, voice, trust, networks, the media and other 
intermediaries.” (Court and Young 2005: 21) 
 
Political context is often the most important issue in affecting the degree 
to which research influences policy (Court and Young 2003: 11; 2005: 
21). Political contestation, institutional pressures and vested interests 
play an important role. The political context also includes the political 
system and processes, the way policymakers think, and policy 
implementation. In an open political system evidence is freely gathered, 
assessed and communicated. In non-democratic contexts where 
academic, public and media freedom are curtailed, this is much more 
difficult. In terms of the political process, one of the main issues that 
affect the extent to which research is taken into account is the degree of 
policymaker demand. Research has a greater impact when it is policy-
driven or has high-level political commitment. The degree of political 
contestation also matters greatly: “even in open systems, many decisions 
are political and research-based evidence may be completely ignored, 
even if it was convincing.” Indeed, research is unlikely to affect policy if 
reforms it suggests run counter to the interests of major political players. 
(Court and Young 2003: 11-13) Policymakers like straightforward 
stories and advice they can understand – even if it does not hold up to 
closer scrutiny. In addition, the agenda-setting process is important to 
understand for researchers seeking to affect policy. A key influence on 
the agenda-setting process are ‘political streams’: the wider political 
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environment, including government changes and public opinion. 
Research will have a greater impact if it fits within “a range of what can 
be seen as ‘good advice’” (Court and Young 2003: 11).  
 
When it comes to the evidence, two sets of issues have a bearing on 
whether research influences policy: the credibility of the research and its 
communication and packaging. Credibility in the eyes of policymakers 
relates not only to the perceived quality of the research and the degree of 
consensus in the research community, but also to the relevance of the 
research and the extent to which it provides solutions. Policymakers are 
particularly convinced when something has been piloted and proved 
successful. The perceived quality of the research is affected by the 
reputation of the researchers and their institutions. In addition, the 
research method plays a role. Participatory methods in particular tend to 
impress policymakers. (Court and Young 2003: 16-18) The success with 
which findings are communicated matters for their impact on policy. 
Strenuous advocacy efforts are usually required. The uptake of 
recommendations is most likely when there has been a clear 
communication strategy throughout the research process. (Court and 
Young 2003: 18-19). 
 
Court and Young (2003: 20) also conclude that “the links between 
researchers and policymakers are critical to bridging research and 
policy. These include feedback, dialogue and collaboration between 
researchers and policy-makers; the role of networks and policy 
communities; and issues of trust, legitimacy and participation.” 
Feedback refers not only to interactions linked to a particular project, 
but to continuous feedback loops between research, policy, 
implementation and monitoring. Shared objectives and views and 
individual contacts between researchers and policymakers are all highly 
influential factors in this context. (Court and Young 2003: 20-21) 
Ideally, contacts should start in the phase of research design. In the 
words of De la Rive Box, “A better understanding of research design 
and execution would allow for the realistic involvement of users, and 
prevent general policy prescriptions from overriding legitimate scientific 
demands. It would also prevent scientific free riding at the cost of user 
relevance.” (De la Rive Box 2001)  
 
Building networks of researchers and policymakers emerges from ODI’s 
case studies as a helpful tool for the bridging of the gap between 
research and policy. Networks and ‘epistemic communities’ – 
colleagues who share a similar position or approach in regard to a given 
issue and maintain contact with each other across different locations and 
fields – provide important channels for knowledge exchange and the 
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discussion of perspectives. This confirms De la Rive Box’ argument for 
networks as ‘mode three’ knowledge creation (see 2.1.2). “The time for 
grand research programmes at the European level [..] has [..] passed; 
now is the time for focused programmes supporting existing knowledge 
networks.” (De la Rive Box 2001)  
 
The interactions between academic researchers and policymakers and 
practitioners in the field of peace and development described here for 
the most part only apply to Northern academics, and Northern 
policymakers and practitioners. The challenge is to better take into 
account local knowledge of people living and working in conflict-
affected developing countries.  
 
 
2.3.3 Indigenous versus external38 knowledge 
 
Local knowledge may take the form of traditional peacebuilding 
methodologies, such as singing and storytelling as ways to educate 
people about conflict resolution, rights, and peaceful ways of living 
together. Traditional peacebuilding methods include traditional rituals 
that can contribute to peacebuilding. “In Mozambique and Sierra Leone, 
actions undertaken by traditional healers for children traumatised by war 
and former child soldiers demonstrate the success of strategies deeply 
rooted in the social and cultural context.” (Pouligny 2005: 502-503) 
Purification rituals also occurred in Mozambique: “[r]eferring to 
concepts of pollution and purification, they made it possible not only to 
designate and describe the period of violence as ‘abnormal’ or 
‘unacceptable’, but also to define the rules indispensable for the groups’ 
coexistence and survival.” Such rituals “reflect a will both to recover 
one’s roots and to reinterpret them in a world that has gone through a 
profound upheaval”. (Pouligny 2005: 502-503) They recognise that the 
dynamics of a conflict itself has a tremendous impact on people 
(‘possesses’ people) and makes them do things that they otherwise 
probably would not have done, thereby reducing the differences between 
victims en perpetrators and contributing to reconciliation. 
 
                                                 
38 The use of the word ‘external’ represents a conscious choice. The oft-heard dichotomy of ‘global’ 
versus ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ knowledge will not be used. The reason is that what is often termed 
‘global’ is really European and North American, and calling it global obscures the fact that it is 
itself ‘local’ in origin and context. The fact that the distinction is often made in these terms does 
reveal an important reality, however, namely that of the global dominance of Western knowledge 
and of a discourse that labels it as universally applicable and uniquely legitimate. We will return to 
this in chapter 5. Here we will instead distinguish between knowledge that is ‘external’ and 
‘indigenous’ to developing, conflict-affected societies. 
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According to Grenier (1997: 10-11), paying attention to indigenous 
knowledge may 
• create mutual respect, encourage local participation, and build 
partnerships for joint problem resolution 
• facilitate the design and implementation of culturally 
appropriate development programs, avoiding costly mistakes 
• make programmes more relevant and, as a result, more 
sustainable 
• identify techniques that can be transferred to other regions and 
help identify practices suitable for investigation, and 
improvement. An example of non-Western peacebuilding 
methods that have been exported is the concept of restorative 
justice, which focuses on reconciliation rather than retribution 
and was made famous by the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. A West-African interviewee 
quoted the concept as a good example of an African way of 
looking at things. 39 
 
However, peacebuilding interventions are often based on Western 
concepts of conflict resolution, mediation, and institution building. In 
many cases this happens despite the best intentions of donor agencies 
and their recognition in theory of the importance of local knowledge. 
Inequalities in knowledge production and recognition, elaborated in 
chapter four, play a role in this. In addition, indigenous knowledge is 
often not easily accessible. It often remains undocumented. It “is stored 
in people’s memories and activities and is expressed in stories, songs, 
folklore, proverbs, dances, myths, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, 
community laws [and] local language […].” (Grenier 1997: 6) 
 
Further on in this book we will see that the importance to combine 
indigenous and external knowledge, weighing the benefits of both 
tradition and innovation, emerges clearly rom my interviews. Indigenous 
knowledge is by no means monolithic or unchangeable. It evolves in 
interaction. Local knowledge systems are dynamic: new knowledge is 
continuously added. (Grenier 1997: 5). “[I]nnovation is part of every 
culture’s reality, and that borrowing, grafting ideas from the outside, and 
reshaping old concepts to hold new experiences are also important local 
strategies.” (Culbertson and Pouligny 2006: 5) The role of outsiders can 
be extremely important in learning processes. They can serve as idea 
givers, researchers, facilitators, or advocates. (Culbertson and Pouligny 
2006: 20) However, translation between external and local knowledge 
                                                 
39 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
  
96 
can be difficult as they are often grounded in fundamentally different 
knowledge systems. 
 
 
2.4 Different knowledge systems 
 
“We all ‘know’ the world through a combination of our education, 
language, culture, and belief and, just as importantly, our actual 
physical realities – gender, location, socio-economic environment. […] 
The issue for anyone working on development issues cannot be simply 
how to deal with ‘knowledge’, but how to act effectively in an 
environment of multiple ‘knowledges’.” (Powell 2006: 521) 
 
The world has different knowledge systems. “[N]ot only are there 
different realities, but different people have different epistemologies or 
‘ways of knowing’. The distinctions usually made in this respect are 
between indigenous knowledge and western scientific knowledge, and 
between different gender epistemologies.” (Baumann 1999: 14) Here we 
focus on the first distinction – between Western and non-Western 
knowledge systems. As will be discussed in chapter four, some 
knowledge systems are more dominant than others. Oversimplifying 
terribly, the gist of much literature about different knowledge systems is 
as depicted in Table 2.1 below: in contrast with non-Western knowledge 
systems, in which magic, myth, intuition, and tradition play an important 
role (Mudimbe 1988: 189), Western knowledge systems emphasise 
rationality, scientific research standards, and codified, written-down 
knowledge.  
 
Western / modern knowledge system(s) Non-Western / traditional knowledge 
system(s) 
Scientifically generated  Experience-based  
Documented, formalised Undocumented, oral 
Codified, abstracted, quantifiable Qualitative, stories 
Scientifically tested  Intuition, tradition 
Systematic, verifiable Myth, magic 
Short-term emphasis, deadlines Long-term emphasis, process-oriented 
Reductionist Holistic 
‘Objective’, ‘value-free’ Subjective, moral, spiritual 
Focus on learning in formalised settings, 
separated from applied context 
Learning through observation and 
experience 
Data generated by researchers Data generated by practitioners 
Table 2.1: Simplified and generalised overview of the differences between 
Western/modern and non-Western/traditional knowledge 
systems 
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A lot can be said against this simplified depiction of opposing 
knowledge systems. In reality, elements of both exist both in the 
developing world and in the West. The elements generally associated 
with Western-style knowledge, shown in the left-hand column, are part 
of ‘machine’, ‘logic’, rational, positivist, or even bureaucratic-style 
knowledge – which certainly has a dominant position in the West but 
not only there and not to the complete exclusion of elements from the 
right-hand column. Myths and rituals play a role in each society, and 
most humans draw on ‘logic’ and scientific types of knowledge as well 
as more intuitive or even spiritual kinds. In any case, some criticise how  
“in their depiction of the way in which western science has conspired 
to subjugate Third World people, populists come close to resembling 
orientalist myths that deny people any history or creativity. […] [T]his 
populist identification of different types of knowledge removes the 
need for critically examining the material underpinnings and social 
context of either.” (Baumann 1999: 15) 
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, there certainly are differences 
between indigenous and Western knowledge systems, if only because in 
the latter the left-hand column elements have dominated for a much 
longer time. Interviewees of local peace NGOs refer to differences 
between local and Western knowledge systems and for that reason alone 
it would be important to look at this distinction. In their view, the 
elements in the left-hand column of the above table are generally 
associated with the West, particularly by those outside that region. 
However, if there is a clash between Western and indigenous 
knowledge, it takes place not so much between parts of the world as it 
does within countries and communities: between those who have been 
educated according to Western standards, and those who have not; 
between the youth, who have access to new sources of knowledge 
through information technology, and the older generation who stick to 
traditional knowledge; between politicians who maintain the Western-
style state apparatuses installed by colonialism, and traditional 
authorities at the local level. (Senghaas 2002) 
 
Western or ‘modern’ knowledge is not universal but represents a 
specific system of knowledge. This is also true for the way knowledge 
itself is viewed. In the tradition of Western Enlightenment, there is a 
separation between the observer and what is being observed. This is 
different for example in Zen-influenced Japanese culture, in which there 
is no such separation. Baumann generalised this to all non-Western or 
indigenous knowledge systems, writing that “1) indigenous knowledge 
is embedded in a particular community and contextually bound; 2) it is 
not based on a subject/object dichotomy, and; 3) it s not individualistic 
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and is based on a commitment to a local context” (Baumann 1999: 14). 
Interestingly, the same things are often said for female epistemologies – 
as opposed to male ones. Indeed, Baumann (1999: 15) mentions that 
some authors group together “western/male epistemologies and 
eastern/female epistemologies”. Given that some women are raised in 
Western scientific traditions while others are raised in non-Western 
traditions, it is difficult to explain this. In any case, doing so would go 
beyond the scope of this study.  
 
In Hinduism, knowledge is seen as a balance of the knowledge of one’s 
self with knowledge of the external world. The African concept of 
Ubuntu relates knowledge very much to a collective sense of identity. In 
this tradition the observer is an integral part of the reality he is observing 
and an individual can only be understood as part of a wider group: ‘I am 
therefore you are’. “Whereas Western science attempts to isolate a 
problem – to eliminate its interlinkage with various other factors and to 
reduce a problem to a small number of controllable parameters – 
traditional approaches usually examine problems in their entirety, 
together with their interlinkages and complexities”. (Grenier 1997: 10) 
In Ubuntu, the truth cannot be objectively discovered and verified, as 
Western scientific traditions like to believe, but is multi-dimensional and 
ever-changing. No truth is static, absolute or eternal in this way of 
thinking; instead it is defined by change, ambiguity and movement. 
(Lammers 2006, 106). Recalling the discussion about the contested 
nature of conflict knowledge earlier in this chapter, this way of looking 
at truth seems quite relevant for people engaged in conflict and 
peacebuilding.    
 
  
2.5 The applicability of knowledge: how context-specific is 
knowledge? 
 
In how far is knowledge based on a specific experience useful in a 
different situation, with different circumstances? To a large extent this 
question relates to the discussion of tacit knowledge in section 2.1.1. 
There the conclusion was that some knowledge is so much related to a 
person’s individual set of mind frames and experiences that it is 
impossible for others to understand and use. An example from another 
context may illustrate this. How I deal with the specific issues I face in 
the relationship with my spouse, issues which are so much related to our 
personal histories and to the way our relationship has developed over the 
years, is highly specific to my context. Much of my behaviour takes the 
form of a habit based on knowledge and experience that I don’t even 
realise I have. At the same time, it may help me to talk to friends who, 
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although their characters and personal histories differ, may be dealing 
with similar issues. Comparing our assumptions and behaviours could 
lead me to see things from a useful new perspective. Alternatively, a 
psychologist could provide me with objectified, codified knowledge 
based on the experiences of many people like me. Even though this 
knowledge alone might not solve my particular problem, which is too 
specific for anyone else to understand completely, my problem does 
contain generalisable facets that others have experience with as well. 
Applying knowledge that originated elsewhere to my own context 
remains a task that only I can fulfil.  
 
The question also relates to the differences between ‘Northern’ and 
‘indigenous’ knowledge. In this context, De la Rive Box (2001) 
describes the prevailing assumption in the 1950s that countries were 
developed because they were scientifically advanced and therefore 
industrialised. Underdeveloped countries lacked knowledge and 
therefore that knowledge needed to be transferred first. Sending experts 
to, or training students from, developing countries could do the job. 
However, says De la Rive Box, experiences have shown that the 
technical knowledge required in tropical countries was not available in 
the West or at least not suited for application in conditions other than 
those in the West. “Nevertheless, the technology transfer model 
continued to inspire aid or cooperation policies for decades to come.”  
 
Similarly, Baud (2002: 54) describes the “classical linear model” of 
knowledge dissemination from North to South, which “assumes that the 
scientific community produces ‘universally applicable knowledge’”, but 
which is now widely criticised for ignoring “the context in which the 
knowledge is produced, and the limits of that context”. In contrast to this 
model, we will see later on that many peace practitioners interviewed do 
not view knowledge as produced in one context and transferred to 
another, but as produced through interaction between and among 
practitioners and researchers, who are at the same time sources and users 
of knowledge40.  
 
 
2.6 Implications: forms of peace and conflict knowledge 
 
The dichotomies described in this chapter - tacit-explicit, academic-
practitioner, indigenous-external –overlap. Indigenous knowledge, for 
example, can at the same time be tacit and academic. To show this 
overlap, the various types of knowledge discussed are combined in the 
                                                 
40 See also Baud 2002: 54. 
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following tables. Table 2.2 deals with academic knowledge and 
organises it into six categories, using the dimensions indigenous-
external and tacit-explicit-implicit. The same is done for practitioner 
knowledge in Table 2.3. Although many other ways of conceptualising 
types of knowledge can be envisioned, the organisation in these tables 
gives an idea of the range of different types and categories of 
knowledge.  
 
ACADEMIC 
KNOWLEDGE  
 
Indigenous / local External 
Tacit / unique The specific expertise and 
experience of indigenous 
academics and local 
academic communities (1) 
Research skills and 
experience of external 
academics; Northern 
academic communities (2) 
Explicit / programmable 
 
Local academic 
publications or lectures (3) 
External academic 
publications (4) 
Implicit / cultural 
 
Research findings and 
knowledge regarding local 
cultural norms and 
traditions; norms and 
traditions of local 
academia (5) 
Research findings and 
knowledge regarding non-
local cultural norms and 
traditions; norms and 
traditions of external 
academia (6) 
Table 2.2: Types of knowledge: academic 
 
PRACTITIONER 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
Indigenous / local External 
Tacit / unique Personal knowledge of staff. 
Stories, contacts, experience. 
(7) 
Travel stories, personal 
contacts, experience of external 
people. (8) 
Explicit / 
programmable 
Statistics, databases, 
intranets. Manuals, project 
reports, lessons learned 
documents, evaluation 
reports. (9) 
Websites, publications, manuals 
of external agencies. (10) 
Implicit / cultural 
 
Local norms and traditions in 
NGOs and communities (11) 
Northern norms and traditions; 
norms and traditions of the 
international peace and 
development community (12) 
Table 2.3: Types of knowledge: practitioner 
 
What is important with an eye on the use of knowledge is that different 
categories of knowledge present different challenges for learning and 
knowledge sharing initiatives. Table 2.4 below draws attention to the 
kinds of process challenges associated with the mobilisation of the 
twelve categories of knowledge distinguished in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. In 
addition, the table lists possible beneficiaries of the various types of 
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knowledge, as well as a number of methods that could facilitate the 
processes needed to reach these beneficiaries.  
 
Type of 
knowledge, 
challenges and 
methods 
 
Process 
challenges 
Utilisation and 
recipients 
Methods for 
knowledge 
production 
(1) The specific 
expertise and 
experience of 
indigenous 
academics and 
local academic 
communities 
Very few local 
academics 
working on peace 
issues 
 
How to make this 
knowledge more 
explicit?  
 
How to make it 
available to other 
researchers and 
non-academics – 
locally and 
globally? 
External academics 
may learn from the 
skills of doing 
research in particular 
local (conflict) 
contexts 
 
Academics in areas 
facing similar 
challenges may 
compare and learn 
from their 
experiences  
 
Practitioners can use 
context-specific 
research skills for 
reflection on practice  
Build local 
academic capacity 
through cooperation 
with external 
academics  
 
Bring together 
Southern academics 
and practitioners in 
research around 
projects and in 
discussion forums 
(see chapter eight) 
(2) Research 
skills and 
experience of 
external 
academics; 
global academic 
communities 
How document 
this knowledge? 
 
How to make it 
available to local 
researchers and 
non-academics? 
Local researchers can 
learn from these 
communities 
 
Practitioners can use 
research skills for 
reflection on practice  
Build local 
academic capacity 
through cooperation 
with external 
academics (see 4.1 
and 4.2) 
 
Bring together 
Northern and 
Southern academics 
and practitioners in 
research around 
projects and in 
discussion forums 
(3) Local 
academic 
publications or 
lectures 
How to reach 
possible audiences 
abroad? 
 
How to apply 
theoretical ideas to 
the practice?  
 
How to bridge the 
gap between 
academia and 
practice? 
External academics 
may use the 
knowledge and 
combine it with 
knowledge from 
elsewhere to generate 
generalised 
knowledge 
 
Academics in areas 
facing similar 
challenges may 
Capacity building 
(see 3.6 and 4.7). 
 
More research in 
response to 
demands from 
practitioners (see 
5.3.4, 5.5.5 and 
chapter eight).  
 
Participatory 
research.  
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compare the 
knowledge with their 
own in order to arrive 
at new conclusions 
 
Practitioners at home 
and abroad may apply 
the knowledge in 
their work 
 
Packaging: writing 
style, summarising.  
 
Active attention to 
communication and 
dissemination of 
research results 
beyond academic 
community (see 
2.1.2). 
(4) External 
academic 
publications 
How to link up 
with indigenous 
research – and 
local and global 
practice? 
Indigenous 
researchers may 
combine this 
knowledge with their 
own research results 
in order to generate 
new generalised 
knowledge 
 
Practitioners may 
apply the knowledge 
in their work 
North-South 
research 
partnerships and 
networks. 
 
More research in 
response to 
demands from 
practitioners (see 
5.3.4, 5.5.5 and 
chapter eight).  
 
Participatory 
research.  
 
Packaging: writing 
style, summarising.  
 
Active attention to 
communication and 
dissemination of 
research results 
beyond academic 
community (see 
2.1.2). 
(5) Research 
findings and 
knowledge 
regarding local 
cultural norms 
and traditions; 
norms and 
traditions of 
local academia 
Intangible nature 
of such knowledge 
and fact that it 
usually exists only 
in tacit form. 
Challenge for 
external actors to 
gain access to this 
knowledge and to 
apply it / adjust to 
different norms 
Northern researchers, 
policymakers and 
peacebuilding 
practitioners – 
researchers in order to 
do research more 
effectively in 
countries with 
different cultures, 
policymakers to make 
more relevant policy, 
practitioners to work 
more effectively 
Comes to the fore in 
indigenous-external 
exchanges.  
 
Attempts may be 
made to document 
this knowledge 
through joint North-
South, participatory 
research. 
(6) Research 
findings and 
knowledge 
regarding non-
Intangible nature 
of such knowledge 
and fact that it 
usually exists only 
Southern researchers, 
policymakers, 
practitioners, in order 
to more effectively 
Comes to the fore in 
indigenous-external 
exchanges.  
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local cultural 
norms and 
traditions; norms 
and traditions of 
external 
academia 
in tacit form. 
Challenge for local 
actors to gain 
access to this 
knowledge and to 
apply it / adjust to 
different norms 
work with external 
actors. 
Attempts may be 
made to codify 
through joint North-
South, participatory 
research. 
(7) Personal 
knowledge of 
staff. Stories, 
contacts, 
experience 
How to find out 
who knows what?  
 
How to make 
explicit and share?  
 
How to share 
beyond the 
immediate 
community? 
Colleagues may 
access the knowledge 
present inside their 
organisation 
 
Other organisations 
could benefit for their 
own work 
 
Researchers (local 
and external) may use 
it to generate more 
generalised 
knowledge 
Staff surveys, 
yellow pages (see 
3.2.4). 
 
Encouraging 
documentation. 
 
Create space for 
intra-organisational 
exchange through 
meetings, joint field 
visits, differing 
team compositions 
(see 3.2 and 5.3). 
 
Make space for 
(online) discussion 
with staff of other 
organisations and 
local communities 
(see 5.3 and 
chapters six and 
seven). 
 
International 
conferences, 
networks or 
discussion forums 
(chapter seven). 
(8) Travel 
stories, personal 
contacts, 
experience of 
external people.  
How to find out 
who knows what?  
 
How to distil 
knowledge for 
sharing? 
 
How to codify and 
share beyond the 
immediate 
community? 
Fellow practitioners 
inside and outside the 
own organisation may 
benefit from the 
accumulated practical 
action experiences 
(learning how to do 
something)  
 
Researchers may use 
it to generate more 
generalised 
knowledge 
Encouraging 
documentation (see 
5.3 and chapter 
eight). 
 
Dissemination of 
conference reports 
and organisation of 
follow-up. 
 
Intra- and extra-
organisational 
exchanges (see 5.5). 
 
Create global 
database of experts. 
(9) Statistics, How to write and ‘Raw data’ for local Accessible writing 
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databases, 
intranets. 
Manuals, project 
reports, lessons 
learned 
documents, 
evaluation 
reports 
process them in 
such a way that 
they do not end up 
on a shelf? 
 
How to enable 
people in other 
regions to learn 
from local 
experience? 
and external 
researchers who use it 
to produce knowledge 
with a wider 
applicability 
 
Local practitioners 
use the information in 
the planning of new 
interventions 
 
Practitioners in other 
regions may learn 
from evaluation 
results, repeat 
successful activities 
or avoid making 
similar mistakes 
with possible 
broader 
applicability of 
conclusions on 
mind.  
 
Pay attention to 
communication of 
results and issues.  
 
Create space for 
(online) discussion 
of outcomes. 
 
Cooperation with 
researchers to make 
sense of 
information and 
draw conclusions 
for wider 
application (see 
chapter eight).  
 
Create global 
networks (chapter 
seven). 
(10) Websites, 
publications, 
manuals of 
external 
agencies 
Dealing with 
information 
overload.  
 
Selection of 
relevant 
information, time 
management 
issues.  
 
Access issues. 
See above. Create online 
portals and search 
engines.  
 
Make websites 
interactive, 
allowing for 
improvement of 
manuals based on 
user experience. 
 
Improve internet 
access.  
(11) Local 
norms and 
traditions in 
NGOs and 
communities 
Intangible nature 
of such knowledge 
and fact that it 
usually exists only 
in tacit form. 
Challenge to gain 
access and to 
apply. 
External practitioners 
in order to work more 
effectively in local 
context. 
Exchange with 
locals; observation. 
Being open to 
different 
perspectives, 
traditions (third-
order, cross-cultural 
learning; see 3.1, 
4.7.2 and 
elsewhere). 
(12) Northern 
norms and 
traditions; norms 
and traditions of 
Intangible nature 
of such knowledge 
and fact that it 
usually exists only 
Local NGO staff are 
relatively adept at 
accessing norms and 
language of external 
Exchange with 
external actors and 
observation.  
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the international 
peace and 
development 
community 
in tacit form. 
Challenge to gain 
access and to 
apply. 
actors in 
peacebuilding and at 
translating these to 
local context  
Project and 
reporting guidelines 
give information 
about norms of 
international peace 
and development 
community (see 4.4 
).  
Table 2.4: Knowledge challenges for peace and development organisations 
 
 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The table above gives an overview of the forms that knowledge of peace 
and conflict takes, and the issues and challenges that arise when it comes 
to sharing them with others. A number of issues emerge from the 
various types of knowledge discussed in this chapter: 
• important challenge for knowledge processes is how to 
mobilise, exchange and apply tacit and implicit knowledge. In 
Table 2.4 in the previous section this was concretised some 
more. But what ideas about learning and knowledge exchange 
actually exist that try to facilitate these processes? We will turn 
to that question in the next chapter. The question may also be 
raised how such processes work in reality in NGOs. While the 
next chapter provides some initial ideas about this, it is in the 
remainder of the book that this question will really be explored 
for the practice of Southern peace NGOs.  
• There are some communication issues between practitioners and 
academics when it comes to the sharing of knowledge, although 
academic knowledge originates in practice. It is suggested that 
dynamic knowledge networks could provide an avenue for joint 
academic-practitioner knowledge creation. But how does this 
work in practice? In chapters six and seven, we will look at 
networks as a knowledge exchange and knowledge generation 
tool. 
• Knowledge of conflict and peace is never neutral and there are 
usually competing versions of the ‘truth’. Discussing these 
different interpretations is in fact an important part of 
peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. This means that 
reconciliation has an important knowledge component. How 
exactly can knowledge exchange and joint learning processes 
contribute to peacebuilding? And does this happen in reality? 
This is another set of questions that we will return to in Parts 
Two and Three. 
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Chapter 3. Processes, actors, relationships 
Knowledge and learning in NGOs 
 
Thinking back to the research question - what are the challenges and 
opportunities Southern peace NGOs are confronted with in 
accumulating, mobilising and disseminating the knowledge that is 
needed to make optimal policy decisions, carry out activities in an 
effective way and adjust to continuously changing circumstances? -, this 
study has so far looked at the role and place of local NGOs in 
contemporary peacebuilding processes and the forms that knowledge of 
peace, conflict and development takes. Now, it will turn to the 
characteristics of organisational learning processes and see how these 
can be applied to Southern peace NGOs. This discussion is based, first, 
on publications about learning and organisational learning processes: an 
extensive body of literature that mostly focuses on the business world. 
Second, this chapter incorporates recent thinking about knowledge 
processes in NGOs; thinking which, as we will see, focuses mostly on 
Northern development organisations.  
 
Organisations working in circumstances of conflict find themselves in 
rapidly changing contexts, calling for flexibility and the capacity to learn 
from their actions. Many NGOs look for new ways of working and 
networking in cooperation with partners. If the quality of work of NGOs 
in conflict situations is to be maintained and improved, the learning 
capacity of these organisations and their employees deserves attention. 
Processes of learning in and by NGOs also come to the fore in 
discussions around monitoring and evaluation and increasingly have to 
be demonstrated when NGOs apply for funding from donor agencies. 
However, the daily circumstances of NGO staff present difficulties: they 
work in a context of urgency, have action-oriented working styles, and 
often find it difficult to create time and space for reflection and learning. 
In such a situation, how do NGO employees find ways to learn and 
reflect, and to connect this to their work? 
 
Section 3.1 looks at learning processes in general, addressing different 
levels of learning and briefly paying attention to what characterises 
learning in circumstances affected by conflict. 3.2 focuses on 
organisational learning processes. Next, the chapter turns to learning 
processes in development and conflict NGOs, with section 3.3 
addressing the rise of the concept of learning in the development field, 
3.4 discussing theory on the knowledge strategies of NGOs, and 3.5 
discussing the fact that little attention is paid in the literature to Southern 
organisations. Next, two bodies of thinking are examined that do shed 
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some light on knowledge flows involving SNGOs: capacity building 
(3.6) and networking (3.7). Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
Sections 3.9 and 3.10 serve to conclude Part One and to set the stage for 
the remainder of the book. In 3.9, the main findings from Part One are 
combined into a model of knowledge processes, actors and relationships 
that exist in and around peace NGOs. This model is used as a starting 
point for the analysis in the rest of the book. In Parts Two and Three it 
will be developed further based on the findings presented there. In 3.10, 
the research methodology used for the study of Southern peace NGOs in 
Parts Two and Three is outlined. 
 
 
3.1 Learning processes: Retaining and using knowledge  
 
One of the most influential sources of thinking about knowledge and 
learning has been the private sector – firms, business schools, think 
tanks and consultancy firms, particularly in the US, Europe and Japan – 
which began to recognise the importance of the retention and exchange 
of knowledge for competitiveness during the 1980s, resulting in many 
experiments and publications and the coining of the term ‘knowledge 
management’. Over the past decade, knowledge and knowledge 
processes have received increasing attention from the development field 
as well. The recognition that learning is of critical importance is 
growing among international peace and development NGOs, as is the 
recognition that a lot needs to be done to improve the capacity for 
learning. Evaluations pay more attention to the issue than some years 
ago. The 2002 evaluation of the co-financing programme of NGOs of 
the Dutch government concluded that the learning capacity of Dutch 
NGOs and their partners was insufficient. More specifically, the 
evaluators wrote that two types of knowledge were required: more 
specialised thematic knowledge and more in-depth knowledge about 
local contexts. (Stuurgroep Evaluatie Medefinancieringsprogramma 
2002: x and xii) In response, during the past decade there have been a lot 
of activities in many of the multilateral and bilateral development 
agencies concerning knowledge and information management. The 
World Bank was the first development organisation to explicitly adopt, 
and systematically tackle, the goal of becoming a knowledge agency. 
(King 2005: 73) 
 
This section maps the main theories and discussions on knowledge 
processes that take place in and around organisations. Various, partly 
overlapping knowledge processes can be identified: knowledge 
identification (finding out or realising what relevant knowledge is 
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available); knowledge retention (preventing this knowledge from 
disappearing); knowledge transfer (from one individual to others or from 
one organisation to others); knowledge reception (being at the other end 
of the transfer); knowledge exchange (the whole process of transfer and 
reception); knowledge processing (translating the received knowledge so 
that it can be used); and knowledge implementation (using the received 
knowledge, thereby changing behaviour and actions). Learning could be 
conceived as a concept that sums up all these processes, as it includes 
everything from the identification and adoption of new knowledge to its 
integration into practice, leading to behavioural change. Organisational 
learning (3.2) is a concept that applies this to organisations, focusing on 
the conditions that optimise learning in organisations and learning by 
organisations. In addition to the processes listed above, one could also 
identify consciously developed mechanisms that aim to facilitate these 
processes, in particular knowledge management (3.2.2). Before 
explicitly linking these concepts to the NGO sector, I will first elaborate 
these concepts as such. 
 
 
3.1.1 Defining learning 
 
A common definition of learning is “knowledge acquisition or 
acquisition of new behaviour” (Smid and Beckett 2004: 406). This 
implies that learning does not necessarily have to lead to new behaviour. 
I might gain knowledge about twelfth century French literature that I 
cannot apply directly to my daily actions41. In Argyris’ definition, by 
contrast, learning is a much more practical and intentional act, designed 
to improve daily behaviour: “[l]earning is the detection and correction of 
error. Error is any mismatch between intentions and implementation. 
Learning occurs when these features are connected to effective action. 
The evidence in learning is that we can implement what we learned.” 
(Argyris 2004b: 29) This is not to say that it is impossible for behaviour 
to change towards less effective action: people do not always know what 
it takes to be more effective, and so they experiment. Another possibility 
is that people act irrationally, for whatever reason. In conflict situations 
irrational behaviour is in fact quite common.   
 
As this study concerns itself not with learning for intellectual 
enrichment, but with learning for more effective action, a definition that 
includes Argyris’ element of the improvement of action will be useful. 
“When someone’s head is filled with knowledge, but his behaviour does 
                                                 
41 although I could argue that this new set of knowledge unconsciously helps shape my world vision 
and thereby indirectly my behaviour 
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not change, he has not learned anything in the eyes of his colleagues” 
(Wierdsma and Swieringa 2002, cited in Smit 2006). Even though a 
perfect match between intention and result is impossible, practice-
oriented learning springs from a desire to function better and obtain 
better results. This desire may come not only from a mismatch between 
intention and implementation: even when I achieve my intended results, 
I might change my aims and intentions and set even higher standards. In 
order to achieve these, learning is also necessary. When people suspect 
that they could act more effectively, they may go searching for the 
knowledge that enables them to do so42. At the same time, learning may 
also be less intentional. It may result not from a conscious decision to 
look for knowledge that could improve action, but simply from learning 
by doing. People may think they are doing an excellent job until they 
happen to come across a piece of evidence that increases their 
knowledge and enables them to change their behaviour for even better 
results. People learn unconsciously all the time through daily action and 
interaction.  
 
According to Smid and Beckett (2004: 409), in traditional mainstream 
thinking about learning daily practice is not considered a source of 
learning. Learning is more seen as something extra, a ‘cost’. This school 
of thought assumes that there is a period of learning, followed by a 
period of non-learning, followed again by a period of learning, etc., 
rather than continuous learning-in-action or experiential learning. 
Traditionally, then, the thinking has focused on learning moments when 
people are actively spending time on learning. In this line of thinking, 
when the moment designated for learning ends, people go back to 
everyday practice. Recent theory, in contrast, focuses on continuous 
learning or learning by doing. This study includes both. Conscious 
learning with the aim to acquire new knowledge may complement 
continuous learning from practice.  
 
In a session in November 2004 with Dutch practitioners and researchers 
from the field of conflict and development43, the participants were asked 
what had been their most important learning moments, whether planned 
or coincidental. The following moments were mentioned:  
• during consultations around policy formulation 
• during longer periods in the field44 
                                                 
42 I write “they may” rather than “they will” because in reality it often happens that there is no time 
or space for this search and therefore it does not take place. 
43 Electronic Boardroom session with Dutch NGO representatives and academics, organised by the 
author in Amsterdam on 29 November 2004. 
44 A 2003 study on learning processes inside the NNGO Cordaid study confirms this: “[m]ost eye-
openers occurred in the field when an intervention triggered unexpected outcomes.” An example of 
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• during seminars, lunch meetings 
• from local knowledge 
• personal contacts in the margins of meetings 
• learning in response to concrete challenges 
 
From this list it appears that a combination of spending time with 
partner organisations in different regions and discussions with people 
inside and outside the organisation creates a learning environment. This 
is confirmed by a study of learning activities inside the Dutch NGO 
Cordaid which showed that staff considered discussions with partners 
around evaluation and the organisation of regular workshops particularly 
conducive to organisational learning (Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst 2003: 
6). From these sources, then, interaction emerges as a key concept for 
learning. The chances to learn something increase when people 
encounter others, from different organisations, other regions, or different 
types of institutions. Thus, I add interaction as an element to my 
definition of learning. For the purpose of this study, then, learning is the 
conscious or unconscious acquisition of new knowledge that makes 
possible more effective action and/or better results. This knowledge may 
be gained in daily practice, during designated learning moments, or by 
combining knowledge gained in those two different settings. Interaction 
with others plays an important role in learning. The process of learning 
includes not only knowledge acquisition but also implementation: 
changing behaviour for better results. 
 
 
3.1.2 Schools of thought about learning45  
 
There are five theoretical schools of thought about learning: 
behaviourism, the cognitive school, pragmatism, constructivism, and 
situated learning. Behaviourism claims that all organisms learn in 
similar ways and have universally shared association mechanisms. 
Training programmes should aim to understand these mechanisms and 
use them in their teaching methods. In this view, the learner is rather 
passive. Student development takes place through training programmes 
which aim to impart pre-established information, practical skills and 
basic competencies. Learning is a one-way process: the learner’s role is 
to receive knowledge. Behavioural change is the central aim of these 
programmes, and the only indication that learning has taken place. 
                                                                                                            
such an unexpected outcome mentioned by a few staff members of Cordaid was that “getting people 
around the table for an unrelated subject, sometimes led to reconciliation of groups of people living 
in conflict areas.” (Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst 2003: 8) 
45 This section is based on Sauquet (2004) and Keursten (2006). 
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Behaviourism is not of much value for this study, which focuses on 
learning as an active and interactive process of exchanging knowledge 
for better practice. 
 
According to the cognitive school, the human mind works as a logical 
system of information processing. Like all systems of information 
processing, the capacity of human cognition is limited. Experiences may 
be interpreted incorrectly and have no learning value. Problem framing 
constrains the interpretation range and may implicitly orient decision-
making. Cognitive theories underscore the need for a better 
understanding of people’s ‘mental models’ and the wise use of limited 
cognitive resources. The cognitive school distinguishes between thought 
and action. For efficient practice to occur there must always be a 
precedent of intelligent thought. People have pre-existing thoughts and 
beliefs that guide their actions. Knowledge is a commodity that exists 
separately from action. It circulates through an organisation as 
information does. Knowledge is available and can be managed like any 
other resource. It is not knowledge itself but the capacity of individuals 
to adopt it that is limited by mental models and suboptimal problem 
framing.  
 
According to Sauquet, the central premise of cognitivism that action 
must be preceded by thought is flawed. Instead, intelligence is 
embedded in practice and people learn by doing. The idea that 
knowledge can be managed like information is also mistaken and lies at 
the roots of the limited success of the, until recently extremely popular, 
notion of knowledge management (see 3.2.2). What is nonetheless 
interesting in the cognitive school is the attention paid to problem 
definitions, images and mental models that frame the understanding 
individuals have of reality and that shape their actions and learning 
processes. As we will see in the next section, for learning in the most 
profound or ‘deep’ sense to take place these frames have to be 
recognised and questioned. 
 
A third theory, pragmatism, tones down the effects of training by 
focusing on learning by doing. Learning occurs as one tries to solve 
practical problems. A problem arises and confusion is the result. To 
make sense of a situation the individual frames the problem using pre-
existing knowledge. This is followed by hypothesis formulation, inquiry, 
and action to correct the situation. The pragmatist school is quite 
relevant to this study as it sheds light on practice-oriented learning 
cycles and has influenced learning concepts such as single- and double-
loop learning (elaborated in the next section). However, it neglects the 
importance of the knowledge of others (whether knowledge made 
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explicit in theories or tacit knowledge shared through interaction) in 
shaping and complementing people’s practical learning experiences. 
 
A related school of thought, constructivism, focuses on personal 
interpretation of information as central to learning. People learn by 
giving meaning to their experience and to other information that they 
come across. In this way they construct, rather than acquire, knowledge. 
Constructivism draws attention to the central importance of 
interpretation and giving meaning to processes of learning. The 
approach is also useful because it shows that much knowledge is 
subjective and context-specific, characteristics that our earlier discussion 
of tacit knowledge, and more specifically, conflict and peace 
knowledge, also made clear.  
 
Finally, situated learning focuses on the context of the learner and 
thereby presents a social understanding of learning. The concept of 
situated learning can be understood as complementing individual 
cognitivism, pragmatism and constructivism by introducing the social 
context. The social context determines the way ideas and concepts are 
incorporated. As knowledge develops in a specific context, it is difficult 
to transfer it to another context or to establish best practices. The social 
environment shapes expectations of how things should be done, leading 
to different solutions in different contexts (see also 3.1.3 on interactive 
learning). The situated learning approach draws attention to 
characteristics of the social environment that may promote or inhibit 
learning. Such characteristics may for example be trust, openness, 
power, competition, caring, and mutual interest or attractiveness. 
Changes of context may also play a role in learning. While continuity in 
one’s environment may help a process of experimentation and 
adaptation, a change of setting may shed a completely new light on a 
problem and thereby lead to genuine innovation. Comparing one’s 
situation with those of others in a process of knowledge sharing or 
interactive learning brings in new perspectives.  
 
Depending on the circumstances, each of the approaches described may 
provide inspiration to people looking to stimulate learning processes. 
Behaviourism may be helpful in standardised processes in which pre-
defined, routine behaviour is required and outcomes are predictable. 
Cognitivism may provide leads where the use of available, formal 
knowledge plays a role. This may be the case with medical diagnoses, 
economic analyses or legal questions. Pragmatism may help with 
definable problems from practice, where continuous improvement, 
individual problem solving and experience building are central aims. 
Constructivism and situated learning fit groups that are jointly looking 
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to develop new solutions in complex situations in which ambitions, 
context and approaches are not fixed but are themselves in development. 
These approaches offer solutions to questions that cannot be solved 
through ‘more of the same’. The latter situation clearly matches the 
peacebuilding field the best. This means that the learning processes that 
this study looks at may be best understood in the light of constructivist, 
interactive approaches. That said, elements of cognitivism and, 
particularly, pragmatism also play a role in different aspects of a 
learning process. In line with these considerations, the book treats 
learning as a social process in which people develop meaning and 
competence (constructivism) through action (pragmatism) and 
interaction (situated learning). Finding better ways to access previously 
documented information (cognitivism) plays a role in these processes as 
well, to the extent that this information does not constitute an end 
product but gets fed into processes of experimentation, interaction and 
sense-making. 
 
 
3.1.3 Learning cycles  
 
At the risk of introducing too many concepts at once, it may be useful to 
distinguish between exploitative and explorative learning (Nooteboom 
2002: 41). Exploitation, also known as first-order learning, refers to 
learning to do existing things better. In this type of learning one tries to 
correct error through practice, in order to better match outcome with 
intention. Exploration, also known as second-order learning, goes 
beyond learning to do existing things better. Instead it searches for new 
things, using a new perspective. This type of learning does not occur as 
a result of experience, but of reflection upon experience. “Exploration 
means stepping back from practice and thinking about what you were 
doing in the first place” (Turel 2005: 27). Intentions, and the values 
underpinning them, are reconsidered and changed in explorative 
learning. The following figure explains the process of second-order 
learning. 
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Figure 3.1: Second-order learning cycle46 
 
The figure shows that second-order learning has its basis in concrete 
experience. Reflection on this experience (how am I doing? Why? How 
are others doing in comparison?) abstracts the information derived from 
this experience. In the next phase, this information is compared with 
other information or used for experimentation in practice. The 
conclusions drawn from this are used to improve action. A Liberian 
NGO worker gave an example from practice: 
“At each phase of the processes in which they work, practitioners need 
to ask themselves whether they are doing the right thing and how 
things can be done better. At each phase, new stumbling blocks arise. 
One learns by dealing with these stumbling blocks. For example, in 
Lofa county there is one village where two ethnic groups did not speak 
to one another. After some time it became clear that they were not 
opposed to each other as such, but that politicians in Monrovia had 
fuelled and managed tensions in order to promote their own interests. 
People were willing to reconcile as long as their leaders in Monrovia 
agreed with it. In response, our organisation decided to engage these 
politicians and bring them to the village in question.”47 
 
According to Kolb (1984), most people have a preference for one or 
more phases of the learning cycle. This is related to their individual 
learning style.  Some people have an activist learning style: they prefer 
doing. Others prefer reflecting: a reflective learning style. Still others are 
most comfortable conceptualising, and have a theoretical learning style. 
Finally there are those who prefer to learn by trying out new ways of 
working: a pragmatic or experimental learning style.    
 
                                                 
46 Kolb 1984 
47 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 14 February 2006. 
Concrete experience
Active experimentation / 
acquisition of additional 
knowledge, comparing 
Abstract concepts and 
generalisations 
Observation and 
reflection 
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Some theorists48 add a third mode of learning, which they call third-
order learning. In their view, the three types of learning can be 
conceived as follows. 
• First-order learning: the passive internalisation of a pre-given 
set of knowledge, or improvement of actions based on an 
acquired store of knowledge and experience 
• Second-order learning: trial-and-error reflecting while acting - 
through an interactive process of asking questions, reflecting, 
and adjusting while acting. ‘Am I doing things right?’ 
• Third-order learning: “reflection-on-reflection-in-action”: 
reflecting on one’s own manner of thinking, acting and learning, 
and the underlying assumptions. ‘Am I doing the right thing?’ 
This also includes questioning the validity of the tasks and 
problems posed by the context, which may lead to a 
transformation of that context. Third-order learning is 
particularly relevant to the processes this study looks at. After 
all, chapter two concluded that reflection on assumptions and 
openness to other ‘mind frames’ are necessary elements of 
cross-cultural learning. 
 
Third-order learning adds another cycle of reflection and learning to the 
one portrayed in Figure 3.1 above: the cycle of self-reflection and the 
questioning of underlying values. What is my own personal role in this 
cycle? What implicit assumptions and experiences do I bring to this 
learning process, and do they lead to any distortions? Should my 
assumptions be modified? Because third-order learning adds another 
cycle, it is often referred to as double-loop learning. In double-loop 
learning, the values and assumptions underlying my actions are reflected 
upon and tested simultaneously with the reflection and testing of the 
actions themselves. In chapter eight, where the concept of action 
learning is discussed, the two loops are visualised and elaborated (see 
8.3). 
 
Engeström gives a more elaborate typology of types of learning based 
on the distinction between first-, second- and third-order learning.  
                                                 
48 Smid and Beckett (2004: 408), Boonstra ( 2004: 16), Cummings (2004). 
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Kind of 
learning 
Explanation Type 
Conditioning Learning by reward and punishment to react in a 
certain manner, passive internalisation of pre-
given culture. 
Surface-level, 
first-order 
Imitation Copying readily available correct behaviour in 
the context. 
Surface-level, 
first-order 
Trial-and-error Finding out how correct solutions can be 
produced even when they are not readily 
available in the context for copying. 
Surface-level, 
second-order 
Investigative Reflect upon a problem, give hypothetical 
explanation of principles behind successful 
solutions. Test of hypothesis and modification 
according to the results. 
Deep-level, 
second-order 
Expansive No limited or pre-defined contents and tasks, 
questioning the validity of tasks and problems 
posed by the context, transform the context itself, 
externalisation of novel cultural practices gains 
priority. 
Deep-level, 
third-order 
Table 3.1: Five types of learning according to Engeström 199549 
 
 
3.1.4 Learning in conflict 
 
In situations affected by conflict the need to learn is high, or, put 
differently, the risk of not learning is great. Not learning from the 
mistakes of oneself or others may cost lives. The context changes 
rapidly, and what seemed like common sense yesterday may no longer 
apply today. For organisations working in conflict-affected settings, 
flexibility is needed, which requires the capacity to adapt in response to 
experiences and changes – in other words, to learn. Therefore, conflict 
may stimulate learning. In a dire situation, people may become more 
creative, simply because they need to be considering the limited means 
they have at their disposal. Learning in conflict is not theoretical but 
solution-oriented; knowledge can lead to survival. At the same time, 
learning in conflict may be regressive or defensive rather than forward-
looking: ‘we have to learn how to prevent this from happening again’.  
 
While conflict may stimulate learning, it may at the same time inhibit it. 
People working in conflict often have little access to knowledge sources 
outside their immediate locality. In addition, the role knowledge plays in 
conflict (see 2.2.2) may mean that people resist learning. “Resistance 
seems to occur when learning does not resonate with an individual’s 
reality. Motivation and incentives are also important considerations.” 
                                                 
49 Smid and Beckett 2004: 409 
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(Taylor et al. 2006: 22)50 In general, people like knowledge that 
confirms their views and may be uncomfortable with knowledge that 
makes them question their ideas and actions. In conflict, this may play a 
particularly strong role. Group identities harden, ‘truths’ become a way 
to legitimise actions, and admitting that there are other ways to look at 
reality risks making one’s own behaviour seem flawed, or even criminal. 
In the case of organisations that are in the business of peacebuilding, 
admitting to flawed views and behaviour could even mean taking 
responsibility for failing to save human lives.  
 
What we can draw from these reflections is that in conflict settings, 
learning at the tactical level (in order to do something better) is 
stimulated, while deeper-level learning, which involves questioning 
one’s views and actions altogether, is difficult.  
 
 
3.2 Organisational learning 
 
3.2.1 Principles of organisational learning 
 
As we will see in chapter five, SNGO staff do not engage in isolated 
learning, but stress the role of interactions with others. In this context, 
the concept of interactive learning, “learning by doing in interaction 
with others” (Boonstra 2004: 15-16), is worth addressing. It consists of 
cyclical processes of interaction in which people can learn at the first, 
second and third levels described above, and can renew their 
assumptions and action repertoires. Interactive learning is based on the 
following principles, which organisational uses.  
• organisations are conceived as feedback systems 
• individuals have room for self-organisation 
• people strive for transparency in interactive patterns in order to 
understand and adjust underlying assumptions, and to jointly 
chart, recognise, and clarify relationships 
• room is made for multiple constructs of reality 
• there is a reflection on interrelationships between actors, 
constructs, and contexts of actors 
• there is a shared sense-making of events 
• there is room for interaction and reflection on personal actions 
and underlying assumptions to make room for learning 
processes (Boonstra 2004: 15) 
 
                                                 
50 Resistance to learning can take various forms: ignoring, devaluing, diverting, cultural apologism, 
and withdrawal (Taylor et al. 2006, 22). 
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The importance of stimulating, retaining, sharing and using the 
knowledge of individuals inside an organisation is now widely 
recognised. This type of knowledge processes is called learning in 
organisations. Another, more difficult concept is that of learning of 
organisations or organisational learning. Individual and organisational 
learning are connected. When an individual joins an organisation he or 
she has to internalise knowledge about the workings and routines of the 
organisation. At the same time, the body of organisational knowledge 
that is internalised by the new member constantly changes, because 
members bring their own knowledge with them, which may become part 
of organisational routines. (Huysman 2004: 70-71) 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Organisational learning51 
 
An individual learns, then, by internalising organisational knowledge 
and combining it with his or her own experience in a community of 
practice. This learning can occur in practice, as first-order learning, or 
through reflection: second-order learning. What is adopted by the 
community of practice may subsequently be objectified into the 
knowledge of the organisation. The changed organisational knowledge 
is again internalised by organisational members. In this way 
organisational change or innovation is implemented. (Turel 2005: 31) 
This kind of process takes place at all levels of the organisation. Each 
change is accompanied by discussions among organisational members 
as to the value of the change. However, individuals learning in an 
organisation do not necessarily lead to organisational learning. To 
illustrate this, Wierdsma and Swieringa (2002, cited in Smit 2006: 9) use 
the example of a soccer team. Even if the best eleven players of a 
                                                 
51 Huysman 2004: 75 
Shared knowledge: 
re-used new combinations 
Organisational knowledge 
Individual knowledge 
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collective 
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country are playing in a team, this does not automatically mean that this 
team wins from teams with lesser players. The team has to learn to do 
things differently together. That does not mean that organisational 
learning can take place without individual learning, however. If nobody 
can play soccer, the team will certainly lose.  
 
A popular way to look at learning in organisations is that it takes place 
through communities of practice: small groups of people who have 
worked together for some time. They are not necessarily a team, task 
force, or division. What holds them together is a common sense of 
purpose and a need to know what the other knows. There are many 
communities of practice within an organisation, and most people belong 
to more than one of them. In an attempt to institutionalise such a 
process, many organisations have established more or less formal 
‘communities of practice’ which regularly exchange knowledge around 
specific themes. This has happened in corporations as well as 
organisations that focus on development – the World Bank is a notable 
example.  
 
Organisational learning thus involves exchanges between staff members, 
so that people can learn from the experience of others when they try to 
implement a project. In that sense one may discern a demand side and a 
supply side of knowledge. The demand side is eager to incorporate the 
lessons learned by others into the design of a particular activity, while 
the supply side may have such knowledge to offer. On the demand side, 
several processes may take place: scanning (finding out who in the 
organisation has relevant experience to share and getting in touch with 
them), interpretation (adapting what others have learned to one’s own 
context) and putting the knowledge in practice (starting a new cycle of 
organisational learning). The problem here is that people on the demand 
side often do not actively seek the knowledge of others. This can make 
organisational learning initiatives, often started by management, quite 
artificial. On the supply side, processes include joint sense-making of 
experiences, generalisation (determining what part of knowledge is 
relevant to others and translating lessons into more general terms), and 
dissemination (face-to-face or through codification). Bringing the 
demand and supply sides together may be done by a person playing the 
role of a broker. This may be a trainer, external advisor, or internal 
learning officer. (Smit 2006: 11-13)  
 
Learning can take place at different organisational levels. It has been 
said that at the management level, strategic learning takes place while 
among employees actually implementing activities, tactical learning 
predominates. While tactical learning is confined to improving the 
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effectiveness of daily dealings and activities through practice, strategic 
learning concerns itself with basic questions about the goal of the 
organisation and ways to achieve it. It takes the form of broad, long-
term planning and may include ‘third-order’ questions about to the aims 
and identity of the organisation. (Turel 2005, drawing on Minzberg) 
This distinction between organisational levels and their specific types of 
learning is rather stylised; reality is more blurred. Of particular 
importance for organisational learning is the interaction among different 
levels. For example, strategic learning at management level is unlikely 
to occur without signals coming from operational levels that 
organisational strategies might be improved. However, this interaction 
among levels is often problematic. In many instances, organisational 
levels speak different languages. For example, in larger NGOs the 
management tends to speak in conceptual, generalised terms while 
operational staff tend to emphasise the context-specificity of knowledge 
and do not often generalise beyond the regions or thematic areas in 
which they work. 52 
  
Taking all these issues into account, the questions that much of the 
organisational learning literature concerns itself with are, first, how to 
create optimal opportunities for learning at all levels of the organisation, 
and between levels of the organisation (creating a learning 
environment). Secondly, organisational learning revolves around finding 
ways to ensure that organisational learning is not merely first-order, but 
second- or third-order (building an organisation’s capacity for self-
reflection and self-renewal). Various suggestions are made to achieve 
these goals. Publications by Boonstra and Britton mention a number of 
organisational characteristics that promote learning, thereby summing 
up much of the literature about this issue. They write that the dynamics 
of an organisation increase and make room for learning and renewal if it 
has the following characteristics.53 
 
Atmosphere and culture: 
• There is openness to new ideas and challenges. 
• Feelings and assumptions regarding renewal can be discussed. 
• There is an atmosphere of safety in which to express and 
manage uncertainties. 
 
                                                 
52 Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst (2003: 7) and MBN Werkgroep Kwaliteit (2006: 7). This issue also 
came to the fore in discussions during the course mentioned in note 36. 
53 The following list draws on Boonstra 2004, Britton 2005, and Taylor et al. 2006. 
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Leadership: 
• There is supportive leadership, which places learning high on 
the agenda. 
• Time and money is made available for learning processes. 
• The leadership communicates the importance of learning to 
organisational members, and recognises and rewards their 
contributions to learning processes. 
• Conceptual clarity is provided about what is meant by 
organisational learning and what kinds of activities contribute to 
it. 
 
Individual competencies: 
• The development of individuals’ learning competences is 
supported. These competences include reflection on practice and 
on one’s own role, interpersonal communication skills, and 
networking and relationship building.  
• Staff members have the capacity to think creatively (rather than 
being skilled in focusing in depth on a single subject or having a 
very bureaucratic background) 
 
Organisational structure and processes: 
• There is space and time for reflection and discussion about 
actions and lessons learned. 
• Many actors with different points of view (inside and outside of 
the organisation) interact. 
• There is a high degree of interactions between actors and 
differences between them are made visible. 
• There is transparency and access to information; information 
and feedback circulate rapidly. 
• Room is created for processes of self-organisation and 
employees have the flexibility to experiment. 
• Learning is integrated into the planning and evaluation cycle.  
 
How can one see the extent to which organisational learning takes 
place? According to Britton, 
“[i]ndications of a learning culture can be seen when colleagues are 
confident to express their thoughts and feelings and share their 
knowledge; when colleagues ask questions of one another, listen to 
each other and constructively challenge each other’s assumptions; 
when mistakes are rarely repeated; when long-standing colleagues are 
not cynical about their work and when problems are exposed and dealt 
with without blame. At an organisational level, a learning culture 
would be indicated when there is a sense of progression in new 
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initiatives and when the organisation’s leadership recognises and 
prioritises learning as an aspect of good practice.” (Britton 2005: 17) 
 
 
3.2.2 Knowledge management  
 
The concept of knowledge management is somewhat difficult to 
separate from organisational learning and knowledge exchange, as the 
term knowledge management is used with various, quite different 
meanings, some of which overlap significantly or entirely with other 
concepts. One definition of knowledge management is that it is a way of 
“getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time and 
helping people share and put information into action in ways that strive 
to improve organizational performance” (O'Dell et al. 1998). This 
definition in fact covers all organisational endeavours to share 
knowledge and learn, and does not tell us much about the unique 
characteristics of knowledge management, if there are any. What is 
interesting however is that the definition equals knowledge with 
information.  
 
That leads us to an issue that is often mentioned in critiques of 
knowledge management (at least in its original form), namely that it 
focuses too exclusively on information retention and accessibility 
through technological means such as databases, web communities, 
newsletters, intranet, and document management systems. This 
technology of developing organisational memory can be important as a 
means to an end, but it has its limits; it focuses on the retention but not 
the use of knowledge. Technical knowledge management solutions also 
assume that all knowledge is objective and can be codified, leaving out 
tacit knowledge entirely. Indeed, knowledge management emerged in 
part as a response to new information technologies and was 
characterised by a great faith in the potential of these technologies to 
retain, circulate and use knowledge within an organisation in order to 
enhance competitiveness. In this sense the traditional concept of 
knowledge management (and its popularity until recently) is based on 
the cognitive school, which assumes that knowledge can be managed 
just like any other resource. However, the cognitive school has its 
limitations in that it separates thought from action (see 3.1.2). As a 
result, knowledge management became little more than information 
management. (Sauquet 2004: 377-378) 
 
This original form of knowledge management did have its value: it 
helped organisations keep better track of what they know, to retain their 
organisational memory, and to make it accessible. It also led to the 
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development of more effective forms of communication. What it did not 
do, however, is think about the application of knowledge. Nor did it lead 
to the generation of genuinely new ideas. (Britton 2005: 7; Keursten 
2006: 4) In more recent years, therefore, literature on knowledge 
management has broadened its focus, recognising the importance of tacit 
knowledge and the limits of information technology. This “second 
generation knowledge management” (Britton 2005: 8) no longer solely 
focuses on its original strategy of top-down standardisation and 
codification of data, but includes bottom-up strategies to preserve, share 
and use tacit and explicit knowledge from all layers of the organisation. 
(Ballantyne 2001)  
 
Thus, the knowledge management field is moving beyond technical 
means for knowledge retention toward a focus on the people that are 
central to organisations and on the development of processes that help 
them share and use their collective knowledge (Britton 2005: 8). This 
has brought the concept of knowledge management closer to that of 
organisational learning. In fact, in many cases it is impossible to 
separate the two concepts, and they are often used interchangeably.    
 
 
3.2.3 Scaffolds: knowledge institutions and other external actors 
 
We will see later on that Southern peace NGO staff emphasise the 
importance of interaction for their learning processes. The literature on 
organisational learning recognises this as well. This section builds on the 
brief discussion of interactive learning in 3.2.1 and focuses on the role 
of other people in the learning of individuals and their organisations. 
Smid and Beckett (2004: 409-411) look at the limits of individual 
learning and the opportunities for more extensive learning presented by 
others. They see a distance between the performance a student is capable 
of on his or her own, and the performance (s)he can attain in 
collaboration with a more knowledgeable or skilled colleague. This 
colleague then functions as a ‘scaffold’. A ‘scaffold’ does not 
necessarily have to be an individual. It can be anything in the 
environment of the learner, including the structure of an organisation 
and the room and opportunities it creates for individual learning. The 
organisation itself then is also a ‘scaffold’. It can also be a training 
course that contributes to the understanding and individual has of his 
situation. Scaffolds, then, are people and structures that help direct and 
shape the development of the individual learner. As critical outsiders 
with fresh perspectives, scaffolds may ask the difficult questions (‘why 
are you doing this and not something else?’) that help a learner move 
beyond first-order learning towards second- or third-order learning. 
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Formal education may serve as a scaffold supporting and deepening 
someone’s learning from practice if it stimulates him to relate the 
theories to his own experience. In line with this, Smid and Beckett 
(2004: 410) distinguish between a “teaching curriculum” and a “learning 
curriculum”. In a teaching curriculum, along the lines of the behavioural 
school described in above, support for learning consists of presenting 
knowledge and facilitating internalisation. This may function as a 
scaffold but the knowledge may not stick because it is not related to the 
personal experience of learners. In a learning curriculum support means 
to use the conflict arising between the activity of the individual learner 
and existing thinking - the basic principle of a ‘Socratic dialogue’ - and 
to enhance development by inviting the individual and collective 
production of new analytical frameworks. 
 
Smid and Beckett (2004: 411) conceptualise organisational learning as 
follows. The point of departure is an activity in the real world. To test 
efficiency, people experiment with this activity. Others may imitate it, 
attempting to adapt it to their own situation. In this context, exchanges 
with others over work methods and effectiveness play an important role. 
In this way, knowledge and rules of thumb are developed. Aided by a 
third party (who functions as a scaffold), it is possible to develop 
activities at a deeper level, creating new individual and collective 
competencies that enable innovative practices. The third party provides 
an external view that enables the individual to step back from practice 
and reflect. From this perspective, interaction with an external partner 
may lead to a better process of reflection and learning. One such partner 
could be a university, which can provide third party support focused on 
the learning process. Interaction with an academic partner also creates 
“transferable competencies”: a person’s skills and knowledge are 
recognised and objectified through a degree or diploma that is 
recognised by others. (Smid and Beckett 2004: 411)54   
 
 
3.2.4 Organisational learning tools 
 
Many different tools have been developed for organisations in order to 
improve their learning capacity. This section briefly mentions some 
examples to give an idea of the kinds of measures that are taken. Tools 
that may stimulate organisational learning include the following.55 
                                                 
54 We will examine this in chapter eight. 
55 The list of tools is based mainly on NHS 2005 and Ramalingham 2006. As discussed, most 
organisational learning and knowledge management text books emphasise that these tools will only 
work in a learning environment (see 3.2.1). They are unlikely to be effective unless the 
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• Knowledge audit: as a starting point to introducing 
organisational learning tools, a qualitative evaluation may be 
held of the knowledge needs, assets, and flows may be held: 
what are the gaps between knowledge needs and assets? Does 
knowledge flow from those who have it to those who need it? 
What obstacles exist? The outcome may be a knowledge map: a 
visual representation of the organisation’s knowledge assets and 
flows. 
• White pages are like a staff directory but include details on 
people’s knowledge, skills, experiences and interests. They aim 
to enable staff to gain access to the tacit knowledge of others.  
• After Action Review: a discussion to draw lessons from a project 
or activity after it has taken place. 
• Exit interviews held with employees who leave an organisation 
in order to capture the knowledge they have accumulated about 
“what it takes to do the job”, so that colleagues and new 
personnel may learn from this. 
• Best practices: a practice widely used also in the NGO world is 
the identification and sharing of best practices – processes or 
methods that have proven effective in achieving objectives. 
• Communities of practice: many organisations have formalised 
the idea of communities of practice described earlier in this 
chapter. Thematic groups are formed that regularly exchange 
knowledge. According to the knowledge management literature, 
such communities should have voluntary membership, a specific 
focus, and no definition of tangible results. 
• Action learning sets are more action-oriented communities of 
practice that come together for shared reflection and feedback in 
several stages of the learning cycle described in section 3.1.3. 
Members of the action learning set constructively challenge one 
another’s assumptions and perceptions, which may lead to new 
understanding that can be tested in practice. After that has been 
done, the set meets again in order to discuss the results, 
explicitly formulating learning points and adapting theories of 
action before a new cycle of action learning begins. 
• Peer assists: a formal process in which a team working on a 
specific activity calls in other teams to ask about their 
experiences and insights for the benefit of the project at hand. 
The demand-driven nature of peer assists has advantages over 
knowledge strategies that focus on the supply-side of making 
                                                                                                            
organisational culture is one of learning and sharing, the leadership of the organisation genuinely 
supports and promotes learning, and there is sufficient ‘social capital’ – trust and relationships - 
within the organisation. 
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knowledge available without a concrete purpose. People on the 
supply-side may be more willing to take the time to share their 
experiences when it is likely that their knowledge will be used 
for a specific purpose. 
• Storytelling may be a way to share knowledge in a way that is 
less dry and technical than with other tools. Stories show the 
relevance of information in-context. Storytelling is an ancient 
activity and is still prevalent in many non-Western parts of the 
world.  
• Thinking hats, a technique developed by Edward de Bono 
(2000), enable groups to look at an issue from different points of 
view and thereby come to more creative insights than otherwise 
might be the case. Participants in meetings are assigned 
different thinking hats. The person wearing the white hat looks 
at the issue in an objective manner, focusing on facts and 
numbers available. The person wearing the red hat looks at 
problems in an emotional way, using intuition, judgments and 
suspicions. The black hat is a negative hat that focuses the 
wearer on risks and possible negative effects of an activity, 
while the yellow hat is positive, optimistic and constructive. The 
green hat is creative and seeks alternatives. The wearer of the 
blue hat, finally, keeps track of process and discussions – this is 
the person chairing the meeting. 
• Knowledge centres are instituted in many organisations. Such 
centres do not only perform a library function but also create 
directories that may help staff members find whoever possesses 
tacit knowledge on a particular topic. 
• Technological tools such as databases and intranets are usually 
used to support all these organisational learning methods.  
 
Returning to the distinction made in chapter two between tacit, explicit, 
and implicit knowledge, we may now categorise these tools according to 
their aims. Do organisational learning tools aim to create, store, or share 
knowledge? And do they aim at tacit, explicit, or implicit knowledge? 
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Knowledge  
Tacit Explicit Implicit 
Create (Action) research 
Workshops 
Thinking hats 
Knowledge audit Staff 
exchanges 
Store Knowledge audit 
Exit interviews 
White pages 
Monitoring and 
evaluation  
Best practices 
Knowledge centres 
Database 
Intranet 
 
Purpose 
Share Training  
Communities of 
practice 
Storytelling 
After action 
reviews 
Peer assists 
E-mail 
Publications 
Storytelling 
Table 3.2: Categorising organisational learning tools56 
 
The table shows that the majority of tools discussed in the knowledge 
management and organisational learning literature aim at the creation, 
storing or sharing of tacit knowledge. The reason is probably that tacit 
knowledge is more difficult to create, store and share than explicit 
knowledge and therefore much of the attention is focused on this 
category. Little attention is paid, however, to creating, storing and 
sharing implicit or cultural knowledge. This is unfortunate because 
cultural knowledge is likely to be very important for our field of 
analysis: knowledge processes of Southern peace NGOs.  
 
 
3.3 Development of learning in development 
 
In the second half of the nineties, the development sector began to see 
the relevance of such knowledge strategies to its own activities. Unlike 
for the corporate sector, for the development sector organisational 
efficiency is not the only aim. In order to work towards their larger 
development objectives, development agencies “not only need efficient 
internal coordination, but also increased ability to be responsive to the 
situation of the poor, and ability to influence debates and policy 
processes” (Hovland 2003: 5). The World Bank pioneered the 
application of knowledge management in the development community. 
In 1996 the Bank announced its intention to become “the Knowledge 
Bank” and in 1998 it entitled its World Development Report 
                                                 
56 Adapted from Ramalingham 2005: 5 
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“Knowledge for Development” (Ramalingham 2005: 8). Like the 
corporate sector, the World Bank’s approach was meant to improve its 
own business processes. Internal measures included building 
communities of practice and developing an online knowledge base and 
directory of expertise. However, in line with the aims of the 
development sector, the Bank added an external knowledge sharing 
approach aiming at interaction with the wider development community. 
This sharing approach was based on the principle that knowledge is the 
foundation of equitable and sustainable development – a principle 
increasingly gaining ground. (Kalseth and Cummings 2001: 168) 
 
The World Bank external knowledge sharing approach consisted of the 
creation of two knowledge networks, the Global Development Network 
(GDNet) and the Global Development Gateway. GDNet is research-
oriented, aiming to enhance the quality and availability of policy-
oriented studies (Clark and Squire 2005). The Development Gateway 
aims to be an internet portal website on development issues. However, 
the Gateway has been criticised for appearing to be a neutral and 
independent resource whilst its content is controlled by the World Bank. 
(Kalseth and Cummings 2001: 169-179) Given that some consider the 
Bank’s knowledge agenda to be overly narrow, neglecting socio-cultural 
differences and the links between local development issues and the 
wider political economy (Mehta 2001, cited in Hovland 2003: 8), this 
would be quite problematic. Leaving aside the discussion on the content 
of the World Bank’s knowledge networks, another point of criticism has 
been that World Bank knowledge policies are still considered to be too 
internally oriented. Indeed, in 2000 the Bank itself concluded that 
“[k]nowledge work at the Bank must be more firmly rooted in client 
demand. While shifts have occurred, the approach remains too internally 
focused and supply oriented. This undermines impact, client ownership 
and capacity building, learning from the outside world, and skews 
priorities” (World Bank 2000, cited in Kalseth and Cummings 2001: 
170).  
 
The World Bank’s pioneering focus on knowledge strategies was soon 
followed by others in the development sector, mainly those based in the 
North, such as donor agencies and international NGOs. The latter have 
become particularly active in the knowledge and learning field in the last 
few years. Particularly in the United Kingdom, independent think tanks 
and training institutes, such as the International NGO Training and 
Research Centre (INTRAC) in Oxford and the London-based Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), publish on the issue and stimulate the 
discussion. Academic institutions like the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) of the University of Sussex contribute to the field as well, 
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as does the NGO network British Overseas NGOs for Development 
(BOND). In the Netherlands, the umbrella organisation of development 
organisations PSO increasingly focuses on organisational learning as a 
capacity building strategy. In addition, government agencies acting as 
donors of NNGOs have begun to emphasise organisational learning 
capacity as a funding prerequisite57.  
 
As with the World Bank, however, the learning activities of 
development and conflict NGOs have so far remained largely internally 
focused. Little attention has been paid to learning in interaction with 
partners in the South. Nor has there been much regard for the particular 
knowledge and learning challenges faced by Southern organisations. A 
recent study by Ramalingham of the knowledge strategies of bilateral, 
multilateral and non-governmental international development 
organisations found that “the majority [of their staff members] identified 
the need to address internal issues first, before looking at external 
issues” (Ramalingham 2005: 26). It may be questioned whether this is 
the right order, as it means that the knowledge strategies and processes 
adopted are based on the needs and inputs of Northern, not Southern, 
staff. Ramalingham (2005: 33) confirms that “there was no sense of how 
the tools might need adaptation in the context of Southern realities, and 
how they might add to or compare with existing approaches such as 
capacity development or participation”. Indeed, when the staff members 
interviewed for his study spoke of external knowledge strategies they 
referred mostly to disseminating knowledge from within the agencies to 
outside actors; only few mentioned the need for information flowing 
from outside to inside the organisation (Ramalingham 2005: 26).  
 
 
3.4 The learning strategies of Northern NGOs 
 
3.4.1 Characterising the organisational learning of NNGOs 
 
While the learning of SNGOs and their interaction with partners in the 
North thus remain under-researched (and under-practiced), a number of 
publications has recently appeared on the learning processes of 
Northern-based development and peace NGOs, looking for 
characteristics that distinguish their knowledge processes from those 
that take place in corporations58. One issue emerging from them is that 
NGO staff tend to characterise themselves as having an activist working 
                                                 
57 For knowledge and learning policies of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see MBN 
Werkgroep Kwaliteit (2006: 2) and Heres and Bieckmann (2007: 9). 
58 Hovland 2003, Ramalingham 2005 and 2006, Smit 2006, Taylor et al. 2006, BOND 2003. 
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style. Thinking and doing are somewhat separated, and doing receives 
most attention. However, NGO staff members are becoming 
increasingly aware of the importance of reflection on, and drawing 
lessons from, their work.  
 
In 3.1.1 a number of learning moments as seen by NNGO staff were 
recounted. They implied that, like their Southern counterparts (see 2.3), 
NNGO staff members primarily learn in interaction. However, 
procedures set up in NNGOs to promote organisational learning often 
consider knowledge more as an object that can be transferred from one 
person to another, rather than something that is created in interaction. 
The organisations have difficulty moving from cognitive information 
management to people-centred learning processes. A recent study of 
NNGOs concludes that the “widespread and tangible outputs of 
knowledge and learning work tend, thus far, to be based on improved 
information systems, rather than improved processes or changed 
behaviours” and that as a consequence, their learning structures are 
“more supply-led than demand-driven”. A tendency was noted among 
these organisations to “point to information systems as the ‘end product’ 
rather than specific processes for knowledge and learning”. 
(Ramalingham 2005: 14-15) The study warns that this trend may end up 
contributing to “the increasing prevalence of ‘information graveyards’. 
In the final analysis, IT systems cannot be relied upon to create 
relationships that are at the heart of effective [knowledge sharing]” 
(Ramalingham 2005: 31).  
 
There are, however, some more positive experiences of NGOs to note. 
The United Kingdom (UK) government’s Department for International 
Development (DfID), the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) 
UK, and Pax Christi Netherlands have experimented with regular 
reflection weeks, in which staff do not travel but withdraw and reflect 
together. Another tool has been developed by Action Aid, which has 
replaced country office reports with annual “participatory reviews and 
reflections” in which programme beneficiaries participate. The reviews 
record achievements, discuss challenges and constraints, and reflect on 
what works and why. Reporting on these reviews and reflections is 
“light” according to Action Aid, the format is left open and creative 
methods of reporting are used.59  
 
Some NGOs – such as the Dutch development organisation Humanist 
Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos) – employ 
specialised learning officers in order to perform the role of broker 
                                                 
59 www.actionaid.org/wps/content_document.asp?doc_id=475 . Read on 11 December 2006.  
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connecting the demand and supply sides of knowledge. Whether this has 
led to improved organisational learning is not yet clear, at least not 
based on the limited information available to me. One may speculate 
that employing a specialised officer in itself is not enough. It runs the 
risk of making learning the responsibility of one rather than all, and 
giving employees the sense that they do not have to worry about 
learning. Instead – or in addition to employing a learning officer – each 
staff member has to become aware of his or her own function in making 
knowledge available to others, as well as asking others for theirs. This 
requires a learning culture. 
 
Thinking back to the theory of learning presented earlier in this chapter, 
some questions arise with regard to the learning processes of NGOs: are 
they generally tactical (first-order) or strategic (second- or third order)? 
How much interaction takes place between organisational levels? Do 
NGOs generally have a learning culture? In the literature not much 
information can be found about these questions. Upcoming chapters of 
this book will contribute to answering them, at least for SNGOs (see 
chapter five in particular). However, at this point a few general points 
can be made. First, in many NGOs learning is intertwined with reporting 
and accountability towards donors. This makes it is difficult for NGOs 
to learn at the second- or third-order level. Where first-order learning is 
merely about realising tactical and operational improvements to a given 
project, these deeper levels require considering whether a project has 
been the right one to start with or even whether an organisation is doing 
the right thing at all. Discussing these questions immediately risks losing 
the funds that have been allocated to a project. (Van Dijkhorst and 
Hilhorst 2003: 7)  
 
Second, studies about organisational learning in NNGOs suggest that in 
many cases, individual learning does not yet lead to organisational 
learning. “Information is acquired through studies and evaluations, but 
the conclusions are not followed up or disseminated to the appropriate 
places in the organisation”. (Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst 2003: 6) Part of 
the problem is that interaction between different organisational levels 
and departments is difficult in NGOs. The different departments and 
levels often speak different ‘languages’ and are to different extents tied 
to the context in which they work. Many organisations have for example 
established thematic departments, but their communication with regional 
and country departments remains a challenge60.  
 
                                                 
60 Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst (2003: 7) and MBN Werkgroep Kwaliteit (2006: 7). This issue also 
came to the fore in research done by participants of the course mentioned in note 36.  
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On the positive side, compared to other organisations NGOs tend to be 
relatively informal and have little hierarchy, which may make inter-level 
interaction actually easier (Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst 2003: 6). 
However, while a ‘flat’ organisation like Hivos is in principle conducive 
to free interaction and sharing, in practice informal personal networks 
may predominate in such an organisation and make it difficult for 
newer, younger staff to participate fully61. This suggests that it is 
necessary to find a balance between too much and too little structure 
when it comes to supporting organisational learning. 
 
 
3.4.2 Organisational characteristics affecting NNGO learning  
 
In section 3.2 a number of organisational characteristics were listed that 
foster a learning culture. They included openness to new ideas and 
challenges, a supportive and facilitative leadership that rewards learning, 
the development of the learning competences of individuals, space and 
time for reflection and discussion, a high degree of interaction between 
actors with different points of view, transparency of information, an 
atmosphere of safety in which to express doubts, flexibility for 
employees to organise and experiment, and the integration of learning 
into the planning and evaluation cycle. In addition to these 
characteristics that apply to all organisations, a number of factors 
conducive to organisational learning have been mentioned that are more 
or less specific to NGOs working for development and peace. As we 
saw in section 1.4.2, by their very nature NGOs tend to be flexible, 
adaptive and innovative, at least compared to governmental and 
intergovernmental institutions. Related to this, characteristics of NGOs 
that stimulate learning include  
• exposure to the outside world, close relationships to 
beneficiaries and communities so as to stay in touch with reality, 
• direct pressure from grassroots groups and social change leaders 
to keep looking for new solutions to desperate problems, and 
• willingness to surface, identify and cope with issues of power, 
inequality and differing agendas. (Taylor et al. 2006: 28) 
 
Although these are important potential advantages, knowledge processes 
in NGOs are complicated by a number of obstacles. In particular, an 
often-mentioned obstacle to learning and knowledge exchange is work 
                                                 
61 According to one study, this is the case for the Dutch NGO Hivos  (MBN Werkgroep Kwaliteit 
2006: 7). 
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pressure and a lack of time.62 NGO staff see the importance of 
knowledge sharing and are willing, in principle, to engage in exchanges, 
but time is money, and knowledge exchange and learning are often 
considered an extra cost to the organisation. Maintaining regular cross-
organisational contacts, making space for reflection, and participating in 
discussion meetings can be time-intensive and costly, and the benefits 
from an investment in knowledge are vague and ambiguous. This is 
inevitable: the whole point of learning is that the outcome will be new 
and unknown. But donors increasingly emphasise ‘direct-impact’ 
activities and pressure NGOs to minimalise resources not spent directly 
on projects. Particularly organisations that are dependent on project 
financing find that there is very little room to take a step back from the 
daily practice of project management and reflect on lessons learned.  
 
The situation is compounded by the fact that for people working on 
conflict there is always a sense of urgency and a need to respond to 
rapidly changing circumstances. The limited time available makes it 
particularly necessary to fall back on the experience of others, and the 
quickly changing circumstances demand that there is a continuous 
updating of knowledge. In addition, the issues dealt with are often 
political in nature, adding politics to the pressures that bear upon staff 
members and managers. More so than in the private sector, the work of 
managers in the public sector, be it governments or NGOs, is to a large 
extent politics- and therefore incident-driven (Noordergraaf 2000: 262). 
Table 3.3 summarises the contradictory pressures that the staff of 
international NGOs face.  
 
EFFICIENCY 
• Urgency: act quickly 
• Apply standard 
procedures 
• Concentrate on large 
scale projects 
 
LEARNING 
• Adapt to local circumstances  
• React in a flexible way 
• Give local staff larger role 
• Take political situation into account 
• Keep gender and environmental impacts 
in mind 
• Show experimental attitude 
 
Table 3.3: Contradictory pressures on the staff of NNGOs 
 
Additional complicating factors for the organisational learning of 
NNGOs include 
• The island culture of organisations: in the decentralised 
organisations that NGOs often are, staff members are confined 
                                                 
62  Out of ten people interviewed at Cordaid by Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst (2003: 7), seven 
mentioned “time constraints due to workload as a major obstacle”. See also MBN Werkgroep 
Kwaliteit (2006: 8). 
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to one project or region and do not interact much. In addition, 
the geographical distance between headquarters and field offices 
often leads to information gaps. At the same time, the 
geographical range of NGOs may be an advantage in that it may 
enable them to connect knowledge coming from the local all the 
way to the international level.  
• The target groups of NGOs (variously called ‘beneficiaries’ or 
‘stakeholders’) are not the same people as their donors. While 
most NGOs feel they should be accountable to their 
beneficiaries, in practice they tend to be accountable primarily 
to their donors. This is true for both NNGOs and SNGOs. It 
complicates knowledge flows, something that will be elaborated 
in chapter four. 
• There is usually a high need for success stories to legitimate the 
existence of NGOs. Indeed, with increasing pressures to show 
results, a shift has taken place in the public relations strategies 
of NGOs. Instead of presenting miserable people in precarious 
situations (which could portray the message that development 
efforts have little effect), they increasingly try to show 
successful examples of aid. This emphasis on success stories 
makes it difficult to pay attention to learning from mistakes. 
More fundamentally, as discussed earlier, admitting mistakes 
may mean taking responsibility for failing to save human lives.  
• Finally, cultural differences within organisations may be more 
salient for NGOs than for corporations, because NGOs often 
have their headquarters in one continent and their field offices in 
another. Those that do not tend to work with local partners in 
developing countries. Cultural differences may lead to 
misunderstandings and since people reason from very different 
contexts the transfer of tacit knowledge becomes even more 
difficult than it normally already is. Cultural sensitivity and 
implicit knowledge transfer are necessary, and this may present 
problems.  
 
 
3.4.3 Improving organisational learning by NNGOs 
 
The Dutch development organisation Hivos writes in its 2003 
Knowledge Sharing Strategy: “An oft-heard obstacle to knowledge 
sharing is work pressure and a lack of time. For this reason, knowledge 
sharing must be included in the normal policy cycle and integrated into 
the regular work schedule.” (Hivos 2003: 4) How can this be achieved? 
For one thing, making contributions to knowledge exchange and 
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learning could be made part of job descriptions and performance 
appraisals. A recent Economist publication about innovation puts it as 
follows:  
“It is not enough to have original thinking. It must be recognised, 
valued and put into practice. […] A lack of innovation usually 
indicates that managers at all levels lack the awareness or motivation 
to spot the potential of the ideas floating around their organisation. 
They may see original thinking as a threat and therefore discourage it.” 
(Syrett and Lammiman 2002: 37-38)  
 
As characteristics of an innovative organisation the Economist 
publication mentions a diverse workforce, opportunities for casual 
exchanges, and an encouragement to share information. These facets 
should be reflected in personnel policy as well as the shaping of 
organisational structure and routines. Overall, organisational flexibility 
is vital: management needs to be open to changes in direction as a result 
of learning and suggestions from staff. In the present field of analysis, 
this bears also upon the donors: demanding rigid planning and strictly 
holding aid recipients to their earlier plans may limit flexibility and 
learning, in a double way: it restricts the time available for reflection, 
and it limits the leeway to change course and procedures as a result of 
learning.  
 
Also of significance for fostering learning despite countervailing 
pressures is the work culture of an organisation: its rules, habits, 
interaction styles, symbols, values and world view (Boonstra 2004: 3). 
Adjustments to organisational routines can create space for changes in 
work culture, but these latter changes eventually make the difference. 
“Research […] provides further support for an emphasis that is less on 
devising management systems to ‘control’ learning or to ‘manage’ 
knowledge, more on finding new ways to encourage people to think 
creatively and feed their thoughts back into the organisation” (Kessels 
and Harrison 2004: 2). As we saw above, a culture that stimulates 
learning is one that fosters an atmosphere of safety in which to discuss 
feelings, uncertainties and assumptions. Trust, a cooperative (rather than 
competitive) culture, the rewarding of knowledge sharing, and an 
atmosphere tolerant of mistakes are a part of this (Sauquet 2004: 382-3).
  
 
3.5 The South as a gap in the literature 
 
The review of the growing amount of literature on organisational 
learning by peace and development NGOs reveals an important gap in 
both the literature and the organisational activities it describes: they 
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hardly deal with Southern organisations. A number of quotes are given 
here that make this gap painfully clear. King (2004: unnumbered) notes 
that 
 “as the new ideas about multilateral and bilateral bodies becoming 
 knowledge agencies and learning organisations […] began to circulate 
 in the late 1990s, it was plain that they were sourced very much from 
 the corporate sector in North America and Europe. There was, 
 accordingly, a powerful tendency for the emphasis to be on the 
 capture, synthesis and more cost-effective utilisation of the agencies’ 
 enormous existing knowledge bases rather than on the generation of 
 new knowledge.” 
 
Hovland’s (2003: 12) annotated bibliography of organisational learning 
in the development sector concludes (abbreviating the term knowledge 
management to KM) that  
“Northern NGOs have so far implemented KM to alleviate their own 
information blockages – based on the same rationale of efficiency and 
profit as corporate businesses – rather than using KM to address key 
questions of how they can contribute to knowledge development in the 
South. […] Can KM/learning increase the responsiveness of Southern 
and Northern institutional processes to the situation of the 
‘beneficiaries’? Can KM/learning help to connect the voice of the poor 
with the institutional knowledge of development/civil society 
organisations?”  
 
Indeed, the earlier-mentioned study of learning in Cordaid found that 
“[l]earning processes of [Southern] partners is something that Cordaid 
says it considers, but people admit that more attention could be paid to 
this” (Van Dijkhorst and Hilhorst 2003: 9-10). According to 
Ramalingham (2005: 26), this situation is particularly striking given the 
nature and mission of development organisations, which base their 
knowledge on their work in the South. Northern development 
organisations’  
“focus on internal knowledge work belies the fact that all the [studied] 
organisations relied on activities in the South as a key source of their 
most valued knowledge, and that eventually, all knowledge that is 
‘value generating’ must by necessity be tied back to a level of 
[knowledge sharing] with those in the South. […] Learning between 
agencies, between agencies and Southern partners, and between 
agencies and beneficiaries, is a clear gap in the knowledge and 
learning strategies [of international development organisations]”.  
 
Dutch development policymakers Wiedenhof and Molenaar (2006: 11) 
explain why their internal focus does not help learning by development 
agencies: 
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“[k]nowledge management is often perceived as an internal corporate 
concern […]. When it comes to learning and knowledge production, it 
really makes not much sense to focus on internal processes. Like any 
other form of learning, organizational learning takes place in context. 
For an organization to fulfil its mandate, it needs to interact with its 
environment. This interaction is the prime source for learning relevant 
lessons. Internal processes for sharing such lessons and anchoring 
knowledge within the organization are of secondary order only.”  
 
Therefore, in the words of Taylor et al. (2006: 29), it is important to  
“create mechanisms inside organizations for incorporating the voice of 
the constituencies, or ‘consumers’ as a way to ensure learning 
practices that allow groups to be in touch with the realities/ problems 
faced by our constituencies and the ‘real’ world outside the 
organizations.” 
 
However, there are two bodies of literature that do pay attention to 
knowledge flows involving SNGOs – even though they do not directly 
discuss organisational learning strategies. These are capacity building 
(3.6) and NGO networking (3.7). 
 
 
3.6 Capacity building: from knowledge transfer to mutual 
learning? 
 
Although it is usually not connected to thinking about NGO 
organisational learning, there is one set of literature – mostly from 
NNGO sources – that does address knowledge strategies of NNGOs vis-
à-vis their Southern counterparts: the literature on capacity building. For 
that reason, the concept of capacity building is discussed in this section. 
In the next chapter, we will compare the theory of NGO capacity 
building to the practice encountered in the field.  
 
Capacity is knowledge that enables a person to do something. It is a skill 
or competence. But capacity also includes a structural aspect – the 
context in which a person operates allows him to exercise his 
competence. Capacity building is a development strategy based on the 
adagio ‘give someone a fish and he eats for a day; teach someone to fish, 
and he can feed himself for a lifetime’. It aims to assist people and 
institutions in developing countries to develop their capacities so that 
they can create their own welfare, build their own peace, and run their 
own government. Capacity building aims to make development 
processes sustainable as they become less dependent on external money 
and knowledge.  
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As mentioned, capacity development needs to take place at the level of 
both agent and structure. “Learning is the key ingredient […]. There is, 
however, a limit to what an individual or organization can achieve 
through informal learning” (Lopes and Theisohn 2003: 22). This is 
where the structure, consisting of institutions, regulations, and social 
relations, comes in. Because of the structural aspect of capacity building 
(the need to create the space for people to exercise their abilities), 
capacity building can also be a political process as it may be necessary 
to change power structures. “Capacity building is fundamentally a 
human process of development and change that involves shifts and 
transformations in relationships and power”. (James and Wrigley 2006: 
6) 
  
The UNDP distinguishes the following levels of capacity and capacity 
building: 
• At the level of individuals, capacity building strategies at this 
level include training programmes, science and technology 
transfer and development, and increasing internet access. 
• At the level of institutions, which “offer  continuity and act as 
repositories of knowledge and experience, reducing dependency 
on single individuals, while enabling access to accumulated 
knowledge” (Lopes and Theisohn 2003: 23), strategies focus on 
improving organisational structures and procedures, improving 
management, and building organisational learning capacity. 
• At the level of the society as a whole, “especially a country and 
its governance”, capacity building strategies largely focus on 
strengthening governments and making them more accountable. 
“The importance of this level of capacity was not fully 
appreciated until quite recently. Capacity development efforts 
focused mainly on individual skills and institutions, tacitly 
assuming that other factors – usually described as externalities 
or an enabling environment – would sort themselves out. But 
experience has shown that externalities such as corruption, 
governance systems or conflict-prone attitudes […] have 
impeded – and even brought down – many capacity 
development initiatives.” (Lopes and Theisohn 2003: 24) In 
addition to government-oriented strategies, societal capacity 
building may also include civil society development and the 
strengthening of legal institutions. 
 
The UNDP (Lopes and Theisohn 2003: 26) has identified core capacities 
for development at the individual, institutional and societal levels, 
including: 
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1. to be guided by key values and a sense of purpose 
2. to define and analyse their environment and their own place in 
the greater scheme of things 
3. to define the issues and reach working agreements on purposes 
or mandates 
4. to manage and resolve conflicts 
5. to formulate strategies 
6. to plan, and act on those plans 
7. to acquire and mobilise resources 
8. to learn new skills and approaches on a continuous basis 
9. to build supporting relationships with other parties 
10. to assess performance and make adjustments 
11. to meet new challenges proactively, by adjusting agendas, 
approaches and strategies. 
 
Lopes and Theisohn (2003: 26-27) further note that “all of them are 
underpinned by fundamental abilities. The formulation of policies and 
strategies, for instance, calls for more than a structured mind and writing 
skills. First, it requires a vision of the ultimate goal. Then it demands a 
whole range of capabilities and mechanisms relating to leadership, 
engagement and dialogue. Knowledge of the stakeholders and the 
management of a meaningful process including large groups of people 
are important, as are the facilities to table tricky issues, negotiate, 
mediate between divergent interests and manage forms of conflict 
resolution.” What is also interesting in the UNDP’s list of capacities is 
the importance of a learning capacity for development, as shown 
particularly in capacities 8 and 11. Indeed, “[l]earning lies at the heart of 
capacity development, since it entails a conscious approach to change” 
(BOND and Exchange 2004: 2). 
 
There are various approaches to capacity building. For example, an 
instrumental approach holds that “capacity building is about improving 
project implementation, results and accountabilities” while a 
transformational approach focuses on shifting relationships and power 
dynamics. “Those who believe that capacity building must deliver quick, 
measurable results and can be achieved through the simple transfer of 
skills, will favour a more instrumental approach. Those who believe that 
capacity building requires a change in power relationships will take a 
transformational approach.” (James and Wrigley 2006: 4) We will see in 
the next chapter that in the practice of North-South peacebuilding and 
development partnerships among NGOs an instrumental approach is 
usually taken. 
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The concept of capacity building is closely linked to that of local 
ownership. According to most writings about the concept, capacity 
building needs to be a demand-driven and participatory process and 
cannot be driven by external interveners. As is illustrated by Figure 3.3, 
capacity building should “help people and organisations to find their 
own solutions, involving those that it is meant to support” (Groot and 
Gerwen 2004: 4).  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Local solutions to local problems63 
 
Ideally, then, capacity building should involve several steps: 
• Participatory problem analysis, involving target groups and 
partner(s)  
• Participatory context and organisation analysis 
• Shared strategic choice for capacity building of one (or more) 
organisations 
• Results-based and coherent intervention plan 
• Tailor-made interventions 
• Tailor-made monitoring and evaluation system focusing on 
accountability and learning 
• Sufficient implementation capacity among partner(s) (Groot and 
Gerwen 2004: iv) 
 
Such a locally-owned process includes building on existing capacities 
rather than inserting completely new ones. This would make solutions 
                                                 
63 Groot and Gerwen 2004: 2 
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more applicable to the local context and more supported by those who 
will implement them. In order to make this principle clear, the UNDP 
prefers to use the concept ‘capacity development’ which emphasises that 
capacities already exist and are merely supported to develop further. 
Figure 3.4 below illustrates the difference between capacity building and 
what the UNDP calls organic capacity development. If imported 
capacities do not build on existing ones, then they will not be relevant 
and miss their target. The reason for this is that 
“[t]oday we know that knowledge cannot be transferred. It has to be 
acquired, learned and reinvented. And it encompasses both the deep 
pool of local understanding that is the very foundation of learning, and 
the wealth of global information that can be reconceived to meet local 
needs. When adaptation fails to happen, however, there is no 
ownership and likely no lasting capacity development.” (Lopes and 
Theisohn 2003: 4) 
 
Organic capacity development, on the other hand, is conceived as an 
interactive process of knowledge sharing with local actors in order to 
find out what their capacities are and help develop them by strategically 
inserting knowledge where it is needed. Although local stakeholders 
play a leading role, the role of the external facilitator is very important. 
External actors may provide structure, introduce an external perspective, 
share learning from other organisations and knowledge institutions, 
inject energy, reduce tensions that may arise among stakeholders in the 
process, and ensure that an organisation does not get caught up and 
distracted by other activities. (James and Wrigley 2004: 20) 
 
Figure 3.4: Organic capacity development according to the UNDP64 
 
                                                 
64 Lopes and Theisohn 2003: 10 
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Theoretically, then, a good capacity building strategy uses participatory 
techniques and is embedded in the specific local and organisational 
context. Its approach is people-centred but also pays attention to 
systemic elements. (James and Wrigley 2006: 12-14) The implications 
for development practitioners who aim to build capacities include “a 
need for facilitation expertise, being flexible rather than working to 
standardised procedures, and creating opportunities to reflect and 
transform – that is, learning how to learn from experiences” (BOND and 
Exchange 2004: 3) 
 
 
3.7 Networking for peace by NGOs65 
 
In chapters six and seven we will see that networking is a common 
strategy among Southern peace NGOs. In recent years some 
publications have seen the light that discuss networking as a strategy for 
NGOs active in peacebuilding. This section gives an overview of some 
of the main insights of these publications. In the sixth chapter, these 
insights will be combined with other findings about learning and 
knowledge sharing by SNGOs to form a list of charactistics that 
influence the success of networking for peace by NGOs. 
 
 
3.7.1 Networks and peacebuilding 
 
A network is “a loosely structured form of cooperation, in which 
coordination is done through a horizontal exchange of information, 
lacking a clear hierarchy. It is composed of communication links 
between individuals or groups. The network notion stresses these 
linkages and allows participants to exchange information and attach 
meaning to it, thus transforming information into knowledge.” (De la 
Rive Box 2001) The members of a network can be individuals or 
organisations “that are working toward a common goal, or whose 
individual interests are better served within a collective structure”. (Van 
Deventer 2004: 1) 
 
Some observers consider networks to be particularly suitable to deal 
with issues of conflict and peace:  
“Networks are becoming a favored organizational form wherever a 
broad operational field is involved (e.g. where links are being made 
between different regions, or between grassroot to international 
levels), where problems are so dynamic that rigid structures are not 
                                                 
65 Earlier versions of this text have been published in Verkoren 2006a and 2006b (see literature list). 
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suitable, and where loose ties are preferable to formal organizational 
bonds. All these features are well known in areas of violent conflicts.” 
(Van Deventer 2004: 1-2) 
 
A 2001 conference on lessons learned by peacebuilding practitioners 
formulated the importance of networking in the following way. The 
conference participants concluded that “[n]etworking has a large role to 
play in pulling together an expanding, but dispersed field”, and went on 
to state that 
“[t]he field of conflict prevention and peace building is expanding 
rapidly. […] However, the field is dispersed over a great number of 
mostly small organizations. In order to pull all these efforts together 
and identify gaps in the field, the sharing of information and co-
operation is becoming more and more important. […] Networking can 
help to avoid a duplication of activities. Also, a broad network is the 
best guarantee against one-sided approaches to the complex issues 
involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.” (Galama and Van 
Tongeren 2002: 34) 
 
Another advantage of networking noted during this conference was that 
it facilitates complementary partnerships, which are necessary in order 
to deal with the lack of resources in the field of peacebuilding (Galama 
and Van Tongeren 2002: 34). Other observers agree that 
complementarity is an important element of networks, which may profit 
from the diversity of their constituencies (Benner et al. 2004: 197).  
 
By networking, participants can advance the work of their individual 
organisation and also promote the wider field of the network. 
Collaboration in networks may expose organisations to new ideas and 
knowledge, enhance and deepen critical thinking and creativity, and help 
avoid competition and duplication of activities. Being a member of a 
network may also add to the credibility and influence of an organisation, 
and lead to new business opportunities. Networks may also enable 
individual organisations to address global problems through joint action, 
based on the realisation that none of the organisations involved can 
address the issue at stake by itself. Such joint action may also strengthen 
the outreach capacity of the field as a whole. (Åhäll 2006: 4-7; Galama 
and Van Tongeren 2002: 34; Benner et al. 2004: 196-197) A Dutch 
NGO supporting networks in the South for example feels that 
networking is an important tool to strengthen civil society and social 
capital in developing, conflict-affected countries. In addition, networks 
may strengthen the voice of particular marginalized groups – such as the 
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Bangsamoro in Mindanao - , thereby helping to correct structural 
inequalities underlying conflicts.66  
 
The light structure of networks may allow them to respond quickly to 
new situations and take new initiatives without going through a heavy 
bureaucratic process. (Åhäll 2006: 4-7; Galama and Van Tongeren 
2002: 34; Benner et al. 2004: 196-197) As an organisational form, 
networks provide more flexibility and openness than more formal 
organisations. This means that they are able to adjust in the process of 
cooperation. As a result, at least in theory, network structures can 
facilitate constant learning from success and failure. (Benner et al. 2004: 
196) 
 
 
3.7.2 Categorising networks  
 
A common type of network is a knowledge network. According to 
Stone, a knowledge network has two main functions. First, it coordinates 
the communication and dissemination of knowledge, acting as an 
intermediary between intellectual communities in different places. It 
provides “a space for discussion, setting agendas and developing 
common visions regarding ‘best practices’, policy or business norms and 
standards”. This helps to avoid duplication of effort and synchronises 
‘communication codes’. It enables the network to speak with a collective 
voice, leading to its second main function: it can have a greater ability to 
“attract media attention, political patronage and donor support than an 
individual or single organisation”. (Stone 2005: 93)  
 
Research on knowledge networks has often focused on scientific 
networks. However, in practice, and particularly in the world of conflict 
and development, academics do not monopolise knowledge networks at 
all:  
“for a variety of reasons – such as government cutbacks and funding 
formulas founded on tuition incomes – universities and their research 
institutes are rarely in the vanguard of identifying or prioritizing 
‘global issues’. Instead, major think tanks and leading NGOs with their 
own innovative policy departments […] are taking greater prominence 
[…]. Hence, the growing salience of national to global knowledge and 
policy networks.” (Mbabazi, MacLean and Shaw 2005: 157) 
  
Knowledge exchange is an important function of peace networks. Many 
networks, however, combine their knowledge exchange function with 
                                                 
66 Conversation with staff member of a Dutch development organisation. The Hague, The 
Netherlands, 19 April 2006. 
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other, more action-oriented functions. In the field of peacebuilding this 
often means joint lobby and advocacy, research projects or the joint 
fundraising for, and implementation of, programmes on the ground.                              
 
Networks can be categorised in various ways. The following dimensions 
are discussed in this section: the degree of cooperation and organisation, 
the focus and objective of a network, and issues related to network 
accountability and exclusiveness.  
 
Degree of cooperation and organisation 
One way to categorise networks is according to their organisation. At 
one extreme of the organisational spectrum, an organisation may look 
like a spider web: a strong centralised network consisting of a central 
board and secretariat, surrounded by circles of members in various 
levels of involvement from full to partial membership. In this type of 
network the secretariat coordinates the exchange of knowledge and 
selects and edits knowledge based on standards of quality and focus. 
Strong centralised networks are usually found in formalised 
environments in which sufficient means can be generated to pay for the 
relatively high coordination costs. They tend to be exclusive in that not 
everyone can become a member.  
 
At the other extreme is the fish-net or cell-structured network, which 
often exists in societies with weak institutions or threatening contexts. 
Such a network is characterised by a low level of organisation and 
coordination. It is inexpensive but depends heavily on the commitment 
and activity of its members. (Van Deventer 2004: 7-8) The advantages 
and disadvantages of either approach are summarised in the table below.  
 
 Decentralised network Structured network 
Pros Ownership of decisions by members 
Flexibility: participation in activities 
is elective 
Lower cost as less is spent on 
coordination and secretariat 
Systematic coordination & 
consultation 
Increased capacity building potential 
Enhanced visibility/strength of 
network 
Clearer lines of accountability 
Cons Small and less ‘noisy’ members not 
heard 
Agenda of individual organisations 
may take over the network 
Rights and responsibilities of 
members may be unclear 
Expense of running a secretariat 
Frustrations linked to more complex 
procedures 
Need to select a location: risk of 
regional bias 
Table 3.4: Comparing decentralised networks with structured networks67 
 
                                                 
67 Robert 2006: 4 
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Activities, focus and objective68 
Another way to distinguish between networks is to look at their 
activities and objectives: do they limit themselves to the knowledge 
exchange component or do they also engage in collective advocacy or 
project implementation? The degree of cooperation is often related to 
the activities of the network. Some activities, like joint lobby or 
campaigning, require more cooperation and organisation than, for 
example, knowledge exchange. 
  
The focus is another distinguishing facet of networks. The case 
described in the chapter six shows that it is difficult to be sufficiently 
focused without becoming too exclusive. There is a balance to be struck 
when it comes to how narrow or broad the content area is on which a 
network focuses. If the area of discussion is too narrow  
• it will not stimulate a broad enough flow of information 
• the interaction may be less creative since creative ideas often 
result from the combination of hitherto disparate elements 
• a too narrow content would only attract the ‘usual suspects’ who 
already know each other well; little cross-fertilization would 
take place.  
 
If the subject matter is too broad (‘Conditions for peace on earth’), then 
• the interaction remains too vague and becomes uninteresting for 
serious people, 
• it attracts, on the contrary, people with lunatic ideas, and 
• it becomes very difficult to arrive at common products which 
bind the group together. 
 
Some networks have a very specific objective. They may have been 
created to prepare a specific event or the next annual report, to elaborate 
a new strategy, or to coordinate a specific project. Common products 
could be joint publications containing lessons learned or 
recommendations, joint projects or programmes, the organisation of an 
event, a broadening of the network, or the start of a new one in a 
different field or region. Aiming for such a specific outcome can make a 
network more attractive and active, as participants feel they are working 
towards something concrete that will serve their interest. Being too 
specific about the intended outcome of the exchange, on the other hand, 
severely limits the creativeness of the process and the possibility for 
arriving at unexpected conclusions.  
 
                                                 
68  This section is based in part on an earlier publication by the author with Gerd Junne (Junne and 
Verkoren 2005). 
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Many networks are created for the exchange of knowledge and 
experience per se. But there is always an implicit assumption that this 
exchange will lead to better results, if not through joint activity, then 
through the improved functioning of the individual participants who are 
enriched by the exchange. Networks working toward a specific outcome 
often function well, because they have a clear focus, their activity is 
time-bound, and the participants have an obvious common interest. The 
problem is often that the knowledge generated during the project is not 
captured or passed on to colleagues in the participating organisations or 
other people. There is also little exchange with other networks or 
organisations with similar activities. For such an exchange, the network 
should be broader, but as a consequence, the objective then becomes 
more diffuse. 
 
Van Deventer (2004: 6-7) draws attention to the fact that the two 
dimensions described so far – activities/objectives and organisation – are 
often interrelated. Networks formed with high expectations on the 
benefit side (ranging from merely gaining information to increasing the 
impact of activities, obtaining resources and gaining collective 
legitimacy) are likely to carry out more pro-active functions (ranging 
from knowledge exchange to advocacy and collective interventions) 
and, as a result, need a higher degree of institutional formalisation.  
 
Accountability and exclusiveness  
As chapters six and seven will show, networks face various issues of 
legitimacy, accountability and ownership. As networks are relatively 
fluid and consist of many different actors, it is difficult to hold them 
accountable for their actions and the way they use the resources of 
donors and participants. “Networks as diffuse, complex and weakly 
institutionalized collaborative systems are [not] directly accountable to 
an electoral base”. (Benner et al. 2004: 198) It can be difficult to 
establish in how far those representing the network really take into 
account the views of their members. As networks develop, devising 
formal structures for representation and governance is often necessary in 
order to deal with these issues, even though such structures may limit 
the looseness and flexibility that set networks apart from other 
organisational forms. 
 
A specific issue that has been raised in the literature regarding 
networking initiatives is their exclusiveness. Often, they have not 
spanned the North-South divide. According to King many development 
agencies have been more concerned with “improving their own capacity 
rather than with improving the quality of engagement with the South”. 
The first circle of sharing is usually within the organisation, the second 
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is with other players in the North, and only in third place are the 
Southern partners and other groups outside the North:  
“it could be suggested that the new assumptions of ‘genuine 
partnership’ between North and South would have made it mandatory 
to start the explorations of knowledge sharing with the primary actors 
in the so-called recipient countries. […] [Instead,] a good deal of the 
initial knowledge management and knowledge sharing in the agencies 
has actually taken place behind the protection of an intranet, 
reinforcing the view that it is the agency’s own staff development that 
is the primary objective.” (King 2005, 72-75).  
 
Even when networks do cross the North-South border, or when they are 
South-South networks, exclusiveness can be an issue. Unequal access by 
different parties that could benefit and contribute may be the result of 
different organisational capacities, including time issues but also things 
like access to internet. It may also be a consequence of politics, 
particularly in conflict areas where some organisations or individuals 
may not want to engage with others because they are considered to be 
allied with one of the conflict parties.   
  
Inclusiveness and the broadening of a network are not necessarily 
positive, however. In chapter seven we will see how members of a 
global civil society network complain that their network is too inclusive 
and broad. A balance needs to be found between a certain critical mass 
to start a lively, sustained interaction, while avoiding the exclusion of 
important actors. If the group is too small, chances are that 
• there will be little exchange, because there are too few people to 
participate. The positions of participants will be known quickly 
and cease to be surprising, so that the interest of members in 
participating will decline rapidly. 
• if only people with a similar background participate, opinions 
may not differ sufficiently to generate creative ideas.  
• if only a small fraction of the potential constituency participates, 
people will turn to other forums where these people do meet.   
• the network may lose legitimacy due to unequal access. (Junne 
and Verkoren 2005) 
 
On the other hand, the community can also be too inclusive. By asking 
too many people with different backgrounds to join, communication 
may falter. The reasons are that 
• chances increase that individual contributions are beyond the 
interest of the majority of members. 
• people hesitate to engage themselves because they do not see a 
common denominator which brings participants together. 
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• the larger number of people may generate so many messages 
that they will no longer be read by the other members of a 
community. A community would then drown in its own flow of 
information, if not skilfully channelled into different subgroups 
and discussion threads. (Junne and Verkoren 2005) 
 
The issue of exclusiveness also relates to the extent to which a network 
provides access to other networks. If a Southern, grassroots network is 
able to link up with international networks, and to provide access to 
formerly inaccessible policy forums, this can be a vital function for its 
members.  
 
 
3.8 Concluding remarks  
 
Learning is what makes people improve practice and avoid repeating 
past mistakes. At the level of an organisation, learning takes place when 
the organisation changes work methods or objectives as a result of 
experience or knowledge encountered. Knowledge and learning 
processes of NGOs and their employees take place in a cyclical way and 
are closely related to action. NNGO staff members primarily learn in 
interaction – with colleagues as well as external actors.  
 
The most profound kind of learning takes place when a person (or 
organisation) questions his own unconscious bias, assumptions and 
world views. Such ‘third-order learning’ is particularly relevant for our 
field of analysis as it supports cross-cultural interaction and learning. At 
the same time, it is precisely such deep learning that is difficult in 
conflict-affected situations, in which questioning one’s views and the 
actions that have been based on them can be quite painful and costly. 
Interaction with others may help a person or organisation move towards 
deeper levels of learning. Outsiders can provide an external perspective 
that is needed in order to step out of one’s thinking world and reflect on 
it. In this way, outsiders act as learning ‘scaffolds’. Formal education 
may also serve as such a scaffold if it builds on the practical knowledge 
and experience of the learner and relates these to theories.  
 
Various issues complicate the learning of NGOs, including work 
pressure and a lack of time. To an extent these obstacles are of such a 
nature that they will never be fully removed. However, two types of 
efforts could help limit them. The first is working to gain recognition of 
the fact that in the long term learning and efficiency are not contrary but 
mutually beneficial. The second effort is trying to devise organisational 
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structures and foster organisational cultures that limit these problems 
and stimulate learning. Trust, a cooperative (rather than competitive) 
culture, the rewarding of knowledge sharing, and an atmosphere tolerant 
of mistakes are a part of this. 
 
Implicit, cultural knowledge is an important but problematic category of 
knowledge for NGOs, which cooperate with people across cultures and 
knowledge systems. Not much thinking has so far been done about ways 
to create, store and share cultural knowledge. This gap is probably 
related to the lack of attention the knowledge strategies of NGOs pay to 
North-South (and South-South) knowledge processes. There are, 
however, two bodies of thinking that do take Southern organisations into 
account: capacity building, which addresses knowledge flows between 
NNGOs and SNGOs, and networking, which focuses particularly on 
exchanges among SNGOs. Regarding capacity building, theory 
developed by the UNDP and others stipulates that it should not be a one-
way knowledge transfer process from North to South but should be 
based on Southern ‘ownership’ and build on existing indigenous 
knowledge.  
 
Literature on networking by peace NGOs suggests that networks are an 
organisational form potentially suitable for peacebuilding due to their 
flexibility and capacity to bring together the large number of small 
organisations that make up a scattered field. Networks may be more or 
less centrally organised and narrowly focused depending on the degree 
of cooperation they desire and on whether they prefer inclusiveness and 
diversity over clearly demarcated objectives and activities. Their 
governance structures need to pay attention to accountability, which is 
often a difficult issue given the loose organisation of networks and the 
fact that they include many different members.  
 
For both capacity building and networking, we will see in upcoming 
chapters how activities in the field compare with the theory presented in 
this chapter. In that and other ways, this book aims to contribute to 
filling the gap in existing theories when it comes to knowledge 
processes involving Southern NGOs, thereby also contributing to 
thinking about cross-cultural knowledge processes as part of North-
South exchange. 
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3.9 Concluding Part One: Towards a model of processes, actors, and 
relationships 
 
In chapter one we saw that Southern peacebuilding NGOs in conflict-
affected regions focus mostly on the local, community level. This is also 
where they have a clear added value compared to other actors. However, 
the chapter suggests that the relevance of their work would increase if in 
addition to their micro-level work they paid more attention to the bigger 
picture of building a peaceful society, reflecting more explicitly on the 
role their activities play in this big picture and whether they complement 
with those of other actors. The difficulty of doing so is related to a lack 
of space and capacity for research, reflection and ‘third-order’ learning 
about whether the organisation is doing the right thing. This is tied to a 
model of civil society support on the part of donors that treats local 
NGOs more as service providers, or implementers of international 
policy, and less as independent political actors. As a result there is not 
much incentive to reflect and little space to address the larger, political 
features of conflict and peacebuilding.   
 
Chapter two showed that conflicts are characterised by competing 
‘knowledges’ and interaction around different visions and interpretations 
of reality is part of peacebuilding. When local NGOs organise 
community dialogues or peace education projects, such exchanges are 
part of these activities. Their own knowledge – the ideas and concepts 
on which they base their actions – develops mainly through action and 
interaction. Joint learning through exchange with people in- and outside 
the organisation is emphasised as a way to increase the understanding of 
NGO staff and the relevance of their actions. When such interactions 
involve people from different cultural backgrounds, as is often the case 
given the large role of Northern donor agencies in shaping the practice 
of local NGOs, they are complicated by the fact that different 
knowledge systems meet. Oral traditions have to adjust to written ones 
and different definitions of how knowledge is generated, and what 
constitutes valid research, interact. The question is whether implicit, 
cultural knowledge on the part of all involved could help improve such 
interactions. 
 
The third chapter suggests that a ‘third-order’ willingness to question 
one’s own assumptions and ideas could potentially facilitate cross-
cultural learning, namely. This would lead to more openness towards the 
knowledge and views of others. However, it is difficult because of 
conflict (which stimulates tactical-level learning but not deeper 
reflection about whether one has been doing the right thing) and also 
because of structural inequalities among the actors involved in 
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exchange, particularly between NNGOs, acting as donors, and the 
SNGOs that receive their aid. Chapter four analyses these structural 
issues. Capacity building and NGO networking represent two bodies of 
thinking and activity that may contribute to overcoming them. Parts Two 
and Three examine the way they function in the field.  
 
As is clear by now, interaction emerges from Part I as a major element 
of the learning processes of NGOs. In order to map the various actors 
that engage in these interactions and the way they relate to one another 
in processes of learning and knowledge exchange, Figure 3.5 provides 
an initial typology of the knowledge processes, actors and interactions 
that feature in and around Southern peace NGOs. It is explained below.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Knowledge flows in and around Southern peace NGOs 
 
The light blue box represents the Southern peace NGO. Inside this box 
an ideal-type cyclical learning process takes place, as introduced in 
section 3.1 on learning and 3.2 on organisational learning. The cycle in 
this model has been adapted to the project cycles of NGOs, in which 
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conscious planning plays an important role. The black arrows inside the 
blue box show where the organisation – or parts of it – moves from one 
learning step to the next in a project cycle. The process may start at any 
point in the cycle. (Often it starts with the introduction from the outside 
of abstract concepts and generalisations, such as peacebuilding 
methodologies developed elsewhere.) Next, these concepts are analysed 
and related to the circumstances and aims of the organisation, followed 
by a planning phase in which the newly adapted ideas are concretised 
into a programme or project. That programme or project is carried out in 
the next stage, which provides an opportunity to test the ideas in action. 
Finally, organisational members reflect on their experience and draw 
lessons from it. These lessons make up new abstract concepts to be 
analysed and adapted in a new cycle of learning, and the process starts 
all over again. As was discussed in this chapter, this organisational 
learning cycle is facilitated by a learning culture: an organisational 
environment that creates the optimal conditions for learning. 
 
However, these organisational learning processes do not occur in 
isolation. Various actors interact in and around them. Such interaction 
with external people is important as it has the potential of stimulating 
deep, reflective learning, something that is important both for innovation 
and for learning and exchange across cultures and knowledge systems. 
This is particularly relevant given that deep (third-order) learning is 
hampered by conflict or its legacy, which makes it difficult for people to 
question their assumptions and the actions they have based on them. In 
Figure 3.5, a number of potential external counterparts are portrayed that 
interact with SNGOs and thereby exchange knowledge. The remainder 
of this study will analyse these interactions in more detail. 
 
For people working in peace and development NGOs, the beneficiaries 
of their programmes represent one important actor in these interactive 
learning processes. In addition, interaction is likely to occur with 
colleagues from other NGOs in the same area. This may happen 
informally, during joint activities, or in networks. Often joint learning 
and interaction by staff members from different NGOs is consciously 
stimulated during training workshops provided by international or large 
local NGOs. Staff members of international NGOs that fund the 
activities of Southern organisations also interact with their local partner 
NGOs, typically around project proposals, reports and evaluations, 
thereby feeding into the planning stage. In addition, through capacity 
building actvitities they may contribute abstract concepts. The arrow 
reflects that, according to the theory, capacity building activities should 
consist of two-way knowledge flows. 
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These international NGOs act as donor agencies towards their Southern 
counterparts but are themselves recipients of donor money as well, 
interacting with Northern government agencies, foundations, and 
intergovernmental agencies around the policy of these donors. These 
Northern donors in some cases also interact directly with the SNGOs 
that are at the centre of this analysis, for example though their embassies 
in Southern countries. Besides, they interact with the governments of the 
countries in which SNGOs are based, for example as providers of 
bilateral development aid. These Southern governments in turn interact 
with NGOs in their country. These interactions may be through 
consultations or networking around policymaking or as part of the lobby 
and advocacy activities of NGOs. Knowledge institutions, such as 
universities and research institutes, play a role as well. We have seen in 
chapter three that they may function as scaffolds that support deep 
learning.  
 
The above is a schematised, hypothesised sketch of actors, processes 
and relations. The remainder of this study sets out to establish how these 
processes function in reality. In doing so it addresses a number of issues 
that are raised by the relations and processes outlined above, and that the 
theory presented so far has not yet dealt with. We have seen that the 
literature on organisational learning by NGOs hardly touches upon 
organisational learning in SNGOs and about North-South knowledge 
interactions. Part Two aims to contribute to filling these gaps. 
Specifically, it looks at a number of research questions that Part One has 
raised: 
1. What factors constrain and support the learning of these NGOs?  
2. How do power differences, donor relations and North-South 
dynamic influence the knowledge that is used and the learning 
that takes place?  
3. What do the knowledge and learning processes of local peace 
NGOs look like, what are their strengths and weaknesses, and 
what are difficulties and gaps in their learning practice? 
4. Given the structural reality in which they operate, what 
initiatives are undertaken to improve the learning processes of 
local peace NGOs? What can we learn from these initiatives? 
5. To what extent do these initiatives facilitate cross-cultural, 
‘third-order’ learning? 
 
 
  
156 
3.10 Research design and methodology  
 
The research approach and design has been the combined result of 
inputs from practitioners in the field of peacebuilding and of a literature 
review. At the start of the research process, a meeting was organised 
with Netherlands-based experts of peacebuilding and learning processes. 
The purpose of this meeting was to make the research focus and design 
as relevant as possible to the interests and needs of the peacebuilding 
field. In an Electronic Boardroom session69 that combined face-to-face 
and chat room discussion to record literally what was contributed by the 
participants, a discussion was held on the priorities and questions for the 
study. The seventeen participants were Dutch NGO staff and researchers 
working on conflict and peace and with a special interest or expertise in 
knowledge processes. This session contributed to the first research 
design. 
 
 
3.10.1 Spread and representativeness of NGOs visited 
 
The table below gives an overview of the NGOs whose staff were 
interviewed for this study. The main criterion for selecting NGOs was 
that they were local organisations with peacebuilding as their mission. In 
addition, a spread in size, geographical base, and focus area of the 
organisations were aimed at. As the table shows, this has been achieved 
relatively well.70 The NGOs were contacted in several ways. First, the 
Dutch donor organisations Inter-Church Development Organisation 
(ICCO) and Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid 
(Cordaid)71 suggested partner organisations and other contacts. Second, 
the networks analysed provided lists of member organisations. Finally, 
people interviewed suggested additional contacts.  
 
In the table, the organisations have been divided into several categories:   
• Scope: whether an NGO is local or national; regional; or global 
in scope. 
• Base: the country in which the office is based. 
• Size: the number of paid staff members. 
• Focus: the areas of work on which the NGO concentrates.  
• Rural/urban: whether an NGO has its office in a national capital, 
a provincial capital, or a small town.  
                                                 
69 Amsterdam, 20 November 2004 (see sources). 
70 See below for some qualifying remarks. 
71 ICCO and Cordaid are two of the four largest development NGOs in the Netherlands.  
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• Finally, the table gives the total number of people interviewed 
and the total number of NGOs they represent. 
 
Overall:  Focus:  
Total number of people 
interviewed72  105 Reconciliation 8 
Total number of NGOs 76 Networking 11 
  Dialogue 26 
Scope:  DDRR73  7 
Local / national NGO 56 Peace education 25 
Regional NGO 9 Training (community) mediators 18 
Global NGO 7 Human rights / justice 11 
  Development 13 
Base:  Women 9 
Kenya 7 Youth 19 
Sudan74  2 Research 4 
Rwanda75  1 NGO development 6 
Ghana 1 Democracy 8 
Sierra Leone 16 Representing a particular group 2 
Liberia 10 Church organisation 9 
Philippines 10 Lobby and advocacy 14 
Cambodia 14 Early warning for early response 4 
Kyrgyzstan 5 Dialogue 26 
Tajikistan 6 Peace zones and civilian peacekeeping 2 
Kazakhstan76  1   
Uzbekistan77  3 Rural/urban:  
  Based in national capital78 47 
Size:  Based in provincial capital79  29 
Staff less than 5 15   
Staff less than 10 21   
Staff less than 25 23   
Staff more than 25 17   
Table 3.5: Categories of NGOs visited 
                                                 
72 In many cases several staff members of the same NGO were interviewed. In addition, donor 
agency representatives (Netherlands) and staff of government agencies (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) 
were interviewed to obtain a government’s perspective on civil society, peacebuilding, and 
knowledge. 
73 Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation 
74 Interviewed in Nairobi, Kenya 
75 Interviewed in Nairobi, Kenya 
76 Interviewed in Utrecht, Netherlands 
77 Interviewed in Osh, Kyrgyzstan 
78 Nearly all of these organisations have programmes, and sometimes offices, in the countryside 
79 Nearly all of these organisations have programmes, and sometimes offices, in the countryside 
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It has been difficult to establish how representative these NGOs are of 
the broader field of peacebuilding organisations. Few global or regional 
directories of peace organisations exist, and those that do (including the 
United Nations NGO database) tend to include only large international 
NGOs and not local ones based in conflict areas. The OneWorld partner 
directory of development NGOs does not include many peace-oriented 
members. GPPAC has a directory of peace NGOs but this directory is 
rather limited and does not include many grassroots groups. It provides 
no information on the number of staff members and focus. Donor 
organisations like ICCO and Cordaid have not integrated information of 
country desks about local partners into a central directory. 
 
Looking at the table, however, the following remarks can be made with 
regard to the spread of the NGOs. 
• Concerning geographical spread, the interviews concentrate on 
Southeast Asia and West Africa. This is the result of the 
selection of these regions as case study areas. In addition, some 
interviews were held in East Africa and Central Asia. This 
means that the Asian and African continents are represented 
relatively well.80 The question whether the countries visited are 
representative of their wider regions is discussed in section 
3.10.4 below.  
• The table also specifies the proportion of rurally-based versus 
urban-based NGOs. The majority of NGOs consulted are based 
in either a national or provincial capital. This is not surprising 
given that most NGOs in these countries have their offices in 
these towns. Reasons for this include better infrastructure and 
electricity, and being near the offices of donor agencies, 
government institutions, and international organisations. Most 
of the projects of these NGOs, however, are in rural areas. Few 
of these projects were visited, because the study does not 
discuss any individual projects. The study is about the 
organisations themselves and their activities and perceptions 
with regard to knowledge and learning. 
• Although some local branches of international NGOs were 
visited, the focus is clearly on indigenous organisations. This 
has been a conscious choice. International NGOs have been 
relatively widely studied, and they themselves sometimes 
analyse knowledge flows among their branches. Locally-
originated organisations face a different set of challenges in 
                                                 
80 Latin America is not represented; there the processes studied may well look different. 
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gaining access to information and getting their voices heard than 
international NGOs. Since these challenges are at the core of the 
study, the local NGOs receive the most attention. Analysing 
their relatively under-studied issues, it is hoped, will contribute 
most to the development of theory in the area of North-South 
knowledge flows and processes. 
• Under ‘focus’ the areas of work which the organisations 
mentioned as core activities are listed. Most organisations work 
in more than one of these areas. All the focus areas mentioned 
are usually considered part of peacebuilding work, although 
there is some discussion with regard to whether social and 
economic development projects and human rights advocacy are 
part of the core toolkit of peacebuilders.81 In general, a relatively 
fair representation has been achieved of the range of activities in 
which peace NGOs around the world tend to engage.82  
• Finally, the size of the NGOs, expressed in the number of paid 
staff members, has been specified. As the table shows, 
organisations of different sizes are relatively equally 
represented. Nonetheless, it was somewhat surprising to me that 
such a large proportion of the NGOs encountered had relatively 
high numbers of staff members. The perception prior to the field 
visits had been that the majority of Southern peacebuilding 
organisations were very small in size. Upon counting staff based 
in rural areas it turned out that many of the NGOs encountered 
were larger than expected. That said, not all staff are paid 
regularly and in many organisations there is a high variation in 
staff size depending, for example, on whether a particular grant 
has been secured for a project. It is not clear whether the 
organisational sizes of the NGOs visited are representative of 
the whole population of Southern peace NGOs.  
 
Related to questions about the representativity of the peace NGOs 
visited is a set of issues relating to those organisations’ constituency in 
the regions in which they work. Are NGOs acting on behalf of 
communities or do they mostly represent their own organisational 
interests? Have they been created as a result of a need arising out of 
communities, or have they been founded in response to funds becoming 
available? Do they mostly implement projects determined by donors, or 
                                                 
81 Most people would say that they are not, but that they do contribute to the overall aim of building 
sustainable peace. 
82 As stated above, there is not much reliable information about this. However, publications such as 
European Centre for Conflict Prevention 1999, Van Tongeren et al. 2005, Anderson and Olsen 
2003, and Barnes 2006 give an idea of the range of activities undertaken. In chapter one more will 
be said about these activities. 
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do they set priorities through participatory processes among the 
beneficiaries of their work? The picture varies among regions, countries, 
and organisations. In some countries, particularly those emerging from 
large-scale violence that has destroyed many of the societal structures 
which may have been present before, many CSOs lack a real 
constituency – something that has for example been noted in Liberia. 
There, as in other parts of Africa and also in a country like Cambodia, 
there have been instances of ‘fake’ NGOs: organisations founded 
exclusively to get access to donor funds. In a country like the 
Philippines there is a strong tradition of a well-organised, interest-based 
civil society83.  
 
The interviews do not answer these questions, because they only give 
the view of NSO staff themselves. No NGO staff member is likely to 
admit that his or her organisation has only a limited constituency. It is 
likely that organisations have been visited which are not well rooted in 
local constituencies. It is even possible that some organisations have 
been ‘fake’ NGOs – although this is not very likely, as it is difficult to 
imagine why these organisations would be interested in discussing 
issues of knowledge and learning. Anyhow, the approach taken does not 
double-check the picture painted by interviewees of their activities; few 
actual projects of the NGOs were visited. However, this is also not the 
central aim of the study. The aim is to learn about the NGOs themselves 
and their perspectives of knowledge and learning. 
 
The interviews did shed light on a related issue: the extent to which 
SNGOs are able to set their own agenda based on the needs of the 
people for whom they work. In many cases, donor relations limit the 
radius of action of local organisations. Despite the popular language of 
capacity building and ownership, local partners are often treated as 
subcontractors that implement the policies set by donors. There is little 
room for local partners to contribute to policy development by outlining 
the local needs and priorities. This limits the extent to which CSOs 
represent local communities; in some cases they seem rather to be acting 
as outposts of donor agencies. Chapters one and four discuss this issue. 
 
 
3.10.2 Regional differences, culture and context  
 
The reason behind the selection of countries to be visited in different 
parts of the world has been to increase the validity of findings for 
                                                 
83 although there, too, doubts have been raised about the extent to which these organisations 
represent the grassroots 
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various contexts. It was also thought that the comparison of findings 
between regions – particularly the two main focus regions, Southeast 
Asia and West Africa – might yield interesting observations about 
regional differences in approaches and experiences with knowledge and 
learning. In fact, it has proved difficult to make such comparisons 
between regions, as differences within regions are very large. The 
countries visited within regions differ significantly – particularly in 
Southeast Asia where Cambodia and the Philippines are very different. 
Differences include stage and scope of the conflict (with relative peace 
in Cambodia for eight years and peace negotiations ongoing in the 
Philippines, and the Cambodian conflict involving the whole country 
while the Philippine conflict is concentrated in one region), maturity of 
democracy and civil society (with civil society in the Philippines much 
stronger and more longstanding than in Cambodia), and the focus area 
of peacebuilders (with Philippine organizations being more political and 
action-oriented than Cambodian ones, which tend to emphasise gradual 
engagement and dialogue as strategies).  
 
The different nature and focus of civil society organisations in the two 
countries relate in part to large cultural differences. In Cambodia, a 
traditionally Buddhist culture exists, which is influenced by Chinese as 
well as Thai traditions and the legacy of the French colonizers. The 
Philippine culture is influenced by Catholicism, Spanish occupation, and 
American influence; and Muslim and indigenous cultures in Mindanao. 
The case may even be made that those two countries represent two 
extremes of a range of Southeast Asian contexts. In that sense, the two 
countries are not a bad representation of the region as a whole. That is 
less true for West Africa. Sierra Leone and Liberia are neighbouring 
countries. They have different pasts (Sierra Leone was a British colony 
while Liberia is linked historically to the United States) but are both 
Anglophone countries and have relatively similar conflict histories. 
Countries in their direct neighbourhood, such as Ivory Coast and 
Guinea, have faced comparable and related civil wars, but other 
countries in the region deal with different kinds of conflicts and issues.  
 
The Francophone parts of West Africa have not been visited. Those 
countries are said to be different culturally as well as in the level of civil 
society development (lower than in the Anglophone countries). 
Differences in colonial and administrative practices in French and 
British colonies have given rise to different state-society interaction. Put 
very briefly, the French tended to rule directly while the British ruled 
through local elites. The latter form of colonial governance had the 
advantage that locals developed governance experience, but it also led to 
conflict as some groups were selected to govern over others. In sum, the 
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study cannot claim to apply equally well to all of West Africa. However, 
the combination regions and countries visited, not only Southeast Asia 
but also East Africa and Central Asia, widen the validity of the findings.  
 
Looking at what the differences in context mean for the findings when it 
comes to knowledge and learning processes by local peace NGOs, no 
obvious differences between the countries visited emerge from the 
interviews. In fact the issues are that NGO staff members around the 
world raise are quite similar. Indeed, this similarity follows from some 
of the developments that are discussed in this book, particularly the 
occurrence of exchanges among NGOs and the prevalence of a specific 
peacebuilding and development discourse. However, this raises a 
difficult question. Do the issues raised by interviewees correspond to 
their reality, or are they merely talking about the issues they know tend 
to be discussed and they expect will be understood by the researcher?  
 
In fact the story is not that bleak. Indeed, many of the NGO staff 
members interviewed are faced with the same reality when it comes to 
the funding regime of which they are a part. This funding regime is 
international and has similar characteristics in different countries. It has 
led to similar issues when it comes to the knowledge local NGO 
employees use in their work. In response, employees in various places 
voice similar criticisms of the situation. They speak the language of the 
dominant discourse, but are not uncritical of it. From their position at the 
interface of international discourse and priorities on the one hand, and 
local realities on the other, they face dilemmas that occur relatively 
independently of the cultural or regional context.  
 
 
3.10.3 Methodological approach 
 
The methodology employed is essentially qualitative rather than 
quantitative. It does not use numerical data but analyses stories and case 
studies. The approach taken throughout the research has been 
explorative or heuristic. This means that theory and empirical data 
interact. Both are used to build up a new conceptual model. As part of 
the heuristic approach, data is collected using a variety of methods and 
perspectives. The the study employs triangulation: the application and 
combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon by combining multiple theories, methods, and empirical 
materials, in the hope of overcoming the weaknesses and biases that are 
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integral to single method, single-theory studies.84 Having collected data 
through various methods and perspectives, the heuristic analysis is 
directed toward discovery of similarities. “Proceeding in this manner, 
the overall pattern, showing the structure of the topic, will gradually 
emerge. All data have to be considered and incorporated […]. The 
analysis is integrated into the process of data collection and mutually 
dependent on it.” (Kleining and Witt 2000) 
 
What have been these various methods employed? Central elements of 
the study have been the review of various bodies of relevant theory on 
knowledge processes, civil society organisations, and peacebuilding 
work, and a large number of interviews with staff members of primarily 
Southern peacebuilding NGOs. In addition, the study has employed 
elements of action research (see section 3.10.7), observation, and case 
study research. As part of one of the case studies, namely the study on 
GPPAC, an e-mail survey was conducted. The survey findings also have 
some broader application beyond the case study alone, and have been 
particularly useful for the chapters on knowledge sharing and 
networking (chapters five, six and seven). All these elements (which are 
elaborated below) are combined in an inductive manner. The analytical 
model is not fixed but changes depending on the empirical data 
collected. Thus, the findings from the interviews, action research 
observation, and case study research serve to adjust and further develop 
the theoretical framework.  
 
An approach which has inspired the methodology used for the current 
study is appreciative inquiry. Appreciative inquiry (AI) is a method for 
bringing about changes in organisations, starting from the strengths of 
the organisation. The approach concentrates not on the problems, but on 
the positive elements within the organisation. It explores what drives an 
organisation, what connects staff members with each other, and what 
inspires and motivates them. AI attempts to identify moments from the 
past in which organisational processes worked best, and to analyse the 
factors and strengths that made these moments possible. In other words, 
appreciative inquiry does not emphasise problem identification, but 
discovering, understanding and fostering social innovation. Although 
this study does identify issues and problems, it also aims to go beyond 
these and make suggestions for ways forward that build on the positive 
potential of the existing experiences and knowledge of Southern 
peacebuilders. Another principle of appreciative enquiry is that research 
                                                 
84 http://www.tele.sunyit.edu/traingulation.htm. Website on triangulation as a research 
methodology. 
Accessed on 1 December 2006. 
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should be applicable, that is, it should generate theoretical knowledge 
that can be used, applied, and thereby validated in action. As will be 
discussed in 0.11 below, this is indeed what this study aims to do.  
 
The study also contains some elements of another approach: action 
research. Action research is a mode of research in which the researcher 
does not strive to be an objective observer but is herself involved in 
what she is studying. Acknowledging her own role, she studies her own 
interventions and consciously reflects on her own assumptions and 
theories in doing so. The action research elements of the study came 
about primarily as a result of opportunities to do advisory work for 
several organisations engaged in knowledge processes in the 
peacebuilding field. They are further discussed in section 3.10.7. 
 
Choices made regarding the approach - the selection of programmes, 
organisations, and countries to visit, and methods to employ - have been 
primarily based on the topic and questions at hand. The triangulated, 
explorative approach chosen is relevant because knowledge processes of 
Southern peace organisations are little-researched. On the specific topic 
few sources are available. Thus it becomes necessary to develop new 
theory, which is done by combining different (but related) bodies of 
theory with empirical data. The empirical data are obtained not only 
from interviews but also by observation and action research in order to 
balance the possible bias that the interviewees may bring, given that 
their views cannot easily be tested by comparing them with the studies 
of others – which are hardly available.  
 
The above-mentioned consultancies (see 0.7 below) matched the content 
of the PhD project - which is why I was asked to carry them out. Their 
inclusion in the study did not lead to a reduction or alteration of the 
approach as it had been developed from a content perspective. They 
only added methods and travel destinations. For example, the review of 
GPPAC that is discussed in chapter seven made it possible to carry out a 
global survey among CSOs on networking in general, and the GPPAC 
network in particular. This survey was added to the methodology toolkit 
already planned or used. This applied only to a specific subset of issues: 
those relating to networks and networking.  
 
 
3.10.4 Interviews 
 
Central to the study are open-ended, semi-structured interviews. These 
have largely been with NGO people working in various conflict-affected 
countries. Table 3.5 gave an overview of the backgrounds and 
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characteristics of the interview partners and their organisations. In 
addition to these 105 Southern peacebuilders, around twenty-five 
conversations were conducted with people involved in supporting these 
peacebuilders, namely, European and American staff of donor agencies 
and international NGOs. The nature of these conversations ranges from 
formal interviews to informal discussions. The questionnaires used as 
reference points to guide the interviews differed depending on the 
respondent. Sometimes respondents were interviewed primarily as 
network participants; in other cases more attention was paid to learning 
processes. In many cases an interview was held for more than one 
purpose85.  
 
Although lists of questions were used as reference points, the 
conversations were open-ended and often changed their focus depending 
on what issues proved to be of particular relevance in relation to the 
respondent’s situation. Having said all this, some general themes and 
questions were addressed in most of the interviews, such the ways in 
which people learn, the knowledge they feel they need in order to 
improve their work, the extent to which they are able to gain access to 
this knowledge, and the difficulties they encounter when trying to learn 
new things. How NGO staff members apply new knowledge in their 
work was also addressed, as were the modalities and difficulties of 
sharing knowledge with others. Besides, the interviews paid attention to 
the type of knowledge interviewees think they have to offer and whether 
or not this knowledge reaches potential users. The role of donor 
agencies in supporting or inhibiting knowledge processes was often 
discussed, and most interviewees were asked whether they thought some 
types of knowledge are considered more important than others in the 
field of peacebuilding. 
 
 
3.10.5 Action research 
 
I have been involved in the GPPAC network analysed in chapter seven 
as well as in the ACTS programme of chapter eight. I have carried out a 
review of the GPPAC network as an external consultant invited by the 
network’s International Steering Group. The GPPAC analysis is not a 
classic case of action research in the sense of one’s intervention in a 
situation being the object of study. The role of the researcher has been 
that of an external interviewer and observer. However, the fact that the 
                                                 
85 For example, one and the same respondent may have been interviewed as a member of GPPAC 
for the case study in chapter eleven, as a participant in ACTS for the case study in chapter twelve, 
and in addition he or she may have been asked questions about general issues regarding learning 
and knowledge sharing. 
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research was designed and carried out in close interaction with people 
within the network, and that a number of concrete recommendations 
were formulated which were then discussed in a seminar organised by 
GPPAC, points to a relatively active role of the researcher.  
 
For ACTS, I was an advisor in developing a monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) framework for the programme. However, as this M&E 
development is a relatively long-term process which has only just 
commenced, it is difficult to see the outcomes of my intervention as of 
yet. In addition, although the M&E framework is an important element 
of any programme and sheds light on the programme as a whole, its 
development is not the central object of analysis in this chapter. This 
means that the study of ACTS is not a classic case of action research 
either. All the same, what is taken from action research methodology is 
an awareness of a researcher’s own involvement in the object of study 
and the implications this may have.  
 
 
3.10.6 (Active) observation 
 
Observation was employed as a method in two ways. First, several 
network meetings and other events at which knowledge was exchanged 
were attended. These concerned two meetings of the International 
Steering Group of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict (GPPAC), a provincial-level meeting of the Network for 
Collaborative Peacebuilding Sierra Leone (NCP-SL), a curriculum 
development workshop of the Applied Conflict Transformation Studies 
(ACTS) programme, a Cordaid conference with staff and partners on 
networking as a peacebuilding methodology, and a GPPAC seminar on 
the same topic. The latter seminar was attended by all fifteen GPPAC 
Regional Initiators plus a number of representatives of other regional 
and global networks86. In addition, academics working on peace issues 
and representatives of donor agencies participated in the seminar.  
 
These observation activities overlap partly with the action research 
described above, as in some of the meetings described I gave a 
presentation or otherwise provided inputs. In those cases it became 
possible to study the effect of my own interventions in the short- to 
medium-term.  
                                                 
86 such as the International Action Network on Small Arms, the Nonviolent Peaceforce, and the 
Amani Parliamentarians’ Forum in the Great Lakes region 
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3.10.7 Survey for GPPAC case study 
 
The GPPAC case study, discussed in chapter seven, uses the results of a 
written survey that was e-mailed to people involved in the GPPAC 
network, which consists of fifteen regional networks around the world. I 
was able to do this because the study was combined with a consultancy 
aiming to carry out a review of the network on behalf of GPPAC’s 
International Secretariat. The survey was developed in close 
consultation with the International Secretariat. Two versions were 
elaborated: version A for people directly involved in GPPAC, and 
version B for people indirectly involved87. 
 
The survey was sent to 623 people around the world. 199 people (or 
32%) returned it. The statistics for each region are depicted in Annex 1. 
They show that all but two of the fifteen regional GPPAC networks 
achieved the minimum response of 25 per cent aimed for. Particularly 
high percentages of surveys were returned in Central Asia (78%), the 
Caucasus (58%), and Central and East Africa (51%). Two regions did 
not meet the threshold of 25 per cent of the surveys returned: Southeast 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. In Southeast Asia 24 per 
cent of the surveys were returned, which is very close to the threshold. 
In addition, 29 people were interviewed in this region. The Latin 
America and the Caribbean region is more of an issue because only two 
out of 87 surveys (which had been translated into Spanish) were 
returned and no interviews were held. This was due to organisational 
difficulties and deficient communication between the various parties 
involved in carrying out the survey in that particular regional network88. 
I cannot assume that the two surveys returned are representative of the 
larger population of GPPAC members in this region, and have to 
conclude that Latin America and the Caribbean is not really represented 
in the case study.  
 
 
3.10.8 Bias and role of the researcher 
 
Ideally, researchers should be non-judgmental when compiling findings. 
Since complete neutrality is impossible, this characteristic is a 
controversial aspect of qualitative research. While absolute objectivity is 
impossible, it is paramount that researchers enter the field or study 
                                                 
87 ‘People indirectly involved’ usually do not consider themselves members of the network but they 
have been in contact with it as resource persons, donor agencies, or through informal contacts with 
network members. 
88 Namely, the International Secretariat of GPPAC, the GPPAC Regional Secretariat for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, a local researcher, and myself.   
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group with an open mind, an awareness of their own biases, and a 
commitment to remain detached from those biases as much as possible 
while observing and interviewing. Indeed, all that can be done is to be as 
explicit as possible about possible biases and ways in which these may 
have influenced the findings. First of all, the choice to visit a number of 
different countries rather than just one has meant that field trips have 
been short: not more than one month at a time. There has not been time 
to immerse in a culture and environment and genuinely get to know 
people. Clearly to the people encountered, I was ‘en passage’ The role 
of the researcher, as a result, has been essentially that of an outsider 
coming in to talk to people, and then to disappear again. The limited 
immersion in the countries means that there may be biases that I am 
unaware of. The approach may also have led interviewees to withhold 
more information than they would with someone they have come to 
know. Indeed, several people honestly stated their suspicion of Northern 
researchers coming to ‘extract information’ and taking it away for their 
own benefit, leaving respondents with nothing. As will be discussed in 
the final paragraph of this methodology section, it has been attempted to 
minimise this issue by involving respondents as much as possible in the 
process and by feeding results back to them. Nonetheless, some 
suspicion may well have been there.   
 
In terms of North versus South, two opposite biases may have been 
operating at the same time: on the one hand, an inbuilt Northern bias of 
myself as a researcher, being born and raised in Europe, and on the other 
hand, a pro-South sentiment. My unavoidable Northern bias has an 
impact on concepts such as time and effectiveness, which are under 
discussion during the research (for example when the interactions 
between Northern and Southern partner organisations are discussed). 
Being a scientist gives me an additional bias, emphasising the need for 
statements to be scientifically verifiable, preferring written information, 
and disregarding myth and intuition as a source of knowledge (see 
chapter four). Although for the aims of the study it is important to be 
open to different perspectives and to criticisms of Northern ways of 
seeing things, I unavoidably still look at these from the perspective of 
someone who has been immersed in those ways from a young age. A 
sympathy for Southern groups as the ‘underdog’ in North-South 
relations may have played a role at the same time. In that context, even 
some indirect sense of guilt about Northerners’ impact on the 
developing world over the centuries (from the slave trade, to 
colonisation, to Cold War sideshows, to neoliberalism) may be a factor. 
In addition, I tend to sympathise with pro-change actors such as civil 
society organisations working for a better world in difficult 
circumstances.  
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My age (young) and gender (female) may have influenced the responses 
given by interviewees, particularly in countries with patriarchical 
traditions. At least I myself perceived this to be something of 
significance in some instances. Upon entry, people would act surprised 
at my youth (and often at my gender, which my name usually does not 
give away to non-Dutch people). I sometimes had the feeling that I was 
taken more seriously after I had presented a book I had previously co-
edited, and some copies of which I had brought along as gifts. At the 
opposite extreme of not being taken seriously, it is also possible that 
people may have accorded me some status on account of being from the 
North and academia, and tried to impress me by giving what they may 
have perceived as ‘socially desirable’ answers – although when looking 
at the interview reports it is difficult to envision what these may have 
been.  
 
Importantly, and somewhat connected to the previous point, I played 
different roles in different interviews, and often played several roles at 
once: PhD researcher, consultant evaluating a Northern partner (this was 
the case for the Kenyan interviews), consultant carrying out a review of 
a global network in which the interviewee is involved (in the 
Philippines, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), and consultant 
facilitating a process of joint monitoring and evaluation system 
development (in Cambodia). Although the different ‘hats’ were clearly 
introduced, this may still have been confusing to people. Moreover, 
depending on the roles, interviewees may have been more or less open. 
For example, if an interviewer is introduced as only and purely a PhD 
researcher (as was the case in West Africa), people may be more 
forthcoming than when she is evaluating an organisation they work with 
(as was the case in East Africa). The different roles played also had 
advantages, however. The consultancies provided me with access to 
information and contacts that would otherwise have been difficult to 
obtain. In addition, I entered conversations with a different status from a 
PhD researcher. People may have been more willing to meet me and 
more thorough in providing information when they knew that it would 
be used for a concrete project. 
 
 
3.10.9 Research ethics and outcomes 
 
As was mentioned above, some SNGO staff are critical of researchers 
coming in to pick their brains only to take the knowledge away and use 
it for their own benefit (for example, to obtain a degree or publish in an 
academic journal). Such issues do not only lead to ethical considerations 
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in the methodology section; they are part of the subject of the study as 
well. Because of this it has become even more important to make the 
research process as relevant and fruitful for the Southern respondents as 
possible. This has been done by according them as many feedback 
opportunities as possible (by e-mailing semi-structured questionnaires, 
interview reports, travel reports, and articles) and by sharing with them 
the results of the research and the information obtained in the process. 
Indeed, the intention is to feed the outcomes of the study back to those 
consulted for it as much as possible. This may lead to the generation of 
additional products aside from this book, such as a website with lessons 
learned, recommendations, links to additional information, and 
opportunities to participate in discussions taking place.  
 
 
3.10.10 Presentation of the research outcomes 
 
Since the study takes a heuristic, inductive approach, it does not rigidly 
separate theory (or the findings of others) from my own empirical 
findings. Literature and empirical data combine to lead to the model that 
gradually emegers from the different chapters. The first three chapters 
were mostly based on literature. The fourth chapter is based on a mix of 
theory and interviews, while the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth chapters 
are almost entirely empirical. As much as possible I try to indicate the 
basis on which statements are made. Where a statement is made about 
the views of Southern peace NGO staff, these reflect the views of the 
majority of people interviewed. Where quotes from interviews are given, 
these are intended to illustrate more widely carried opinions and ideas, 
rather than being exceptions to the rule (unless this is expressly stated).    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II.   STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN THE 
  KNOWLEDGE STRATEGIES OF 
  SOUTHERN PEACE NGOS 
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Addressing the questions posed at the end of Part One (see page 155), 
Part Two looks at the structure (chapter four) and agency (chapters five 
and six) shaping the knowledge and learning processes of Southern 
peace NGOs. By ‘structure’ I mean the larger framework within which 
local organisations operate and which they cannot easily change. It 
includes power structures and international realities. By ‘agency’ I mean 
the abilities organisations have to give shape to their own work and, 
perhaps, help change the structure in which this work takes place. The 
structure in which this actor learns constrains and directs his room for 
action, or agency. Both structure and agency are needed for a proper 
understanding of learning-for-action or strategic learning. 
 
Chapter four addresses the factors that constrain and support the 
learning of these NGOs, particularly in relation to power differences, 
donor relations and North-South dynamics. In this way, the chapter 
clarifies the structural, contextual elements that constrain and give shape 
to the learning and knowledge sharing of Southern peacebuilders. Next, 
the fifth and sixth chapters examine the knowledge strategies and 
experiences of local peace NGOs as they navigate within this structural 
context. In this way, Part Two aims to further elaborate the picture of 
actors and relationships that was painted in Figure 3.5 at the end of Part 
One. While that figure looked ‘flat’, Part Two gives depth to it by 
adding the element of structure, power and inequality. In addition, Part 
Two concretises the discussion of the knowledge processes of peace 
NGOs by introducing the reality of Southern peacebuilding NGOs and 
the constraints and opportunities they face as they try to give shape to 
their learning. 
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Chapter 4. One way street? 
Structural inequalities in knowledge generation, 
dissemination and recognition 
 
Part One has outlined the field of NGO peacebuilding and connected it 
to trends and developments with regard to knowledge and learning 
processes. It ended with a figure depicting the various actors and 
relations that play a role in knowledge processes in and around local 
peace NGOs. This chapter gives depth to the relations among the 
peacebuilding players that take part in cross-cultural knowledge 
exchange and learning processes, bringing into the equation North-South 
issues, donor regimes and inequality among actors. It shows how such 
structural factors constrain the possibilities for joint, ‘third-order’ 
learning. 
 
The interviews held with Southern peacebuilders highlighted the fact 
that their knowledge flows and learning processes occur in the context 
of an international set of relationships that are not equal. The majority of 
interviewees mentioned the role of Northern donors in shaping or even 
determining the knowledge that goes around and the extent to which 
learning takes place. The fact that these and other structural issues came 
to the fore so clearly made it necessary to collect more literature about 
these issues. As a result, this chapter is based on both interview findings 
and theory. 
 
The field of peacebuilding is characterised by asymmetric interactions 
between Northern and Southern actors. These interactions shape not 
only the form and frequency of knowledge flows, but also the content of 
the knowledge that is accepted and used. Unequal power relations 
between Northern and Southern actors mean that some types of 
knowledge receive more recognition than others. Because peacebuilding 
activities of NGOs are part of the ‘development aid industry’, they take 
place in a framework of money and other types of assistance flowing 
from the developed to the developing world. Knowledge transfer is part 
of this assistance. Capacity building has become an important catchword 
that is part of most development and peacebuilding programmes. 
Northern NGOs work with partner organisations in the South, aiming to 
capacitate them so that they will ultimately be able to continue the work 
without foreign assistance. Training is an important part of capacity 
building, and knowledge is transferred as part of such training 
programmes.  
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But there are also other, more subtle ways in which knowledge flows 
from one actor in the chain to another. Project proposals have to be 
written in a particular language and jargon in order to be funded. Donor 
organisations often come to a country with a pre-determined policy and 
ideas about the types of activities they are willing to support. This 
influences what is considered peacebuilding and how it is framed in 
concepts and theory. The policies and ideas of international NGOs that 
play the role of donor vis-à-vis local organisations are themselves 
shaped by education and research institutions and by the governments, 
international organisations, and sometimes private individuals that fund 
them.   
 
Chapter four draws attention to the fact that the interactions summarised 
in Figure 3.5 at the end of Part One are not ‘flat’ or ‘neutral’. Power 
differences among the actors make their relations asymmetric. This has 
consequences for the content and effectiveness of peace work in the 
communities which, in the end, the entire chain or network of relations 
has been set up to support. The chapter therefore focuses on the 
inequalities among actors playing a role in knowledge generation and 
dissemination, and elaborates how these result in the recognition and 
domination of some types of knowledge over others.  
 
Section 4.1 looks at inequalities among the actors when it comes to the 
production of recognised knowledge. 4.2 analyses research capacities in 
the South. 4.3 looks at ‘knowledge for development’ policies of donor 
agencies that try to bridge the North-South knowledge gap. 4.4 focuses 
on knowledge regimes in the NGO sector, while 4.5 examines how these 
lead to a particular development discourse that shapes the actions of 
local actors in peacebuilding. 4.6 looks at the way in which the aid chain 
often leads to donor-driven programming in peacebuilding. Finally, 
section 4.7 zooms in on the concept of capacity building that was 
introduced in the previous chapter, asking how it work out in practice 
and what this means for the knowledge used in the field. 
 
 
4.1 Inequalities in knowledge production and recognition 
 
“The realization is dawning upon us that both development and 
economic growth are based on knowledge. As we grow aware of that, 
we are faced with a gap between North and South in the ability to tap 
into the globalizing knowledge economy.” (Hoekema 2006: 3) 
 
“Knowledge asymmetries remain one of the key differences between 
the developing and industrialised worlds, and the recent language of 
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the digital divide just serves to reinforce the divisions in access to 
higher education, and the stark contrasts in research funding, patents, 
and numbers of scientists that were already well-known” (King 2004: 
unnumbered). 
 
In section 2.4, I discussed the existence of different knowledge systems 
in the world. Although we should be careful not to overstate the 
dichotomy between Western and non-Western systems of knowledge, 
many NGO employees interviewed perceive a fault line between 
modern, scientific, Western approaches to knowledge on the one hand 
and traditional, indigenous ‘knowledges’ on the other hand. These fault 
lines run within developing countries. This section adds to this picture 
by drawing attention to the fact that the different ‘knowledges’ do not 
enjoy equal status in today’s world.  
 
The problem from the perspective of achieving an equal exchange of 
knowledge is that, at least according to some observers, Southern 
knowledge systems have been delegitimised by Western colonisation 
and the ensuing inequality between North and South. The Western 
knowledge system has gained ground in the Third World through the 
establishment of Western-style institutions and the education of local 
elites in the West. Indigenous knowledge institutions are under-
resourced. The debt crisis and structural adjustment programmes starting 
in the 1980s have cut off funding for Southern universities and 
publication structures (Van Grasdorff 2005: 50-54). The difference can 
be seen in the number of publications in academic journals89. Powell 
(2006: 528) writes that the “overwhelming majority of internationally 
published work on development issues and places is produced by 
Northern researchers” or institutions, as Southern researchers face  
“multiple barriers to international publication, while locally produced 
journals are seldom well distributed internationally, or cited by 
Northern researchers if they are. This means that locally produced 
research – with its methodologies and research questions potentially 
[…] corresponding to local priorities – is not seen and therefore not 
used by development practitioners, policy makers, or even many 
academics, based in the North.” (Powell 2006: 528)  
 
Indeed, in one of the interviews done for this study, an NGO director 
noted that  
“There is a gap between North and South in terms of knowledge 
generation. Most of the well-resourced institutes and well-trained 
researchers are in the North, making it inevitable that much of the 
                                                 
89 In 1995, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries – the 
developed countries – on average produced 72.9 such publications per 100,000 inhabitants, while 
the low-income countries produced 0.8 (Sagasti 2004: 59). 
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discourse is driven by Northern perspectives and perceptions. For 
example, the majority of the authors of the People Building Peace II 
book [a collection of stories of civil society peacebuilding around the 
world] come from the North.”90 
 
The background to these developments is that global inequality and the 
dominance of particular development models lead to the modernisation 
and homogenisation of most developing economies and societies. This is 
also true for formal education, which tends to be largely modelled on the 
West. At the same time, more traditional channels of oral knowledge 
transfer have been disrupted by societal transformations that include 
urbanisation and large-scale migration. With many people travelling to 
the city each day for school, trade or work, it becomes harder for the 
older generation to pass its knowledge on to young people.  
 
Through education as well as in other ways, formal, documented, and 
scientifically tested knowledge has been presented to local actors in 
developing countries as the definition of ‘legitimate’ knowledge, 
discarding more traditional types of knowledge. (Mudimbe 1988; 
Mawdsley et al. 2002: 12-13) In some cases the arrival of such ‘modern’ 
knowledge leads to tensions with tradition.  
“When our children come back from school, they have been turned 
into foreigners. They cannot understand why we ask them to kneel 
before their parents. They cannot understand why we tell them not to 
go to their parents’ bedrooms. We believe that one week at an 
initiation ceremony is worth ten years at a primary school as far as the 
developing of values is concerned”.91  
 
Thus, colonialism, ‘modernisation’, global inequality and the 
globalisation of knowledge flows have all contributed to an erosion of 
indigenous knowledge and traditions. Local knowledge has become 
segmented. It is difficult for people to stay connected to their roots in the 
face of the arrival of ‘modern’ knowledge: 
“There is a lot of prejudice about white people. Most people have only 
known them as bosses. Among many people there is an exaggerated 
reverence for people who are like whites. In Liberian communities 
people (often children) who can write their own name are considered 
kwi, civilised. Kwi people do not have to do hard labour or listen to 
their parents. This upsets a natural balance.”92 
 
                                                 
90 Telephone interview with Kenyan NGO director, Nairobi, 29 November 2005. 
91 African women interviewed by Malunga (2006: 8) 
92 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 
2006. 
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 “I remember in a recent workshop a lady asking me, ‘why am I a 
different person at my place of work and at my home – I am an 
African at home but I feel like I am somebody else at the office?’ 
What she meant was that she felt more connected to ubuntu values and 
principles at home and the community in which she lived, but was at a 
loss for how to apply the same values at her place of work.”. (Malunga 
2006: 7)   
 
The dominance of Western knowledge systems over local ones is not 
new. Over the years, such knowledge hegemonies have engendered 
responses – see Box 4.1 below.  
 
Box 4.1: Responses to knowledge hegemony 
 
As a response to hegemony, the concept of popular education came into existence in the 
1970s. The most famous proponent of this approach, Paulo Freire (1979) saw a need to 
counteract the way people in the South had ‘internalised’ the culture of external 
dominators. In Freire’s view, centuries-long dependencies have impacted people’s 
psyche. As section 4.5 elaborates, discourse analysis draws attention to the way in 
which domination is constructed not only in relationships of power but also in 
ideologies and discourses – in the ways in which people make meaning of situations. In 
line with this approach Freire saw that subjects of oppression have subconsciously 
adopted societal outlook of the oppressor. In this way, hegemony is internalised into 
people’s consciousness.  
 
Popular education is characterised by a commitment to social change in the interests of 
the marginalised. For example, the organisation ATTAC (Association pour la Taxe 
Tobin pour l’Aide aux Citoyens), a prominent member of the anti-globalisation 
movement, sees itself as an “action-oriented movement of popular education” whose 
function it is to “equip members with the necessary knowledge to deal with the 
contemporary globalising era” (Novelli 2004, 165). Organisations like ATTAC build on 
the method developed by Freire (1979). This method is based on the premise that 
education cannot be neutral or value-free. Instead its aim should be the emancipation of 
the oppressed. This is done by raising their consciousness of injustice. Freire also 
rejected what he called ‘depository’ education in which what is taught is seen as the 
absolute truth, in the possession of the teacher. Instead, education ought to be 
characterised by a horizontal relation between teachers and students. It should start 
from students’ reality and use concepts of examples that they understand. This element 
in particular is one that has inspired many training courses, also in the realm of 
peacebuilding. Action research approaches – like the one we will analyse in chapter 
eight – are one example of this. 
 
 
As most education systems in the developing world have been 
developed to mirror Northern education systems, the subjects taught in 
schools and universities are not always relevant to the context. This may 
contribute to brain drain: “if you are educating someone according to [a] 
system, which actually addresses the needs of the North, surely these 
people will be attracted by job opportunities in the North” 
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(Mwinyimbegu 2006). Education that does not fit a country’s needs can 
also lead to conflict. In Cambodia, in the 1960s, graduates trained in 
subjects like French literature and philosophy were unable to fill the 
needs of the labour market in a predominantly rural country. They 
became a largely idle urban elite that was the target of significant 
resentment on the part of the hard-working rural population. This 
resentment helps explain the rise of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s that 
went on to establish a kind of rural ‘utopia’ in which intellectuals were 
targeted and killed. (Vickery 1984) 
 
There are also more subtle ways in which the gap within Southern 
societies between tradition and modernity can create fault lines of 
conflict between modern solutions and traditional ways. Not only 
Northern researchers tend to regard indigenous knowledge as not 
‘scientifically sound’, but “in some countries, official propaganda 
depicts indigenous cultures and methodologies as backward or out of 
date and simultaneously promotes one national culture and one language 
at the expense of minority cultures. Often, formal schooling reinforces 
this negative attitude.” (Grenier 1997: 8). Local elites sometimes 
deliberately reinforce ‘Western’ knowledge, and discredit indigenous 
knowledge, in order to maintain a political system and its elites. These 
elites are usually Western-educated and their education provides them 
with a position of power. In order to maintain this position they strive to 
ensure that only modern, Western knowledge is recognised as 
legitimate.  
 
The oral tradition of local communities and the corresponding fact that 
much of local knowledge is not written down are another reason why 
local knowledge in developing countries appears to be losing ground in 
the dynamic interaction between different traditions. It contributed to the 
fact that traditional knowledge was not captured in modern education. 
The difference between oral and written traditions also plays a role in 
the work of local NGOs and their relationship with donor agencies. As 
interviewees in all the countries visited mentioned, people with oral 
traditions find it difficult to prioritise writing down experiences or 
reading newsletters and reports. A Liberian saying goes that “if you 
want to deny Liberians information, write it down and circulate it.”93 
But written information is what Northern stakeholders, like donors 
agencies, base their work on.   
 
Another aspect of the asymmetries in knowledge production and 
recognition has to do with language. The dominance of English in 
                                                 
93 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO, Monrovia, Liberia, 14 February 2006. 
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international interactions is a disadvantage for local groups in 
developing countries. Powell (2006: 523) writes that “[b]y failing to 
engage systematically with local languages, the sector limits its 
understanding of and its ability to communicate with most of its 
intended beneficiaries.” These beneficiaries face the “practical 
difficulties of [either] being forced into using a second language or of 
being excluded from development discourse altogether.” In the cross-
cultural interactions that characterise peacebuilding and development 
interventions, “the issue is not simply one of translating speech but of 
appreciating the intellectual, ideological, and social understandings upon 
which speech is based. The use of language encompasses a structure of 
thought and shared understanding that may not be simply translatable.” 
(Powell 2006: 522) The dominance of English has practical 
consequences for NGOs working in developing countries. For example, 
“[t]he very concept of log-frame analysis [a tool for monitoring and 
evaluation which I will address in 5.2] is based on Anglo-Nordic 
perceptions of reality and is arguably untranslatable into most languages 
and most understandings of reality across the globe.” (Powell 2006: 523)  
 
Although I have emphasised that the rift between Western and 
indigenous knowledge systems runs within Southern societies, the South 
has been presented largely as a monolithic whole up until this point. 
There are, however, important differences and inequalities within the 
developing world. Of course there are differences between countries and 
regions of the world. Non-Western knowledge traditions, some of which 
were discussed briefly in section 2.4, vary enormously across the globe, 
although they largely seem to have some general aspects, like oral 
traditions and an emphasis on the observer being part of the reality (s)he 
analyses, in common. There may also be differences between countries 
with regard to the way they have dealt with the arrival of ‘modern’ 
knowledge.  
 
There are also important differences within developing societies with 
regard to, for example, access to the different knowledges. For example, 
women tend to play a relatively minor role in the production and 
legitimisation of knowledge. “Women in general [are often] excluded 
from the processes of problem analysis, planning, and decisionmaking” 
due to the fact that in many parts of the world they have lower status, 
fewer rights and higher illiteracy rates (Grenier 1997: 31-32, citing 
Durno and Chanyapate 1995). Cultural traditions keep women in the 
dark. Women also have little access to ICTs. As a result of all this, 
women in developing countries usually do not share their knowledge 
and expertise beyond their immediate environment. To make matters 
worse, training and capacity development programmes often reach 
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mainly men. (Knabe and Nkoyok 2006: 5 and 12) In order to correct the 
knowledge imbalance between men and women, a Cambodian woman 
notes that 
“learning and knowledge sharing are particularly important for 
women. Women need to know what happens in the world, not to stay 
at home. Knowledge is power, also for women in the family. When 
your children know more than you they will no longer respect you. 
This happens with the children of the generation that lacked education 
opportunities under the Khmer Rouge.”94 
 
In response, “[i]n many communities across Africa, women have 
initiated their own projects to assist each other and to improve 
livelihoods and communities”. In addition, “[w]omen are sharing their 
local experiences.” (Knabe and Nkoyok 2006: 12-13) This includes the 
creation of networks for solidarity, joint action and learning. In 
peacebuilding, and not only in Africa, we also see this trend. In Box 4.2 
below, we find an example of such a network. 
 
Box 4.2: The Rural Women Peace Link in Kenya’s North Rift province95 
 
The Rural Women Peace Link is a grassroots initiative by women in Kenya’s North Rift 
Province. This province has a long history of conflict. Its people have been 
marginalised since colonial times, when the most fertile land in the region was 
colonised by white farmers. After independence it was redistributed but the local people 
did not get any share. They have been forced to live in dry areas where their main 
economic activity is pastoralism. With population growth there has been increasing 
competition for grazing areas for livestock. Possession of weapons is widespread with 
arms flowing across the borders with neighbouring countries. Children are socialised 
from a young age to understand the historical wrongs committed against their people, 
and a warrior identity is cultivated.  
 
In the Rural Women Peace Link local women have organised themselves into a 
network. By the time of my visit this network consisted of fourteen local sub-networks, 
each consisting of various women groups. The aim is to exchange experiences and build 
the women’s capacities to deal with conflict. In their own localities, their activities 
include mediation in any conflicts from violence between pastoralist groups to family 
disputes, educating people about their rights, promoting healthcare, and engaging local 
government bodies to promote accountability and improve security provision. The 
women also strive to change gender relations in a region where women have 
traditionally had subordinate roles and are often abused.  
 
Each sub-network meets once a month and annually there is a conference in which all 
the members come together to record and share experiences. Here they also receive 
training from the Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa (NPI-Africa) and other organisations. 
These trainings deal with mediation, leadership, presentation, and other skills. The 
women from the Peace Link are also taught how to present information. This includes 
                                                 
94 Interview with former NGO worker. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 22 May 2006. 
95 Meeting with staff of SNV and members of the Rural Women Peace Link in Eldoret, Kenya, 1 
December 2005. 
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presentation training but also how to provide proof through pictures and data.  
 
The network is supported by the local branch of the development organisation SNV. 
Through SNV Kenya North Rift Portfolio the Rural Women Peace Link became a 
member of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), a 
global network that is examined in detail in chapter seven. GPPAC for the women 
represented an important opportunity to gain visibility for the insights and results 
gained in the North Rift. They consider it crucial that the voices of the Rural Women 
can be heard more widely, and the Global Partnership made this possible.  
 
GPPAC also provided women of SNV North Rift and the Rural Women Peace Link 
with new ideas and skills that could be - and are - applied at the local level. For 
example, tools for early warning and response are being adapted to the local context. 
 
 
Returning to the general issue of inequalities between North and South 
in terms of knowledge recognition, it deserves mention that the picture 
is not a hundred per cent gloomy: it is certainly not the case that all 
Westerners regard indigenous knowledge as illegitimate. In fact, in 
recent years external researchers and practitioners have exhibited 
increasing attention for the potential value of local knowledge. More and 
more often the view can be heard that local people’s unique knowledge 
of their own situation represents a pool of knowledge that external 
agencies pursuing projects in developing countries ought to tap into. 
Particularly in the fields of agriculture and ecological preservation, there 
is increasing recognition of this.  
“Development efforts that ignore local circumstances, local 
technologies, and local systems of knowledge have wasted enormous 
amounts of time and resources. Compared with many modern 
technologies, traditional techniques have been tried and tested; are 
effective, inexpensive, locally available, and culturally appropriate; 
and in many cases are based on preserving and building on the patterns 
and processes of nature.” (Grenier 1997: 10) 
 
In peacebuilding, as we will see in this chapter and beyond, approaches 
towards local knowledge vary. In the relationship between donor 
agencies and their partners in conflict-affected countries, some donors 
are more open to it than others. Many external stakeholders recognise 
the value of local knowledge and approaches at least in words – but the 
structural issues such as the aid chain and global hegemonies in terms of 
discourse make it difficult to treat it as equal in practice. Before looking 
at some of these issues in more detail, we will first look at the research 
capacities that exist in the South. 
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4.2 Research capacities in the South 
 
In recent years there has been increasing attention for the unequal 
situation described above. Authors from development studies and 
practice draw attention to the fact that in order to achieve a better 
balance, ‘Southern’ knowledge should be mobilised much more. Rather 
than importing knowledge from the North it is important to invest in 
research and knowledge generation capacities in developing countries 
themselves to stimulate indigenous knowledge production and find 
‘Southern’ solutions for ‘Southern’ problems. In 2000, the Netherlands 
Development Assistance Research Council (RAWOO) published a 
report entitled ‘Mobilizing Knowledge for Post-Conflict Management 
and Development at the Local Level’. Among other things, it found that 
• local actors need to be involved in knowledge generation. 
• there is a need of local capacity for generating new knowledge. 
• it is important to draw lessons from comparative exchange 
between knowledge agents in different regions of the world. 
• most research is too theoretical. (RAWOO 2000: 200) 
 
Six years later the issue was still on the Council’s agenda: “[i]t is crucial 
that ‘the missing poor’, ignored by policies, are enabled to do their own 
research.” The reason is that “[c]ountries without an own and diversified 
knowledge system are not able to shape their development in accordance 
with their own wishes and circumstances.” (RAWOO 2006: 1) The 
Council now emphasised that Southern research capacities should be 
linked to government policies and institutions as well as other societal 
actors in developing countries: “[l]inking research to the national 
systems of innovation is likely to increase its relevance and impact” and 
“[k]nowledge production that proactively pursues interaction with local 
stakeholders is likely to make a better contribution to the empowerment 
of the poor.” (RAWOO 2006: 3) 
 
However, the need to build Southern research capacities contrasts with 
reality, in which these capacities are not yet increasing. Although 
research capacity is growing rapidly in India, China, and the East Asian 
newly industrialised countries (De la Rive Box 2001), in most of the 
developing world it remains low. Sufficient research skills and resources 
are lacking in many cases, and often there is no time and money to do 
field research. Structural adjustment programmes imposed by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have resulted in cuts in 
public funding of higher education in many developing countries.  
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Even where research capacity grows, it may be that the wrong kind of 
research is being conducted – at least from the perspective of finding 
practical solutions to Southern problems such as war and poverty.96 
Adding to RAWOO’s conclusion that most Southern research is too 
theoretical, De la Rive Box writes about the perceived irrelevance of 
traditional sciences, particularly in many African countries. ‘Borrowed’ 
concepts from Northern scientific traditions dominate, but these 
concepts are insufficiently sensitive to the specifics of local conditions. 
Many African intellectuals are often unwilling to be ‘usable’ (De la Rive 
Box 2001). Abstract science leads to prestige in many countries. 
Gassama Dia (2006: 14) agrees that the “connection between research 
and the use of research products does not exist in many institutes, while 
we keep training researchers in increasingly sophisticated techniques 
while they do not generate products that are greatly needed by the 
populations.” This is a global problem, but the situation is probably 
worse in most Southern countries. Many Southern universities do not 
consider development studies and conflict studies academic disciplines 
(Bieckmann 2007: 8). Little academic teaching in the field of peace 
studies takes place in the countries visited.   
 
Again we are confronted with a gap between research and practice97. 
The 2000 RAWOO report identifies a gap in many developing countries 
between the academic research community, based mainly in the large 
cities, and grassroots organisations. (RAWOO 2000: 200) Universities 
and research institutes in the South do not meet the needs voiced by 
peace NGOs for more practice-related research of the needs of 
communities or locally relevant methods for peacebuilding practice. 
Indeed, out of the 105 NGO staff members interviewed for this study, 
only a few mentioned local knowledge institutions as potential sources 
of knowledge for them. What emerges is that initiatives to build 
Southern research capacity need to focus on researching problems 
identified by communities in an interdisciplinary way and in interaction 
with local communities (Mode Two) and to use knowledge networks 
(Mode Three)98.  
 
Authors increasingly draw attention to another factor that may affect 
Southern research capacities, namely new technologies. On the negative 
                                                 
96 This is not to say that these problems are easily solved – or that Northern research has 
significantly contributed to solve similar problems in the North. Still in the North there seems to be 
more recognition of the importance of linking research with practice – as is for example shown by 
the fact that research proposals submitted to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO) are increasingly judged not only by a scientific committee but also by one with 
representatives of societal stakeholders.  
97 See 2.1.2 and 2.3.2 
98 See 2.1.2 
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side, the high cost of advanced instruments for research, particularly but 
not exclusively in the exact sciences, puts entire fields of research out of 
the reach of academic institutions in developing countries. However, 
“advances in information technologies may be ameliorating some of 
these trends. […] [A]dvances in microelectronics, information 
processing and telecommunications now allow researchers from all parts 
of the world […] to actively participate in joint research projects. There 
is greater access to libraries and other written information [and] it is 
possible to interact in real time with peers in distant places […].” 
(Sagasti 2004: 35) Another potential use for ICTs are “locally oriented 
analysis and alerting services that aggregate and re-package information 
for decision makers” in order to deal with the problem that the 
knowledge generated by the African research and policy world is 
scattered and, to a large extent, hidden. However, this is made difficult 
by a shortage of good local content in digital form and a large enough 
market or audience to justify or recover the costs. (Ballantyne 2001: 4-5) 
 
Although access to computers and internet are still limited in the 
developing world, and many grassroots peace NGOs do not have their 
own connection99, people in the peacebuilding field are certainly making 
use of the potential ICTs have to offer them. Cambodian NGOs with 
internet connections use digital telephone tools such as Skype for all 
their local and international phone calls in order to cut costs and 
circumvent the bad telephone lines of the regular Cambodian network. 
Sierra Leonean NGO staff members frequent internet cafes in order to 
maintain e-mail contact with colleagues and donor agencies. More than 
a year after visiting Liberia and Sierra Leone, I am still in contact with 
some of the people I interviewed and we exchange information about 
my research and their activities. Sometimes they ask me to forward 
project proposals to donor agencies in Europe. Increasingly the internet 
is also used to download information about peacebuilding approaches 
and methodologies developed elsewhere. As of yet, less use is made of 
computers by local NGO staff to document and share their own 
experiences and lessons. This is something that would be necessary in 
order to achieve an increased participation of Southern practitioners in 
research and theory development. Doing so requires overcoming the 
arrears created by the oral tradition of Southern practitioners. “We need 
to learn how to document our experiences. […] Western researchers 
pick our brains, document this information and gain recognition as 
                                                 
99 Approximately a third of the organisations visited do not have an internet connection. Most of 
these ‘unconnected’ NGOs were in Liberia and Sierra Leone where they made up about half of the 
NGOs visited. 
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experts on the basis of this. Why don’t we become experts ourselves 
instead? This can also help us build our self-esteem.”100  
 
 
4.3 Knowledge policy  
 
The inequalities described in the two previous sections are also 
recognised by policymakers and attempts are made to address them. 
This section describes the way knowledge policies of donor agencies 
have developed, looking first at official donor policy and secondly at the 
policy of NNGOs. These policies help shape the structure in which 
SNGOs are able to exercise their agency and carry out learning and 
sharing activities. 
 
 
4.3.1 National knowledge for development policies 
 
Until the 1980s the policies of donor governments to promote science 
and technology for development focused on North-South technology 
and knowledge transfer. This was followed by a period in which an 
emphasis on the free play of market forces created a disregard for 
science and technology policies. A new phase in ‘knowledge for 
development’ policy began in the second half of the 1990s. This current 
phase focuses on building the capacity of ‘national innovation systems’. 
Tying together science, technology and production, it is characterised by 
intertwined activity of various knowledge agents in a country. (Sagasti 
2004: 80-83) Thus, matching De la Rive Box’ second mode of 
knowledge creation, development policy has adopted a broader systems 
view that includes various knowledge agents, not only academia. In line 
with this new perspective, RAWOO developed a new definition of the 
term ‘research capacity’: “the capacity of a whole research system to set 
its own priorities, and to design a research policy and programme 
accordingly. This includes development research carried out in a non-
academic setting – such as research NGOs or users’ initiatives.” (Baud 
2002: 56)  
 
The new policies emphasise demand-driven capacity building of 
Southern knowledge actors. Until the early nineties, for example, Dutch 
policy was characterised by well-intended forms of North-South 
partnership which led to a situation in which the Northern partners 
(mostly Dutch research institutes) tended to dominate the research 
agenda and programme implementation. In response to this, a new 
                                                 
100 Interview with director of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 February 2006. 
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policy was adopted, which was characterised by a strong focus on 
demand orientation and Southern ownership. (Bieckmann 2007: 8) The 
idea was that development challenges could be met by conducting “user 
oriented, location specific, trans-disciplinary research. There was a lot of 
emphasis on Southern research capacity building, including capacity in 
research management and research funding. The articulation of an 
authentic Southern research agenda was a prime concern.” (Wiedenhof 
and Molenaar 2006: 8) 
 
This led to an exclusion of Dutch researchers from government-funded 
research programmes and more generally to a disregard for the expertise 
of Dutch development researchers (Bieckmann 2007: 8). Moreover, 
“[i]n order to protect the purity of the Southern research agenda, the 
involvement of other donors was actively discouraged. […] [E]ven 
Dutch embassies were not allowed to play any meaningful role.” In 
short, “based on an acknowledgement of unequal power relations in 
research partnerships or in development cooperation in general, an 
attempt was made to place ownership entirely in Southern hands. […] In 
a sense, an attempt was made to erase the donor as a factor in the 
equation.” (Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006: 9) The unintended result, 
however, was that Dutch-funded development research became isolated 
from other sectors of development policymaking. Soon Dutch 
development policy was no longer based on research funded by research 
unit of the development ministry, which played an increasingly marginal 
role in strategy development. In addition, a gap developed between 
Dutch research and policy. On the one hand, Dutch development policy 
was no longer informed by Dutch development studies, while on the 
other, the research agenda of Dutch development scholars ceased to be 
informed by Dutch policy concerns. (Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006; 
Bieckmann 2007) 
 
In response, a new strategy has recently been developed. This new 
approach takes into account “an important lesson”, namely “that donors 
are very much an integral part of the social reality they want to change. 
Existing inequalities in power and resources cannot be denied by 
standing aloof, but should be acknowledged and taken into account in 
the practice of development cooperation.” (Wiedenhof and Molenaar 
2006: 11) The new approach entails a shift from a relatively narrow 
focus on research to a wider focus on knowledge and emphasises actual 
use of knowledge rather than its production. “In this context, an 
important realisation was that for knowledge to be used, the production 
of knowledge needs to be firmly embedded in social processes, in 
interactions between various stakeholders (such as researchers, policy 
makers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, and other end-users).” (Wiedenhof and 
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Molenaar 2006: 10) In other words, the Ministry has adopted more of a 
network approach: mode three knowledge creation. In this network 
model, the government itself, as a donor, aims to play an active role. 
“We cannot be relevant or effective as a donor […] without a constant 
dialogue with policy makers, researchers and practitioners and without 
the capacity to learn from this. Did we not implicitly assume that we, as 
donor, did not have anything to learn?” (Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006: 
10)  
 
Figure 4.1: Joint learning?101 
 
Such multi-stakeholder (mode two or three) knowledge policy makes 
sense from the perspective of the research-practice gap identified in this 
study. However, practice appears to lag behind policy. Practical 
obstacles in developing, conflict-affected countries may be part of the 
reason for this. The active interplay between scientific community, civil 
society, the private sector and political society that is required for mode 
three knowledge generation “may be very difficult to carry out in many 
countries in the South as a result of longstanding conflicts and high 
levels of mistrust between the different groups of actors” (Baud 2002: 
58). As a result, Northern governments end up setting research agendas 
for lack of a unified Southern voice. Baud writes that this problem can 
be prevented through “interactive consultations with a variety of 
Southern actors” which “can lead to informed policy choices to whose 
voices to give priority” (ibidem). This may be achieved by adding 
support to networking to existing programmes that promote North-South 
cooperation between research institutions (ibidem).  
                                                 
101 Groot and Gerwen 2004: 8 
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However, even in multi-stakeholder networks the various partners 
involved do not necessarily have comparable research capacity. The 
“structural inequality inherent in the donor-recipient relation” makes it 
“difficult for the donor to question his own preconceptions and to enter 
into a dialogue on an equal footing” (Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006: 
13). In other words, inequality inhibits ‘third-order’ learning. As the 
director of Culture, Research and Education at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs said at a recent seminar, “[i]t is a real challenge to 
question one’s own images and to profit from others’ visions and views” 
(Hoekema 2006: 8). This is compounded by the tendency of donors to 
“stick together and to reconfirm one another’s preconceived ideas” 
(Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006: 14). This tendency may well be 
strengthened by current efforts to better coordinate and harmonise donor 
policy. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a case in point. 
In King’s words, “at the very time […] that donors were allegedly 
beginning to retreat from ‘their’ projects and move towards policies and 
programmes ‘owned’ by their partners in the South, the Northern agency 
discourse was laying down what those policies should consist of” (King 
2004: unnumbered).  
 
Building the capacity of weaker network members – Southern 
knowledge agents – would be a way to address the structural inequalities 
that inhibit North-South exchange and learning. However, despite talk 
about research capacity building, development assistance funds to 
support higher education and research in the South have shrunk in recent 
years. This is despite the fact that “[t]he few developing countries that 
have made spectacular economic and social gains during the last few 
decades are precisely those that have adopted development strategies 
that envisaged a key role for science and technology.” (Sagasti 2004: 
85) The MDGs that set overarching targets for international 
development have nothing to say about education above the basic level. 
Indeed, as Ferrier says, 
“when you talk about education related to development, it is always 
about basic education. And to have development it is vital that every 
developing country has an independently thinking intelligentsia. Thus, 
our focus in development should be much more on science and higher 
education” (Ferrier 2006)  
 
At the same time, policymakers and civil society actors in developing 
countries themselves often do not recognise the importance of higher 
education and research, seeing other needs as more pressing. “[I]n most 
developing countries there is not as yet widespread awareness and 
understanding of the importance of science and technology in the 
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contemporary world” (Sagasti 2004: 85). A brain drain of educated 
minds migrating to the North to find employment (or staying there after 
being educated in Western universities) further exacerbates the situation. 
 
As part of the solution Wiedenhof and Molenaar present the challenge of 
creating “learning embassies”. “A learning embassy is fully aware of 
and interacts with the parties and stakeholders involved in (or left out of) 
the process of formulating […] strategy and knows about the knowledge 
base of this strategy. It is also aware of the research institutes and other 
knowledge institutes that play (or could play) a role on the process and 
the constraints they face. Wherever possible, it tries to strengthen the 
national or sectoral knowledge infrastructure and innovation systems.” 
(Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006: 15) In how far this approach is adopted 
and successful remains to be seen.  
 
 
4.3.2 Policies of Northern NGOs vis-à-vis their Southern partners 
 
Despite the aim of official policies to stimulate multi-stakeholder 
knowledge generation that includes practitioners, governmental donors 
rarely interact directly with SNGOs around policy development and 
knowledge generation. If the ideas of Wiedenhof and Molenaar become 
practice, then in future embassies may start filling this gap. As it is, 
however, the Northern agents with whom SNGOs interact are primarily 
NNGOs. As these are themselves often funded by official donors, they 
are links in the aid chain and act as intermediaries between official 
donors (back donors) and SNGOs. At least in the field of peacebuilding, 
there is not much evidence that the above-described national ‘knowledge 
for development’ policies are passed to NNGOs, and through them, to 
SNGOs. These policies aim mostly at Southern governments, with 
which Northern governments have a direct aid relation, and at Northern 
and Southern universities and research institutes. The stated aim of 
official donors to involve practitioners in knowledge generation is 
therefore not yet realised in practice. 
 
In their funding relation with NNGOs, however, national donors do 
emphasise another aspect of knowledge policy – the need to develop 
learning organisations. To some extent, the trend towards knowledge 
and learning in international development NGOs described in chapter 
three is stimulated by government agencies that have made learning part 
of their requirements for the financing of NNGOs. As a result, the 
knowledge policies of NNGOs supporting peace organisations in the 
South relate mostly to organisational learning. We have seen in chapter 
three that the focus of these policies is more on (mostly internal) storing 
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and dissemination of existing information than on knowledge generation 
and accessing the knowledge of Southern actors. This limits the ability 
of these organisations to learn in exchange with their partners in the 
South. “The danger for agencies that started with several years of sorting 
and synthesising their own knowledge resources – in what has been 
termed internal knowledge sharing – is that when they finally turn their 
attention to their clients and partners in the South, the agencies might 
well have decided on what was their priority knowledge for 
development” (King 2004: unnumbered). Ramalingham (2005: 33) 
agrees that international development organisations “often argued for 
improving internal knowledge work prior to addressing external issues” 
and adds that, problematically, “there was no sense of how the tools 
might need adaptation in the context of Southern realities.” As a result, 
“the incorporation of Southern knowledge by these organisations” tends 
to occur “at the tactical, rather than strategic, level – and then only in an 
ad hoc manner” (Ramalingham 2005: 27). 
 
The World Bank has led the trend towards knowledge management in 
development. What is interesting in the light of the above-described 
limits of this trend is that the Bank has recently started to change its 
approach – at least in words. It identified a need to “update our view of 
the Bank’s business and the way we measure and value our outputs and 
impact – from transferring knowledge and resources, to enabling 
learning and building capacity […] We need to move beyond the idea of 
the Bank as the repository of finance and knowledge that is transferred 
to clients, and towards the idea of the Bank as a facilitator and enabler of 
client learning – the crux of capacity building, and the best way to create 
sustainable policy shifts and development.” (World Bank 2001: 33-34, 
cited in King 2004: unnumbered) Notable in this citation is that learning 
by the World Bank itself, for example from the experiences and 
knowledge of its clients, is not mentioned. Still, given the World Bank’s 
leading role in policy-oriented development research, this turn-around is 
potentially significant. However, “economists accuse the Bank of having 
used research to promote pre-conceived policy ideas, rather than to 
disseminate new knowledge” (Klasen 2007: 87), and this is a view that 
many working in development informally endorse.  
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4.4 Knowledge regimes in development and peacebuilding 
 
  “[T]he criteria of what constitutes knowledge, what is to be excluded 
 and who is designated as qualified to know involve acts of power” 
 (Foucault 1971, cited in Baumann 1999: 16). 
 
In several places, this study has mentioned the embeddedness of local 
NGOs in a funding chain that leads from ‘back donors’ (Northern 
governments and international organisations) via NNGOs to SNGOs. 
The terms and conditions that this chain prescribes are sometimes 
referred to as the ‘funding regime’. A regime is a set of “implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge” (Keohane 1991: 108). These 
norms, rules and procedures prescribe certain actions and imply 
obligations – even though these obligations are not necessarily legally 
enforceable. (Keohane 1991: 110) The norms prevalent in funding 
regimes are created and maintained largely by back donors and 
influenced by the intermediary NNGOs that pass their funds on to 
Southern partner organisations.  
 
The most recent major development in international development policy, 
the MDGs, provide an interesting example of how policy targets are set 
at the top of the aid chain in spite of rhetoric about participatory 
development planning. According to King (2004: unnumbered), the 
MDGs came into existence as a result of mainly Northern research102. In 
King’s words, “it is not at all clear how this international architecture 
relates to the much proclaimed importance of national planning, national 
priorities or country ownership.” […] “What is intriguing is that donors 
seem able to combine a discourse that suggests their aid policy is to 
support country priorities with a conviction that the MDGs should be 
supported” (King 2004: unnumbered). King quotes a policy paper by the 
Danish development ministry, Danida, to illustrate the contrast between 
the desire of donor agencies for genuine policy partnership with 
Southern actors on the one hand, and their top-down policy development 
on the other:  
“[d]evelopment co-operation must support the national policies for 
poverty reduction on the basis of partnership. Through a series of UN 
conferences international agreement has been reached on the following 
major goals for poverty reduction [….]. These are ambitious goals and 
their fulfilment will require a comprehensive international effort. 
                                                 
102 This was at least the case for the goals regarding education, for which “it was agency-
commissioned research that played the key initial and subsequent roles in the formulation and 
monitoring of a part of the world agenda. There is little or no evidence of research from the South 
having played a part.” (King 2004: unnumbered) 
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Denmark subscribes to these goals.” (Danida 2000: 22-23, cited by 
King 2004: unnumbered).  
 
In 1.6.2 we have seen how NNGOs have become increasingly dependent 
on such official funds, and how SNGOs have increasingly become 
implementers of policy handed down through the policy chain and how 
this has led to a reduction in their independent political role. They have 
become less activist, more ‘professional’, and have come to resemble 
one another more. This limits possibilities for independent research and 
reflection on the part of Southern peace NGOs. In a study of NGOs in 
eight conflict-affected countries103, Goodhand (2006: 144-145) found 
that 
“the introduction of Western managerialism and the consequent 
demands for [...] rational planning techniques undermined the 
traditional NGO comparative advantages of flexibility, responsiveness 
and innovation. Donors encouraged NGOs to avoid risk […] and to 
minimize overhead costs, so that establishing capacities in strategic 
analysis and research on the causes of conflict are treated as 
unnecessary luxuries.” (Goodhand 2006: 144) 
 
Another aspect of the funding regime that constrains the learning 
processes of SNGOs is the increasing emphasis of official donors on 
direct-impact activities at the expense of NGO performance in areas like 
institutional development and advocacy (Edwards and Hulme 1996). In 
the words of a West African peacebuilder, “donors push for 
‘deliverables’”104.The trend towards demanding concrete, measurable 
results makes the work of NGOs engaged in peacebuilding, which is 
often hard to quantify, more difficult. It requires “quantitative measures 
of qualitative transformation” (Mendelson 2001, cited in Pishchikova 
2006: 80), “encourages NGOs to talk up their results and leads to an 
understating of the less tangible but possibly more significant impacts of 
NGO activities on social relations, norms and leadership” (Goodhand 
2006: 144-145).  
 
The direct-impact trend also potentially makes learning and knowledge 
exchange difficult because this type of activity is hard to measure. A 
related issue, repeatedly mentioned in interviews by the staff of 
Southern NGOs, is a dependency on short-term funding. Donor funds 
are often tied to time-bound projects with specific objectives. As a 
result, fundraising becomes an increasingly time consuming activity for 
local NGOs. “Securing funding becomes an ever-expanding part of the 
NGOs’ function, pushing other concerns – such as ethics, project 
                                                 
103 Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka 
104 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
  
195 
efficacy or self-criticism – to the margins.” (Goodhand 2006: 144). 
Activities like reflection, discussion, networking, and improving 
organisational capacities for long-term M&E and learning are in most 
cases not part of the projects so clearly circumscribed by donors. They 
are considered ‘overhead’ and are often not financed. (Pishchikova 
2006: 79) 
“Short time frames and a project-based approach discouraged more 
innovative and high-risk activities. […] This had a range of negative 
[…] effects, including […] discouraging NGOs from thinking long-
term about their role in areas such as local institutional development 
and strengthening civil society; fostering shallow careers that were 
patched together and involved either moving from one agency to 
another or from one conflict to another; encouraging aid project 
monocultures. (Goodhand 2006: 144-145)” 
 
The most frequent points at which SNGOs and their donors interact is, 
first, when SNGOs submit funding proposals, and after their proposal 
has been accepted, when they report about their activities and outcomes. 
Both activities usually have to be done according to pre-set formats 
prescribed by donors. Donors often have policy frameworks that 
describe the types of activities they are willing to fund. These 
frameworks contain particular catchwords that proposals should include. 
As a result, proposal writing and reporting is done in a jargon-laden 
vocabulary that has originated largely in the North. Ramalingham (2005: 
27) writes that proposals for funding are judged by Northern standards 
and “reacting to strategic issues within Northern development 
organisations currently requires the application of forms of knowledge 
which are largely internal to these organisations.” Similarly, Powell 
(2006: 525) notes that “[t]he [proposal writing and reporting] tools that 
have been produced are based on the linear processes of a service 
industry, rather than the complex interactions of a knowledge industry”. 
This approach does not usually promote the kind of two-way interaction 
that Southern peacebuilders desire.  
 
Wallace et al. (2006, cited in Powell 2006: 526) analysed standard 
methods for planning and reporting that NNGOs require from their 
Southern partners: 
“There is an almost invisible and little analysed bias towards valuing 
and favouring systems that are developed in the north, with their 
accompanying detailed explanations, models and practices over the 
local knowledge, concepts, language and understanding of civil society 
and staff in the south. They have to learn the new aid paradigms if they 
want to be included and funded. Donors and international agencies do 
not have to learn the local language or cultural norms in return; far 
from it and these universal frameworks are now seen as appropriate 
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ways to work in contexts of extreme diversity. […] At the same time 
staff on the frontline […] all said that the tools do not work once 
implementation starts. There were no exceptions in the research and 
this is a really striking finding. The disjuncture between paper based 
plans, objectives, activities and indicators and the day to day realities 
poor people and NGO […] staff try to grapple with in a wide range of 
different contexts and cultures is too great to be bridged.”  
 
In this way, two-way interaction and joint ‘third order’ learning is 
discouraged. Another way in which Goodhand (2006: 144-145) found 
donors to be limiting learning was by preventing coordination among 
SNGOs:   
“though coordination mechanisms were in place, they rarely led to 
joined-up policy and practice on the ground. Coordination 
arrangements were resisted by donors for various reasons: they limited 
donors’ room for manoeuvre in terms of pursuing commercial and 
political interests through aid programmes; they were costly in terms 
of administrative time and expense; and there were genuine 
disagreements over policies and priorities.”  
 
Such lack of opportunities for coordination among local organisations 
inhibits joint reflection and learning about how the larger aims of 
peacebuilding can be achieved. However, the picture painted by 
Goodhand does not represent all donors. In Liberia, the partner network 
of the Dutch NGO ICCO was mentioned by several interviewees as a 
positive example of donor-facilitated coordination and exchange among 
Southern peace NGOs.  
 
In sum, the embeddedness of SNGOs in international funding regimes 
not only constrains their political role in addressing wider issues of 
conflict in peace, as we saw in chapter one, but also their capacity to 
autonomously and jointly reflect, learn, and generate knowledge. 
 
 
4.5 Discourse 
 
Discourse plays an important role in knowledge transfer and learning in 
peacebuilding. “By privileging certain visions of society and discarding 
others, discourses frame and construct certain possibilities for thought 
and subsequent action” (Van Grasdorff 2005: 31). Discourse becomes 
dominant through a combination of coercion (peer pressure, wanting to 
remain part of a group), conviction (people find the discourse 
convincing), and seduction (it is attractive for people to be part of the 
discourse coalition). (Hilhorst 2003: 75) These elements of coercion, 
conviction and seduction characterise the interaction among researchers, 
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national donors, multilateral donors, politicians, and NGOs in so-called 
“discourse coalitions” (Stone 2005: 95-96; Brock et al. 2001; Hajer 
1995). This interaction has led to the rise of a particular ‘development’ 
discourse, the background of which is formed by the idea that “social 
change occurs according to a pre-established pattern, the logic and 
direction of which are known”, and that the West is leading the way in 
this evolutionary process, “exhibiting the most advanced stance of 
human perfectability” (Van Grasdorff 2005: 34).  This discourse has 
been adopted by donor agencies and become part of funding regimes. As 
a result of their embeddedness in these funding regimes, SNGOs find 
themselves forced to adopt it. 
 
The discourse of development hides the political nature of development 
activities by casting them in a neutral, technical language (Pronk 2007). 
Development interventions inherently lead to social and political 
change, both intentionally and unintentionally, particularly in conflict 
situations. In what Ferguson (1994) calls the “anti-politics machine”, 
however, this facet of development is obscured by the use of seemingly 
technical terms. To illustrate this depoliticisation of development, Mitlin 
et al. (2005: 13) note that where NGO staff in the 1970s and 1980s were 
well familiar with the radical writers who focused on underlying 
structures of oppression, today the bookshelves in NGO offices often 
display more sector-specific, less political and more technical texts.  
  
The fluency of representatives of Southern grassroots organisations in 
the discourse of development and its ‘technical’ terminology is 
sometimes striking. This “development speak” (Hilhorst 2003: 57) 
includes concepts such as “‘performance’, ‘outcomes’, and ‘efficiency’. 
None of these notions are simple givens, and alternative situations could 
exist in which NGO activities and organizational forms could be 
organized, for example, by an alternative discourse of ‘long-term 
commitment’.” (Pishchikova 2006: 48) However, to qualify for funding 
local actors have to use the dominant discourse in funding proposals, in 
monitoring reports, and at partner conferences. Staff of SNGOs make a 
lot of jokes about the vocabulary of donor organisations, which 
illustrates that they find many of the concepts not really applicable to 
their situation and are very much aware of the opportunistic use of such 
language. 
 
Recent trends in these mainstream discourses and approaches include 
the increasing dominance of the neoliberal agenda, the hegemony of the 
poverty reduction agenda in international aid, and most recently the 
prominence of the security agenda and attempts to tie it to the poverty 
agenda (Mitlin et al. 2005: 8-12). Peacebuilding NGO staff interviewed 
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for this study identified several discourse trends in their field. First, an 
increasing emphasis on security was mentioned:     
“a trend in the discourse of peacebuilding is an increasing emphasis on 
security sector reform. Our organisation finds that security sector 
reform can only be addressed if the underlying issues that cause the 
insecurity in the first place are dealt with as well – if not, then it can 
even strengthen authoritarian regimes. The same is true for 
disarmament: people carry arms because they feel insecure; disarming 
them doesn’t solve the problem. These arguments are now not usually 
taken up. The trend is related to an increasing emphasis on security in 
general, led by US and other donors in the framework of the ‘War on 
Terror’.”105 
 
This quote indicates that in addition to inequalities in knowledge 
production and recognition, the dominant discourses also spring from 
direct political pressure to place particular items high on the agenda. The 
increasing emphasis by US donors on security issues in the context of 
the War on Terror was particularly noted in Kenya and the Philippines. 
Another trend in peacebuilding discourse that was mentioned relates to 
early warning: 
“there is an increasing trend among donors to emphasise early warning 
activities. Though these are important, they are meaningless without 
the capacity for early response. Early warning also presupposes that 
there is a capacity to influence policymakers to act in line with one’s 
recommendations – but policymakers have their own agendas. So 
more than a narrow focus on early warning is needed.”106 
 
At the same time, local actors do have a role to play in the use and the 
shaping of discourse. Discourses get reinterpreted at the local level, at 
the interface with other discourses that exist locally and internationally, 
drawing together fragments from both modernity and tradition. Local 
actors master multiple development notions and use them for their own 
ends. They “reshuffle, circumvent, and accommodate” discourses 
(Hilhorst 2003: 81). In section 4.4 I quoted Wallace et al., who wrote 
about the disjuncture between paper based plans and the daily realities 
of NGO staff. Their research also illustrated the way in which local 
NGO staff dealt with this disjuncture:  
“[t]he paper based plans are left in the office, while NGO staff try to 
find ways – many very innovative, others very inappropriate – to work 
[…]. They then revert to the written tools again when it comes to 
reporting and accounting for donor aid money; often one set of people 
do the front line development activities, while others complete the 
                                                 
105 Interview with staff member of Kenyan NGO working throughout East and Central Africa. 
Nairobi, 29 November 2005. 
106 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
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required paperwork. More time, training and focus is given in most aid 
chains to ensuring that managers and finance staff can complete the 
documentation to a satisfactory level, than is given to training frontline 
staff.” (Wallace et al. 2006, cited in Powell 2006: 526) 
  
Discourses, then, are used and reproduced both unintentionally and 
intentionally. What is important about this is that in both cases they 
shape reality in a very direct way. Discourses have unintended 
consequences for “confirming, accelerating or altering social change 
[…] It is through actors’ use of multiple discourses that social patterns 
are negotiated, power distributed and development shaped”. (Hilhorst 
2003: 100-101) 
 
 
4.6 Donor-driven projects   
 
The discourse that dominates is closely related to the peacebuilding 
activities that are predominantly carried out. Northern-dominated 
discourse goes hand in hand with Northern-dominated policymaking and 
donor-driven projects. In each country visited, the majority of 
interviewees mentioned donor-driven projects as an issue. According to 
African and Asian NGO staff interviewed, donors often announce ‘we 
have money for this and that’, instead of asking ‘what is needed’. “Each 
donor has its own programme area to which it refers. This ties 
organisations down. They are in no position to turn down money and 
thus have to go along.”107  
 
As a result, it can happen that money is not spent well at all. 
Interviewees told various stories about money having gone down the 
drain because donor agencies pushed their own policy priorities without 
taking local realities into account. For example, an American donor 
pushed a West African peace network to organise a Muslim-Christian 
dialogue in Niger and Mali. When the network’s staff noted that those 
countries have good traditions of inter-faith tolerance (as opposed to 
another West African country like Nigeria), the donor did not respond. 
“They were not interested in a conversation about why we feel their 
proposed activity was irrelevant. We are glad that not all donors act this 
way.”108  
 
The imposition of project priorities by NNGOs is seen by locals to 
reflect a lack of recognition of insider expertise. External experts are 
                                                 
107 Interview with staff member of Sierra Leonean youth organisation. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 
February 2006. 
108 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
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brought in that do not necessarily understand the situation. Often they 
miscalculate, assume, generalise, or simply do not know the local 
context. The analysis of people on the ground is often not taken 
seriously, in part because they do not have university degrees. When a 
donor-financed programme is evaluated, donors usually do not look for 
an expert within the country - even though a local would know the 
terrain, implications, practices, and (political) obstacles, and as a result 
might use the right indicators to determine success or failure. In Sierra 
Leone, “an external evaluator once asked why staff did not commute 
more between regions, showing a complete lack of understanding of the 
condition of the infrastructure”.109  
 
Not all NNGOs are blind to local knowledge and needs, and most at 
least make an effort to take them into account. Many donor agencies are 
themselves tied to the priorities of those that fund them, and they 
manoeuvre as well as they can within the leeway that they have, trying 
to take the idea of a two-way partnership seriously. But they do operate 
within the reality of an unequal relationship due to the structural 
constraints described in this chapter. Some donor agencies appear more 
willing or better able than others to use the leeway they have to establish 
a genuine two-way interaction with Southern partners. “Knowledge 
interaction with donors is often one-way. However, it varies 
significantly among donors. Some donors are interested in views from 
the ground. It is sometimes possible to influence donor policy. This also 
gives us a better chance of securing funds.”110  
  
The Southern NGOs in this study judged some donor agencies are 
judged outright positively. Actions that are appreciated include when 
donors appoint a contact person who regularly gets in touch, not to 
check up but to keep track of processes taking place. It is also 
appreciated when donor contacts understand that plans are changed due 
to a changing situation on the ground – something which requires trust 
in the capacities and intentions of the partner organisation. It is also 
considered positive that some donors are willing to fund unusual things - 
like an informal dinner to build relationships. Most importantly, SNGO 
staff members appreciate NNGOs that take their views seriously. A 
Liberian NGO worker for example noted that “a two-way knowledge 
sharing process with our donor takes place; they for example ask us to 
give inputs into a concept paper”111.  
                                                 
109 Interview with staff members of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 16 February 
2006. 
110 Interview with staff members of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 February 
2006. 
111 Interview with staff member of Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 10 February 2006. 
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Which donors are seen as more and less open to local knowledge and 
ideas? The interviews have not systematically addressed this question, 
but from the donors that were mentioned the following picture arises. 
American donors, particularly the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), are considered relatively uninterested in having 
a conversation about why their proposed activity is relevant. These 
donors tend to come with pre-set project ideas in mind. This criticism of 
American donors can be heard particularly in West Africa. In Mindanao, 
there is the added complication that many Mindanawans are suspicious 
of American organisations who they think have a hidden 
counterterrorism agenda. Two non-American organisations considered 
to be pushing through project ideas without listening to local advice are 
the UN mission in Sierra Leone and DfID, also in Sierra Leone.  
 
Northern partners that are seen to be more open to local views, and 
promoting genuine partnership, are mainly European. They include the 
Dutch organisations European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP; 
Kenya)112, Cordaid (Mindanao, West Africa), ICCO (Liberia) and Kerk 
in Actie (Sierra Leone)113. “Cordaid has made possible institutional 
survival, creativity, and the bottom-up setting of priorities through 
untied funding”114 and does not try to impose its own concepts. ICCO 
regularly asks its Liberian partners for input and feedback (on one 
occasion through a questionnaire). In addition ICCO’s Liberian partner 
consortium is considered useful for knowledge sharing. In Sierra Leone, 
other European organisations seen as treating their Southern partners 
more as equals are Save the Children Sweden and the Oxfam 
International Youth Parliament, a network with members all over the 
world that provides support to members, facilitates open information 
exchange, and asks for feedback about its own functioning. In 
Cambodia, positive examples given are the Deutsche 
Entwicklungsdienst (DED) and the Open Society Initiative (OSI), who 
“do not act as bosses but as equals”115, and the UK-based Catholic 
Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), which is appreciated for 
its personal way of keeping in contact and its willingness to fund 
unusual things. In Mindanao, one American organisation is mentioned in 
a positive light: the Asia Foundation. The UN organisations United 
                                                 
112 See next section. 
113 There may be some bias in the findings about ICCO and Cordaid. These organisations co-funded 
this study, and in a few cases put me into touch with local partners, which I visited for interviews. 
However, this was only the case for a small number of organisations. Many others were unaware of 
any connection I had with these Cordaid and ICCO. 
114 Interview with director of a West African network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
115 Interview with director of a Cambodian NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 2006. 
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Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF; Liberia) and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP; Liberia, Philippines) are also 
considered open to local knowledge. 
 
Such positive exceptions to the rule of unequal ‘partnerships’ and 
NNGOs imposing discourse and policy are characterised by a long-term 
relationship and trust that has developed over time. This trust makes it 
possible for Northern partners to leave Southern partners considerable 
planning and implementing freedom. Another factor enabling genuine 
partnership is the provision of core institutional funding rather than tied 
project funding. The latter funding form is predominant but it binds 
Southern partners to specific activities and objectives. It also helps when 
flexible arrangements are made regarding timelines and planning, 
providing for changes to be made along the way as a result of learning 
or changing circumstances. Another factor playing a role in positive 
North-South policy exchange is that the governments at the top of the 
funding chain do not have strong political interests in the country, 
enabling humanitarian and development criteria to guide policies. 
(Goodhand 2006: 145). The way an NNGO itself is funded may play 
also a role. If it receives only tied project or programme funding, then 
the priorities attached by their own donors are in turn imposed on 
Southern implementing NGOs. But NNGOs that receive longer-term, 
less tied grants have more freedom to engage in a dialogue with SSNOs 
about the needs in the field.  
 
Another factor that may influence the extent to which Northern partners 
take local views into account is the degree of specialisation of both the 
NNGO and the SNGO. “Our donors are not very specialised and as a 
result they leave us [an organisation specialised in arms reduction] 
considerable autonomy and are interested in our inputs about the way 
our work should be done. Nonetheless, the donors do determine the 
broader topics on which we work.”116 NNGOs that are less specialised 
and have developed less precise policy ideas before entering the field 
may leave their Southern partners more freedom of action: “donors 
usually do not really question our ideas; they focus more on ways of 
reporting impact.”117  What also helps SNGOs to be taken seriously is 
the transparency of their organisation “so that donors can see what it is 
we are really doing, and where our activities correspond with their 
priorities.”118 Such transparency contributes to building trust among the 
partners. 
                                                 
116 Interview with acting director of a Cambodian NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 22 May 2006. 
117 Interview with secretary general of a Mindanawan NGO consortium. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 
May 2006 
118 Interview with staff member of a Sierra Leonean NGOs. Bo, Sierra Leone, 21 February 2006. 
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Until now I have focused mainly on the role played by NNGOs acting as 
donor agencies vis-à-vis SNGOs. At the other end of the exchange, it is 
worth taking a closer look at the role played by SNGOs in the 
interaction with their Northern counterparts. Local peace NGOs are not 
just passive ‘victims’ of an often unequal policy process. Southern 
partners recognise that they are often less assertive in the face of donor 
demands than they might be.  
“They sometimes take the easy road of saying what the donors want to 
hear in the hope of getting their money. Or they simply take donors’ 
claims for granted and do not study the situation themselves. 
Sometimes a recipient NGO does not even really understand what his 
project is supposed to be doing; he merely proposed it because it was 
what donors were willing to fund. This makes it more difficult for 
donors to assess the real capacity and needs of their partners. Southern 
partners should be more assertive in making clear what is wrong with 
donor’s demands.”119  
 
Being more assertive would entail being strong enough to resist donor 
policy preferences. Interestingly, SNGOs see that a thorough knowledge 
of the community provides such strength as it makes arguments better-
founded and convincing120. In some cases being assertive even requires 
actually refusing a proposed project. This is difficult, however, given the 
dependency of most SNGOs on project funds for heir organisational 
survival. One reason why many Southern NGOs are not more assertive 
may be, in the words of Mawdsley et al., “a deep lack of self-confidence 
within Southern NGOs, inhibiting them from advancing their own 
agenda more openly and positively.” This may be explained by “older 
colonial and postcolonial/ developmentalist hierarchies, and the 
systematic ways in which Northern, ‘formal’ (scientific and 
management) ideas have been privileged over local ways of seeing and 
doing things” (Mawdsley et al. 2002: 12-13).  
 
Another problem may be that some NGOs simply have little interest in 
challenging the accepted wisdom. Fierce competition over funding 
among local NGOs means they will often rather take the money 
available than reject funds because the conditions attached to them are 
not relevant to the situation. In addition, many NGOs were created not 
out of a particular need or ideology but in response to funds becoming 
available in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result they do not have a 
particular agenda to advance, and “acquiesce to working only or mainly 
                                                 
119 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 
2006. 
120 Interview with Liberian NGO director. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
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at their paymasters rather than their clients demand” (Mawdsley et al. 
2002: 12-13). What then happens is that “Northern NGOs may be 
committed to listening to their Southern partners, and through them to 
the voices of the poor, but many of their Southern partners are prepared 
to tell them whatever they want to hear.” (ibidem: 5) 
 
An additional factor that may play a role in the domination of Northern 
discourse and priorities is the ‘professionalisation’ of Southern partners: 
“[a]s Northern NGOs have withdrawn from their previous levels of 
direct development work, and the number of Southern NGOs has 
exploded, they have had to find appropriate ways of working together. 
This has tended to mean that these Southern NGOs have to conform to 
certain organisational practices” (ibidem: 15). These practices include 
financial accounting procedures and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
systems, as discussed in the next chapter.  
 
However, at least in some parts of the world, it appears that local NGOs 
are becoming more critical and assertive. This is, for example, the case 
among SNGOs in Mindanao, as the following citations from interviews 
with staff there make clear. 
“After the peace agreement many funding institutions came. Local 
NGOs were just being set up. The donor agencies knew exactly what 
they wanted the locals to do, while the local NGOs were still figuring 
out what they wanted. Now the local NGOs have matured and they are 
beginning to demand that the international NGOs listen to their 
concerns and priorities. Some donors have come to realise that they 
should consult local NGOs to find out the needs of their 
communities.”121  
  
“In recent years funding agencies and NGOs have flooded into 
communities, which are now in constant interaction with these 
agencies. This has been quite a culture shock. Now communities are 
becoming more and more critical of NGOs coming in to implement 
projects, especially of they have not looked into the needs first. They 
now start asking questions: who has commissioned you to do this? 
What is the methodology? What are the expected outputs? Does the 
project try to change our way of life? People are now able to identify 
the background of a project and the roles and characters of different 
players. They demand to be involved in the whole process. 
Communities are usually willing to accept technical assistance (like 
water infrastructure) and technical skills (such as the maintenance of 
such infrastructure) but are suspicious when it comes to more social 
projects and skills. They are particularly suspicious of American 
organisations who they think have a hidden agenda (such as 
                                                 
121 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
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intelligence gathering with regard to Muslim organisations in 
Mindanao).”122 
 
“Engaging large international funding NGOs in networking has often 
led to them imposing priorities on the network. Networks can lose 
their popular mandate as a result. Our network aims to reverse the 
situation: rather than having donor organisations tell local NGOs what 
they should do, we encourage our member NGOs to present a 
programme to donors and let them choose what parts they want to 
fund. This is difficult to achieve, however. At present our members do 
not yet have conscious fundraising strategies. They usually jump in 
when a donor offers something rather than researching local needs and 
setting their own priorities.”123  
 
Also illustrative are the following aims elaborated by Central Asian 
peace NGOs in the region’s Action Agenda developed in the framework 
of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC; see chapter seven). The Central Asian NGOs aim to “[a]dapt 
the ideas, methods and technologies introduced from outside to local 
current situations’ peculiarities” and to “[r]eview approaches to in-
country implementation of programs and projects in order for the latter 
to be focused on real issues and not just goals of the donors” (GPPAC 
2005: 78). 
 
In conclusion, although the majority of SNGO staff raised the issue of 
donor-driven projects as an important constraint to their space for action 
and learning, positive, two-way relations were also noted. In addition, 
some recognised that SNGOs themselves also have a role to play in 
changing the partnerships with donors by taking a critical and assertive 
stance while working on longer-term relations of trust and reciprocal 
partnership. This resonates with some of the principles of capacity 
building according to the literature dealt with in chapter three, which 
stipulated that it should build on existing knowledge and be ‘owned’ by 
local actors. In the next section, the practice of capacity building is 
described as it emerged from interviews and from the findings of other 
authors. 
 
 
                                                 
122 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
123 Interview with secretary general of a Mindanawan NGO consortium. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 
May 2006 
  
206 
4.7 Capacity building and partnership  
 
4.7.1 Capacity building in practice 
 
Most of the SNGOs visited have been on the receiving end of some kind 
of capacity building initiative by NNGOs or international (often UN) 
organisations. In addition to external actors, many of the stronger 
SNGOs aim to develop the capacity of weaker SNGOs and grassroots 
groups. (The role of SNGOs visited as providers of capacity building is 
discussed in the next chapter.) The previous chapter described how 
ideally, capacity building consists of knowledge exchange rather than 
one-way knowledge transfer. In how far does this correspond to the 
reality of capacity development programmes? More specifically, in how 
far do the structural inequalities of the international aid system, which 
have been described in this chapter, make local ownership difficult or 
even impossible? After all, the examples of donor-driven projects cited 
in section 4.6 above contradict the ideal of locally owned development 
practice. A Liberian NGO staff member interviewed illustrated how 
capacity building, too, can be donor-driven: 
“Donors do not trust local counterparts and condition them to say what 
the donors want to hear. When they talk of capacity building, they first 
tell you what it is not, according to them: salaries, offices, vehicles. So 
all you can ask for is training, which is what they are willing to fund. 
When you bring up the need for a vehicle they treat you as being 
selfish. They do not understand that it is a basic necessity in a country 
without reliable public transport.”124 
 
Indeed, activities under the heading of capacity building for local peace 
NGOs most often come down to training courses. These courses focus 
not only on peacebuilding concepts and methods but also on 
organisational skills such as the monitoring and evaluation of 
peacebuilding programmes, technical and financial management 
expertise, fundraising, and proposal writing125. Research and learning 
capacity development is rarely supported, but networking sometimes is 
– although networks find it hard to raise funds due to the intangibility of 
their results. Training and capacity building programmes by SNGOs 
tend to emphasise knowledge sharing and networking as important 
capacity building tools more than NNGOs and IOs.  
 
                                                 
124 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 
2006. 
125 Interview with national coordinator of Liberian NGO network. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 
2006. Interview with national coordinator of Sierra Leonean NGO network. Freetown, Sierra 
Leone, 15 February 2006. 
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The somewhat scattered evidence collected from the interviews suggests 
that many training courses consist of ready-made content126 and does not 
explicitly build on the knowledge of the participants. Indeed, the UNDP 
publication cited in section 3.6 recognises that local ownership does not 
come naturally: “[l]ack of ownership on the recipient side has been a 
major reason for the failure of many projects, including the structural 
adjustment programmes supported by international financial 
institutions” (Lopes and Theisohn 2003: 29). A Sierra Leonean 
peacebuilder illustrates the importance of local ownership with the 
following example: 
“Intervention strategies should be devised on the views of the 
beneficiaries. At the beginning of a workshop we ask people to analyse 
the conflict and say how they would solve it if they had the power to 
do so. They are asked about the methods they would use. Then, the 
workshop builds on these, adding its own methods. Workshops should 
not be subject-centred but learner-centred. A facilitator must 
endeavour to understand what motivates people. Once a facilitator 
teaching people maths explained that ‘if a chicken lays one egg in the 
morning, one in the afternoon and one in the evening, she will have 
laid three eggs.’ An old man said: ‘that is not possible because a 
chicken can only lay one egg a day!’ The instructor could not get the 
man to agree. This facilitator’s approach is misleading because his 
method is not learner-centred and also failed to understand the 
traditional/cultural values and the level of understanding of the 
community. You have to build on what people know.”127 
 
That said, some courses (such as the ones described in Box 4.3 below) 
do make an effort not to use the experiences of the participants but also 
to match their knowledge demand. Either way, the structural aspect of 
capacity building is not usually explicitly addressed in these 
programmes – although one might argue that training organisations in 
the development of funding proposals is a way to help create a context 
in which stakeholders can actually exercise their newly developed skills.  
 
                                                 
126 For example, May (2006) describes how peacebuilding modules offered at a Ugandan university 
were American modules that had been copied without adaptation to the local context. 
127 Interview with director of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 16 February 2006. 
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Box 4.3: Capacity building in Mindanao by Catholic Relief Service 
(CRS)128 
 
Catholic Relief Service (CRS) is involved in many training, capacity building and 
networking initiatives. Its training courses include the annual international Mindanao 
Peace Institute (MPI, at which about 800 people have graduated until now) and a 
grassroots training programme in Mindanao.  There is also a separate capacity building 
programme for CRS partners, which includes things like organisational management, 
strengthening leadership, documentation, and project development. This is preceded by 
a needs diagnosis: what are the issues the partners face? People who went through the 
grassroots training have formed networks. They form a trainer’s pool and exchange 
resources.  
 
The Mindanao Peace Institute is a three-week programme, in which various approaches 
to peacebuilding are discussed. Indigenous, Islamic and Western approaches are applied 
to the specific issues of participants and compared as to their usefulness. The third week 
consists of a field visit in which local grassroots organisations are visited and 
discussions are held about ways to apply the concepts discussed in the course. 
 
The grassroots training is intended to catalyse peace efforts in the communities. It 
especially targets key leaders. Not only skills are taught but also commitment to peace – 
especially relevant for former combatants. Commitment to peace is stimulated by 
starting with the participant’s own identity including his faith as a resource, and by 
working at self-transformation. Not only former fighters need to transform, also people 
who see themselves primarily as victims are assisted to turn into active peace advocates.  
 
The training courses are part of a larger peacebuilding process. Participants are 
supported after they go back to their communities. They receive technical support, help 
with planning, and general mentoring. They are also supported in advocating the model 
they have learned to other groups.  
 
 
Thus, the extent to which capacity building initiatives take in local 
knowledge varies, but it is clear that the majority of them focus on 
providing individual training to help them become more effective at the 
implementation of micro-level projects, rather than addressing more 
structural issues. Such practice does not resonate with the principle that 
capacity development should build on what is already there and make 
use of local knowledge and practices – even if these are different from 
one’s own. In that sense, capacity building for Southern peace NGOs is 
part of their depoliticisation as promoted by donor agencies. Southern 
groups are largely supported to fit into the organisational model of an 
NGO able to implement projects devised by donors and be accountable 
about their results129. In addition, capacity building does not tend to 
                                                 
128 Interview with CRS peacebuilding coordinator and attendance of opening session of course. 
Davao, Philippines, 15 May 2006. 
129 Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen (2005: 546-547) found in Southern Sudan that “[i]nstead of 
supporting existing structures of Sudanese NGOs or churches, most INGOs concentrated their 
capacity building efforts on creating Community Based Organisations in Sudan. […] Most 
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include the strengthening of local learning and knowledge generation 
through enhanced learning and research capacity. 
 
In conflict situations capacity development may be particularly difficult. 
Goodhand (2003: 153) found that in such circumstances “[i]nternational 
NGOs were found to be surprisingly weak in the area of local capacity-
building [..]. Reflective and participatory approaches were often 
overtaken in emergencies and the imperatives for speed tended to 
marginalize local actors. [The] INGOs [..] cited concerns about 
neutrality, politization and corruption.” Indeed, these are important 
concerns. They illustrate the dilemma for donors, touched upon in 
chapter one, of finding the balance between promoting an independent 
civil society and maintaining the values on which their development and 
peacebuilding missions are based.   
  
Coming back to the more structural constraints that result from 
inequalities between Northern and Southern actors, James and Wrigley 
note that   
“[m]any elements of the aid system act as major disincentives [...]. The 
increasing preoccupation with proving quantifiable results within a 
short, project-based period obviously makes taking a longer term 
approach difficult; [...] the competitive bidding process requires 
organisations to prove they already have adequate capacity. There is 
certainly no room in proposals to identify or admit weaknesses and 
plan for how these might be addressed.” (James and Wrigley 2006: 6)  
 
James and Wrigley (2006: 26) add that in order to overcome these 
disincentives, “[c]apacity building providers need to actively see how 
they can ‘bend the aid rules’”. 
 
 
4.7.2 Partnership and capacity building  
 
Positive examples of genuinely participatory and interactive capacity 
development appear to be the result of long-term, trust-based 
partnerships between local and external actors (Goodhand 2003: 154). In 
section 4.6 I already discussed some of the characteristics of such 
partnerships. In the words of Fowler (2000, cited in Partos 2006), 
“[a]uthentic partnership implies [...] a joint commitment to long-term 
interaction, shared responsibility for achievement, reciprocal obligation, 
equality, mutuality and balance of power”. It “goes far beyond a 
                                                                                                            
organisations shy away from supporting existing organisations because of anecdotal evidence 
suggesting these do not fit into preconceived conditions about ‘civil society’ and ‘local 
organisations’.” 
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functional, project-based approach, to emphasise the development of 
long-term relationships as an end in itself, based around solidarity and 
strengthening civil society organisations” (BOND and Exchange 2004: 
7). In such a model, the donor merely plays a catalyst role in supporting 
locally-driven developments. Such an equal partnership however does 
not entail completely factoring the NNGO out of the equation, as 
happened in the Dutch knowledge for development policy described in 
section 4.3.1; after all, they also have relevant knowledge and networks 
to contribute.  
 
As Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen (2005: 561) note, long-term partnership is 
even more important in conflict-affected countries: “[i]nternational 
organisations have to realise that capacity building of local organisations 
is a long-term process that needs serious commitment. This is especially 
the case in conflict and post-conflict situations, where civil society tends 
to break down. The depletion of local resources, a lack of organisational 
capacities, and the environment of suspicion in which civil society 
organisations have to grow, makes organisation building in such 
situations complicated.”  
 
Indeed, the term partnership is used by most NNGOs when describing 
their cooperation with SNGOs. However, although the notion of 
partnership seems to carry a sense of equality and reciprocity, in reality 
the use of the term covers a whole spectrum of relationships. Aid 
partnerships are not necessarily long-term, trust-based and reciprocal. In 
fact, many Southern partners feel that Northern NGOs do not meet these 
ideals of partnership. The NNGOs are considered paternalistic, 
inflexible and, in some cases, unreliable. The majority of interaction 
between partners is not about policy but about financing and 
accountability. (Partos 2006: 8) It is telling that Northern NGO staff 
members often call their Southern counterparts ‘partners’ but refer to 
themselves as ‘donors’. One NNGO, the Dutch organisation Oxfam-
Novib, actually does not use the term ‘partner’ in reference to the 
SNGOs it works with. Instead Oxfam-Novib prefers the term 
‘counterpart’, which is considered more realistic and comes with fewer 
expectations of equality. Novib sees the donor-recipient relationship as 
unequal by definition. The organisation chooses an active policymaking 
role and looks for counterparts that match its policy; counterparts have 
to comply with the quality standards of Novib to be eligible for funding. 
(Partos 2006: 11 and 22) 
 
Indeed, most SNGOs interviewed tend to regard the NNGOs that 
support them as donors rather than partners. A study done by the Dutch 
development umbrella organisation Partos (2006) even concluded that 
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SNGOs are often not interested in genuine partnership. According to 
Partos, this has two reasons. First, SNGOs find that NNGOs do not have 
much useful knowledge to contribute to the exchange. NNGOs have 
decreasingly specialised knowledge and SNGOs have increasing 
confidence in their own knowledge. They see dialogue more as a 
requirement for funding. A possible way to deal with this according to 
Partos could be to broaden such dialogues, including other stakeholders 
and embedding them in Southern networks. A second reason noted by 
Partos is the tension between learning and accountability. Policy 
dialogue requires openness and trust, but in order to secure future 
funding, SNGOs may paint a rosier picture of their activities than reality 
would support. A possible way to deal with this is to separate the roles 
of donor accountability and partner dialogue. For example, the Dutch 
NNGO Oxfam-Novib has ensured that financial negotiations are done 
by a different staff member than policy dialogue. (Partos 2006)  
 
My own findings do not readily support Partos’ conclusion that SNGOs 
are less interested in genuine partnership with NNGOs. SNGOs may be 
interested primarily in money that enables them to maintain their 
organisation and carry out their activities. But they are also frustrated 
when they cannot carry out the activities they consider most relevant 
because of the priorities imposed by funding regimes. SNGO staff 
members interviewed almost unanimously stress the need for a two-way 
knowledge exchange and policy dialogue. My interviewees generally 
value the knowledge brought by Northern counterparts; they just 
emphasised that this knowledge needed to be combined with local 
knowledge in order to be applied. On the other hand, Partos’ reference 
to the tension between accountability and learning does ring many bells. 
It is mentioned by many interviewees as a constraint on learning and 
two-way knowledge exchange. Although the separation of roles within 
NNGOs may help minimise this tension, what appears even more crucial 
is that trust is built among partners. Long-term relations are a way 
towards trust-building. NNGO representatives could strengthen their 
relationship with Southern partners by being present in the region more 
often. 
 
In addition, it is important that NNGOs show flexibility regarding 
planning and budgeting, thereby creating the space for learning on the 
part of Southern partners as well as themselves and providing the 
possibility that such learning (or changing circumstances) could help 
adapt programmes. In addition, allowing for failure or incomplete 
success without immediately cutting funding would create space for 
honest reflection and interactive learning. Clarity of communication and 
cutting the jargon might also help. Most fundamentally, a way to build 
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trust and ensure a two-way exchange around knowledge and policy is to 
involve partner representatives in the policy making structures of 
NNGOs. Some NNGOs already have an advisory council on policy 
issues in which partners are represented. (Partos 2006: 19)  
 
Building local capacity and developing the prerequisites for interactive 
learning and equal knowledge exchange would also entail supporting 
SNGOs in their learning and local knowledge generation. The problem 
is that SNGOs often have difficulty obtaining funds for knowledge and 
learning activities. Interviewees do note however that there are some 
donors that recognise and support the importance of learning and 
knowledge sharing. In fact, “donors sometimes play a role in 
harmonising methods and combining the best elements of different 
approaches.”130 There appears to be some difference among the regions 
when it comes to the ability of SNGOs to secure donor support for 
learning and knowledge exchange. Compared to their counterparts in 
West Africa, NGO staff members in Southeast Asia consider donor 
agencies to be relatively conducive to such activities. Donor agencies 
generally stimulate knowledge sharing and even carry out ‘learning 
experiences’ studies among their Southern partners131. Having said this, 
donor agencies do frame the field of peacebuilding and determine the 
broader topics on which local NGOs work. Thereby they also influence 
the knowledge that is shared and the lessons that are learned.  
 
 
4.7.3 Ownership and partnership different in peacebuilding? 
 
In 2005-2006 I was involved in an evaluation of Dutch and British 
peacebuilding NGOs132 financed through a special, theme-based Dutch 
official development cooperation budget (Barakat et al. 2006). During 
this evaluation, the peacebuilding NNGOs made the following point 
about partnership. They worked with local partners, but there was no 
clear-cut chain of decision-making or policy input in either direction. In 
most cases there was money flowing down the chain, but field activities 
were also carried out directly by the NNGOs. Many other activities were 
difficult to fit into the North-South chain model, being network 
activities, advocacy and lobbying activities in the North, or lobbying 
                                                 
130 Interview with staff members of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Kenema, Sierra Leone, 22 February 
2006.  
131 The UNDP did this in 2004. Interview with director of a Philippine NGO. Quezon City, 
Philippines, 19 May 2006. 
132 Pax Christi Netherlands, Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV), War Child Netherlands, the 
European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), International Alert, and Saferworld UK. Partners 
were interviewed in Central and Eastern Africa. 
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activities in the South by the NNGOs themselves rather than their 
partners (or in collaboration with their partners). The NNGOs argued 
that as a result, the strategies of capacity building and the slow transfer 
of responsibilities to Southern partners that the Dutch ministry (their 
back-donor) expected of them did not really apply to the nature of their 
work.  
 
In contrast with ‘regular’ development work, the Dutch NNGOs argued, 
prolonged Northern involvement is a necessity in peacebuilding. Local 
partner organisations might be prosecuted, harassed or discriminated 
against by local authorities, and the impact of direct interaction between 
them and NNGOs can be much larger than any lobby activity by local 
organisations alone. In other cases, the success of an intervention in 
conflict situations depends very much on being recognised as impartial. 
Working through local partners would, in such cases, not be very 
productive.  
 
The field visits carried out in the context of the evaluation largely 
confirmed what the NNGOs had indicated about the different nature of 
partnerships in peacebuilding. In many cases, organisations’ local 
partners were not the weaker party that needed to be supported and 
developed, with the eventual objective of a gradual transfer of 
responsibilities. In the case of networking activities, the partners were 
equal partners in a relationship in which both sides have something to 
offer. Partners were selected based on their unique position, experience 
or strength. In the case of lobby and advocacy work partners were often 
local activists who needed their NNGO partner to help them gain a voice 
at Northern policy platforms as well as Southern ones. Conversely, the 
NNGOs needed the local voice and experiences of their partners in order 
to have a stronger message for advocacy and lobbying. The organisation 
of peace dialogues requires an outside third party and often could not be 
carried out by local partners themselves. Thus, in many cases the peace 
NNGOs acted not so much as donors (though money did flow from 
them to their partners), but as facilitators and international conduits for 
joint lobby and advocacy activities. They saw partnership as part of a 
network of equal partners, rather than a hierarchical policy chain.  
 
Such partnerships, that do not revolve mainly around money and in 
which each partner has a clear added value, have more potential to 
achieve an equitable and two-way knowledge exchange and policy 
process than partnerships that are firmly embedded in the aid chain and 
in which Southern partners are mostly implementers of Northern policy. 
Indeed, the aforementioned Partos study notes that NNGOs that do not 
have a financial relationship with their partners tend to be more positive 
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about their policy dialogue (Partos 2006: 20). Hilhorst and Van 
Leeuwen (2005: 550-551) describe how entering into a financial 
arrangement thoroughly changed the relationship between a Southern 
Sudanese NGO and a Dutch organisation. The Dutch NGO became a 
donor rather than an equal partner and began demanding compliance of 
its partner with various funding conditions. A lot of mutual mistrust 
finally led to an end of the relationship.  
 
This might suggest that in the field of peacebuilding there are more 
possibilities for North-South partnership and exchange than in the field 
of development more generally. However, some qualifying remarks 
need to be made. First of all, with regard to the Dutch and British peace 
NGOs the picture painted above is incomplete. The picture was in fact 
very diverse with the NNGOs having strong partners with whom 
genuine partnership was possible, but also weaker partners with whom 
they had more ‘classically’ financial relations. Most Dutch and British 
peace organisations also engaged in capacity building initiatives. In 
some cases these were aimed at building the capacity of weaker 
partners. In other cases they worked in cooperation with partners to 
build the capacity of other groups.  
 
In any case, the Dutch and British NGOs evaluated make up only a 
limited part of the NNGOs that support peacebuilding organisations in 
the South. These were the purely peace-oriented organisations133, 
considered by the Ministry to fall somewhat outside the category of 
development organisations supported from its regular budget – which is 
why they were sponsored through a special theme-based funding 
programme. However, most of the SNGOs I visited for this study are 
financed from regular development cooperation budgets and their 
NNGO partners are aid organisations134 that see peacebuilding as one 
part of their wider spectrum of development activities. As the interview 
findings cited in this chapter show, these SNGOs and their relations with 
Northern counterparts do largely fit the aid chain description.135 The 
only organisation in the evaluation a number of whose partners I have 
visited is the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), a 
network organisation that facilitates the Global Partnership for the 
                                                 
133 The organisations evaluated were: the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), Pax Christi 
Netherlands (later merged with IKV), the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), War 
Child Netherlands, Saferworld and International Alert (the last two are UK-based organisations). 
134 Such as Cordaid and ICCO in the Netherlands or USAID in the United States 
135 Even for the ‘special’ peace NNGOs evaluated in the above-mentioned study, things may be 
changing. The Dutch government has abolished the theme-based grant programme and now 
requires these organisations to apply for regular development aid financing. As a result the Northern 
peace organisations may increasingly become implementers of Dutch development policy. But this 
still remains to be seen. 
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Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC; see chapter seven). Its 
relationship with its partners indeed does not fit the chain model as all 
are treated as equal participants in the network, as the following citation 
from its Kenyan partner Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa (NPI-Africa) 
illustrates. 
“There has been a free flow of information going back and forth. The 
relationship is considered healthy and equal. NPI-Africa has retained 
autonomy in determining how activities are carried out. The 
relationship with ECCP is the type of partnership sought by NPI-
Africa because it brings added value to its own activities by extending 
the reach of its message and creating visibility of its work. Being a 
partner of ECCP and a member of GPPAC has enabled NPI-Africa to 
make important contacts worldwide. In this way it has increased the 
organisation’s ability to carry out its objectives. In terms of 
accountability, NPI-Africa submits regular financial reports to ECCP. 
Being accountable for content is always a little more complicated. But 
because there is a lot of interaction it is quite clear what ECCP and 
NPI-Africa are doing and both parties are able to hold the other 
accountable for delivering on agreements that were made. Because 
ECCP has the financial power, the fear of it dictating the process easily 
arises. However, this never happened because of the governance 
structure of GPPAC. NPI-Africa has a seat in the International 
Steering Group in which ECCP is only one actor.”136 
 
It is good to realise that different kinds of partnerships do exist, perhaps 
particularly in the field of peacebuilding, and that my sample of SNGOs 
may not be entirely representative. I seem to have visited mostly weaker 
NGOs137, which in any case make up the majority of NGOs in the 
countries that were part of the study. Nonetheless I have also visited a 
number of stronger organisations – such as the Nairobi Peace Initiative 
Africa (NPI-Africa) in Kenya, the West African Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Ghana, and Initiatives for International 
Dialogue (IID) in Mindanao. Although these organisations, too, 
complain that Northern actors do not sufficiently recognise and 
stimulate local knowledge and its generation, they can and do strike up 
more genuine partnerships with NNGOs. In addition, these stronger 
SNGOs engage in their own capacity building and knowledge transfer, 
providing training courses to other organisations and coordinating 
knowledge sharing networks. In the next chapter I will discuss these 
activities in more detail, and continue to distinguish between stronger 
and weaker SNGOs.   
 
                                                 
136 Interview with director and programme coordinator of NPI-Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 29 and 39 
November 2005. 
137 Weaker in terms of staff capacity and numbers, resources, and networks. 
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4.8 Concluding remarks  
 
In chapter two a need to stimulate knowledge generation and 
dissemination by Southern partners was identified in order to capitalise 
on (often tacit) local knowledge. However, the possibilities for 
achieving this are constrained by a number of structural aspects. Chapter 
four has looked at these aspects. It has illuminated the dynamic 
interaction and competition among different kinds of knowledge, and 
the important role played by (a lack of) money and donors in every 
aspect of these processes. Knowledge transfer is conditioned by 
differences in the extent to which Northern and Southern knowledge are 
recognised as legitimate, by discourse dominance, and by the position of 
local NGOs vis-à-vis donor agencies. The chapter has analysed the way 
in which these factors set the framework for the learning and knowledge 
activities of Southern peace NGOs. Thus, in relation to “the challenges 
and opportunities Southern peace NGOs are confronted with in 
accumulating, mobilising and disseminating the knowledge that is 
needed to make optimal policy decisions, carry out activities in an 
effective way and adjust to continuously changing circumstances”, as 
the research question of this study puts it, this chapter has mapped the 
structural framework in which the learning activities of local NGOs take 
place. In doing so, it zoomed in on the following sub-question, posed at 
the end of Part One: how do power differences, donor relations and 
North-South dynamics influence the knowledge that is used and the 
learning that occurs? In looking at this question, chapter four also paid 
attention to the more general sub-question what factors constrain and 
support the learning of Southern peace NGOs?  
 
The structural framework outlined in this chapter constrains the 
opportunities Southern peace NGOs have for learning and knowledge 
exchange in a number of ways. First, indigenous knowledge in 
developing countries is often seen as less rational and scientific and 
therefore less legitimate than knowledge that fits into ‘modern’ 
knowledge systems. This lack of recognition of the potential value of 
different knowledge systems has at the same time been reinforced by 
and contributed to the erosion of traditional knowledge systems in the 
face of the ‘modernisation’ of the social, economic and political systems 
of developing countries. Formal education in the developing world is 
largely modelled after Western education systems and as such 
contributes to the devaluation of traditional knowledge. These 
developments also lead to the development of fault lines within 
countries between those who have been educated in ‘modern’ systems 
and those who have not. Difference in access to ‘modern’ knowledge – 
seen increasingly as the key to social mobility and progress – often lead 
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to ridges between rural and urban groups, generations, and men and 
women. In some cases this leads to conflict. 
 
Second, there is an enormous inequality between the developed and 
developing worlds when it comes to scientific research outputs. This 
means that development and peacebuilding programmes in the South are 
most often based on Northern research findings and ideas. Despite 
policies of donors to develop it, Southern research capacity is not 
growing significantly in most countries. This may be because it is not 
sufficiently prioritised by donors (who in the Millennium Development 
Goals have only included primary education) and developing country 
governments alike. To complicate matters further, the Southern research 
that does take place is often very abstract and theoretical and does not 
immediately lend itself to application. As a result, there is little 
interaction between NGOs and research institutes in the countries visited 
for this study.  
 
Third, initiatives by donors to stimulate Southern knowledge generation 
are not linked to policymaking, which remains top-down. Therefore 
Southern knowledge does not find its way into development policies. In 
addition, ‘knowledge for development’ policies tend to be aimed at 
Southern governments and universities, and do not include practitioners 
such as NGO staff. The knowledge management policies of NNGOs are 
mostly internally oriented and do not explicitly include partner 
organisations in the South. Fourth, the sections on knowledge regimes 
and development discourse mapped the aid regime (or chain) in which 
the SNGOs studied are embedded, and looked at what this 
embeddedness means for their operating space when it comes to 
learning in interaction with other - Northern and Southern – 
stakeholders. One of the conclusions is that the aid regime and dominant 
discourse forces Southern NGOs to speak the language of NNGOs and 
back-donors. They need to do this in order to get funding proposals and 
progress reports approved. This limits the scope for local concepts and 
visions to trickle through into policy and practice.   
 
Fifth, the aid regime is increasingly characterised by short-term funding 
and an emphasis on ‘deliverables’. These characteristics clash with the 
requirements for learning and two-way knowledge exchange among 
stakeholders, namely flexible funding that is not tied exclusively to 
projects and measurable outcomes so as to create space for research and 
learning; and long-term partnerships based on trust and mutual 
dependence. Sixth, the aid regime has led to an increasing 
professionalisation of Northern and Southern NGOs which have moved 
from social movements that play a political role towards service 
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providers or sub-contractors implementing official development policy. 
This ‘anti-politics machine’ is reinforced by the dominant discourse 
which casts development as a neutral, value-free activity. As a result less 
attention may be paid to social, political or cultural peculiarities – and 
local knowledge – while a universal, technical language and toolkit are 
promoted.   
 
Seventh, often despite good intentions, the aid regime leads to donor-
driven projects and top-down policy making. In spite of policies 
stimulating Southern research, this structural situation constrains the 
ability of Southern NGO actors to produce knowledge and contribute to 
international policy debates. Whereas needs-driven programming would 
stimulate local research into the circumstances of communities, donor-
driven projects do not. Even well-intended capacity building 
programmes often reflect the inequalities inherent in the regime and 
have difficulty realising Southern ‘ownership’. 
 
However, these structural aspects are not set in stone. This chapter has 
also pointed towards possible ways to change them when it comes to the 
relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs. After all, in addition 
to structural constraints, the chapter has noted positive examples in the 
exchange between NNGOs and SNGOs that have the potential of 
increasing the agency of the latter. Truly reciprocal partnerships do 
exist, perhaps even more in peacebuilding than in other development 
sectors, because of the nature of peace work in which much depends on 
things other than money. Some NNGOs and SNGOs have established 
relatively equitable partnerships and policy dialogues. Things that have 
made this possible include the following.  
• A long-term relationship and trust between partners, in order to 
allow for honest reflection and ‘third-order’ learning 
• Flexible arrangements regarding timelines and planning, with 
NNGOs leaving their Southern partners considerable planning 
and implementing freedom 
• Core institutional funding rather than tied project funding 
• NNGOs being willing to think out of the box and fund unusual 
things 
• NNGOs respecting indigenous notions, processes and time 
frames for organisational development, while SNGOs are open 
to external ideas and suggestions. An equal relationship does not 
mean factoring the knowledge and preferences of donors out of 
the equation. To maintain the values on which their 
development and peacebuilding missions are based, donors 
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cannot be expected to come into the field without any 
preconceived principles.   
• NNGOs allowing for failure or incomplete success without 
immediately cutting funding. This creates space for honest 
reflection and interactive learning 
• Self-confidence within Southern NGOs also plays a role. As we 
have seen, indigenous knowledge has been discredited in many 
developing countries for quite some time, and being familiar 
with modern or Western notions is considered to be an 
advantage. When Southern NGO staff recognise the value of the 
knowledge possessed by themselves, their colleagues and the 
communities, they may claim a stronger position in the 
exchange with external actors. Indeed, as mentioned in 4.6, my 
field research has generated some anecdotal evidence that 
Southern peace NGOs are beginning to be more assertive. 
• Networks in which SNGOs come together may help strengthen 
the voice of these organisations vis-à-vis donors and other 
powerful external actors. Chapters six, seven and eight pay more 
attention to this.  
 
These factors only come into play in a structural climate that allows for 
the development of such long-term partnerships beyond concrete, 
output-oriented projects. The way an NNGO itself is funded plays an 
important role in this regard. If the NNGO is dependent on project 
funding that is tied to specific objectives, then it has little choice but to 
pass these objectives on to SNGOs, which leaves little space for 
exchange over content and direction. Other structural factors that may 
play a role are: 
• The degree of specialisation of both the NNGO and the SNGO. 
NNGOs that are less specialised and have developed less precise 
policy ideas before entering the field may leave their Southern 
partners more freedom of action.  
• Transparency and trustworthiness on the part of the SNGO 
increases mutual trust and good relations and makes it possible 
for an NNGO to be flexible and leave the SNGO with some 
discretion in policy development.  
• When the governments at the top of the funding chain have a 
strong political interest in the developing country in which 
projects are carried out, then they are likely to leave NNGOs 
and SNGOs with little policymaking leeway. For example, 
American donors’ emphasis on the security agenda and counter-
terrorism activities is strongly felt by many SNGOs. Based on 
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the limited information available to me, it appears that such 
direct political pressure is less of an issue with European donors. 
• The capacity of SNGOs also plays an important role. It appears 
that genuine two-way exchange is easiest between relatively 
equal partners – in other words, with strong SNGOs. It is also 
the stronger NGOs that tend to be able to do research into the 
needs of communities and that feel secure enough to turn down 
programmes that they feel do not meet these needs. Still, even 
these stronger NGOs would like even more time, space and 
capacity for research and reflection than they have at present.  
 
As the majority of Southern peace NGOs does not fall into this ‘strong’ 
category, capacity building is an important activity – as long as it tries to 
take into account the principles of ownership and partnership. This is a 
bit of a ‘catch 22’ because these principles are most difficult to realise 
with weak organisations who may not be so certain of what they know 
and want and due to their strong dependency on donor funds may be 
more than willing to say whatever they think NNGOs want to hear. 
Thinking about possible ways out of this ‘catch’, our attention is drawn 
back to the importance of research, reflection, and organisational 
learning capacities. Capacitating SNGOs to research local conditions 
and to record and disseminate lessons would strengthen their position in 
exchanges over policy and practice and help lead to more relevant and 
effective activities. In this way, the potential significance of learning and 
knowledge exchange for local peacebuilders becomes very clear. “The 
value of knowledge sharing is in closing the African-modern knowledge 
gap. Thereby it contributes to transforming conflicts.”138 
 
Capacity building should therefore focus much more on building 
capacities for learning, reflection and knowledge generation. This 
involves helping develop skills for reflection, documentation, analysis 
and dissemination of knowledge –by peacebuilding practitioners as well 
as local research institutions, which could play a role in the future in 
developing new strategies for peacebuilding, carrying out baseline 
studies and monitoring of the work of local NGOs. Action research can 
be a helpful tool for NGO staff to reflect on their work, extract lessons, 
and document these. The Applied Conflict Transformation Studies 
(ACTS) that I will analyse in chapter eight provides an interesting 
example. Another way to start building a bridge between different 
bodies of knowledge lies in the assessment of the impact of 
programmes. A number of larger Southern peacebuilding 
                                                 
138 Interview with the director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
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organizations139 have begun to develop new ways of impact 
measurement that include both ‘Western’, formalised and measurable 
information and more process-oriented, qualitative data. I will return to 
this in the next chapter.  
                                                 
139 Such as the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the Nairobi Peace Initiative 
Africa (NPI-Africa) 
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Chapter 5. Practice to knowledge and knowledge to 
practice 
Learning and sharing by Southern peace NGOs 
 
Having outlined the structural aspects that shape the learning of 
Southern peace NGOs in chapter four, I will now examine the ways in 
which these organisations exercise their agency within these structural 
constraints. Thus, this chapter focuses on the following sub-question: 
what do the knowledge and learning processes of local peace NGOs 
look like, what are their strengths and weaknesses, and what are 
difficulties and gaps in their learning practice? The answers given in 
this chapter are largely based on the interviews done with local NGOs in 
the countries visited140. 
 
Section 5.1 looks at the practical meaning of peacebuilding knowledge, 
a concept discussed in chapter two. 5.2 examines the types of knowledge 
needed and offered by the peacebuilding NGOs studied. Next, the 
chapter turns to the strategies these organisations employ for learning 
and exchange.  
 
Hailey and James (2002) studied the learning activities of a number of 
Indian NGOs considered successful in their work. They found that these 
NGOs held regular meetings, retreats, workshops, and seminars. One 
organisation even “moves staff around in the organisation or assigns 
them to new projects as part of its strategy to encourage cross-functional 
learning. It transfers staff from research posts to field positions and from 
specialist to management positions in an attempt to disseminate and 
institutionalise learning.” Other knowledge-related activities of these 
organisations included sponsoring relevant and applied research and 
publishing research findings (Hailey and James 2002: 402-403). Section 
5.3 looks at our sample of Southern peace NGOs and the organisational 
learning activities they engage in. It assesses their knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge retention, knowledge application and transfer, 
and research and dissemination. 
 
The Indian NGOs from the study by Hailey and James also had 
“sophisticated internal management information and monitoring 
systems”. However, “[t]he extent to which donor-led evaluation 
processes contributed to learning was mixed, with the incentive to cover 
up mistakes in order to maintain funding undermining the learning 
                                                 
140 See the overview of NGOs visited at the end of Part One and the description of their activities in 
1.5.1. 
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process.” (Hailey and James 2002: 404) As we will see in this chapter, 
this is consistent with the picture emerging from my interviews with 
local peace NGO staff. Section 5.4 explores some reasons for this and 
explores ways to better make use of the learning opportunity provided 
by monitoring and evaluation procedures. 
 
The learning processes of the peace NGOs analysed in this study do not 
necessarily occur purposely. The organisations have few formalised 
organisational learning policies in place. Their staff members emphasise 
informal learning from practice as the main way of learning. Interaction 
– with colleagues within and outside of the organisation, beneficiaries, 
and others that play a role in peacebuilding – is deemed an important 
way of learning by SNGO staff. Section 5.5 looks at these processes of 
knowledge exchange in more detail.   
 
Important constraints exist that limit the learning of Southern peace 
NGOs. The structural constraints discussed in the previous chapter play 
a major role in this. In addition, there are a number of more specific 
obstacles to learning. These are discussed in 5.6. What may also play a 
role is a lack of priority accorded to knowledge and learning processes 
by Southern peace organisations. This is difficult to say for certain 
because although interview partners did recognise the importance of 
learning for their work, this may also have been because they were 
asked about it.  
 
 
5.1 Peacebuilding knowledge in practice  
 
5.1.1 Knowledge for peacebuilding 
 
Section 2.2 mentioned that knowledge of conflict dynamics in general is 
a prerequisite for peacebuilding knowledge. My interviewees made clear 
that knowledge of the specific context is a necessary addition to such 
general conflict knowledge when one wants to successfully intervene in 
a conflict. This includes knowledge of local power relationships, 
cleavages, identity groups, leadership, and the role of external parties in 
causing, prolonging or de-escalating a conflict. Such knowledge may be 
found among academic experts of particular countries or regions and 
their publications as well as, importantly, among (former) residents of 
the region one is dealing with. Insiders at different societal levels can 
offer different expertise: people familiar with a country’s leadership 
know about the power dynamics at the national level of decision-
making, while a (former) foot soldier will be able to relate what causes 
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individual fighters to join a militia – and what it may take for them to 
lay down their arms.  
 
Section 2.2 also discussed how efforts to establish some kind of 
common ‘truth’ about the conflict can be part of peacebuilding. Part of 
this is the collection of data. The Documentation Center of Cambodia 
(DC-Cam), a local NGO financed mainly by international donor grants, 
has been collecting more than 600,000 pages of documents detailing the 
workings of the1975-1979 Khmer Rouge regime. DC-Cam’s director 
Youk Chhang, himself a victim of the Khmer Rouge regime which 
killed his parents and sister, says that “knowing and understanding what 
happened has set me free.”141 DC-Cam’s documentation includes 
minutes of Khmer Rouge leadership meetings, confidential memos 
describing conditions in the countryside, and the confessions under 
torture of prisoners killed by the secret police; maps of some 20,000 
mass grave sites, 189 prisons, and 80 memorials; 6,000 photographs; 
200 documentary films; and 4,000 transcribed interviews with former 
Khmer Rouge soldiers.142 In addition to data collection, civil society 
initiatives try to stimulate dialogue around parties’ diverging 
interpretations of history. For example, the Split Screen project ran a 
pilot with Israeli and Arab youth in the Netherlands who put their 
histories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alongside each other on a 
computer screen. The aim was not to agree on a common history but to 
become aware of others’ different views.143   
 
Arriving at joint visions of peace may be seen as a next step after 
processes of fact-finding and joint interpretation (sometimes in the form 
of truth commissions) have been completed. However, this step has not 
received much attention up to now. As we saw in chapter one, even 
NGOs whose daily job it is to work for peace often lack an integrated 
vision of the kind of situation they are aiming to contribute to. Through 
their networking activity (discussed in upcoming chapters) the NGOs 
visited do pay attention to this, albeit usually not very systematically. 
Other initiatives in this direction appear in the literature. Powell (2006: 
530) gives examples of projects that employ participatory processes to 
explore and express societal issues wider than the planning of a 
programme:  
• The Dialogues Politiques project by the organisation 
Environmental Development Action in the Third World 
                                                 
141 Interview with DC-Cam director. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, November 2001.  
142 Ibidem. (In 2006, the work of the Center took on another value as the tribunal for Khmer Rouge 
leaders has finally begun its operation.) 
143 http://www.netuni.nl/splitscreen/ (in Dutch). The Network University Split Screen project. 
Accessed various times. Accessed various times. 
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(ENDA) in Dakar, Senegal, aims to give each Senegalese person 
the opportunity to become an actor in change and development. 
It focuses on marginalised groups in particular and organises 
workshops in which people give their vision about the future of 
the country. Dialogues are organised on themes such as cross-
border trade and cooperation, agriculture, and sustainable 
fisheries, involving the people working in these sectors. ENDA 
also stages dialogues around the elaboration of local, regional 
and national development plans.144  
• In Brazil, the Landless Workers Movement has carried out 
similar visioning activities among its members, which “have not 
only managed to secure land, therefore food security for their 
families, but also continue to develop a sustainable socio-
economic model that offers a concrete alternative to today's 
globalization that puts profits before people and humanity.”145  
• The international NGO Action Aid has developed the Reflect 
Programme, an “innovative approach to adult literacy and social 
change, where groups construct their own learning materials 
using drama, story-telling and songs. It was tested in nations 
including El Salvador, Bangladesh and Uganda and is now used 
by 350 different [partner organisations] in 60 countries.”146  
 
Some peacebuilders interviewed see knowledge sharing as contributing 
directly to peace by changing perceptions and attitudes, countering 
misinformation, and empowering people through knowledge.147 Having 
access to various sources of knowledge is likely to make people less 
vulnerable to propaganda. A Sierra Leonean interviewee noted that “in a 
society with seventy-five per cent illiteracy, high unemployment, 
poverty and food insecurity, people who have knowledge are in a 
position of power. Many try to use their knowledge to influence people 
with ideologies.”148 Giving traditionally marginalised groups access to 
knowledge may reduce their grievances. Cambodian women are one 
example: 
“learning and knowledge sharing are particularly important for 
women. Women need to know what happens in the world, not to stay 
at home. Knowledge is power, also for women in the family. When 
your children know more than you they will no longer respect you. 
                                                 
144 http://www.endadiapol.org/. Accessed on 28 February 2007. 
145 http://www.mst.org.br/mst/. Accessed on 8 February 2007. 
146 http://www.actionaidusa.org/un_student_donate.php. Accessed on 8 February 2007. 
147 See table 6.1 in section 6.2 summarising findings on the benefits of networking and knowledge 
exchange. 
148 Interview with director of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Kenema, Sierra Leone, 22 February 2006. 
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This happens with the children of the generation that had lacked 
education opportunities under the Khmer Rouge.”149 
 
 
5.1.2 Indigenous and external knowledge 
 
Most interviewees emphasised the importance of indigenous knowledge 
for peacebuilding. Not taking local knowledge into account can lead to 
peacebuilding and development projects missing their target partly or 
entirely. According to one NGO worker in Liberia, “the experts 
designing the national DDR [disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration] programme said that combatants had to be put in an 
encampment. This would have been suitable if they were regular 
soldiers, but instead they were often kids who simply defended 
themselves. They just needed to be taken back home.”150 This resonates 
with the problems caused by donor-driven projects that were discussed 
in section 4.6.  
 
In line with the distinction between different knowledge systems (see 
2.5), traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding methods in 
countries like Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Liberia differ from ‘Western’ 
ways. Western methods often involve written text, while in many 
developing countries knowledge transfer tends to occur orally and 
illiteracy is high. The following citations show what this can mean for 
the practice of local NGOs. 
“In accordance with our oral tradition, written exchanges have 
received less priority within our network [of peace NGOs] and when 
we ran out of funds the quarterly newsletter and ‘From the Field’ 
reports were the first activities to be cancelled. They were deemed less 
important than direct facilitation of peace processes in the field. 
Nonetheless we try to create more of a habit of writing – as long as 
this is done to retain important knowledge and benefit from our own 
work and that of others, not to boast or take credit. We feel that donor 
agencies sometimes push us to publish stories from our practice for the 
sole purpose of providing them with ‘deliverables’ and enabling them 
to show off our results.”151 
 
“There is no reading and writing culture in the Philippines. This is 
sometimes difficult towards donor agencies. The NGOs that know how 
to make funding proposals are the ones that get the funding.”152 
 
                                                 
149 Interview with Cambodian NGO staff member. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 22 May 2006. 
150 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
151 Interview with director of West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
152 Interview with staff member of Philippine NGO. Manila, Philippines, 19 May 2006. 
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Other differences between Western knowledge systems on the one hand 
and African and Asian ones on the other that were mentioned in the 
interviews include the way people deal with gender and the role of 
religion “as a fall back during war and a source of strength and 
resilience”153. Both issues are mentioned particularly often in (Muslim) 
Mindanao. Family structures are also different, with African and Asian 
families being much more extended and parents exercising particular 
positions of authority. The influence of elders is often used to resolve 
conflict. Elders mediate and their authority is respected. “This type of 
conflict resolution leads to reconciliation, whereas going to court only 
leads to dissatisfaction and hatred on the part of the losing party”.154 
Another difference is in the way people experience time. Where Western 
donors demand time-bound activities with clear deadlines, Africans and 
Asians tend to be more process-oriented: the process has to be 
completed regardless of the time it takes. Consultations and consensus 
are important elements of indigenous, including Islamic, ways of 
working.155 Although Western or ‘modern’ knowledge is usually 
considered particularly rational, in this case one may wonder whether 
Westerners’ obsession with time, independently of the natural time that 
processes take, is not in fact quite irrational.  
 
Southern peacebuilders emphasise the importance of traditional symbols 
in peacebuilding – acts such as land cleaning or exchanging gifts and 
sharing meals to validate an agreement and build trust. Western donor 
agencies do not always recognise these activities to be important. They 
do not match Western standards of scientific validity. From the 
perspective of a Western-educated academic such as myself this is often 
quite understandable. For example, an organisation in Liberia organised 
a workshop on traditional early warning systems with elders from two 
ethnic groups, in order to expand the toolbox for early warning and 
conflict prevention. As it turned out, in some traditions early warning 
signs were found in dreams and occurrences like the movement of 
birds.156 These are very far from what most Westerners would consider 
valid signs.  
 
However, Western concepts do not necessarily clash with indigenous 
traditions. Most of the African and Asian NGO staff interviewed 
conclude that both ‘modern’, ‘Western’ knowledge and traditional 
knowledge are important. They do not agree about whether the two 
                                                 
153 Interview with chairman of Mindanawan NGO network. Marbel, Philippines, 16 May 2006. 
154 Interview with staff member of Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
155 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
156 Interview with national coordinator of a Liberian NGO network. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 
2006. 
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clash or complement each other. Some say that there is no tension 
between Western and non-Western concepts of peacebuilding: “Western 
concepts are more elaborated, but not fundamentally different”157. 
Others see a more contradictory relationship between types of 
knowledge seen as closer to and further from local traditions. The 
intermediary, and most often stated, position is that many Western 
concepts are useful but need to be applied in a way that is sensitive to 
local circumstances and traditions. Western methods are not unfit for the 
local context, but the crux of the matter lies in their implementation. 
They cannot be replicated in Asia and Africa without modification. For 
example, for programmes to succeed one must work with traditional 
power structures, and to do so, knowledge about these structures is 
required.  
 
Another way in which the intermediary position was stated was that both 
Western and indigenous approaches are needed. Sometimes one proves 
workable, sometimes the other. “Western medicine can bring new 
solutions but does not know which leaf in our woods cures which 
condition.”158 It is important to be armed with both concepts. “It does 
not really matter whether useful knowledge is originally Western or 
African. Different knowledge systems are interacting in a globalising 
world, and a strong traditional system may no longer be applicable 
because of changes taking place.” 159  Human rights NGOs tend to 
emphasise these changes and the importance of getting into line with 
modernisation. They state the position that “human dignity overrides 
[…] culture and tradition. People have to be educated about their rights 
in the modern system.”160 Non-human rights organisations tend to place 
more value on tradition and cultural differences.  
 
Regarding regional differences, a Ghanaian peacebuilder hypothesises 
that 
“Asian countries have compromised less with Western knowledge 
systems and retained more of their own knowledge; or at least they 
have been better able to integrate traditional and modern knowledge 
(whereas in Africa modern and traditional knowledge are completely 
unconnected). As a result they have been better able to develop 
politically and economically.”161 
 
                                                 
157 Interview with staff members of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Freetown, Monrovia, 16 February 2006. 
158 Interview with director of West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
159 Interview with Liberian NGO director in Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
160 Interview with Liberian NGO staff member. Monrovia, Liberia, 10 February 2006. 
161 Interview with director of West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006.  
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This hypothesis is not really corroborated by the findings that came out 
of interviews in Cambodia and the Philippines. The picture arising from 
those did not differ significantly from the one emerging in Africa. But 
the Philippines and Cambodia may not really have been the kind of 
economically successful Asian countries the Ghanaian had in mind162. In 
any case, what emerges is that it is difficult to generalise across 
continents.  
 
In any case, it is important not to suggest that modernisation is always 
bad or that traditional, local knowledge is always good. Indigenous ways 
of doing things may in fact have contributed to conflict, like in Sierra 
Leone where traditional systems of land ownership and hierarchical 
relations between generations led to a marginalisation of youth, many of 
whom joined one of the warring parties (Richards 2005). In Liberia, 
some traditional laws (such as the ‘trial by ordeal’ in which an iron is 
held in a fire and then pressed on a suspect’s leg – if he does not get 
burned he is innocent) have been outlawed by the constitution because 
they are now generally considered to be inhumane, but are still 
implemented locally.163 Similarly in Mindanao, various interviewees 
refer to the traditional Rido system of revenge killings as something that 
needs to be changed.   
 
 
5.2 A two-way exchange: Knowledge demand and supply in the 
field 
 
5.2.1 Knowledge demand 
 
Based on the interviews held with peacebuilders in different parts of the 
world, what knowledge do they need in order to do their work well? 
What knowledge do they have to offer? Starting with the knowledge 
need, people working for peacebuilding NGOs in developing countries 
mention - in the context of this study - several kinds of knowledge to 
which they would like to gain access in order to work more effectively. 
Table 5.1 below gives an overview of the kinds of knowledge that were 
mentioned164. They can by and large be placed in two categories: first, 
                                                 
162 It is probably true that different countries have responded differently to the potential tensions 
between ‘knowledges’. Analysing these different responses, and their results, would be an 
interesting research project in itself. 
163 Interview with Liberian NGO staff member. Monrovia, Liberia, 10 February 2006. 
164 Like the ones that will follow, this table is intended to give an impression of the kinds of issues 
that people mentioned when they talked to me about knowledge and learning. Although the table is 
split up into different countries, the numbers given cannot be read as representative of the views and 
activities of NGOs in these countries. This is because not all interviews addressed all questions. The 
semi-structured, open-ended nature of the conversations in combination with time limits meant that 
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the NGO workers identify a need for peacebuilding content knowledge. 
Second, SNGO staff would like to gain more knowledge on working 
skills. In addition to these categories, the table portrays two remarks that 
were made: first, some people said that they did not (or not only) seek a 
specific kind of knowledge, but that they rather sought interaction with 
others through which new knowledge could jointly be created. Second, a 
large number of people emphasised that although they would like to gain 
knowledge, this would need adaptation to the local context before it 
could be usefully applied. Both issues are elaborated further on in this 
section. 
 
Knowledge 
demand 
 Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14) 
To-
tal 
(49) 
General 
peace-
building 
9 4 3  16 
 
Lobby and 
advocacy 
1 3  1 5 
Human 
rights and 
justice 
2 1  1 4 
Early 
warning 
and 
response 
 1  1 2 
Conflict 
analysis 
2    2 
Global 
issues 
   2 2 
Peace 
education 
 1  1 2 
Mediation   1  1 
Theo-
ries, 
method
s 
Solidarity 
work 
   1 1 
Research into 
traditional ways of 
conflict management 
3  1  4 
Research on needs, 
issues beneficiaries 
1 1 2  4 
Peace-
building 
content 
knowledge 
Case studies from 
elsewhere 
1 2   3 
 
                                                                                                            
some interviews went in other directions than others. This also depended on the specific place and 
role of an interviewee. As a result, when an interviewee did not mention a particular issue, this may 
also simply be because it did not come up during the conversation. An additional thing to note 
about this particular table is that it includes only interview findings from Liberia, Sierra Leone, the  
Philippines and Cambodia.  
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Capacity for 
reflection and 
documentation 
3 5 4 3 15 
Organisation/project 
management; 
planning; financial 
management 
4 4 3 3 14 
Impact assessment 3 4 4 3 14 
Research capacity 2 2 2 1 7 
Fundraising 2  1 2 5 
Creative ways to 
spread information 
1  2  3 
Funding opportunities 1 2   3 
ICT / webpage design 1 1   2 
Working 
skills 
English language 
skills 
   1 1 
 
Joint brainstorming to create new 
knowledge 
2 3 4 3 12 
 
Knowledge gained needs adaptation to 
be useful 
6 9 7 7 29 
Table 5.1: Knowledge demand of Southern peacebuilders165  
 
Additional insights may be obtained from the survey done among 
members of the GPPAC network for the case study portrayed in chapter 
seven. Annex 2 provides excerpts from the global survey reports of this 
survey. In response to a question about their priorities for knowledge 
sharing, many people mentioned conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
knowledge and methods in general, while a number of specific issues and 
methods were mentioned. In this category, peace education, human rights, 
arms and disarmament, early warning and early response, lobby and 
advocacy, and good governance were mentioned more than once. In 
addition to peacebuilding knowledge, respondents wanted to exchange 
experiences about activities undertaken by members. In terms of working 
skills, networking methodologies, capacity building methods, and strategic 
planning were mentioned as issues around which to exchange 
knowledge.166  
 
Summarising the findings from the interviews and the survey, the 
peacebuilding content knowledge that Southern NGO staff would like to 
gain includes: 
• theories and methods of peacebuilding that have been developed 
and tested elsewhere. Peace NGO staff see value in comparing 
                                                 
165 Lib refers to Liberia, SLto Sierra Leone, Phil to The Philippines, and Cam to Cambodia. 
166 See question 22 of survey version A in Annex 2. 
  
233 
these with their own methods in use and to take out applicable 
elements that can be adjusted and applied to the local context.  
• research into traditional ways of conflict management. Few 
studies have been carried out into the elements that keep people 
together in all those traditional communities that live in relative 
peace. 
• research on the needs and issues affecting the beneficiaries or 
stakeholders of NGO programmes, and the priorities of these 
target groups. 
 
Working skills include: 
• capacity to reflect upon activities, analyse trends, causes, and 
achievements, and to document the outcomes of such reflection 
and analysis. Related to this are research capacity (in order to be 
able to carry out the above-mentioned research into traditional 
ways and the needs of beneficiaries) and ways to assess the 
impact of work 
• practical skills relating to organisational management, financial 
administration, information and communications technology 
(ICT) and webpage design, fundraising, project cycle 
management, and strategic planning. In addition there is a desire 
to gain access to new and alternative ways of bringing a 
message across to the (often illiterate) public, such as 
documentary making. Among GPPAC members, networking 
methodologies and capacity building skills are priorities.  
 
 
5.2.2 Knowledge supply 
 
Although they would like to gain more knowledge and skills, local 
peacebuilders in West Africa, Southeast Asia and other regions are 
obviously not void of these themselves. They emphasise that they have 
unique experiences and knowledge that they have developed as they 
carry out their work. Some of this knowledge is specific to the context 
(for example, how to address the chief of a particular tribe), but other 
parts may be of use to others working in the same field. Table 5.2 below 
gives an overview of the types of knowledge the interviewees feel they 
have to offer167. 
                                                 
167 See note 164. 
  
234 
 
Knowledge supply Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14) 
To-
tal 
(49) 
Specific area of work 5 3 2 3 13 
Communal, leadership structures; 
symbolism 
3 2 2 1 8 
Experience with grassroots work 4 2 1 1 8 
Application and translation of external 
knowledge 
2  3  5 
Information from locals; knowledge of 
context (early warning) 
3  1  4 
Working under difficult conditions, with 
limited resources 
1 2   3 
Table 5.2: Knowledge supply of Southern peacebuilders 
 
In addition to specific expertise around their area of work (people 
mentioned for example peace education skills, networking, and 
training), local peacebuilders may offer 
• tacit and implicit knowledge about communal structures, family 
structures and traditional leadership structures, and the role of 
symbolism. For example, one NGO staff member noted that “we 
can help explain the nature of the chieftaincy in Liberia to non-
locals. A chief in Liberia is not an autocratic ruler. His role is 
much more circumscribed and difficult to define. Symbolism 
plays a large role. A chief is like a bee queen: the softest and 
most valuable, but not necessarily the strongest. One never 
really knows what authority he exercises until he is removed; 
then everything falls apart.”168 
• experience with grassroots work, including the facilitation of 
dialogue at the community level and the stimulation and support 
of grassroots initiatives 
• ways of applying peacebuilding methods developed elsewhere 
in the context of war-torn developing countries and experience 
with efforts to combine traditional and Western methods 
• access to local information through work with local people who 
keep them informed. This knowledge can also be used as early 
warning signals in the case that a potential for renewed violence 
is identified 
• experience with working under difficult conditions and being 
creative with limited resources.  
 
 
                                                 
168 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 
2006. 
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5.2.3 Interactive knowledge generation and learning 
 
When asked about the nature and value of knowledge transfer and 
sharing169, local peacebuilders emphasised the importance of comparing 
one’s ideas with the thoughts, concepts, and experiences of others. This 
helps put people’s work into perspective and find new dimensions. 
Indeed, local NGO staff emphasise that learning and capacity building 
tend to occur through interaction with others. “I do not really have a 
defined set of knowledge that I would like to acquire. I am more 
interested in commonly achieving new insights through knowledge 
exchange and joint brainstorming, taking the problems organisations 
face as a point of departure.”170 This is particularly the case in non-
Western parts of the world that have an oral tradition and where even 
those who are educated often do not have the habit of reading and 
recording information. As a result, face-to-face meetings and training 
sessions are considered to be more valuable than written documents. 
This is particularly the case in Africa, where the oral tradition is 
emphasised the most, but it also plays a role in the other regions studied 
- except perhaps Central Asia where the Soviet past has left a highly 
educated population accustomed to working with knowledge in written 
form.  
 
Oral traditions are not the only reason why people emphasise learning 
through interaction. Exchange is more generally seen as a requirement 
for creativity and innovation. One interviewee introduced the expression 
‘knowledge that is not shared does not grow’171. Together people arrive 
at new insights. Interaction also helps reveal the tacit knowledge that 
others have, sometimes without being aware of it. “[N]o explicit 
knowledge […] has any meaning unless it connects with the tacit 
knowledge held by the user” and “[s]uccessful communication and 
application of knowledge […] depend as much on the recipient as on the 
provider”. (Powell 2006: 520) When someone simply sends you an 
article without explanation, it is unlikely that you will prioritise reading 
it or see its importance. When someone sends you an article explaining 
that ‘the other day after we had talked about your work, I realised that 
this might be relevant for you because..’ you are likely to respond with 
more interest.  
 
SNGO staff consider learning and knowledge exchange to be necessary 
in order to keep up to date on new and different ways of solving 
                                                 
169 See also table 6.1 in section 6.2. 
170 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 14 February 2006. 
171 Interview with the director of a Sierra Leonean NGO, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 16 February 
2006. 
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problems. Although it is important to learn by trial-and-error, a 
grounded knowledge of issues and existing methods can help one work 
more systematically and consciously. It is by combining one’s own 
experiences with theory and the lessons of others that genuine learning 
occurs. In this way, gaining new knowledge also leads the staff of 
organisations to being more reflective about their work and that of 
others. This process of reflection and interaction changes individual 
perceptions and attitudes. In addition, as we shall see in upcoming 
chapters, knowledge sharing builds solidarity and can be a source of 
inspiration and learning. For example, a Sierra Leonean youth 
organisation that employs drama as a peace education method read in 
the report of another organisation about the use of film as a more cost-
effective alternative to theatre. “Though in some ways community 
drama is better – involving the whole community, it gives people a sense 
that it is about them – this opens up new possibilities.”172 An example 
given in Liberia is that “exchanging knowledge with people from 
countries with trust and reconciliation commissions could bring useful 
experiences to Liberians dealing with the newly established commission 
here”173.  
 
Southern peace NGO staff members feel that both external and internal 
knowledge are needed for good practice, and that it is by combining 
these bodies of knowledge that true learning occurs. In response to 
questions about the context-specificness of knowledge, many peace 
practitioners interviewed made it clear that they do not view knowledge 
as produced in one place and transferred to another, but as produced 
through interaction between and among practitioners and researchers, 
who are at the same time sources and users of knowledge174. As written 
in 2.1.2, knowledge production can be conceived as being basically 
conducted in two processes: first by translating local problem definitions 
into the language of more generalised knowledge, and then by 
translating the results obtained from generalised knowledge back to the 
local context (Rip 2001, 14). What is perhaps most important in this 
conception is that although knowledge is not universally generalisable 
and applicable in every context, it (or parts of it) can often be translated 
to another context. This translation process requires an open mind: 
making explicit and calling into question one’s assumptions and 
perspectives175 may open a person up to other ‘mind frames’ and ‘world 
views’, making translation possible.   
                                                 
172 Interview with staff member of a Sierra Leonean youth organisation. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 
February 2006. 
173 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 10 February 2006. 
174 See also Baud 2002: 54. 
175 As in third-order learning: see 3.1.3. 
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5.3 Organisational learning activities 
 
In this section the knowledge-related activities in which local peace 
NGOs engage are discussed in some more detail. First, I will look at the 
ways in which they acquire new knowledge. Secondly, I will examine 
strategies to share and retain such knowledge inside the organisation – in 
other words to prevent it from getting lost when knowledgeable staff 
members leave the organisation. Thirdly, the processes in which 
organisations translate, apply and pass on such new knowledge are 
analysed. Finally, I will look somewhat more specifically at research 
and dissemination as a knowledge strategy.  
 
 
5.3.1 Acquiring knowledge 
 
As Table 5.3176, shows, SNGO staff in the various countries visited find 
interaction with other organisations working in the field (elaborated in 
5.5) and ‘learning by doing’ the two most important ways of acquiring 
knowledge. In West Africa, both strategies were equally important, 
whereas in the Philippines the first was more important and in Cambodia 
the second. It was often said in the interviews that practical experiences 
yield knowledge than can never be obtained from other sources. The 
knowledge of beneficiaries is considered another source important of 
knowledge. Their experience with peaceful coexistence or living with 
conflict are seen as untapped sources of peace and conflict knowledge. 
In addition, knowing about their needs and specific circumstances helps 
make programmes more relevant and effective. Spending considerable 
time in the communities of beneficiaries is therefore considered 
important, as is research into local needs. More attention is paid to the 
interactions between SNGOs and local communities in 5.5.3.  
                                                 
176 Like the tables that will follow in this chapter, this table is intended to give an impression of the 
types of issues mentioned by interviewees when discussing knowledge strategies. It should not be 
read as a representative sample of NGOs in these countries, because of the open and semi-
structured nature of the interviews done. If a particular item was not mentioned during an interview, 
it is possible that this was because the issue did not come up during the conversation. This table 
does not include Kenya and Central Asia at all since organisational learning strategies were not 
structurally discussed in the interviews in those countries. 
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Acquiring knowledge Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14)  
Total 
(64) 
Interacting with other organisations 5 8 9 2 25 
By doing 6 6 4 5 21 
Beneficiaries 5 5 6 1 17 
Training 3 5 2 5 15 
Internet   2 2 5 9 
Colleagues 3 1  3 7 
Books, manuals 2  2 2 6 
Conferences   1 2  3 
Project monitoring and evaluation 1 1 1  3 
Following procedures    2 2 
Formal education    2 2 
Table 5.3: Organisational learning activities of Southern peace NGOs: 
acquiring knowledge 
 
The mentioning of the knowledge of communities (and colleagues) 
shows the importance accorded to local expertise. Most Southern 
peacebuilders agree that the knowledge of local people is invaluable. 
After all, they have used it to sustain themselves throughout the years. 
No one can better judge the best ways to deal with local circumstances 
and traditions than the people living in the locality itself. Local 
knowledge may take the form of traditional peacebuilding 
methodologies, such as singing and storytelling as ways to educate 
people about conflict resolution, rights, and peaceful ways of living 
together.177 In Mindanao people mentioned the Djandi system, a 
mediation process between tribes led by a chief or spiritual leader178. 
Other traditional peacebuilding methods include traditional rituals that 
can contribute to peacebuilding. In Cambodia, mediums and healers 
played a role in the reintegration of displaced people and refugees.179 In 
Liberia, land purification rituals took place involving the whole 
community, mediums and healers.180  
 
Workshops and training courses are also considered to be important 
ways of gaining new knowledge. Such courses tend to be relatively short 
(from several days to a few months) and may take place in the home 
country of participants or abroad. Courses abroad that have been 
attended by interviewees are offered by institutions like Johan Galtung’s 
Transcend (in various locations); Eastern Mennonite University (EMU) 
in Virginia in the United States; Responding to Conflict, a British NGO 
                                                 
177 Interview with staff member of a Sierra Leonean youth organisation. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 
February 2006. 
178 Interview with director of a Mindanawan NGO. Amsterdam, Netherlands, 9 April 2006. 
179 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
180 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
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based in Birmingham, United Kingdom; and Bradford University’s 
School of Peace Studies in Bradford, the United Kingdom. Only a small 
percentage of interviewees have attended such courses, but those who 
have seem to occupy rather central positions in the NGO community in 
their countries. The director of the West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP), an EMU graduate, is a notable example. 
Interactions with colleagues from different countries during these 
programmes are deemed very useful in order to gain new perspectives 
and compare approaches.  
 
Other NNGOs, international organisations, and larger SNGOs offer 
training courses in the areas in which the local NGO staff work. About 
two-thirds of interviewees in each country has attended such training 
sessions. Most of the courses mentioned focus on various types of 
peacebuilding methodologies, such as analysing and conceptualising 
conflict and peace, early warning, mediation and conflict resolution, 
peace education, and reintegration and reconciliation. In addition, people 
attend courses on practical subjects like fundraising, management, 
proposal writing, and training and facilitation methods. Often the 
concepts and methodologies introduced there are considered quite 
useful, although the SNGO staff members emphasise that the concepts 
gained during training workshops usually need to be adapted to local 
circumstances. Once trained, some local NGOs attempt to further 
disseminate the knowledge gained by organising their own training 
courses and training of trainer programmes181 (see section 5.5).  
 
SNGO staff also noted interactions with colleagues as a source of 
learning. Accompanying and observing experienced colleagues and 
simply following the rules and instructions of their organisation are 
related activities that people mentioned. This is how people learn to 
write reports and proposals, for example. Mentoring by experienced 
colleagues, peer-to-peer exchanges and networking were found to be 
important ways of learning. Formal education is hardly seen as useful 
for peacebuilding practice. In West Africa, most interviewees have not 
had access to university education. In Cambodia the quality of university 
education is considered low and little attention is paid to crucial skills 
like critical thinking and social awareness182. However, NGO personnel 
in all countries do deem formal education to be important, mainly 
because of the status and opportunities a university degree brings. 
 
                                                 
181 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
182 In response a new private university, Pannasastra University of Cambodia, has been founded 
explicitly to focus on these issues.  
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In line with the lack of importance attached to formal education as a 
source of knowledge, academic knowledge does not figure in the list of 
sources mentioned. This has to do with the fact that little academic 
knowledge is available locally when it comes to peacebuilding. The vast 
majority of academic institutions doing peace and conflict research are 
based in the North. Some universities in (post)conflict countries have 
recently begun to develop programmes in this field, but as yet they 
remain exceptions to the rule. Still, academic knowledge finds its way to 
local practitioners in other ways. The manuals and training courses 
provided by NNGOs as part of capacity building often use concepts 
developed by academics like Johan Galtung, Hitzkias Assefa, and John 
Paul Lederach. Via the manuals and workshops these concepts find their 
way to local practitioners. As we saw above, training courses abroad are 
often (though certainly not always) organised by academic institutions. 
Finally, internet resources and books, though not frequently mentioned 
as sources, often originate from a scientific source.  
 
West African and Southeast Asian NGO staff often refer to the oral 
tradition of their societies as a reason why reading and, particularly, 
documenting experiences are not widespread practices. They emphasise 
that most learning takes place through face-to-face interaction. Another 
reason for this may be that tacit knowledge gained through direct 
interaction is especially valuable in faster moving contexts – in which 
explicit knowledge is always running behind reality (ALNAP 2003: 58). 
Still, many interviewees see a need for more documentation of 
experiences and work. This is necessary for advocacy purposes, for 
interaction with donors (“those who know how to make proposals get 
the funding”), and in order to disseminate and exchange knowledge 
beyond the immediate locality in which they work. Despite their shared 
emphasis on oral interaction, Liberian, Cambodian and Philippine 
peacebuilders sometimes read books and manuals. Particularly in 
Cambodia, they also look up information online. Staff members look up 
information on issues like decision making and leadership, or search for 
the details and activities of other organisations working in 
peacebuilding183. However, peace practitioners tend to have difficulty 
finding their way through the myriads of information available and in 
finding the time to read these sources. One interviewee mentioned that 
the archive of his organisation was an important source of information 
for him – he could look things up if needed. However he also noted that 
a basic level of education is needed to be able to do this. Less educated 
people can less easily search and find information.  
                                                 
183 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 
2006. 
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Western literature on peacebuilding concepts and methods is mentioned 
only by Philippine NGO workers as a source of knowledge. Some read 
books by authors like John Paul Lederach and try to adapt relevant 
concepts to the local situation, creating new theories and frameworks. 
These are then disseminated further to other SNGOs, grassroots groups 
and village leaders. In one case, village leaders trained by an NGO are 
now being invited by other organisations to introduce these concepts and 
discuss the way they are applied in their village.184 A few organisations 
mention having obtained training manuals from large SNGOs or partner 
NNGOs, and trying to adapt these manuals based on their own 
experience. One staff member noted that the manuals are based mainly 
on Western concepts and that information on traditional ways of conflict 
management has not really been documented.185  
 
A Cambodian youth organisation uses interns from abroad as a way to 
acquire new knowledge. These interns participate in the development of 
new training curricula, supplying concepts they have learned in their 
education. These are then adapted by local staff and developed for use in 
the local context. Interns have also been useful to this organisation in the 
areas of technology and fundraising. When it comes to the latter, the 
interns’ mastery of the English language is an asset. The NGO’s own 
staff have difficulty in communicating in English, and interns help by 
reviewing funding proposals. 186  
 
No matter what the source of knowledge, nearly all interviewees 
emphasised that newly acquired ideas, concepts, theories, methods and 
skills must be compared with the situation at hand and adapted to the 
context before they can be used. This point was already made in 
previous section when the importance SNGO peacebuilders attach to 
interaction for learning was discussed. As a result of the interaction 
between knowledge from external sources, knowledge from experience 
and colleagues and the NGO’s analysis of the context, new 
methodologies are created.187 In the necessary interaction around the 
application and translation of external and local concepts, the role of 
local staff is of vital importance because of their familiarity with the 
context. Someone who is thoroughly familiar with a situation may feel it 
when change begins to occur. This may not always be tangible and will 
go unnoticed by external observers, and the reporting formats of 
                                                 
184 Interview with chairman of a Mindanawan NGO network. Marbel, Philippines, 16 May 2006. 
185 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth organisation. Monrovia, Liberia, 10 February 
2006. 
186 Interview with director of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 2006. 
187 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan youth NGO. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
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NNGOs and back donors usually do not capture it. Local NGO staff 
members nonetheless try to translate these kinds of changes into the 
necessary format, but part of the knowledge gets lost in the translation 
process.  
 
In my interviews, project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were 
mentioned only three times as sources of learning – even though all 
SNGOs engage in these activities. A study by the Active Learning 
Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action 
(ALNAP) confirms the lack of learning taking place as a result of M&E: 
“[n]one of the respondents mentioned […] agency monitoring and 
reporting systems as sources of learning […] Lack of reference to these 
mechanisms may result from their not generally being set up in a fashion 
that promotes learning.” (ALNAP 2003: 48) We will return to this in 
section 5.4 below.  
 
 
5.3.2 Retaining knowledge within the organisation 
 
When asked, the staff members of local peace NGOs affirm the 
importance of sharing information internally. As Table 5.4188 shows, 
regular staff meetings are the most common way in which this is done. 
Other methods – from the organisational learning toolbox discussed in 
chapter three – are rarer. One Sierra Leonean organisation holds a three-
day reflection with all staff every three months, involving staff travelling 
in from different field offices. At these sessions, a staff member may be 
given a particular topic to prepare and this issue will be discussed. Also 
everyone reports on their work and is given feedback by the others.189 A 
Mindanawan organisation mentions that its activity plans are shared and 
discussed among staff, and their implementation is jointly monitored.190  
 
                                                 
188 See note 164. 
189 Interview with staff member of a regional NGO working in several West African countries. 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 February 2006. 
190 Interview with director of a Sierra Leonean church-based NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 
February 2006. 
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Retaining knowledge Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14)  
Total 
(76) 
Staff meetings 1 4 4 4 13 
Post-training seminars 2 3  1 6 
Discuss work plans 1 1 2  4 
Staff required to stay after training 2    2 
Share materials  2   2 
Writing reports  2   2 
Provide job security 1    1 
Table 5.4: Organisational learning activities of Southern peace NGOs: 
retaining knowledge 
 
A big problem for SNGOs is high staff turnover. Talented, 
knowledgeable staff members are often the first to leave as they are able 
to obtain better-paying positions, sometimes in government (as 
happened in large numbers in Liberia after the election of Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf as president) and more often in the local offices of international 
organisations, such as the UN, or NNGOs. This problem is salient in 
Sierra Leone and particularly in Liberia, where there are large UN and 
international organisation offices. Indeed, “all local Liberian 
organisations have lost knowledgeable staff to the government and 
international NGOs”191. It is not an exclusively West African issue, 
however. It is mentioned in every country visited.  
 
In Cambodia the staff of peacebuilding NGOs also frequently change 
jobs and organisations, but seem to move more between SNGOs rather 
than to NNGOs, international organisations or government. This staff 
mobility is related to the fact that local organisations regularly grow and 
shrink in size depending on whether they have funding for a particular 
project. Once project funding has been secured, they hire additional 
staff, but after the project has finished, they have to let these people go 
again. This is seen in the other countries as well – a consequence of 
funding being largely tied to projects. It makes it difficult for SNGOs to 
provide job security – another reason why staff leave for positions in 
international organisations or governments, which are often more 
secure. That is, until an international organisation leaves the country and 
leaves its local staff behind.  
 
High staff turnover presents local SNGOs with the following dilemma: 
they want to invest in the knowledge and training of their staff, but as 
soon as they do, this raises the value of their newly trained employees 
and thereby their job opportunities elsewhere. As one NGO director put 
                                                 
191 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
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it, “we invest in our staff and their knowledge. Unfortunately this means 
that they become quite sought after by other organisations and 
sometimes leave for better-paid positions”. 192 A Sierra Leonean 
organisation sent two staff to the Netherlands to attend several training 
courses. After they had attended the courses they disappeared and never 
came back to Sierra Leone.193 When such people leave their 
organisation, the danger is that they take the knowledge with them 
which they have acquired, leaving their employers and colleagues 
empty-handed.  
 
In order to deal with this dilemma, Southern peace NGOs have come up 
with a range of measures. In one Liberian NGO, when staff attend 
training they are required to do two things: first, they have to organise a 
training for all staff after the course in order to spread the knowledge 
inside the organisation, and secondly, as a prerequisite to attending the 
training they have to commit to continue working with the organisation 
for at least two more years.194 Similar measures are taken by other 
organisations. One NGO director mentioned having a regulation that all 
course materials received during trainings are the property of the 
organisation. In addition, staff are required to write reports on the 
training they have participated in.195  NGO directors also note that to 
retain staff it is important to pay well and provide job security. In order 
to achieve this, quality work needs to be delivered so that donors can be 
convinced of the need to give more funds for staff costs. Unfortunately 
most funding is tied and few donors are willing to fund this. 196 
 
An indication that knowledge acquisition and exchange actually lead to 
learning is when operational changes are made as a result. A few 
organisations revisit working plans every year to see whether they are 
still relevant. 197 Evaluating activities – and relating the outcomes to 
other experiences and ideas - can play an important role in this. The 
problem here is that evaluations are usually carried out primarily at the 
request, and according to the methods, of donors, and that this external 
accountability function of evaluation often tends to get more emphasis 
than its internal learning function. Section 5.4 elaborates on this issue. 
 
                                                 
192 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
193 Interview with staff member of a regional NGO working in several West African countries. 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 February 2006. 
194 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
195 Interview with staff member of a regional NGO working in several West African countries. 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 February 2006. 
196 Interview with director of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
197 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
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One interviewee mentioned that it is not always possible to change a 
programme directly as new knowledge comes in – because investments 
have already been made in a particular programme or because donor 
agencies do not allow changes to be made along the way. However, it is 
always possible to make small changes at the tactical level – and this is 
something NGO workers do on a daily basis, often without even 
realising it. 
 
As discussed in section 3.2, staff working at different levels in an 
organisation may possess different types of knowledge. Genuine 
strategic learning primarily takes place when these different levels are 
connected – for example, when field-level experiences of implementing 
a given policy are connected to management-level discussions on 
strategy. Davies (1998: 209) suggests that indeed, in SNGOs, different 
types of knowledge and learning are required of different categories of 
staff: “[t]he short memory of the office staff is not problematic, because 
their work is highly routinised whereas the work of field staff involves 
more discretion and this requires more contextual knowledge.” 
However, in most NGOs I visited there is no clear distinction between 
office staff and field staff. As nearly all staff are engaged in operational 
activities in the field, they have to perform different learning functions 
instantaneously – from a more tactical to a more strategic level. At the 
same time, as we have seen, to a large extent policy is made outside 
these organisations and it is with donor agencies that strategic policy 
discussions should, and sometimes do, take place.  
 
 
5.3.3 Adapting, passing on, and applying knowledge  
 
Table 5.5198 portrays the strategies Southern peace NGOs employ to 
process, pass on, and use the knowledge they gain. It shows that in all 
countries visited, networks are very prominent forums for sharing and 
refining knowledge. The next chapter will elaborate this strategy. 
Particularly in West Africa and the Philippines, interviewees mentioned 
organising community workshops at which they pass on their knowledge 
while at the same time learning new things from the interaction with 
local people. Capacity building of grassroots groups and weaker NGOs 
and peace education are related activities and the use of all these terms 
overlaps. Again, these ways of applying and adapting knowledge are 
mentioned particularly in West Africa and the Philippines. Cambodian 
and Central Asian NGOs do not mention this strategy. This may be 
because they are generally weaker and are not able to provide capacity 
                                                 
198 See note 164. 
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building. Advocacy towards policymakers is seen as another avenue for 
passing knowledge onto others. Southeast Asian NGOs also employ 
staff exchanges and internships as ways to pass on and adapt knowledge. 
 
Adapting, 
passing on, 
applying 
knowledge 
Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Kenya 
(11199)  
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14)  
Centra
l Asia 
(15) 
To-tal 
(76) 
Networks 6 9 3 7 7 5 37 
Community 
workshops 
6 6  5 1  18 
Capacity building 5 8 2 3   18 
 
Advocacy 1 4 1 6 1 2 15 
Peace education 4 4  2 1  11 
Create new 
manuals, modules 
2 1  2  1 6 
Newsletters  1  2 3   6 
Internships, staff 
exchanges 
   3 3  6 
Booklets, comics 2   2   4 
Conferences  1  1   2 4 
Resource centre 1 1    1 3 
Storytelling  1 1 1    3 
E-groups, 
listserves 
   1 1  2 
Website 1      1 
E-mail  1     1 
Press conferences, 
policy briefings 
 1     1 
 
 
Table 5.5: Organisational learning activities of Southern peace NGOs: 
adapting, passing on, and applying knowledge 
 
As discussed earlier, all SNGO staff interviewed are open to new 
knowledge, but some are wary of culturally inappropriate, Western 
concepts being imposed. In some areas people see a tension between 
Western concepts and local culture, for example with regard to the 
concept of gender and the role of women. The challenge is to look for a 
convergence of different concepts rather than emphasising the divide. 
Indeed, Southern peacebuilders generally agree that they can learn from 
available theories but they have to put them into the local context; to 
translate them. Each conflict is different. It is one thing to receive 
knowledge through training and quite another to implement it in one’s 
work. Theories have to be compared with the situation at hand and 
adapted to it. As a result new methodologies are created. All 
                                                 
199 This includes two Sudanese and one Rwandese organisation; all based in Nairobi, Kenya. 
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organisations do this in one way or another – some more explicitly than 
others. Usually the translation process is informal, but sometimes more 
formalised, written tools are developed as a result of adapting external 
knowledge to local ideas and circumstances. The resulting knowledge 
finds its way into community workshops and capacity building 
activities. 
 
Particularly in the Philippines, NGOs have been active in using relevant 
concepts from books and training and adapting them to the local 
situation, creating new theories and frameworks. Examples include the 
training and documentation activities of Catholic Relief Service (CRS) 
Mindanao. Its Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute200 aims to help 
grassroots organisations to learn about peacebuilding concepts and 
frameworks, and how to apply these on the ground. The application, 
adaptation, contextualising of concepts is already assisted during the 
course when cases from the practice of participants are used to illustrate 
the concepts that are introduced. These concepts come from books by 
renowned peace researchers and from conflict resolution manuals from 
NNGOs.  
 
CRS emphasises that local organisations can offer insights derived from 
their experience with grassroots peacebuilding experiences and 
knowledge about initiatives that are working. For this reason the third 
week of the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute is an exposure 
programme in the field where the participants can see how the 
communities are doing things. This also reinforces the effort of the local 
community.201 Another example of initiatives to translate external 
knowledge into new concepts is the development of modules and 
frameworks for grassroots actors and village leaders by the Mindanao 
People’s Caucus (MPC): see Box 5.1 below.  
 
Box 5.1: Module developed by Mindanao People’s Caucus (MPC)202 
 
The Mindanao People’s Caucus (MPC) has developed a module on the ‘culture of 
peace’. The module includes the history of the Mindanao conflict, conflict resolution 
skills, cultural sensitivity, and inter-religious dialogue. The module is taught to people 
at the grassroots and paramilitary groups. Storytelling is an important tool used in the 
programme – one that fits Mindanawan traditions of knowledge transfer.  The approach 
emphasises that no one should be treated as enemies; instead, all are victims. Via the 
participants in the course the organisation hopes this view will slowly spread to their 
colleagues in NGOs and paramilitary units, who often have a more adversarial 
approach. The staff of the MPC are often invited by NGOs and others to speak. 
                                                 
200 See Box 4.3 in section 4.7. 
201 Interview with staff member of Mindanawan NGO. Davao, Philippines, 15 May 2006. 
202 Interview with MPC chairman. Marbel, Philippines, 16 May 2006. 
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These Mindanawan organisations are not the only SNGOs that engage in 
the provision of training courses. As we will see in section 5.5.4, which 
deals with capacity building by SNGOs, many organisations visited do. 
Their courses are offered to other NGOs, grassroots organisations and 
communities. They tend to focus on peace education and peacebuilding 
methodologies. Some training programmes offered also include more 
practical issues like organisational management, financial 
administration, ICT, fundraising, and impact assessment. One NGO has 
made it a focus activity to link up organisations that provide training 
with people who can benefit from it.203  
 
In addition to training courses, there are various other ways in which 
Southern peace NGOs pass knowledge on to others. Some SNGOs 
regularly publish newsletters which are handed out to beneficiaries 
during field visits or e-mailed around to organisations that might be 
interested. Some organisations let members of the target group of their 
newsletter – other NGOs, grassroots partners - contribute to it 
themselves so that they can share their stories and feel ownership of the 
knowledge sharing process. Other SNGOs publish booklets 
documenting information about grassroots peace initiatives – such as the 
Mindanawan zones of peace - and translate them into local languages to 
that they may inspire people. Some larger peace NGOs also publish 
peacebuilding manuals. Others produce comic books which provide 
information to communities in a more easily digestible form. (One 
organisation mentioned that drawing the pictures for its comic book was 
a long process because it had to make sure the drawings were culturally 
sensitive. 204)  
 
 
5.3.4 Research and dissemination 
 
As Table 5.6205 shows, nine of the 76 NGOs visited mentioned research 
as an explicit focus area. Of these, three are based in Sierra Leone, three 
in Kenya, two in the Philippines and one in Tajikistan. In Liberia and 
Cambodia research was not mentioned as a prominent activity. This is 
not to say that peace NGOs in these countries do not carry out research. 
Most organisations try at least informally to gather information about 
the circumstances and needs of beneficiaries, while some also study 
local peacebuilding practices.  
 
                                                 
203 Interview with director of a Mindanawan NGO. Amsterdam, Netherlands, 9 April 2006.  
204 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Davao, Philippines, 15 May 2006. 
205 See note 164. 
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Research and 
dissemination 
Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Kenya 
(11206)  
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14)  
Central 
Asia 
(15) 
Total 
(76) 
Research and 
dissemination 
 2 3 2  1 9 
Table 5.6: Organisational learning activities of Southern peace NGOs: 
research and dissemination 
 
A lot of interviewees said that they would like to do more research than 
they are doing at present207. They would like to study local needs, the 
experiences and methods of others, and their own work, taking more 
time to reflect on experiences and ways forward. For example, a 
Mindanawan NGO staff member mentioned she is considering writing a 
proposal to do a participatory research project on how to reconcile 
concepts and methods of peacebuilding with traditional ways of living 
and doing things, particularly from Islamic culture, which could result in 
a training module.208 Some of the issues that kept people from doing so 
were a lack of time and a lack of willingness on the part of donors to 
fund such activities.  
 
Research is more likely to get funded when it is for the purpose of early 
warning for conflict prevention. As recognition grows that preventing 
conflict is more desirable and cost-effective than curing it, local research 
leading to risk assessments and information on possibly mounting 
tensions in a given area gets some donor support. However, gathering 
information for early warning purposes represents only one area of study 
in the range of things that NGO staff members want to research. As 
mentioned, many NGOs would like to study their own work. Many 
interviewees desire more opportunity to reflect, draw lessons and 
document experiences. Such documentation would help Southern peace 
organisations to better contribute to global knowledge exchanges, 
discussions, and concept development in the field. A Mindanawan 
peacebuilder said that although he is used to oral exchange, he is now 
realising more and more the importance of writing, particularly for 
advocacy purposes. Written information can reach many more people 
than oral information. So, this peacebuilder has begun to write down 
experiences, and they have been published in magazines and books.209  
 
Similarly, a West African NGO network has recently begun to retain 
and write down the stories from its practice. It is also starting up a 
                                                 
206 This includes two Sudanese and one Rwandese organisation; all based in Nairobi, Kenya. 
207 See table 5.1. 
208 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan youth NGO. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
209 Interview with chairman of a Mindanawan NGO network. Marbel, Philippines, 16 May 2006. 
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research effort to document conflicts and create a database of narratives 
on conflict and peacebuilding in the region. This also provides baseline 
information for interventions.210 In another illustration of what may be a 
beginning trend, the action research Master programme that is analysed 
in chapter eight represents an effort to support local peacebuilders in 
Cambodia and elsewhere in their desire to reflect, learn, document, and 
contribute to theory development based on their practice. 
 
The nine NGOs that already focus explicitly on research as a core 
activity do so in the following ways.  
• In Kenya, SNGO research focuses on various issues. For one 
Kenyan NGO research is connected to awareness raising and 
capacity building work. This takes place around security issues, 
particularly the control of small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) in Kenya and beyond. The organisation has been 
actively involved in the process leading up to the Nairobi 
Protocol on SALW, and now helps provide the technical 
capacity towards its implementation.211 Another Kenya-based 
organisation considers itself a resource institution on 
peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, 
providing knowledge based on research and interaction with 
people who intervene in conflicts. It also engages with 
governments to try and shape policy. It has formed various 
partnerships and platforms to deal with issues in the region, 
including a group working on early warning with governments 
and NGOs.212 The third Kenyan NGO is a network which does 
research mainly into existing activities and methodologies for 
peacebuilding and focuses on sharing best practices among its 
members.213 
• In the Philippines, a Mindanawan youth organisation carries out 
research into the traditional Rido system of feuding families and 
revenge, and ways of dealing with it. This includes a study of 
the ways the ancestors resolved Rido issues and what we today 
can learn from that.214 The second Philippine NGO for which 
research is an important activity is an organisation tied to a 
university that focuses on peace education.215  
                                                 
210 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
211 Telephone interview with director of a Kenyan NGO. Nairobi, Kenya, 29 November 2005.  
212 Interview with staff member of a Kenyan NGO. Nairobi, Kenya, 29 November 2005. 
213 Interview with director of a regional NGO working in East Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 28 November 
2005. 
214 Interview with staff members of a Mindanawan NGO. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 May 2006. 
215 Interview with director of a Philippine NGO. Quezon City, Philippines, 19 May 2006. 
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• In Sierra Leone, an NGO peacebuilding network listed research 
as one of its activities. Its coordinator mentioned he was 
working on a research proposal together with a member 
organisation on the issue of chieftaincies that have been 
amalgamated into larger entities216, causing disgruntlement 
among some chiefs and providing a possible potential for 
renewed conflict217. Another organisation did research during 
the war into the extent of destruction in order to establish a 
baseline for post-war interventions.218  
• A Tajik organisation carries out scientific research and surveys 
on a variety of subjects, including elections, ethnic relations, 
trafficking, child labour, migration, drugs, political Islam, 
security and conflict. It wrote the study on Tajikistan for 
UNDP’s Human Development Report for Central Asia.  
 
 
5.3.5 Concluding 5.3 
 
Section 5.3 has shown that the learning processes of Southern peace 
NGOs are usually informal and action-based. Written information and – 
particularly – formal education play very limited roles in the learning of 
SNGO staff. However, training courses specifically oriented at 
improving the work of peacebuilding organisations are found useful, 
both for the new knowledge introduced in them – which is then adapted 
by participants before it is applied or passed on – and for the interactions 
with other participants. Knowledge retention within organisations is a 
challenge due to high staff mobility. This forces NGOs to think 
increasingly about internal knowledge sharing strategies, which may 
support organisational learning.  
 
When it comes to using new knowledge and passing it on, its adaptation 
to local knowledge and circumstances is once again emphasised. Most 
SNGOs do this in informal ways but some – particularly in the 
Philippines – increasingly document their own knowledge in the form of 
training modules, handbooks or articles. Still, many voice a desire to 
have more time, money and skills for such documentation. While only 
few Southern peace organisations in the countries visited explicitly 
focus on research and knowledge dissemination as an organisational 
strategy, many others do so informally. More significantly, nearly all 
                                                 
216 the number of chieftaincies in Sierra Leone went from 400 to 49. 
217 Interview with coordinator of a Sierra Leonean NGO network. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 
February 2006. 
218 Interview with staff member of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Bo, Sierra Leone, 21 February 2006. 
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local peacebuilders want to do more in this area in order to reflect on 
work, draw lessons, find out more about the needs and circumstances of 
local communities, and contribute to global discussions and theory 
development in the field of peacebuilding.   
 
 
5.4 Monitoring and evaluation as a tool for learning 
 
Although all SNGOs that work with donor funding (and the large 
majority of organisations visited does) are required to carry out 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in some form, only few interviewees 
mentioned M&E as a source of learning. This is surprising as on the face 
of it M&E seems like a useful tool for information gathering, reflection 
and adaptation. Through M&E mechanisms, NGOs relate the 
implementation of their activities back to their original plans and 
objectives. In doing so organisations try to assess the effectiveness of 
the inputs that they make and the processes they use.219 At a higher 
level, NGOs may try to assess how their efforts have, or have not, 
supported the ending of violence or the achievement of justice.  
 
As we will see in this section, these are difficult things to determine, 
particularly in the shorter term. Trying to do so, however, stimulates 
reflection and learning by stepping out of daily practice and relating 
work to the bigger picture of conflict and peace. Below, we will 
elaborate the link between M&E and learning, examine some of the 
difficulties that occur when M&E is done in the field of NGO 
peacebuilding, discuss possible ways to overcome these difficulties, and 
formulate some characteristics of M&E procedures that support 
learning. Even though the respondents of my study did not pay much 
attention to M&E, the fact that they all have to do M&E and combined 
with its potential use in learning processes makes it worthwhile to 
devote some space to the issue nonetheless. The section is based on 
NNGO publications, academic literature, and a few SNGO publications 
and interview results. 
 
 
5.4.1 M&E as a tool for learning and knowledge sharing 
 
At least in theory, mechanisms for the M&E of activities constitute an 
important tool for the learning of NGOs. Activities are monitored and 
                                                 
219 This usually includes the project design, the selection of participants, how well the methodology 
was implemented, how well problems and follow-up were managed, how participants responded, 
and what the immediate results were. 
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evaluated with the aim to find out which parts of them have been more 
and which less successful. This is done for several purposes: 
accountability towards donors and project users; communication 
between stakeholders; improving the performance of the organisation by 
learning from experience; and helping others improve their performance 
by sharing lessons. (Britton 2005: 12) The last two aims show the 
contribution that M&E can make to learning processes in and around 
organisations. In this context, M&E can be a tool that facilitates the 
learning cycle by keeping track of developments, creating space for 
reflection on them, generating new knowledge as a result of this process, 
and feeding this back into practice. From this perspective, learning is a 
way to close the gap between M&E on the one hand, and project and 
programme planning on the other. This is important as “[t]here is an 
impressive body of policy recommendations and lessons learned [but] 
many practitioners […] are concerned that these cumulative insights 
have not led to a more informed and harmonised international response 
activity” (Salomons 2004: 24). 
 
In addition, M&E processes offer an opportunity for exchanges of views 
between researchers, policy makers, and practitioners about the 
usefulness of activities and the future course of action. According to 
Baud, “this applies more to programme level evaluations than project 
evaluations; the former are specifically designed to instigate changes for 
more overall effectiveness, whereas project evaluations often remain 
within the boundaries of their existing terms of reference.” (Baud 2002: 
60) In that sense, programme and project evaluations correspond to 
second and first order learning, respectively.  
 
Thinking about the depth of learning made possible by different types of 
evaluations, it is also important to recall the structural constraints 
described in chapter four. In many ways, the international aid system 
and the Northern partners of SNGOs set the margins of practice and 
limit the learning of Southern partners to first order learning – making 
tactical adjustments within given terms. For more in-depth reflection 
and learning about the terms themselves an interaction with NNGOs and 
possibly back-donors is needed. Such deeper learning also requires 
introspection and learning on both sides – not only on the part of 
SNGOs. 
 
Within the structural constraints of the aid regime, the specific approach 
organisations take in their M&E processes determines what 
opportunities for learning and exchange are created. The process 
adopted also helps shape the important next step: the incorporation of 
the results into policy and practice. In how far the results from 
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monitoring and evaluation, often formulated as ‘lessons learned’, are 
used depends on other factors as well - most notably the organisation’s 
capacity for organisational learning.  
 
Unfortunately, the reality of M&E practice contrasts with the ideal 
picture in which M&E and learning mutually reinforce one another. 
After all, we saw in section 5.3 that when peace SNGO staff were asked 
about their sources of learning, project and programme evaluations and 
monitoring activities were hardly mentioned at all. Indeed, it is an often-
heard complaint that in most cases the learning aims of M&E are not 
served. Lessons learned reports are written on the basis of evaluations, 
but they are not sufficiently used in future planning and execution. One 
reason for this is that M&E is often seen as a policing instrument, 
imposed by donors to keep an eye on the way their money is spent, 
rather than a system for learning and reflection for the organisation 
itself. Another reason for the lack of learning on the basis of M&E is 
said to be that evaluation procedures are inadequate, particularly in the 
field of peacebuilding. We will now turn to these issues in some more 
detail.  
 
 
5.4.2 Difficulties: funding regimes and the special nature of 
peacebuilding work 
 
Before elaborating on the issue of the adequacy of existing methods for 
peacebuilding work, we first look at the first issue mentioned at the end 
of the previous section: the role of funding regimes in constraining 
learning from M&E. When it comes to monitoring and evaluating their 
work, SNGOs experience a tension between learning on the one hand 
and accountability on the other. The NNGO donors determine not only 
the policies of their SNGO partners but also their procedures for M&E 
and reporting on results. A lot of emphasis is placed on these results, as 
NNGOs themselves face discussions at home about the effectiveness of 
development aid and in turn have to report to their back-donors. This 
increasing pressure for results-based reporting heightens the climate of 
competition among NGOs in the field (ALNAP 2003: 55).  
 
SNGOs on their side are highly dependent on the funds of their Northern 
partners – funds which are often tied to specific projects rather than 
being part of a long-term, trust-based partnership. At the end of each 
project they have to write new project proposals to solicit new funds. 
Success in previous projects increases the likelihood of obtaining 
renewed or continued funding commitments. As a result, SNGOs have 
an incentive to obscure failure or partial success and emphasise results – 
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whether real or not. This clashes with the requirements of learning, 
which include self-reflection, a willingness to admit mistakes, and an 
open policy dialogues with donors and other stakeholders about what 
works and what does not.  
 
Because of the strong emphasis of donors on M&E as a requirement for 
funding, M&E is primarily seen by SNGOs as a tool for accountability. 
There is little space to use it also for learning, particularly given the 
tension between showing results and learning from mistakes. In 
addition, SNGOs often have little space to develop their own M&E 
procedures in a way appropriate to their practice and circumstances. 
This is because donor organisations tend to have their own M&E and 
reporting formats, which they require their Southern partners to use. To 
make matters worse, different donors require different reporting formats. 
This results in a lot of work for SNGOs. Fortunately, the willingness of 
donor organisations to try different tools and methods, and to the 
learning needs of their partners more generally, varies. Some are much 
more open to suggestions for alternative ways of reporting than others. 
But the many complaints of Southern interviewees show that the 
constraints described are structurally present in all countries visited.  
 
The funding regime and its consequences for the M&E practices of 
SNGOs also bears on the second issue introduced at the start of this 
section – the suggested mismatch between dominant procedures and 
peacebuilding practice. The logical framework or logframe model 
mostly used by donors comes in different forms, but generally resembles 
the following table: 
 
Goal Objectives Indicators Activities 
/ inputs 
Outputs Outcomes Impact 
      
     
     
 
 
     
Table 5.7: Example of a logical framework 
 
The goal is the overall purpose of a project – what it wants to achieve. It 
is split up into more specific objectives. For each of these objectives, 
indicators of success are then specified – observable changes that tell us 
whether an objective has been achieved. Traditionally, such indicators 
are largely quantitative. In the next column, the activities or inputs that 
the project plans to carry out in order to achieve the objectives are 
quantified. There are different understandings of the terms output, 
outcome and impact, and they are sometimes used interchangeably. 
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Most people seem, however, to make the following distinction. Outputs 
are readily observable, measurable results – for example, the number of 
meetings organised or the number of people attending those meetings. 
Outcomes are any follow-up developments that resulted from these 
outputs (the meetings may for example lead to increased interaction or 
even joint activities by the participants). Impact, finally, is the actual 
change the project has made in the conditions of the beneficiaries – in 
other words, the progress towards reaching the overall goal.  
 
This framework is widely used in development and peacebuilding for 
the planning and monitoring of programmes and projects. Many find it a 
useful way to help structure their interventions. However, as we have 
seen, there is also criticism, particularly in the field of peacebuilding. 
This criticism takes several forms, each having generated new 
responses. First, the model is criticised for being grounded in a Western, 
overly structured way of thinking. It is rigid and inflexible and does not 
capture the complexity and fluidity of conflict situations and peace 
processes. The Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) 
methodology described below is one initiative that tries to relate project 
monitoring explicitly to the conflict context. PCIA is still mostly 
developed in the West and is rather elaborate and structured, and for that 
reason might still be subject to some of the above criticism. Other ways 
of taking this critique into account include participatory evaluation and a 
more general openness to other, locally or jointly developed methods.  
 
A second, related but more specific point made is that in the practice of 
implementing logframes, indicators and outputs tend to be defined in 
measurable and quantitative terms. In Western knowledge systems 
statistics tend to be highly regarded as evidence, whereas doubts are 
raised regarding the wider applicability of qualitative information such 
as personal change stories. This contrasts somewhat with the practice of 
peacebuilding, which includes activities like organising dialogues, 
lobbying governments, and advocacy work to draw attention to 
problems and possible solutions. In response, many – particularly larger 
– Southern peace organisations work to develop alternative indicators by 
which to assess the outcomes of programmes. Below, one such initiative 
is elaborated upon.  
 
Thirdly, it is increasingly argued that interventions aiming to build peace 
and promote reconciliation cannot easily be assessed in terms of 
‘results’ or ‘impact’. Peacebuilding is a long-term change process. Its 
results often take the form of something not occurring (such as conflict 
escalation or outbreaks of violence). When such a (non-)outcome is 
observed, it is almost impossible to attribute it to one particular 
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intervention, given the many factors at play. This is often referred to as 
the ‘attribution problem’. In response to the attribution problem, new 
methods are developed to provide an alternative, such as the Outcome 
Mapping method of the Canada-based International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) elaborated in the next section. 
 
A fourth body of criticism relates to the way in which logframes are 
usually applied, namely at the short-term, project level. Contrasting with 
the long-term and often intangible nature of peace work, donor funding 
as we have seen is often tied to a particular project: a time-bound and 
tangible, result-oriented undertaking. (NPI-Africa and the NCCK-CPBD 
project 2001: preface) M&E is a requirement at this project level, even 
though longer-term, programme-level M&E activities may better serve 
the purpose of learning and knowledge exchange. The project-oriented 
nature of much funding, monitoring, evaluation and reporting is 
therefore another facet of dominant M&E procedures that does not 
match the field of peacebuilding well. After only a short amount of time 
has passed it is not yet possible to say anything meaningful about 
outcomes or impact at that point in time. Thus, evaluations should either 
take place over much longer terms or be less ambitious in what they 
claim to be able to find.  
 
These and a number of other, more specific characteristics of 
peacebuilding that present difficulties for evaluation are summarised in 
Box 5.2 below.  
 
Box 5.2: Difficulties for the evaluation of peacebuilding activities, 
compared to other development-oriented interventions220 
 
• Peacebuilding includes activities like organising dialogues, lobbying 
governments and advocacy work to draw attention to problems and possible 
solutions. The outcomes of this type of work are more difficult to measure 
than activities like the building of roads or vaccination campaigns. 
• Its results often take the form of something not occurring (such as conflict 
escalation or outbreaks of violence). The results of conflict prevention 
measures are therefore difficult to evaluate.  
• The attribution problem is particularly salient: there are so many factors and 
actors at play, at different levels, that it is almost impossible to attribute an 
outcome to one particular action or intervention. 
• It is especially difficult to link “project outputs and outcomes on the micro 
level to changes and thus impact on the macro level of politics and society (an 
often-cited influence gap as well as an attribution gap)”. (Schmelzle 2005: 5) 
• Peacebuilding is a long-term change process. It takes place in a highly 
volatile environment in which preliminary successes can be easily 
overshadowed by subsequent set-backs, - which does not imply that an 
                                                 
220 Barakat et al. 2006 
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intervention has not made a positive contribution to the development. 
• Peacebuilding is a highly dialectical process. The very success of a dialogue 
process, for example “might lead extremists to take violent action before their 
political standing is seriously eroded” (Smith 2004: 59).  
• Conflicts are over-determined, i.e. even if some of the root causes are taken 
away, others may still be at work and perpetuate a conflict. Interventions can 
have been successful in addressing some of the root causes. But their effect 
will only be visible once other causes are subsequently (or in parallel) 
addressed as well. 
• The causes of conflict can change. Some original causes may fade away, 
while new causes come up (new grievances, interests of refugees, interest of 
profiteers). In many cases, the violence itself takes the place of other ‘root 
causes’ as the main issue that needs to be addressed. 
• “[T]he field of peacebuilding is a relatively young one as many organisations 
only emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. It is therefore not surprising that many 
strategies, methods and instruments still remain in a test phase and therefore 
need further elaboration and investigation.” (Schmelzle 2005: 2) 
 
 
The issues introduced in this section have led to considerable debate in 
both the North and the South. As a result, thinking about M&E in the 
area of peacebuilding has developed in recent years. The next section 
looks at alternative M&E methods that are being proposed in order to 
deal with the issue of the appropriateness of existing procedures for 
peacebuilding.  
 
 
5.4.3 Developing methods and indicators for peacebuilding work 
 
Going back to the criticism about the limited usefulness of quantitative 
indicators, two African organisations, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa 
(NPI-Africa) and the National Council of Churches of Kenya 
Community Peace Building and Development Project (NCCK-CPBD 
project), developed a Community-based Monitoring and Evaluation 
System (CMES) in 2001. The system gives examples of suitable 
quantitative ‘output’ indicators and qualitative ‘impact’ indicators that 
require a longer narrative. To measure “increased interaction among 
differing ethnic groups”, for example, a quantitative indicator could be 
the number of “good neighbourliness workshops” held in the 
community.  
Qualitative indicators could be  
• new community peace initiatives established; 
• confessions by community members; 
• sharing of resources like water and pasture; 
• agreements reached. 
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(NPI-Africa and the NCCK-CPBD project 2001) Such indicators could 
help capture the changes taking place in reality. Indeed, more and more 
organisations try to include qualitative data in their M&E procedures 
and there also appears to be growing acceptance on the part of donors of 
the need to do so.  
 
In relation to the third criticism – about the usefulness of the concept 
‘impact’ – the IDRC argues that this concept is too elusive and that it is 
difficult to assess which factors have contributed to a change in 
situation, and in how far the intervention was what made the difference 
(the attribution problem described above). Therefore its Outcome 
Mapping method limits assessment of programme outcomes to the 
people the programme interacts with directly, and their direct ‘sphere of 
influence’. Instead of using concepts like ‘impact’ or ‘result’, the 
method uses ‘progress markers’ to assess developments. By 
concentrating on small but observable changes in behaviour, at least 
some progress towards a programme’s goal may be demonstrated and 
directions may be provided for continuation (learning from the 
evaluation) as well as accountability towards donors. (Earl et al. 2001)  
 
Outcome Mapping is valuable in cautioning about claiming credit for 
changes taking place, and its progress markers represent a useful 
alternative to ‘impact’ and ‘result’. At the same time it is somewhat 
limited in that it does not give any picture of the broader, structural 
situation and the longer-term changes taking place. This is difficult to do 
but many would at least desire some kind of tentative conclusion about 
broader impact as well. Indeed, there is some discussion about the level 
of measurement possible (Fischer and Wils 2005: 5-6). The indicators 
mentioned as examples by NPI-Africa and the NCCK above clearly 
focus on the project and community level. But how to establish what 
effects a project has had on a wider conflict? Some argue that impact at 
this higher level cannot be evaluated at all. Others look for ways to 
gather information about wider changes. Participatory methods could be 
of assistance: what are local opinions about whether the programme 
made a difference? We will return to this in the next section.  
 
Another initiative to link specific projects to the wider context of 
conflict and peace is a tool called Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
(PCIA), which has been developed over the last few years through 
contributions by various NNGOs221. PCIA is designed to better assess 
                                                 
221 According to Hoffman (2005: 3), these include the Active Learning Network for Accountability 
and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP); the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands; 
the UK-based organisation International Alert; the UK government’s Department for International 
Development (DfID); the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation; and the 
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“the ways in which the peace and conflict environment may affect an 
initiative or project” and “the ways in which an initiative or project may 
affect the peace and conflict environment”, as is depicted in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment222 
 
PCIA carries out these assessments at various stages of a project. Before 
a project starts, a risk and opportunity assessment (on the left side of 
Figure 5.1) is undertaken to assess the impact the conflict environment 
could have on a project. At this stage, risks and opportunities are listed 
with regard to  
• location (geographical extent of the project; status of territory; 
level of infrastructure)  
• timing (current stage of the conflict; current or future 
developments; increasing or decreasing opportunities to work in 
the area) 
• political context (relationship between communities and 
authorities; level of political support for the initiative; stability 
of the environment; presence or absence, and inclusiveness, of 
major peace initiatives; nature of the political system; external 
conditions) 
• military context (relationship between armed actors; intensity 
and patterns of violence) 
• socio-economic issues (legacies of conflict; relations between 
communities; cultural factors; economic relations) 
• partners/stakeholders (capacity of implementing organisation; 
position of organisation in conflict; choice of beneficiaries and 
its political implications; ability of stakeholders to make choices 
and willingness to make changes) 
• other factors (vary by location). 
In addition to listing risks and opportunities for each of these factors, the 
assessment also lists whether more information is needed and what 
                                                                                                            
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
222 Bush 2003: 4 
Risk and Opportunity Assessment Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment 
Initiative/ 
Project  
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Project  
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changes or clarifications are necessary before starting the project. (Bush 
2003: 11-17) 
 
When the risk and opportunity assessment is completed and it is decided 
to do the project, a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (right-hand 
side of Figure 5.1) is undertaken three times: during the design phase, 
during implementation, and during evaluation. This assessment lists the 
potential or actual impact a project has on peace and on conflict through 
the following factors: 
• conflict management capacities (of state or civil society) 
• militarised violence and human security (patterns and levels of 
violence; the sense of security or insecurity of individuals and 
communities) 
• political structures and processes (strengthening or weakening 
of governance capacities of different levels of government; 
ability or inability of civil society actors to actively and 
constructively participate in political processes) 
• economic structures and issues (strengthening or weakening 
equitable socio-economic structures, institutions and processes; 
distortion or conversion of war economies; availability of 
capital; distribution of resources; income generation; training) 
• social empowerment (creation of a culture of peace 
characterised by constructive social communication, tolerance, 
inclusiveness, justice, gender equity, and participation; 
confidence and capacity of all members of society to overcome 
obstacles to a satisfying life). As in the previous phase, the 
assessment lists not only impact but also looks at additional 
information needed and possible changes in the project. (Bush 
2003: 20-24) 
 
The proponents of PCIA have paid relatively little attention to the 
development of suitable indicators to measure the impact on the factors 
listed above, but they do state that both quantitative and qualitative 
indicators should be used. Initiatives such as those of NPI-Africa and the 
NCCK-CPBD project, as well as others working to develop relevant 
indicators, can be useful additions in this regard.  
 
The table below gives an overview of the methodologies discussed in 
this section and compares their characteristics. 
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Peace and Conflict 
Impact Assessment 
(PCIA) 
 
Community-based 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation System 
(CMES) 
 
Outcome Mapping 
(OM) 
Level of 
analysis, 
target groups 
 
 
 
The PCIA debate 
focuses on assessing 
impact on the macro 
peace process 
(Paffenholz  2005: 6) 
Community Peace 
Groups 
 
“Sphere of 
influence” which 
each project has: OM 
aims to asses the 
observable 
“behavioural 
changes” within the 
boundary partners’ 
sphere 
Kind of 
activities 
which are 
evaluated 
 
Conflict management 
capabilities, political 
structures and 
processes, economic 
structures and 
processes, social 
empowerment 
Improvement of 
interaction between 
ethnic groups, 
analysis of root 
causes; introduction 
of sustainable early 
warning system for 
early action 
Programmes identify 
partners with whom 
they work & then 
devise strategies to 
help equip these 
partners with the 
tools and resources 
to contribute to 
change. 
Methods, 
tools 
 
 
Participatory 
workshops with 
stakeholders, field 
research 
Log Frames 
Activity Interviews 
Case Monitors 
Participants’ Lists  
Shift away from 
assessing the 
products of a 
program (e.g. 
poverty alleviation, 
reduced conflict) to 
focus on concrete 
changes in 
behaviour, 
relationships, actions 
Concrete 
experience 
 
 
 
Field testing (of “Aid 
for peace)” in 
Rwanda (2001), 
Bosnia, Burundi, 
South Africa, 
Nigeria, Angola, and 
Nepal (2002) Angola, 
Sri Lanka, South 
Kivu, and Nepal 
(2003) 
The Community 
Peace Building and 
Development Project 
in Western Kenya 
has experimented 
with CMES since 
1999 
At a global civil 
society conference in 
New York organised 
by GPPAC in July 
2005, Outcome 
mapping was applied 
to the Belfast mobile 
phone project 
described in Van 
Tongeren et al. 
(2005: 435-440). 
Weaknesses 
 
 
 
(Too) much oriented 
towards a broad 
framework for a 
standardized 
approach to aid in 
conflict situations 
LogFrames may be 
too much based on a 
linear, development 
project model and do 
not easily 
accommodate the 
flexibility of a 
dynamic process 
Focus on observable 
behaviour may 
disregard structural 
changes (difficult to 
see); seems to be 
based on external 
perspective 
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Examples of 
indicators   
 
 
 
Proponents of PCIA 
have paid relatively 
little attention to the 
development of 
suitable indicators to 
measure the impact 
of interventions  
Ethnic diversity at 
meetings;                   
new community 
peace initiatives, 
confessions of 
community 
members; 
agreements over the 
use of resources 
Number of new ideas 
shared in the team, 
number of key 
informants from 
which programs 
seeks feedback, 
number of requests 
to share the 
program’s “wisdom” 
Table 5.8: Methodologies for the evaluation of peacebuilding activities 
 
Another ongoing discussion revolves around the way in which M&E is 
carried out. In particular, attention focuses on the limitations of 
evaluation by external people of interventions done by external people. 
Every programme is based on certain values, which may be culturally or 
ideologically determined. When an evaluation is done by people with 
the same cultural and ideological background, the programme outcomes 
are measured against these same values. After all, the word evaluation 
means that value is attributed to a certain set of data. However, the 
people for whom the programme is intended may cling to different 
values and from this perspective have a completely different opinion of 
the impact of the programme. (Barakat et al. 2005) The only solution to 
this problem would be to allow programmes to be evaluated by the 
people that they are intended for, using participatory evaluation 
methods.223 
 
Barakat et al. (2005: 8) write that participatory evaluation is 
underpinned by several core themes:  
“1) The importance of harnessing collective knowledge of many 
stakeholders, especially at the community level, to reflect on the 
development intervention; 2) the need to adapt the evaluation to the 
particular circumstance and contexts, thus requiring flexibility and 
reliance on qualitative rather than quantitative data; 3) the need for 
participation between evaluators and constituents; 4) the need to 
ensure that participants become beneficiaries, meaning that the 
evaluation becomes associated with joint benefits that evaluation 
participants obtain from taking part, particularly in terms of 
empowerment.”  
 
Most important in participatory evaluation is that the primary 
stakeholders or intended beneficiaries of the programme play a role in 
                                                 
223 Related to this is the question of what should be evaluated: the actual situation (in so far as this is 
possible) or local perceptions of the situation. When statistics show that per capita income has 
grown, but the popular perception is that people are worse off, then there is still a problem – social 
dissatisfaction - to be solved. By including as many sources as possible that relate local perceptions 
of reality, an evaluation can help uncover this kind of problem as well.   
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the planning and management of the process and define the indicators, 
often helped by a facilitator. Together they determine what for them 
would indicate success of the project. Thus, participatory evaluation 
starts at a much earlier phase than one would expect from an evaluation: 
it starts at the phase of planning a project and its M&E system. Such 
participatory indicator development could include not only the 
beneficiaries of a project and the staff of the SNGO carrying it out, but 
also in as far as possible staff of the financing NNGO and a 
representative of their back-donor (for example, someone working at the 
embassy of the back-donor government in the country in which the 
project takes place). In some cases organisations include colleagues 
from other organisations undertaking similar projects. In East Africa 
some SNGOs are experimenting with ‘peer reviews’ in which different 
organisations participate in the evaluation of each other’s activities. This 
can also have an important knowledge sharing function.224 
 
 
5.4.4 A learning approach to M&E 
 
In addition to the development of more suitable indicators and more 
participatory methods, there has been some discussion about arriving at 
a learning approach to M&E more generally. A study by the Dutch 
Inter-Church Development Organisation (ICCO) and the European 
Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has 
distinguished between traditional approaches to M&E on the one hand 
and a learning approach on the other. Where traditional approaches tend 
to look at specific project deliverables only, a learning approach 
contains the following elements: 
• the establishment of clear learning objectives 
• the inclusion of qualitative as well as quantitative indicators of 
success 
• participatory evaluation 
• evaluation components are embedded in the planning 
framework from the beginning. 
• regular monitoring takes place throughout the life of the project 
• a reassessment of the concepts of ‘output’ and ‘impact’ : the 
results of learning processes cannot be described in substantive 
terms yet can be framed in terms of capacities, process outputs 
and value added. (ICCO and ECDPM 2004: 14-17) 
 
                                                 
224 Interview with director of a regional NGO network working in East Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 28 
November 2005. 
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When we look at the results of evaluations, often formulated as lessons 
learned, we find that the way they are phrased also plays a role in 
determining whether they are applied. A lesson learned that takes into 
account the insights from organisational learning has the following 
characteristics:  
• It contains a generalised principle that can be applied in other 
situations. 
• It is related to the assumptions (hypotheses and existing 
knowledge) on which the programme or project has been based. 
• It does not contain untested or inadequately justified 
assumptions about what might happen if something is done 
differently. 
• It is neither too general nor too specific to be useful to others. 
• It is clear about the audience for whom it might have relevance 
and is thus articulated in appropriate terms and targeted at 
intended audiences. (Adapted from Guijt et al. 2002: 11)  
 
Taking such pointers into account could help make M&E not only a tool 
for reporting to donors, but also a method to facilitate organisational 
learning and knowledge exchange. It would then help to test 
assumptions, learn from activities, and feed these lessons back into 
activities in a cyclical learning process. This cyclical learning model for 
M&E is depicted in Figure 5.2 below.  
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Figure 5.2: A learning model for peace evaluation225 
 
There is, however, an important requirement for such a learning 
approach to M&E to take root. This is a “culture of transparency and a 
willingness to share results”. The funding regime can facilitate or 
obstruct this. “As long as projects are rewarded for good practices only, 
the willingness to discuss ‘failure’ or negative consequences is reduced 
– and a learning opportunity missed”. (Fischer and Wils 2005: 8) 
Willingness on the part of donors to tolerate failure and stimulate honest 
and critical reflection would help solve the tension between learning and 
accountability. This brings us back to the importance of longer-term 
donor-recipient partnerships that are based on trust.  
 
As we discussed in the previous section, another necessity for M&E to 
become a learning tool is that various stakeholders are involved in it, 
                                                 
225 NPI-Africa and the NCCK-CPBD project 2001: 23 
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including those a project is aimed at but also those who help set the 
structural framework in which action and learning take place – the 
donors. As became clear in chapter three, an important part of learning 
is interaction with others - in this case especially with those who help set 
the structural margins of action. This requires all involved in M&E to 
take a learning approach and to be willing to look critically at their own 
role and how it might be improved. Learning donors are just as 
important as learning SNGOs. Recall the statement by Dutch ministry 
staff quoted in section 4.3.1: “[w]e cannot be relevant or effective as a 
donor […] without a constant dialogue with policy makers, researchers 
and practitioners and without the capacity to learn from this. […] Did 
we not implicitly assume [in the past] that we, as donor, did not have 
anything to learn?” (Wiedenhof and Molenaar 2006: 10) 
 
Thus, a learning attitude by donors and reciprocal, trust-based 
partnerships help make space for learning and creativity on the part of 
Southern peace organisations. As a result, they may begin to adapt M&E 
procedures to their own circumstances and at the same time play a role 
in global discussions about how these procedures may be improved 
more generally. One organisation in Mindanao for example took the 
logframe and added a dimension to it based on theories of change. The 
new framework asks additional questions such as: how did change 
happen at the personal, relational and cultural levels? The NGO finds 
that this makes a deeper analysis possible.226 Another example, this one 
more specifically about donor-recipient interaction around M&E 
formats, comes from Cambodia. There, a local peace organisation 
organised a meeting with representatives from its various donor NNGOs 
to discuss the problem that different donors required different reporting 
formats, which meant an enormous workload for the SNGO. The donors 
understood, deliberated, and came up with a common framework. Some 
of them said they had themselves learned a lot from this experience.227 
 
 
5.4.5 Concluding 5.4 
 
In theory, the cycle of planning, monitoring, evaluation and renewed 
planning matches the learning cycle very well and thereby presents a 
good opportunity for supporting organisational learning processes in 
NGOs. However, for many Southern peace NGOs M&E procedures do 
not play a major learning role. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
                                                 
226 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Davao, Philippines, 15 May 2006. 
227 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 
2006. 
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the procedures have been created by donors for accountability purposes, 
rather than developed to fit the learning needs of SNGOs. There is some 
tension between learning and accountability. SNGOs hesitate to include 
weaknesses or changes made in programmes – highly relevant 
information from the perspective of learning - into their monitoring and 
reporting for fear of losing future funding as a result.  
 
A second reason why M&E does not work well for the learning of 
Southern peace NGOs is that standard procedures, elaborated for 
development projects, may not match the realities of peacebuilding 
practice. More specific tools may be needed for peacebuilding. These 
tools are indeed being developed, but a problem is that they tend to 
rather qualitative in nature, while many donors continue to call for 
numerical evidence of the outcomes of programmes. That said, 
understanding grows of the limits of quantitative information in 
reflecting peacebuilding practice – in the North as well as the South.  
 
In Table 5.8 an overview was given of alternative, more qualitative 
approaches that are being developed. Given the criticism that most 
existing M&E tools have been developed in the North, are based on 
Western knowledge systems, and are generally applied inflexibly 
without much regard for locally developed alternatives, what would 
seem to be the best way forward is for organisations to develop their 
own systems, using elements of these or other approaches, in close 
collaboration with both their beneficiaries and their donors. This would 
ensure that M&E tools are as relevant as possible to the context and 
nature of the work of an organisation. A major difficulty, however, lies 
in finding ways to fit such a flexible approach into the M&E and 
reporting procedures and formats that donor NNGOs themselves use. 
Those procedures are necessarily standardised in order to prevent 
complete work and information overload in the offices of NNGOs and 
also as a way to fit the reporting requirements of their back-donors. A 
joint discussion involving all stakeholders along the chain would be 
required in order to find creative solutions to deal with these constraints. 
 
More generally, the participatory elaboration of evaluation tools and 
criteria of success, involving all stakeholders in a programme – donor, 
SNGO, beneficiaries – would help making M&E more relevant to 
practice and more useful for learning. This requires similar relational 
characteristics between Northern and Southern actors as were described 
in section 4.7 on capacity building. Thus, we come back to the 
importance of a learning attitude by donors and reciprocal, trust-based 
partnerships between NNGOs and SNGOs as prerequisites for learning 
on the part of Southern peace organisations. 
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5.5 Canyons and bridges. Exchanging knowledge between 
 organisations 
 
We have seen in various places in this book that learning requires 
interaction with others. While in section 5.3 I discussed interactions 
within organisations, I now turn to interactions with people outside 
one’s organisation as activities contributing to learning, as knowledge 
exchange beyond the organisation is the main knowledge strategy used 
by many Southern peace NGOs.  
 
Local peace 
NGOs exchange 
knowledge 
with… 
 
Lib (10) SL 
(16) 
Keny
a (11) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam (14)  Central 
Asia 
(15) 
Total 
(76) 
Other local 
NGOs 
8 13 7 8 5 3 44 
International 
(non-
governmental) 
organisations 
7 5 2 2 5 1 22 
Local 
beneficiaries 
5 5 2 6 1  19 
Government 
agencies 
5 1 4 2  2 14 
Knowledge 
institutions 
 1  1   2 
Table 5.9: Partners in knowledge exchange of Southern peace NGOs 
 
Table 5.9228 shows the actors with which local peace NGO staff engage 
in knowledge exchange and joint learning outside their direct 
organisational environment. The most widespread are exchanges with 
other local NGOs. These occur twice as much as with any other actor. 
Second in importance are international organisations. Exchange also 
takes place with local beneficiaries and government institutions. 
Knowledge institutions were mentioned only twice. Below all these 
interactions are analysed in more detail.  
 
 
5.5.1 Exchange with other local NGOs 
 
Knowledge sharing with other local NGOs is an activity in which all 
organisations visited are very active. “[F]ield workers draw heavily on 
tacit knowledge assets through conversations with colleagues” (ALNAP 
2003: 56). Many networks have been set up for this explicit purpose, as 
                                                 
228 See note 164. 
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we will see in the next chapter. There also, the reasons why SNGO staff 
choose this strategy are explored. Prominently among them is the fact, 
already mentioned repeatedly in this chapter, that the staff of peace 
SNGOs see exchange and interactions as important ways of knowledge 
generation and learning. They feel they can learn from the experiences 
of others and that sharing tacit knowledge leads to new, joint insights 
and ideas.  
 
In addition to networks, there are also many more informal ways in 
which knowledge exchange among SNGOs takes place. These include: 
• processes in which smaller, lower-capacity organisations learn 
from larger, stronger ones. This impact of large SNGOs on other 
local SNGOs occurs through mechanisms such as imitation, the 
setting of standards, formal training provided by the strong 
SNGO to smaller organisations, and staff moving from one 
organisation to another.  
• partner meetings organised by NNGOs to coordinate the 
activities of their local partners in a specific region or country. 
In Liberia, a consortium of ICCO partners gets together 
regularly to coordinate ideas and share experiences. Several 
partner organisations mentioned finding this very useful. There 
is an open atmosphere and people are not afraid to talk about 
their strengths and weaknesses. Together a need was identified 
to organise training to fill specific knowledge gaps. The ICCO 
partner network in Liberia is considered a positive example of a 
donor-initiated (but not donor-driven) network.229 
• training courses, which can have an important exchange 
function. Some programmes explicitly aim at this. For example, 
the West Africa Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI) set up by the 
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) employs 
facilitators (coming from various different countries) who 
ensure that knowledge is exchanged in an interactive way and 
concepts are continuously related to their practical relevance in 
the different contexts represented.230 
• newsletters: in every country there are some organisations that 
produce newsletters that are handed out or e-mailed to other 
organisations. These newsletters give overviews of current 
events in a region in relation to peace and conflict, relate the 
activities of the organisation and others, give suggestions for 
                                                 
229 Interview with Liberia programme coordinator of a regional NGO working in several West 
African countries. Monrovia, Liberia, 10 February 2006. Interview with staff members of a Liberian 
NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 14 February 2006. 
230 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
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funding sources, announce upcoming events, and/or discuss 
global developments and what they mean for the region.  
• thematic meetings for organisations to share experiences around 
a specific issue. For example, an umbrella of church councils in 
the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region recently 
organised a cross-border dialogue event on small arms with 
Sudanese, Kenyan and Ugandan local church representatives, 
because these countries face similar issues in their pastoralist 
areas.231  
• follow-up workshops: a director of a youth organisation 
mentioned that after his staff members return from a conference, 
they are required to hold a workshop for other youth 
organisations so that they can benefit from the newly gained 
knowledge. 232 
• staff exchanges among organisations in different countries and 
international internship programmes. Such activities promote 
knowledge sharing. When taking place within a region, staff 
exchanges also build regional solidarity. People are 
strengthened when they discover that others face similar 
dilemmas and that they can do things together.233 Organisations 
also organise short exchange visits – for example, the above-
mentioned church umbrella organisation organised for Kenyan 
and Ugandan church council members go to Burundi during the 
election period to assist and share experiences with their 
Burundian counterparts 234 
• communication technology: much exchange takes place face-to-
face but internet is also used as well as, in a few cases, 
videoconferencing.235 
• informal conversations: last but not least, much interaction takes 
place in informal conversations – “at the margins of 
coordination meetings, in the car park afterwards, in coffee bars, 
and in restaurants and bars in the evenings” (ALNAP 2003: 56). 
 
                                                 
231 Interview with staff member of a regional NGO working in the Great Lakes region and the Horn 
of Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 30 November 2005. 
232 Interview with staff members of a Sierra Leonean NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 16 February 
2006. 
233 Interview with director of a Mindanawan NGO. Amsterdam, Netherlands, 9 April 2006. 
Interview with director of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 2005.  
234 Interview with staff member of a regional NGO working in the Great Lakes region and the Horn 
of Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 30 November 2005. 
235 In Phnom Penh, local NGOs are allowed to use the videoconferencing facilities of Cambodian 
World Bank office. Interview with director of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 
24 May 2006. 
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Knowledge shared among SNGOs in these ways tends to have the 
following content. 
• Often, staff members of different peace NGOs exchange tacit 
knowledge about their programmes and the experiences they 
have gathered in implementing them. What worked, what did 
not, and why? What lessons have been learned?  
• Updates on the situation are also regularly shared – what are the 
latest developments with regard to the conflict, and what is the 
security situation? Box 5.3 below illustrates this. 
• Exchange also takes place around organisational strategies. 
What are the main issues that we should focus on? In which 
ways should we do so? In this context, meetings often aim at 
coordinating activities so as to prevent duplication and identify 
opportunities for joint action. This is hard because of the 
constraints presented by the funding regime (with donors to a 
large extent determining the strategies of organisations), and 
because of competition among NGOs that makes it difficult to 
openly share strategic information. Still, it is done.  
• Exchanges during training courses and network meetings often 
focus on transferring knowledge of tools and methods for 
conflict analysis and conflict management. These include 
concepts that can help to understand and categorise conflict and 
methodologies for mediation, dialogue and reconciliation.  
• Both training courses and network meetings focus on technical 
knowledge in the sense of ways to run an organisation 
efficiently. Two West African network coordinators note that in 
exchanges among members the emphasis is shifting from 
content knowledge towards technical issues and organisational 
skills, including M&E, planning, and proposal writing.236 
• Some knowledge sharing activities aim explicitly at bringing 
together people from different sectors or backgrounds. One 
West African network runs a programme that explores the 
tensions between proponents of bringing to justice soldiers who 
have committed crimes during conflict, and those favouring 
reconciliation and drawing attention to the fact that calls for 
justice may impede peace processes. The programme aims to 
bring together human rights practitioners (who tend to 
emphasise accountability) and peacebuilding workers (who tend 
to prioritise reconciliation).  
 
                                                 
236 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
Interview with national coordinator of a Sierra Leonean NGO network. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 
February 2006. 
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Box 5.3: Report of a meeting of the Eastern regional chapter of the 
Network for Collaborative Peacebuilding Sierra Leone (NCP-SL), 
Kenema, 22 February 2006237 
 
Out of the sixteen member organisations in the region, five were represented at the 
meeting. Including the visiting researcher, eleven people were present. The meeting was 
opened with prayer, followed by introductions of those present. Next, the coordinator for 
the Eastern region gave a report of the ‘national visioning process’ of the network and 
the Annual General Meeting that had taken place in Freetown.  
• During the visioning process the representatives present had worked on 
adjusting the constitution of the network.  
• It was suggested that the AGM should not always take place in Freetown but 
rotate between the regions.  
• Participants agreed that inactive NCP-SL board members should be replaced.  
• It was agreed that the secretariat would write a concept paper on research. 
• It was discussed that the network should link up with the organisations dealing 
with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC has issued 
recommendations, but these have not been implemented. Here lies a role for 
civil society. 
• The representatives looked at the three-year strategic plan, harmonising ideas 
and making a concise plan, which was put to the AGM. 
  
A discussion followed, in which the following questions and issues came up: 
• People agree that the network should be less Freetown-centred. A member 
proposes that the next AGM be held in Kenema. 
• People are unclear whether the election of board members takes place centrally 
or in the regions. It turns out to be in the regions. All are dissatisfied with the 
performance of the board members representing the Eastern region. The 
Eastern region is highly affected by conflict issues, but none of the board 
members for the Eastern region attended the visioning process or the AGM. 
• It is suggested that the TRC should be asked to join the network.  
• Some of the districts in the Eastern region are inactive. Those present who 
carry out programmes in Kailahun and Kono districts are asked to approach all 
involved organisations there and ask them to come to the next meeting. 
 
Various practical issues are discussed, including the distribution of a report about 
whether peacebuilding includes human rights organisations, the suggestion that 
invitations for meetings should be sent longer in advance, and the problem that many 
people do no check their e-mails regularly. There is some discussion about funding and 
the network. It is noted that the network asks the members to solicit their own funding. 
Finally, someone notes that the meeting was supposed to exchange information about the 
work of the members and learn from each other’s intervention strategies. 
 
The next meeting is set to take place in two weeks. 
 
 
Box 5.3 illustrates some of the issues discussed at meetings between 
local NGOs. In this particular meeting practical and organisational 
matters took prominence over substantive discussions regarding peace 
                                                 
237 Excerpts of the report I drafted after attending the meeting 
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methodologies. At least for networks, this seems to occur more often.238 
However, such discussions are also useful. To some extent the Kenema 
meeting described in the Box was also about organising substantive 
knowledge exchange (rather than doing so at that moment in time) in 
that it set the stage for information to be exchanged in written form or in 
the next meeting. 
 
 
5.5.2 Exchange with international organisations and government 
 agencies 
 
Next to interactions with their donors, Southern peace NGOs engage in 
knowledge exchange with other non-local actors, namely international 
multilateral organisations with a presence in their countries. The main 
reason for this is that international organisations (IOs) are important 
players in the field of peacebuilding in all the countries visited. Large 
NNGOs have offices there and as we have seen play an important role in 
shaping the policies and practices of local civil society. In some of these 
countries– particularly Liberia – large UN missions are present and play 
a large role in day-to-day security, political and socio-economic matters. 
In all countries, specialised UN agencies are present that focus on 
development issues. Other IOs include intergovernmental regional 
organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in Southeast Asia and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa.  
 
In addition to intergovernmental actors, NGOs also interact with 
governmental ones in their country and region. These interactions often 
take the form of lobbying work in order to get governments and IOs to 
put specific issues onto their agenda, more strongly support civil society, 
or respond to specific challenges identified by NGOs. In addition, some 
organisations advice and training services to advice and training services 
to governmental employees and the staff of IOs. This type of work is 
done particularly by stronger SNGOs. The West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP), for example, provides expertise to IOs by 
giving advice, organising workshops, and writing manuals.239 Smaller, 
weaker NGOs are more localised and do not engage much in such 
activities. For them, networks are important vehicles to make their 
voices heard to official institutions as they are not able to do so on their 
                                                 
238 Based on network meetings attended (see list in sources). 
239 Interview with national coordinator of a Liberian NGO network. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 
2006. 
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own. Somewhat surprisingly, in the interviews little mention was made 
of knowledge flowing the other way: from governments to NGOs.  
 
More horizontal knowledge sharing takes place in policy forums 
organised by civil society networks. In the run-up to the 2002 Kenyan 
election, a local civil society network organised policy forums with 
likeminded institutions, including the government, on issues such as the 
relationship between the police and the media and the making of a 
constitution. Unfortunately, due to staff shortages, these forums were 
not continued.240 In Sierra Leone, a national NGO network regularly 
organises a National Peace and Development Forum with network 
members and government representatives from various ministries as 
well as UN staff. Each person present reports on his activities and a 
discussion takes place.241  
 
In Cambodia there is much less interaction with governmental agencies; 
in fact, the government is not mentioned as a partner for exchange. 
Cambodian NGOs interviewed did not elaborate on this, but the lack of 
responsiveness of the government towards civil society is likely to be a 
reason. In the Philippine government, a presidential Office for the Peace 
Process has been established which liaises with civil society, and about a 
third of NGO staff interviewed mention this office as a partner for 
exchange. However, other Mindanawan NGOs consider the office to be 
part of the ‘enemy’. In Liberia, organisations speak of organising a large 
multi-level consultation process that would link up the grassroots level 
with the governmental level via peace NGOs and culminate in the 
creation of a two- or three-year plan for peacebuilding in Liberia. This 
would counter the influence of donors in determining both “the 
diagnosis and the solution adopted”. However, as of yet they have not 
been able to realise such a process.242 When it comes to interactions with 
government agencies, the difference between Liberia, in which this is 
quite common, and Sierra Leone in which it is hardly mentioned, is 
striking. Although the new Johnson-Sirleaf government (which includes 
many former civil society members) was not yet established at the time 
of my visit, it seems that even then there were stronger links between 
government and civil society. In Sierra Leone by contrast many SNGO 
staff complained about the unresponsiveness of their government.  
 
 
                                                 
240 Interview with staff member of a Kenyan NGO. Nairobi, Kenya, 29 November 2005. 
241 Interview with national coordinator of a Sierra Leonean NGO network. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 
15 February 2006.  
242 Interview with Secretary General of a Liberian church-based NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 
February 2006. 
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5.5.3 Exchange with local beneficiaries  
 
When asked about knowledge sharing, many local peacebuilders bring 
up exchanges with the communities in and for which they work as an 
important activity. The reasons for this have been elaborated in section 
5.3.1, where beneficiaries featured as an important source of knowledge 
for SNGOs because of their unique knowledge of the local context. 
Exchanges with beneficiaries take the following forms. 
• Community workshops and town meetings are regularly 
organised. These aim specifically at the surfacing of local 
knowledge and information about priorities and needs. In 
addition, they are intended as exchange forums in which a 
mutual learning process takes place involving both SNGO staff 
and community members.243 For example, a Cambodian NGO 
organising peacebuilding training programmes for young people 
emphasises the value of its participants as knowledge resources 
– whether they have received formal education or not. In line 
with Freire’s ideas (see Box 4.1 in section 4.1) the courses this 
organisation provides are based on the knowledge of the youth 
participants. “They are given the opportunity to discuss and 
learn by themselves. Our staff members are not teachers but 
merely facilitate the young people’s learning”.244 
• In a similar vein, some youth SNGOs organise peace camps in 
which views are exchanged with local stakeholders.245 
• In case of membership organisations – umbrellas of grassroots 
or church groups – regular assemblies are held in which all the 
members participate to develop policy. This also occurs in most 
networks. One umbrella organisation notes that “it is necessary 
to actively extract information from members as they rarely 
share it on their own initiative”.246  
• Some NGO staff members mention community-level dialogues 
and mediation activities as important ways to bring out local 
knowledge. In this sense knowledge sharing becomes a tool for 
peacebuilding: “mediation is a process in which knowledge 
exchange plays an important role. Missing parts of history are 
rewritten through the exchanges that take place in the mediation 
process. This completion or rewriting of history makes peace 
                                                 
243 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. Interview 
with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
244 Interview with director of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 2006. 
245 Interview with staff member of a Sierra Leonean youth NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 
February 2006.  
246 Interview with staff members of an NGO working in South Sudan. Nairobi, Kenya, 28 
November 2005. 
  
277 
possible.”247 More generally, village-based processes of 
dialogue spur organisational learning from beneficiaries. 
• Some organisations explicitly try to gather local inputs for 
lobbying work or for higher-level exchanges. For example, a 
Nairobi-based fellowship of churches in the Great Lakes region 
played a role in the process leading up to the government-level 
International Conference on the Great Lakes region. As part of 
these preparations it collected inputs from church leaders and 
women.248 
• If SNGOs are able to do so, they conduct research into the 
needs and capacities of local communities, as a basis for the 
planning of capacity building and other activities.249 
• Some organisations engage in a conscious process of 
documenting local information, such as information about the 
human rights violations for the purpose of human rights 
reporting, and information about possibly rising tensions in a 
particular area for the purpose of early warning: 
“We have access to local information in areas difficult to 
reach in a way that others do not. While others face security 
issues, we have access through our work with the local 
people, who keep us informed. They consider our staff to be 
part of them and protect them. This is a functioning early 
warning system. Indeed we have in the past accurately 
predicted events such as large-scale population movements. 
People now tend to listen to us because we have proven to be 
well-informed and credible.”250 
 
In more general terms, interviewees emphasise that establishing a 
genuine two-way knowledge exchange with beneficiaries requires an 
attitude of openness to local information and views. This is helped by a 
willingness and ability to spend time with communities and listen to 
them. Unfortunately, there is often a lack of (paid) time to do this. Still, 
the example quoted below shows the difference it can make. 
“[I]n an effort to expand the impact and scope of its health programme, 
[an Indian NGO]’s staff were ‘mobilised with motorbikes’. They 
became so focused on meeting quantitative project objectives that they 
had little time to sit and talk with local people. It soon became 
apparent that ‘when we walked or went by bicycle, we did much 
better.’ So [the NGO] introduced slower, more time-consuming ways 
of working with local communities.” (Hailey and James 2002: 402)  
                                                 
247 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
248 Interview with staff member of a church-based organisation working throughout the Great Lakes 
region. Nairobi, 30 November 2005 
249 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
250 Interview with staff members of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
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5.5.4 Capacity building by Southern NGOs 
 
Southern peace NGOs engage in the capacity building of various target 
groups, including grassroots organisations, local government staff, 
village leaders, elders, and ‘ordinary’ community members. Such 
activities are part of a strategy of peacebuilding: the aim is to provide 
local groups with abilities, tools and knowledge that may help them deal 
with conflict in a peaceful way. In addition, some SNGOs - particularly 
larger, stronger ones - aim to build the capacity of other – usually 
smaller and weaker - SNGOs. This is motivated by the observation that 
many local NGOs are deprived of knowledge and skills:  
“there is a knowledge gap among Liberian NGOs in the areas of 
conflict transformation and the systematic analysis of conflict. There is 
little skilled manpower with organisations. The majority of 
organisations working on peacebuilding were founded in the last few 
years. In earlier years, international organisations and donors focused 
on supporting ‘hardware’: building schools, agriculture, water, etc. 
More recently there is recognition of the importance of ‘software’: 
peacebuilding capacity. This includes advocacy, justice, and good 
governance.”251  
 
The following types of activities undertaken by Southern peace NGOs 
may be grouped under the heading of capacity building: 
• Building the capacity of grassroots groups and smaller NGOs 
through training and advice. Organisations for example advise 
such groups on conflict analysis and on how to organise, lobby, 
and draw attention to a cause. A network organisation working 
in the Great Lakes region notes that this was successful in 
Eastern Congo where “people have come together and organised 
themselves, and lobbied to draw attention to the situation 
there”.252 
• Building the capacity of local policymakers through training and 
exchange. For example, SNGOs work to promote understanding 
of the existence of a rule of law, to increase the skills of local 
council members, or to help policymakers to integrate 
peacebuilding into their work. A Kenyan organisation noted that 
it was only successful in convincing local councils of the need 
to become aware of conflict transformation concepts and tools 
once the issue was approached from an economic perspective 
and the NGO began to emphasise how conflict was affecting 
                                                 
251 Interview with national coordinator of a Liberian NGO network. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 
2006. 
252 Interview with director of a regional NGO network working in East Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 28 
November 2005. 
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local revenue collection. This led local government institutions 
to engage in peacebuilding activities out of their own budget in 
order to ensure the sustainability of their policies.253 
• Quite a number of NGOs in all countries visited engage in the 
training of mediators who then mediate in conflicts arising at the 
local level in communities or schools. These mediators usually 
participate in training and afterwards in mediation voluntarily in 
addition to their regular work or education. An organisation 
aiming to train young people to become mediators has devised a 
strategy to draw people to its offices in order to become 
interested in becoming a mediator. It provides table games at the 
offices, so that youngsters will come to play, hang around for a 
while and hopefully start to talk to the facilitators present. 254 
• Some SNGOs enable trained mediators from different places to 
meet and exchange experiences. A Liberian youth NGO has 
created peace mediation committees consisting of trained 
mediators, who meet once a month to share experiences from 
their own communities. The NGO provides transport and a 
small allowance to make these meetings possible.255 
• Training of trainers is used to broaden the scope of training and 
mediation is the in various areas within the field of 
peacebuilding.256 
• Some organisations assist others in implementing activities to 
achieve learning through joint action. An umbrella organisation 
working on conflict prevention and peacebuilding with church 
councils in the countries of the Great Lakes region and Horn of 
Africa aims to empower the councils to implement programmes. 
If there is a lack of capacity, then the organisation goes into a 
country to assist. It has supported the joint preparation of civic 
education material before elections and helped to convene 
roundtable meetings for knowledge exchange on issues such as 
small arms. 257 
• Over a third of all NGOs visited engage in peace education. 
Through billboards, posters, newsletters, radio programmes, 
theatre, training school teachers, organising lectures, and other 
activities, organisations attempt to spread the message of 
                                                 
253 Interview with Kenyan staff member of the local office of an international NGO in Kenya’s 
North Rift province. Eldoret, Kenya, 1 December 2005. 
254 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
255 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
256 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
257 Interview with staff member of a church-based regional NGO working in the Great Lakes region 
and the Horn of Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 30 November 2005. 
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peaceful coexistence and promote basic conflict resolution skills 
among local populations. 258 
 
In capacity building, quite a number of organisations emphasise the 
importance of starting with the pre-existing knowledge, skills and needs 
of those whose capacity is being developed. This is in line with the 
theory of capacity building discussed in section 3.6. For example, 
interviewees say they aim to strengthen people’s traditional ways of 
dealing with conflict rather than trying to impose alternative approaches. 
“One should not tell people that they are doing things in the wrong way, 
but instead support them and influence their actions slowly through 
positive reinforcement”.259 In how far the approaches described match 
the actual practice of capacity building by SNGOs I have not been able 
to find out.  
 
 
5.5.5 Exchange with knowledge institutions   
 
As was already mentioned in 2.3.2 and 5.5.5, little interaction takes 
place between Southern peace NGOs and universities and research 
institutions in the countries in which they operate. Some more 
interaction takes place with knowledge institutions abroad – mainly in 
the North – as staff members take short courses or degree programmes 
there. Local universities, however, do not often have departments 
focusing on peacebuilding or related issues and tend to be rather 
theoretical rather than practical in their approach.  
 
As we saw in chapter three, knowledge institutions have the potential of 
functioning as learning ‘scaffolds’, helping individuals and 
organisations to take a step back from practice and reflect at a deeper 
level than they otherwise would. Universities could play a role in the 
research and documentation activities SNGOs want to develop. They 
could strengthen the voices of both Southerners and practitioners in 
global development and peacebuilding debates, which tend to be 
dominated by Northerners and academics.  
 
The practitioner-oriented action research Master programme entitled 
Applied Conflict Transformation Studies (ACTS), which is offered in 
Cambodia and other places in cooperation with local universities, is an 
interesting example in this regard. For that reason it is discussed 
relatively extensively in chapter eight. But there are a few other 
                                                 
258 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
259 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
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examples of NGO-university interaction that came up in the interviews 
and that deserve mention here. In Freetown, Sierra Leone, the local 
university has created a peacebuilding department. In developing its 
curriculum it is actively engaging with the local NGO community. 
Students work with NGOs as interns in order to learn from their 
practice. As of yet, these interactions seem to benefit mainly the 
university department and not the NGOs, as the department does not yet 
have much knowledge and capacity to offer. But in the future this may 
change.260  
 
Another example is the Centre for Peace Education (CPE) at Miriam 
College in Quezon City in the Philippines. An academic but practice-
oriented institution, it engages with NGOs in order to help develop 
peace education activities in various countries in Southeast Asia. In the 
Philippines itself the Centre trains school teachers in peace education in 
cooperation with the Department of Education. The Centre has three 
staff of which two are part-time. It is funded in two ways: Miriam 
College pays for the staff costs, and for all other costs project funding 
from donors is sought. CPE faculty associates (volunteers from among 
Miriam college faculty) and the Pax Christi student organisation in 
college and high school provide volunteer services. The CPE is a 
member of a global peace education centres network that was created to 
undertake a joint project on the ethical and spiritual foundations of peace 
education, which included teacher trainings in Quezon City, Tokyo 
(Japan) and Seoul (South Korea). The network has four member Peace 
Education Centres located in Teachers College, Columbia University in 
New York; the Lebanese American University in Lebanon; Seisen 
University in Tokyo; and the CPE in the Philippines.261 
 
 
5.5.6 Concluding 5.5 
 
Southern peace organisations engage in various types of knowledge 
exchange with actors outside their organisation. Exchange with 
knowledge institutions, particularly local ones, lags behind despite the 
potential this has for improved research and documentation. But with all 
other actors involved – other local NGOs, international organisations, 
governments, and beneficiaries – SNGOs work to establish regular 
interaction. Stronger, more developed NGOs are able to engage with 
governments and international organisations in a two-way manner – they 
                                                 
260 Interview with director of a Sierra Leonean church-based NGO. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 
February 2006.  
261 Interview with director of the Centre for Peace Education (CPE). Quezon City, Philippines, 19 
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lobby them for specific policy approaches while at the same time 
offering them knowledge and training. Stronger NGOs also engage in 
capacity building activities in order to develop the skills and abilities of 
weaker NGOs and local communities. Smaller, weaker NGOs 
participate less in knowledge exchange with governments and 
international organisations but more so with other NGOs and grassroots 
groups. These SNGOs are more often on the receiving end of capacity 
building programmes, but they also try to offer knowledge based on 
experience and draw from the knowledge of local beneficiaries.  
 
Some organisations complain that knowledge exchange initiatives are 
sometimes too detached from action. There are “meetings, meetings, 
meetings” and there is a lot of talk – but not always is sufficient 
attention paid to planning for concrete action. Neither does follow-up to 
meetings always receive the necessary attention. “Follow-up should be 
budgeted from the start” (Huna and Beernink 2005: 12), but this is often 
neglected. Depending on the needs of organisations involved, such 
follow-up could entail “mentoring, or training in the tools learnt through 
exchange, or even a capacity building within the organisation itself. 
Follow-up can also entail time and space for experimentation.” (Huna 
and Beernink 2005: 12)  
 
 
5.6 Obstacles to learning and knowledge sharing 
 
In chapter four we saw that structural constraints that result from North-
South inequalities in general, and the aid regime in particular, limit the 
learning of SNGOs. In addition to these structural constraints, a number 
of more specific obstacles to the learning of Southern peace NGOs 
emerge from the interviews. Table 5.10262 portrays these obstacles as 
they were mentioned by SNGO staff members. Several of these have 
already been discussed earlier: the fact that knowledge gained needs to 
be adapted to be relevant to the context, the lack of capacity 
organisations have to document their knowledge in order to more easily 
share it with others, the imposition by donors of ways to look at 
peacebuilding, and the fact that not all SNGOs are necessarily tied to 
constituencies at the grassroots. Others – mainly the issue of different 
expectations – will be addressed in the next chapters.  
 
Mentioned most often is a lack of time and money (elaborated in 5.6.1), 
followed closely by the observation that much knowledge exchanged is 
not directly relevant and needs to be adapted to the context – an issue 
                                                 
262 See note 164. 
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discussed in other places in this book. Competition and distrust (5.6.2) 
among actors in peacebuilding is mentioned third often. Imposition of 
knowledge and priorities by donors is also considered to limit learning 
and open exchange, as was discussed in the previous chapter. Limits to 
the capacity and characteristics of individual organisations (5.6.3) was 
also mentioned. Factors resulting from the difficult social and political 
situation in (post)conflict societies (5.6.4) include bad infrastructure, 
government scrutiny and conflict-related constraints. Related to both 
conflict and competition are aspects relating to power relations and 
inequality among participants in knowledge exchange (5.6.5), which 
play a particularly strong role in Sierra Leone. As Table 5.10 shows, 
various other issues are mentioned. Further on we will address cultural 
issues and gender (5.6.6) and the fact that knowledge changes over time 
(5.6.7).  
 
Obstacles to knowledge 
exchange 
 
Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Keny
a 
(11) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14)  
C-
Asia 
(15) 
To-
tal 
(76) 
Time and money 4 9 4 3 4 7 31 
Knowledge not relevant, 
needs adapting 
6 9 2 7 5 1 30 
Competition and distrust 5 9 2 4 2 1 23 
Imposition by donors 6 5 3 4 1 2 21 
Organisational capacity  2 3 3 1  5 14 
Documentation 4 3  3 2 1 13 
Bad infrastructure 4 4 1 1 2 1 13 
Power relations within 
network 
1 7 1   1 10 
Political context / 
government scrutiny 
  1   9 10 
Language, illiteracy  2 1 2  2 2 9 
Limitations posed by 
conflict 
2 3 1 1   7 
Different expectations of 
exchange initiative 
2 2 1   2 7 
NGOs lack constituency 1 3 1 1   6 
Cultural issues 3 1   1  5 
Lack of follow-up, 
implementation 
 3 1   1 5 
Contested knowledge  2  1 1 1 5 
Knowledge changing   1 2   1 4 
Initiatives confined to 
capital 
 2    1 3 
Gender  2   1  3 
Different opinions on the 
role of civil society 
     1 1 
Table 5.10: Obstacles to knowledge exchange for Southern peace NGOs 
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5.6.1 Time and money 
 
Section 3.4.2 made clear that for NNGO staff a lack of time poses a 
major obstacle to learning processes. This is compounded by pressures 
for direct impact and to spend resources efficiently, and by the sense of 
urgency that comes with working in conflict situations. For SNGO staff, 
the situation is no different. Asked about the main obstacles to learning 
and knowledge sharing, they mention a lack of time most often. SNGO 
workers tend to be overwhelmingly busy. They feel that peacebuilding is 
such a big undertaking and there is so much to be done that there is 
always a shortage of time. This means that they often have to miss out 
on knowledge sharing meetings or other occasions in which learning 
may take place. The business of NGO staff also affects meetings when 
they do take place: 
“if a meeting is organised in Monrovia then it does not work because 
people will be running around to other meetings and have their phones 
on all the time. It is better to go far away. Unfortunately, when we 
propose this to donors they understand it as a selfish desire to take a 
trip”. 263 
 
The emphasis of donors on short-term impact in order to have something 
to show for the money spent makes it a challenge for SNGOs to find the 
resources needed to reflect and share. These activities require time to be 
allocated to them in budgets so that learning does not become an added 
activity in addition to the regular workload of staff members. In 
addition, it sometimes requires resources for travel and accommodation 
to bring people together for knowledge exchange. As we have seen in 
chapter four, the preference of many donor agencies for clearly 
demarcated projects and activities with concrete outputs leaves little 
space for this.  
 
However - is funding always necessary for learning and knowledge 
exchange? Could the emphasis on required funding perhaps mean that 
the inherent value of learning processes is not strong enough to provide 
an incentive for SNGOs to realise meetings, reflection processes and 
documentation? Funds are not necessarily required for staff members to 
take the initiative to discuss lessons and strategies, and indeed, they do 
this. But more structured processes require time and given the high work 
load on NGO staff members it is not realistic to expect them to create 
additional space for learning on top of normal practice. In order to 
become a part of practice time has to be set aside for it. In any case, 
“[i]n resource deprived states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia funding 
                                                 
263 Interview with staff members of a Liberian youth NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 9 February 2006. 
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seems to be an important prerequisite for any NGO activity. Only on 
rare occasions has civil society mobilised without any external funding” 
(Douma 2005: 10). 
 
Local NGO workers (and, increasingly, donor organisations) do 
recognise the importance of learning from experience and of knowledge 
and lessons from elsewhere. However, learning aims are perceived to be 
in conflict with other aims (‘direct impact’ in particular) and learning is 
often seen as an extra activity rather than an integral part of action. 
Some interviewees said they were not paid to read, reflect or participate 
in networks. They are paid to act, and this always receives more priority. 
It makes a difference, however, when NGOs consider learning and 
networking to be part of their work rather than an extra activity. 
Organisational policy, culture and capacity are important in that respect. 
 
 
5.6.2  Competition and distrust   
 
Competition among NGOs is another important obstacle to learning and, 
particularly, to knowledge sharing. After time and money it the obstacle 
mentioned most often by interviewees, and it came up in each country 
visited. NGOs in the same area tend to compete for the same donor 
funding. In the words of one NGO staff member, “conflict is business 
now.”264 Such competition can influence people’s willingness to share 
information beyond their own organisation. This not only applies to 
information about funding sources, but also to any other knowledge that 
may be seen to provide an organisation with a strategic advantage over 
others. As a result, there is a reluctance to share for fear of losing one’s 
competitive edge. Goodhand found in his study of NGOs working in 
conflict areas that “[i]n each of the case studies, NGO rent-seeking 
behaviour was common, with organizations undermining competitors, 
concealing information and acting unilaterally. Interorganization discord 
is a predictable result of existing material incentives.”(Goodhand 2006: 
144) 
 
As a result, the will to work together, and the acknowledgement that 
sharing is important, are less strong than considerations of 
organisational survival.265 This plays a role not only during, but also at 
the start of knowledge sharing initiatives. Those not already engaging in 
inter-organisation exchange may not easily be convinced to participate, 
                                                 
264 Interview with staff members of a regional NGO working in several West African countries. 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 16 February 2006. 
265 Interview with staff member of a Kenyan NGO. Nairobi, Kenya, 29 November 2005. 
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thinking there are hidden agendas involved. Such distrust, inherent in 
the funding regime, is likely to be strengthened by the legacy of the 
conflicts that have taken place in the countries studied. As was discussed 
in chapter one, NGOs in conflict-affected regions are not necessarily 
politically neutral and are likely to have affiliations with one group or 
another that played a role in the conflict. Even if this is not the case, 
suspicions in that direction are easily born in others. In Mindanao, for 
example, a Bangsamoro-based civil society consortium faces regular 
distrust and accusations of partiality. “It is difficult to optimise 
knowledge flows, because of distrust and misconceptions among 
communities. Many non-Moro organisations perceive our organisation 
as terrorist or criminal, and are unwilling to engage with us”.266  
 
A related aspect that is mentioned about knowledge sharing among 
NGOs is that cooperative endeavours – such as networks - raise issues 
of credit, billing and name recognition. People are unwilling to foot the 
bill for meetings while at the same time eager to get credit for their 
contributions, which in collective processes they often do not. 
Interestingly, an NGO staff member noted that “these issues are most 
salient with NGO leaders. People who are lower in the organisations, 
those who actually carry out the work, tend to be more open towards one 
another. They are less occupied with issues of recognition and billing 
and see the benefits of knowledge sharing directly in their work”267. 
Issues like competition and credit recognition are strongest in inter-NGO 
interactions, as these involve participants that are at the same time direct 
competitors. With grassroots groups they seem less significant. In 
addition, in exchanges across borders they are also less important as 
competition is less direct – people are not competing for funds allocated 
to a specific country or region.  
 
Solutions for the obstacles posed by competition and distrust are 
mentioned as well. They include good communication, trust building 
and emphasising a common goal that overrides individual objectives. 
This also entails creating a safe space for learning and sharing, in which 
people feel secure enough to talk openly. For longer-term knowledge 
exchange initiatives such as networks, agreeing on codes of conduct for 
the use of information may help, although it is often difficult to claim 
ownership of a specific piece of knowledge after it has been shared and 
used by others. Another solution for networks is to agree on a clear 
division of labour among organisations in which each focuses on its own 
                                                 
266 Interview with Secretary General of a Mindanawan NGO consortium. Cotabato, Philippines, 17 
May 2006. 
267 Informal conversation with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Davao, Philppines, 15 May 
2006. 
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strong points. This prevents competition and duplication of activities. 
However, it may be difficult in a situation in which donors are more 
willing to pay for some activities than for others. 
 
 
5.6.3 Organisational capacity and characteristics 
 
Among Southern peace NGOs the level of organisational capacity varies 
widely. Organisations with low capacity face a lack of funds, are 
understaffed, and have insufficient access to infrastructure such as the 
internet. Their staff members have a lack of appropriate skills. Most 
NGOs complain of a lack of knowledge in the areas of conflict 
transformation and the systematic analysis of conflict. There is little 
skilled manpower within organisations. The majority of organisations 
working on peacebuilding were founded in the last few years. “In earlier 
years, international organisations and donors focused on supporting 
‘hardware’: building schools, agriculture, and water supplies. More 
recently there has been recognition of the importance of ‘software’, such 
as peacebuilding capacity”268. The need for skills is a priority. With 
respect to the learning capacity of members, some aspects of 
organisational learning (such as training and retention of knowledge 
from training) receive more attention than others (such as learning 
cycles, reflecting on work, and sharing knowledge within the 
organisation).  
 
Of course, the aforementioned issue of funding plays a role in limiting 
the capacity of staff. Qualified staff usually prefer to work with 
international organisations, because they pay more and because few 
local organisations are able to guarantee employment between projects. 
This causes organisational brain drain.269 Language issues also play a 
role, more specifically in many cases, a lack of fluency in English. 
Similarly, a lack of proficiency in ‘technical’ terminology, jargon, 
inhibits the access SNGOs have to available information and their 
ability to participate in sharing and networking. Thus, these issues 
present obstacles for learning and knowledge exchange.  
 
Knowledge exchange can itself contribute to capacity building by 
providing access to tools, training and donors. The knowledge 
exchanged may include information about whom to see for what, how to 
frame messages in order to draw attention, and how to raise funds. 
Where capacity of participants or potential participants is an issue, it 
                                                 
268 Interview with national coordinator of an NGO network, Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 2006. 
269 Interview with staff member of Sierra Leonean NGO. Kenema, Sierra Leone, 22 February 2006. 
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would help for knowledge exchange initiatives – such as networks - to 
explicitly include the transfer of this kind of process knowledge. This 
includes the translation of documents into local languages and jargon-
free versions270. What also helps to develop the learning capacity of 
local organisations is to raise awareness of the importance and 
requirements for learning and to make instruments for learning and 
M&E available.  
 
However, organisations need to prioritise the development of their 
learning capacity if they are to yield any results. Some consider that 
there is a lack of awareness of the need to learn and share knowledge 
among people in the field. People go about doing their work without 
taking the opportunity to reflect, document or evaluate. They themselves 
could do more to place learning higher on the agenda. It seem to be 
mostly the larger SNGOs with the means to engage in reflection and 
research, that emphasise the importance of these activities. As we saw in 
section 5.3.2, another difficulty SNGOs face is to retain knowledge 
within their organisation. Organisations are pressed to devise methods to 
prevent staff from leaving shortly after having received training. 
Providing job security from one project to another would contribute to 
retaining staff for longer periods, but the funding regime often prevents 
this.  
 
A final aspect of the organisation of NGOs relates to the extent to which 
their decision-making is participatory and their leadership accountable. 
Although one would expect NGOs to be naturally democratic in nature, 
this is not necessarily the case. Many SNGOs are highly dependent on a 
strong leader figure who founded and continues to run the organisation. 
These leaders are not necessarily authoritarian – in fact they usually are 
not – but their preponderance in terms of skills and contacts makes them 
dominant figures around whom the organisation revolves. Knowledge is 
often concentrated in the head of such a figure, rather than being spread 
evenly in the organisation. Culture may also play a role in this. In 
Mindanao, a network coordinator noted that “some participants in 
training and networking activities are too leader-oriented and follow 
everything their director says. This is particularly the case with 
grassroots actors in Mindanao; traditional Moro culture emphasises 
strong leadership”. The danger is that when such leaders leave – one 
leader I met during my travels is now in the United Kingdom doing a 
PhD while several others have moved to government positions – they 
                                                 
270 The Central and Eastern African Peace Tree Network has begun to do this (source: conversation 
with director of Peace Tree Network, Nairobi, 28 November 2005). 
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take their knowledge with them and their organisation struggles to 
survive.  
 
Box 5.4: Issues relating to the capacity of CSOs in Central Asia271 
 
According to some network members interviewed in Central Asia, the networking 
concept is not really understood in the region. Central Asian CSOs are said to lack the 
knowledge and skills to develop a network. Problems mentioned include the following.  
• Central Asian CSOs are relatively weak.  
• Most CSOs do not develop their own policy but depend on the policy of donors; 
they are ‘grant-hunters’. Asian CSOs are dependent on foreign, particularly US, 
funds. 
• Most CSOs engage in multiple tasks instead of specialising in one area (such as 
conflict prevention); as a result they offer less quality. 
• Even if CSOs try to engage governments, they are not sure what their message 
should be. CSOs have little self esteem and organisations from different Central 
Asian countries do not easily agree on the right message, because they all have a 
different focus.  
• There is little thinking in Central Asia about the role of civil society beyond the 
implementation of technical projects. There is also no sense of global solidarity, for 
example with regard to events in Lebanon – although this may also be related to the 
dependency on US funds.   
• Not all CSOs consider conflict prevention to be the responsibility of civil society. 
Instead they tend to focus on implementing concrete, ‘technical’ socio-economic 
projects in a project-driven way. Conflict prevention, however, is more than a 
project. It is a large and political undertaking. It is also still quite vague and unclear. 
• There is an absence of moral motivation; as a result networks work ad hoc, namely 
only when there is funding. 
 
 
 
5.6.4 Limitations posed by politics and conflict  
 
NGOs are involved in interventions to change societies, but they are also 
part of those societies. Their actions have intentional and unintentional 
consequences for the context in which they operate – and vice versa. 
Hilhorst writes that “everything happening in and around NGOs has a 
bearing on the politics of power within the organizations, the politics of 
organizational legitimation and, finally, the politics of (local and global) 
development” (Hilhorst 2003: 4). The room for manoeuvre local actors 
have, or the social space available to them for their projects, is restricted 
by the presence of other actors in peacebuilding. State-society-NGO 
relations make up the context of the actions of NGOs. In many 
developing countries, family standing and tribal affiliation cut across 
and help determine state-society relations. Finally, NGOs are fitted into 
local politics. Local constituents shape their identity and goals. All this 
                                                 
271 Interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 23-29 July 2006. 
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modifies the idea of a linear, step-by-step policy and implementation 
model: in reality actions are shaped by personal perspectives, social 
relations, and everyday politics. (Hilhorst 2003: 106-119) 
 
In Table 5.10 we see that in Central Asia the restrictions placed on civil 
society by political actors is a major issue that limits their freedom of 
action – and therefore, the knowledge they are able to gain and share. In 
chapter seven more attention is paid to this. In the other countries state 
authoritarianism is a less direct threat, but NGOs do sometimes have 
difficulty gaining access to official actors. In chapter one and beyond, 
the limited ability of many peace SNGOs to play an independent 
political role was linked mostly to the international funding regime. 
However, governments may also play a role in preventing the 
involvement of NGOs in political processes. Although this issue is not 
mentioned in these terms by peace organisations in the countries visited 
except for Central Asia, it is possible that it plays a role in subtle ways. 
Moreover, in countries not visited state authoritarianism is certainly a 
major issue.  
 
Achieving an active interplay between actors is difficult in conflict areas 
due to high levels of distrust between groups and individuals. In 
addition, such regions are often plagued by a scarcity of resources, low 
security and weak or bad governance, none of which provides an 
enabling environment for open learning and interaction processes. Fear 
may prevent people from speaking freely, and practical issues such as 
illiteracy, low Internet connectivity, expensive and intermittent energy 
supply, and bad physical infrastructure (particularly in West Africa) 
limits access to information and participation in exchanges. This weak 
enabling environment also puts local actors in conflict-torn developing 
countries at a disadvantage in generating and disseminating their own 
knowledge and lessons. As a result, capacity building programmes and 
knowledge exchange networks are more likely to revolve around 
international research agendas and Northern policy concerns. (Stone 
2005: 101) As we have seen, this is compounded by the fact that those 
who control the money to a large extent control the content. 
  
 
5.6.5 Power relations  
 
A related set of obstacles has to do with power relations and inequality 
among people involved in, or surrounding, knowledge sharing 
initiatives. It is mentioned particularly in Sierra Leone. The context in 
which these remarks were made is the Network for Collaborative 
Peacebuilding Sierra Leone (NCP-SL), which is analysed in the next 
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chapter. As will become clear there, this network has been plagued by 
accusations of power abuse by board members and more generally by a 
sense that some members try to impose their will on the network. This 
draws attention to the fact that those who have the capacity, means, 
experience, or legitimacy to impose their preferred solution upon others 
determine to a large extent what happens in a knowledge sharing setting. 
In general, Northern participants will be better positioned to do so than 
Southern participants, and better-funded actors will be more likely to 
have power than less well-off ones. Indeed, power issues are strongly 
related to the control of resources. This means that opportunities to get 
the most out of knowledge exchange are unequal. In order to understand 
a knowledge sharing initiative – such as a network - it is important to 
take this dimension into account by asking questions like: ‘who benefits 
from the network?’ and ‘who is seeking to influence the network?’. 
 
 
5.6.6 Cultural issues and gender 
 
Cultural issues are mentioned as obstacles to knowledge sharing in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cambodia. People mean different things by 
this, including cultural differences between indigenous and external 
participants in exchanges and differences between organisational 
cultures. Both are addressed in this section. In addition, a few 
interviewees mentioned gender issues, dawing attention to inequality 
between men and women in their countries and the way in which this 
inequality limited the extent to which women’s knowledge and views 
were taken up. External actors may not realise that in many countries it 
is more difficult for women to participate in learning and discussion than 
it is for men. In Liberia it was mentioned that in some communities 
women do not talk openly with men present and may need to meet 
separately in order to get a more active knowledge exchange process 
going272. 
 
Regarding cultural issues, differences between external and indigenous 
actors in peacebuilding where mentioned in each country. To the extent 
that external actors participate in joint learning activities, the differences 
between Western and other knowledge systems (described in section 2.4 
and elsewhere) come into play. It has even been suggested that 
structured initiatives explicitly organised for knowledge exchange, such 
as networks, by their very nature emphasise ‘Western’, rationalistic 
knowledge over other types of knowledge: 
                                                 
272 Interview with staff member of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 13 February 2006. 
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“[n]etworks systematise knowledge generated by diverse individual 
and organisational knowledge actors and impose a rationality that 
gives precedence to a particular conception of knowledge – usually of 
a codified, technocratic, secular, westernised society. Participation is 
informally restricted through boundary drawing discourses by the 
network to exclude or devalue indigenous knowledge that does not 
conform to techno-scientific criteria.” (Stone 2005: 99) 
 
Efforts to exchange tacit knowledge through direct interaction might be 
less prone to this type of rationalisation. However, such exchanges will 
be very difficult across cultures as there is less of a shared context that 
makes the tacit knowledge explainable and understandable. In any case, 
the above warning seems most relevant for international networks that 
aim at exchanges across cultures and regions. From what I have seen, 
local or national-level knowledge sharing among actors involved in 
peacebuilding, usually taking place in face-to-face meetings, offer 
sufficient opportunity for the exchange of any kind of tacit or explicit 
knowledge deemed useful by the participants.  
 
However, for cross-regional exchanges – for example in the GPPAC 
network discussed in chapter seven – these considerations are quite 
relevant, as is the more general realisation that cultural issues can be an 
important constraining factor in achieving successful knowledge sharing 
and joint learning. In addition, representatives of NNGOs regularly 
participate in – or even organise – knowledge sharing events among 
peacebuilders in Southern conflict-affected areas. This introduces a 
North-South and cross-cultural element into these meetings. In fact, 
given the knowledge regime and structural inequalities in knowledge 
production and discourse domination described in the previous chapter, 
even meetings with only local participation are likely to have knowledge 
originating outside of the locality play a role in the exchange. As 
discussed in the third chapter, implicit, cultural knowledge and a 
willingness to question one’s assumptions and views may help 
overcome barriers between cultures and knowledge systems.  
 
A West African peacebuilder drew attention to differences Francophone 
and the Anglophone countries in the regions with regard to how they 
look at the world.  
“People educated in France have a particular sense of ‘civilisation’ and 
feel closer to France than to their Anglophone neighbours. Cote 
d’Ivoire feels more affiliation with France than with neighbouring 
[Anglophone] Ghana. This is despite the artificiality of the border 
between Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, which actually separates families. 
The knowledge that is most recognised in Cote d’Ivoire is knowledge 
coming from France. The special relationship with France ensures the 
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commercial influence of French companies in the country. [Our 
regional network] attempts to foster more of a regional identity by 
making sure that our Secretariat is composed of people from different 
countries in the region, Anglophone and Francophone. Its meetings 
and documentation are bilingual, despite the higher costs that this 
represents. Documents are also translated into local languages.”273 
 
Cultural issues posing difficulties for knowledge sharing are impossible 
to overcome entirely, but it helps to recognise them and make them 
explicit during exchanges. In doing so it may be necessary to be aware 
of different kinds of cultural cleavages. Culture is not only 
geographically bound. Different organisations also have different 
organisational cultures. In inter-organisational exchange this can lead to 
misunderstandings. Organisational cultures tend to differ particularly 
among different categories of organisations – such as government 
agencies, NGOs and private businesses. In addition, the different 
backgrounds of participants when it comes to education or profession 
can lead them to looking at reality in very different ways. One 
peacebuilder noted that “exchanging with friends who work in 
government is difficult because they have a different perspective. The 
same goes for lawyers, who tend not to look at root causes as peace 
workers do.”274    
 
Sensitivity to cultural differences may lead knowledge exchange 
participants to think about different ways to package information in 
order to be most accessible and relevant to a particular target audience. 
For example, in areas with predominantly oral traditions written 
information may not be the best way to reach people. Alternative – more 
visual – ways of documentation may therefore be more useful. Working 
on such alternatives can be done parallel to activities that support the 
documentation of knowledge in written form. The latter is still important 
as internationally as well as within many societies written knowledge is 
dominant and therefore needed to participate in debates. In Mindanao, 
for example, “in spite of their oral culture, even the indigenous people 
are now starting to document things: they are codifying their traditional 
laws in order to get them recognised and integrated into the justice 
system.”275 
 
 
                                                 
273 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
274 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 24 May 
2006.  
275 Interview with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Davao, Philippines, 15 May 2006. 
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5.6.7 Knowledge changing over time 
 
Four interviewees, including two in Kenya, drew attention to the rapidly 
changing nature of much knowledge about conflict and peacebuilding. 
As circumstances in their locality change, information and 
methodologies may no longer apply. Groups that were initially willing 
to enter into dialogue with one another can suddenly become hostile 
again in response to a particular incident, such as cattle raiding in 
Northern Kenya. And both the policies of governments and of powerful 
international actors change the context to such an extent that activities 
and ideas are no longer relevant. For example, the work of Bangsamoro 
organisations in Mindanao changed when the ‘War on Terror’ began and 
they were suddenly branded as semi-terrorists.  
 
Often, knowledge is implicitly or explicitly considered to be cumulative: 
it builds up over time. One piece of knowledge adds to another and 
expands the knowledge base. This is not always the case. Knowledge 
has a short ‘shelf life’ and often the knowledge of yesterday is no longer 
relevant today because the world may look radically different. The 
paradigm has changed, fashion and language are different, different 
discourse coalitions dominate, and packaging has changed. In the field 
of conflict transformation and peace building relevant knowledge has 
dramatically changed with the end of the Cold War, and partly perhaps 
again after 11 September 2001, which changed the discourse. Looking at 
a more local level, relevant and up-to-date knowledge changes all the 
time in conflict situations due to their fluidity and rapidly changing 
circumstances, as the following citation illustrates. 
“[W]hat we see as the learning need during a field level assignment is 
for very rapid assimilation of new knowledge assets specific to the 
immediate task, the key ones of which will be in tacit form. The right 
sources for these are not always evident so aid workers need skills, 
partners and tools to be able to smell out and unearth these truffles. 
Even if these are made explicit efficiently, the fluidity of field 
conditions is likely to create a demand for new tacit information 
tomorrow. The explicit is always in catch-up mode. Explicit 
knowledge from other situations may be of interest (if people know 
that it exists), but few have the time to plough through others’ reports 
to find the truffles they need. The best form of explicit knowledge in 
this situation is in the form of highly distilled checklists and 
methodologies based on a wide range of evaluations and 
organizational experiences, which can serve as tools for locating more 
local tacit knowledge.” (Faulkner and Foster 2004, cited in ALNAP 
2003: 59) 
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As a result, saved up, explicit knowledge may become irrelevant more 
quickly than we might think. It is therefore a continuous challenge to 
keep databases and other storing tools ‘clean’ of outdated knowledge in 
order to prevent them from becoming unworkable. In addition, as the 
citation suggests, paying attention to ways of gaining quick and easy 
access to tacit knowledge when needed may be more valuable than 
merely focusing on the creation and storing of explicit knowledge.  
 
 
5.6.8 Concluding 5.6 
 
Summing up, the following issues make learning and knowledge sharing 
more difficult:   
• a lack of time and funds to engage in knowledge activities;  
• low organisational capacity and organisational characteristics – 
such as a leader who monopolises knowledge and dominates 
decision-making 
• the fact that, particularly in conflict-affected contexts like those 
under study, knowledge is always contested, which gives 
knowledge sharing a conflict resolution component; 
• the important issue of competition among actors working for 
peace in a given area, which leads to mistrust and creates 
incentives to withhold rather than share information; 
• in addition to the North-South inequalities discussed in the 
previous chapter, issues of power and inequality also play a role 
among local actors. In knowledge sharing forums, more 
powerful participants may dominate the agenda at the expense 
of others;  
• the social and political situation in (post)conflict societies, 
which contributes to distrust and tensions but which also leads 
to many practical circumstances relating to the resources and 
infrastructure for learning and knowledge sharing;  
• cultural differences can inhibit sharing among actors engaging 
in joint learning, while inequalities between genders create 
differences in access to knowledge and exchanges;  
• the fact that knowledge changes over time, and that particularly 
in conflict situations relevant knowledge quickly becomes 
outdated, represents a constraint for ‘classical’ organisational 
learning tools that focus on making knowledge explicit and 
storing it for future use.  
 
Possible ways to overcome these obstacles will be discussed in the next 
chapter when we look at a specific – and common – tool used to 
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facilitate learning and knowledge sharing by Southern peace NGOs, 
namely networks. In that chapter these obstacles, as well as other factors 
discussed in this study that influence the learning of SNGOs, will be 
translated into factors that influence the success of networking.  
 
 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter set out to analyse what the knowledge and learning 
processes of local peace NGOs look like, what their strengths and 
weaknesses are and what difficulties and gaps exist in their learning 
practice. Here I will briefly sum up the findings for each element of this 
question, before moving on to discuss some implications and remaining 
questions.  
 
Local peacebuilders would like to gain external knowledge but stress the 
importance of learning in interaction and combining external knowledge 
with their own, indigenous knowledge. In order to better do so, 
peacebuilders would like to obtain more time and skills to do research 
and to reflect upon their practice. In this way they would generate 
knowledge that might be usefully combined with external concepts and 
methodologies. Interactive learning involving people from North and 
South entails translation processes that help bridge cultures and 
knowledge systems. It requires an open mind and a willingness to 
question one’s assumptions and even world views: the characteristics of 
‘third-order learning’. However, chapter four has shown that inequalities 
among the participants in such processes may limit the extent of 
openness and retrospection on all sides.  
 
In analysing the learning processes of the organisation, the following 
characteristics emerged. Learning seems to be mostly tactical or first-
order: how can we better do what we do? Second- or third- order 
learning – are we doing the right thing? Are we basing our work on the 
right ideas and assumptions? – is less done. The staff of local peace 
NGOs tend to have activist learning styles. They learn from experience 
and from interaction with others in the field. Workshops and training 
courses are also found useful, although knowledge gained there needs to 
be adapted to the circumstances in which people work. Reading to gain 
knowledge is not a common activity and formal education is hardly seen 
as a source of relevant knowledge at all. In contrast, exchange with 
others within and outside the organisation is an important activity. 
Outside their organisation, staff members of Southern peace NGOs 
engage in exchanges with the following categories of people and 
organisations. 
  
297 
• Interactions with other local NGOs take place regularly, despite 
obstacles that limit this (see below). 
• Exchange with international organisations and local and national 
governments is undertaken particularly by stronger SNGOs. 
These interactions take the form of lobby, sharing information 
in policy forums, advice and training. 
• Exchange with local communities and the beneficiaries of 
programmes is deemed an important source of knowledge for 
SNGOs. Such sharing takes place during the implementation of 
programmes. In addition, peace organisations undertake specific 
capacity building activities that attempt to build on local 
knowledge. However, learning from local communities takes 
time for immersion into their reality and building trust. Given 
the project-oriented funding regime, this time is often not 
available.  
 
Exchange with Southern knowledge institutions hardly takes place, 
despite the potential this could have for both sides: for knowledge 
institutions, more interaction with practitioners could help make their 
research more relevant and practically grounded. For NGOs, knowledge 
institutions could help meet their need for increased research into the 
context and modalities of their work. Knowledge institutions could 
function as ‘scaffolds’ and facilitate deeper levels of reflection and 
learning. For both, such cooperation could contribute to building a 
stronger Southern knowledge base and lead to a more prominent 
Southern, and practitioner, role in global discourse and theory 
development about peacebuilding.  
 
Research is done by SNGOs themselves, but not very much or 
structurally. Many organisations would like to be able to do more 
research to find out about the needs and knowledge of local 
communities and peacebuilding methodologies, both external and local. 
In addition, research would help document lessons from people’s own 
work and facilitate reflection. All this could help Southern peace 
practitioners to have a stronger position in exchanges with Northern 
partners and play a larger role in global peacebuilding debates and 
theory development. 
 
What are the strengths and weaknesses (or gaps) in the knowledge and 
learning of Southern peace NGOs? As mentioned, interaction with 
knowledge institutions is a weakness or gap, as is research and 
documentation. In addition, there is not much learning from monitoring 
and evaluation. To a large extent this is due to M&E procedures being 
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embedded in funding regimes that emphasise accountability and results, 
and limit learning. Strengths include learning by doing – although it is 
difficult to prove concretely that this has occurred -  and the frequent 
interaction of SNGOs with other SNGOs and beneficiaries. Particularly 
striking is the prominent place among learning strategies of interactions 
among SNGOs, often in networks, in order to exchange knowledge and 
learn jointly. Such inter-SNGO-exchange is clearly a strong point of the 
peace NGOs visited. This is despite the existence of obstacles to 
knowledge exchange. 
 
What exactly are the obstacles to learning and exchange by Southern 
peace NGOs? In addition to the structural issues described in the 
previous chapter, more specific issues include a lack of time and funds, 
low capacity and skills to do research and document, the contested 
nature of much knowledge in conflict areas (and elsewhere), 
competition and low trust among peacebuilding actors, power and 
inequality, practical obstacles posed by the social and political situation, 
cultural differences, and the fact that knowledge changes over time.  
 
Now let us compare these findings to those by Hailey and James (2002: 
402-404), who studied successful Indian NGOs and their knowledge 
strategies. In the introduction to this chapter, where this study was cited, 
the following learning activities of these Indian NGOs were mentioned. 
• The NGOs held regular meetings, retreats, workshops, and 
seminars. This also goes for the peace NGOs examined in this 
study.  
• One organisation even “moves staff around in the organisation 
or assigns them to new projects as part of its strategy to 
encourage cross-functional learning. It transfers staff from 
research posts to field positions and from specialist to 
management positions in an attempt to disseminate and 
institutionalise learning.” This I have not encountered in the 
organisations visited; however, some do organise exchanges 
among rather than inside NGOs. 
• Other knowledge-related activities of these organisations 
included sponsoring relevant and applied research and 
publishing research findings. As mentioned, the NGOs studied 
are not able to do this as much as they would like.  
• The NGOs had “sophisticated internal management information 
and monitoring systems”, but “[t]he extent to which donor-led 
evaluation processes contributed to learning was mixed, with the 
incentive to cover up mistakes in order to maintain funding 
undermining the learning process.” This is consistent with the 
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picture emerging from my interviews with local peace NGO 
staff.  
 
Although in theory the cycle of planning, monitoring, evaluation and 
renewed planning presents a good opportunity for supporting 
organisational learning processes in NGOs, for many Southern peace 
NGOs M&E procedures do not play a major role in learning. One reason 
for this is the tension between learning and accountability. In addition, 
many NGOs contend that existing, predominantly quantitative, 
procedures do not match the realities of peacebuilding practice. 
However, more specific procedures for peacebuilding are being 
developed to overcome the limits of only quantitative information in 
reflecting peacebuilding practice.  
 
The participatory elaboration of evaluation tools and criteria of success, 
involving all stakeholders in a programme – donor, SNGO, beneficiaries 
– would help making M&E more relevant to practice and more useful 
for learning. This requires similar relational characteristics between 
Northern and Southern actors as were described in sections 3.6 and 4.7 
on capacity building. Thus, we come back to the importance of a 
learning attitude by donors and reciprocal, trust-based partnerships 
between NNGOs and SNGOs as prerequisites for learning on the part of 
Southern peace organisations and for joint, North-South, third-order 
learning. 
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Chapter 6. Hubs and links 
Networking for peace 
 
Given that Southern peace NGOs identify exchange and interaction with 
other actors as central to the way in which they learn, in this chapter we 
look at networking as a knowledge strategy. Networking is a major 
learning strategy for nearly all of the organisations visited as part of this 
study. The number of networks in the peacebuilding field has risen 
immensely in recent years. Donor agencies are also beginning to focus 
on these networks. The Dutch NGO Cordaid, for example, has made the 
support of peace networks a central part of its peacebuilding strategy.  
 
This chapter builds on the discussion in section 3.7 of networking as a 
strategy for knowledge exchange by NGOs by providing information 
about networks encountered during my field visits, drawing on 
interviews with a large number of NGO staff members involved in those 
networks. The chapter analyses some of the main characteristics, 
obstacles and conditions for success of civil society peacebuilding 
networks. The first section of the chapter discusses the characteristics of 
peacebuilding networks in the countries visited. 6.2 goes into the 
potential benefits of networking as seen by civil society organisations, 
while 6.3 discusses the challenges that peace NGO networks face. 6.4 
combines findings about the functioning of networks with earlier 
findings on NGO learning, knowledge exchange, and obstacles to 
learning and exchange, in order to formulate a number of factors that 
influence the success of networks and networking in the field of 
peacebuilding.  
 
Next, these factors are applied to a case study of a specific network, 
namely the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and its 
member networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone. WANEP is introduced in 
6.5, and in 6.6 it is connected to the earlier mentioned success factors in 
order to achieve a better understanding of what conditions the results of 
networking for learning in a postconflict context. 6.7 discusses the 
implications of all this and relates the findings from the chapter back to 
the research questions guiding this study. Finally, as chapter six 
concludes Part Two of this book on structure and agency in the 
knowledge strategies of Southern peace NGOs, 6.8 draws a number of 
conclusions from this Part.  
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6.1 Networks and networking in the field of peacebuilding 
 
6.1.1 Networks encountered in the field 
 
Section 3.7 discussed the literature on networking as a strategy for peace 
NGOs. It emerged that networking can be a useful peacebuilding 
strategy because it involves making links between different regions and 
levels, because the dynamic nature of peacebuilding means that rigid 
structures are not suitable, and because the field is dispersed over a great 
number of mostly small organisations. Advantages of networking 
included strengthening the field of peace NGOs as a whole, helping to 
avoid duplication of activities, and facilitating complementary 
partnerships.  
 
Indeed, as the lists of networks encountered during my research visits 
illustrate (see Boxes 6.1-6.4), networks of peace NGOs are widespread 
in the countries visited. They exist locally (such as the Rural Women 
Peace Link in North-western Kenya), nationally (such as the Alliance 
for Conflict Transformation in Cambodia), regionally (such as the West 
Africa Network for Peacebuilding or WANEP) and globally (such as the 
International Action Network on Small Arms or IANSA). Most striking 
is the abundance of networks in the Philippines. Although some in that 
country say that there are too many networks, peacebuilders in the 
Philippines and elsewhere value networks as important venues for 
knowledge exchange, mutual support, voicing issues and grievances, 
and joint action.  
 
Box 6.1: Networks encountered in the Philippines and Cambodia or 
 mentioned by interviewees276 
 
Philippines:  
• Waging Peace network of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (organises 
regular conferences of Philippine peace NGOs and published the conference 
reports) 
• Peace Education Network  
• Mindanao Peaceweavers (a network of Mindanawan peace networks) 
• Mindanao People’s Caucus (see Boxes 1.1 and 5.1 and section 1.5.2) 
• Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (a network of Mindanawan NGOs 
focusing on the empowerment of the Bangsomoro) 
• Catholic Relief Service (CRS) partner network (regular meetings and capacity 
building initiatives) 
• Mindanao Emergency Response Network  
                                                 
276 In this and the following boxes, information is provided about the networks to the extent that it is 
available to me. Some networks were merely mentioned in passing and I do not have additional 
information about their focus and activities. 
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• Minnland (horizontal NGO network) 
• Mindanao Development Coalition of NGOs 
 
Cambodia: 
• Peace Forum (irregular meetings among Cambodian peace NGOs) 
• Alliance for Conflict Transformation (network that also engages in various 
activities as an NGO, including training programmes. Partner in ACTS – see 
chapter eight) 
• Women Peacemakers Network 
• Nericlahan (brave women) forum 
• Citizen Action for Development network 
• Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) network 
 
Regional: 
• GPPAC Southeast Asia (see chapter seven) 
• Action Asia (network of Asian peacebuilders, made up of individuals rather 
than organisations. Organises solidarity rallies, exchanges information, 
supports NGOs during peace processes) 
• International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Southeast Asia 
Network (IANSA is a global NGO network focusing on the elimination of 
small arms, with regional sub-networks) 
• Pax Christi International Southeast Asia Network 
• Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network 
• Asia-Pacific Peacebuilding Network (initiated by the World Bank; exchange 
through videoconferencing from local World Bank offices) 
 
Global: 
• GPPAC (see chapter seven) 
• Peace Education Centres Network (see 5.5.5) 
• Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)  
• Global Campaign to Ban Landmines (global activist network) 
• International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA; see above)  
• Hague Appeal for Peace (global NGO peace network which was founded as 
follow-up to a conference but has now become largely inactive) 
 
 
Most civil society peacebuilding networks encountered were founded 
relatively recently: in the late 1990s or later. While in Kenya and the 
Philippines most networks seem to be local in origin, in West Africa 
most peace networks were created to some extent through outside 
interventions – by local branches of international NGOs or as national 
sub-networks of larger regional forums. In Cambodia both are the case. 
In Central Asia, many networks have been created top-down (by donors, 
NNGOs or large SNGOs), but there are exceptions, such as the Dolina 
Mira network in the Ferghana Valley (see Box 6.5) In the Philippines 
and Kenya the networks appear the most indigenously driven. In both 
countries there are grassroots networks that aim to strengthen 
marginalised groups through joint action – such as the Bangsamoro in 
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Mindanao, which have formed various networks. The women forming 
the Rural Women Peace Link in North-western Kenya are another 
example (see Box 4.2 in section 4.1). In addition to such grassroots 
empowerment networks, both countries witness many networks that 
have been created for exchange among peace NGOs.  
 
This difference between Kenya and the Philippines on the one hand and 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cambodia on the other appears to correspond 
with the state of civil society more generally in these countries (see 
chapter one), which in turn corresponds with the amount of destruction 
and level of development of the countries concerned. In resource-
deprived states such as Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Liberia funding 
“seems to be an important prerequisite for any NGO activity”, including 
peace networking (Douma 2005: 10). Networks are also seen as a tool 
for access to funding. At the same time, participants emphasise the 
intrinsic value of networking in terms of knowledge sharing, avoiding 
the duplication of activities, and gaining contacts both within and 
outside the country. Central Asia is a region that is different due to its 
Soviet past and present prevalence of authoritarian governments, which 
make it difficult for civil society to operate independently from 
authorities. Although many people said that networking is a new and 
little understood methodology in Central Asia, interviewees and survey 
respondents also named various networks operating in the region. The 
Dolina Mira network was identified by many as a successful network 
(see Box 6.5). 
 
Box 6.2: Networks encountered in Liberia and Sierra Leone or mentioned 
 by interviewees 
 
Liberia: 
• Union of Liberian Civil Society Organisations 
• Network of Liberian environmental NGOs 
• Network for Collaborative Peacebuilding Sierra Leone (NCP-SL; see case 
study in this chapter) 
 
Sierra Leone: 
• Sierra Leone Association of NGOs (SLANGO) 
• Partners in Conflict Transformation (PICOT; consortium of three relatively 
strong Sierra Leonean peace NGOs) 
  
 
Regional: 
• West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP; see case study in this 
chapter) 
• Women in Peacebuilding network (WIPNET; part of WANEP) 
 
Global: 
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• GPPAC (see chapter seven) 
• International Fellowship of Reconciliation (global spiritually-based movement 
for non-violence with various members including many peace NGOs and a 
secretariat in Alkmaar, the Netherlands) 
• Global Family 
• Peaceways 
• United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY; global network of youth 
organisations that work on peacebuilding with a secretariat in The Hague, 
Netherlands) 
• Women for International Peace and Arbitration (women’s movement 
advocating the peaceful settlement of international disputes, with chapters in 
countries including Sierra Leone) 
 
 
Networks are formed to extend the reach and influence of members and 
to gain access to sources of knowledge that could improve practice. 
They aim at a “cross-fertilisation of knowledge”277 between different 
actors who learn from each other’s perspectives and experiences. The 
content focus of the networks varies. Some focus on peacebuilding as a 
whole, others on sub-issues (disarmament, early warning, the role of 
women in peacebuilding) or related issues (human rights). Still others 
are even broader. In most of the networks encountered, civil society 
organisations make up the members of the network and send 
representatives (often the director of the organisation) to network 
meetings. In some cases, individuals not directly aligned to an NGO, but 
nonetheless considered to be players in peacebuilding, are allowed to 
join. Central to the activities of most networks are regular meetings. In 
addition, many engage in online interaction between meetings. This 
depends on the extent to which members have access to internet. All 
networks have either appointed an individual coordinator or established 
a network secretariat. Sometimes one of the member NGOs takes on the 
role of secretariat, in other cases it is newly created.  
 
Knowledge sharing is considered by most participants to be a 
networking priority and important benefit, although at the same time it is 
difficult due to a lack of trust among NGOs and fear that others may 
take advantage of sensitive information. There is quite some competition 
and suspicion among NGOs. In Sierra Leone it is said that that 
politicians use NGOs and networks to “nurture a specific public 
personality […]. [NGOs] with a high public profile are useful starting 
points for political campaigning. Networking in such cases means 
personal networking to advance the interest of specific individuals.” 
(Douma 2005: 10)  
 
                                                 
277 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
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In addition to knowledge sharing, many networks engage in joint 
activities. The network secretariat often raises funds for particular 
programmes after which it engages relevant members in their joint 
implementation. In this way networks engage in similar kinds of projects 
as individual peace NGOs. Networks encountered engage in human 
rights monitoring, local dialogue and mediation programmes, the 
‘training of trainers’ in conflict mediation, peace education, advice and 
advocacy towards authorities, and early warning. The latter activity may 
be particularly suitable for networks as it requires a widespread presence 
and capacity for gathering and disseminating information. Aside from 
engaging jointly in peacebuilding work, many networks also carry out 
support functions for their members. They try to assist NGOs in getting 
in touch with each other and aim to build the individual and 
organisational capacities of their members through knowledge sharing, 
training, advice and direct support in activities. Networks do not always 
succeed in achieving these support aims. WANEP Liberia for example 
has not been able to implement its capacity building programme, while 
it does carry out many direct peace programmes – as we will see in the 
case study further on. 
 
Box 6.3: Networks encountered in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan or mentioned 
 by interviewees 
 
Kyrgyzstan:  
• A network of centres for educational policy 
• Regional Coordination Councils of government and civil society  
• Association of Crisis Centres in Kyrgyzstan 
• The UNDP has established a local network in Southern Kyrgyzstan 
 
Tajikistan: 
• The Public Committee for Democratic Processes (coalition of Tajik pro-
democracy CSOs)  
• Tajik Public Council (high level body consisting of state and CSO 
representatives) 
 
Regional: 
• Dolina Mira network (see Box 6.5) 
• Young Lawyers of the Ferghana Valley network 
• Ferghana Valley Lawyers without Borders (established as a result of a 
conference on the role of legal specialists in conflict prevention. Members are 
lawyers, prosecutors and judges based in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. Aims at the protection of the rights and interests of citizens and 
provides free legal consultations.) 
• Central Asian network of human rights protection organisations 
• Central Asian development network 
• EAWARN, an early warning network for the post-Soviet states based in 
Moscow 
• International committee of CSOs on People’s Diplomacy, Moscow 
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• GPPAC Central Asia (see chapter seven) 
 
Global: 
• World Assembly ”Movement for democracy”  
• Global Centre for Pluralism  
• GPPAC (see chapter seven) 
 
 
Networks have sometimes been difficult to sustain. In Cambodia various 
attempts to form peace NGO networks failed over the past decade. This 
was because of a lack of time invested in them and in other cases due to 
disagreements over organisation, representation and management. 
However, lessons have been learned from these experiences. When the 
Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT) was founded in 1997 it was 
decided to adopt a very loose organisational form in order to avoid 
governance issues. This has kept the network going. People can join in 
activities and pull back as they please; there is no set membership. 
 
Leadership is a problematic issue for many peacebuilding networks. 
Some networks are ruled relatively autocratically and leaders often 
exercise an exclusive grip on networks. This is noted particularly in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mindanao. Sometimes networks are used as 
political fronts by important civil society leaders. More generally many 
are “dominated by few individuals who are important public 
figureheads. In Sierra Leone and Liberia networks quickly become 
identified with such an individual. This may have an important political 
side effect. Networks can easily become associated with a specific party 
or a political interest group.” (Douma 2005: 29) Many networks 
concentrate resources and staff at the central level. This is particularly 
the case in West Africa and Cambodia. Phnom Penh, Freetown and 
Monrovia contain nearly all of the headquarters of peacebuilding 
networks (or for that matter of all civil society organisations active in 
these countries). As the report from the network meeting in Kenema, 
Sierra Leone in Box 5.3 (section 5.5.1) illustrates, the physical and 
mental distance between network headquarters and members in the 
provinces is often large.  
 
Box 6.4: Networks encountered in Kenya or mentioned by interviewees 
 
Kenya:  
• Africa Peace Forum (resource institution working for peace and security in the 
greater Horn of Africa. Carries out research and engages with governments to 
shape policy. Founded a group working on early warning that includes 
governments and NGOs.) 
• Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet Kenya; national umbrella body of 
NGOs, organisations and individuals supporting human rights, peace and 
  
308 
reconciliation, justice and conflict resolution in Kenya) 
• Rural Women Peace Link (see Box 4.2) 
 
Other country but with secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya:  
• New Sudan Indigenous Network (network of NGOs working in South Sudan to 
empower civil society and act as a watchdog in order to achieve sustainable 
peace for the region) 
• New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC; consists of six member churches. 
When in the late 1980s the national Sudan Council of Churches ran into 
increasing difficulties as a result of the war, NSCC was founded to focus on 
the South of Sudan only. Initially it was a relief organisation, but shifted its 
focus towards peacebuilding in response to increasing conflicts within the 
South of Sudan) 
 
Regional: 
• Peace Tree Network (regional network connecting NGOs working for peace in 
East Africa, the Great Lakes region, and Africa as a whole) 
• Fellowship of Christian Councils in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa 
(FECCLAHA; supports the peacebuilding activities of church councils in the 
countries of the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa) 
• All Africa Council of Churches  
• GPPAC Central and East Africa (see chapter seven) 
 
Global: 
• GPPAC (see chapter seven) 
• World Council of Churches (global organisation of Christian churches that, 
among other things, supports its members to carry out peace activities) 
 
 
Most peace networks face resource constraints and have to focus much 
of their energy on the acquisition of funds on order to sustain their 
institutions and pay for salaries of staff, stationery and other running 
costs. Due to their dependency on donor funding, peace networks in all 
countries face issues similar to those described for individual NGOs in 
chapter four. Network coordinators who interact with donors to secure 
financing for their activities complain of a lack of contextual 
understanding by donor representatives, and are critical of the 
programming priorities that donors impose. Like peace NGO employees 
more generally, network staff members feel that donors should be more 
aware of the knowledge, priorities, and concerns of themselves and their 
members. Networks have difficulty securing support for network 
meetings – particularly for transport and accommodation of members. 
These are often seen to be overhead rather than project costs or even 
unnecessary. The hesitancy of donors to fund not only programmes but 
also core funding and overhead costs represents an obstacle for 
networks. Costs for staff and logistics are not systematically taken into 
account. As a result, most secretariats are under-capacitated.  
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The issues posed by the funding regime may be particularly salient for 
networks, as they are for learning, given the intangible nature of these 
activities and their results. They are also generally quite long-term in 
orientation. As particularly the Southeast Asian interviewees 
emphasised, networking is not a technical matter but is about building 
relationships. This takes time. However, unlike technical arrangements, 
relationships are likely to last, and participants will know how to find 
each other when they need something. The Action Asia network, for 
example, is built around a number of key and committed individuals. As 
these people move to different jobs around the world, they take their 
network and knowledge – as well as their vision and energy - with them 
and continue to be of value. These people share resources with one 
another and because they are so committed they do it in addition to their 
regular work.278  
 
Box 6. 5: The Dolina Mira network in the Central Asian Ferghana 
Valley279 
 
The Dolina Mira (“Valley of Peace”) network is a cross-border CSO network in the 
conflict-stricken Ferghana Valley on the border of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. The network aims to address a variety of cross-border issues relating to 
ethnic tension, resource conflicts, vulnerable populations, customs regulations, legal 
issues and border crossings in the region. The Dolina Mira network comprises thirty 
CSOs and has a paid membership. Member organisations often carry out joint activities, 
such as constructive dialogue and awareness raising activities and training and tolerance 
building in relation to conflicts originating from border crossing. There is also a small 
grants programme through which grassroots organisations can carry out socio-economic 
projects. Through this programme organisations also did a border monitoring project for 
the improvement of the Ferghana Valley region. 
 
Dolina Mira operates at the micro level. Most members agree that it is practical and 
working well. In the past year Dolina Mira has been the only functioning network in 
Uzbekistan - illegally. Even after the bloody shooting of demonstrators in Andijan, 
Uzbekistan in 2005, Dolina Mira was able to keep the Uzbek CSOs involved by offering 
them funds and training. What is considered especially important about Dolina Mira is 
that it provided local civil society groups with knowledge and qualifications and has 
enabled them to exchange experiences.  
 
The way Dolina Mira was established was truly bottom-up. It was created by locals, 
unlike many other networks in the region that were founded in response to the 
availability of donor funds. A concept paper was produced, and a donor found: the 
Danish Refugee Council (DRC). One interviewee remarked that “Dolina Mira is our 
baby, who found a tutor”. The donor is not dominating; the decisions are made by the 
coordinators and General Assembly of the network. People feel there is mutual respect. 
 
There is a strong and competent secretariat, with resources. The coordination board is 
                                                 
278 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian NGO and coordinator of a regional network. 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
279 Interviews held in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 23-29 July 2006. 
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also considered competent and professional, consisting of well-known persons. The 
work of secretariat and coordination board is transparent; members can always ask for 
reports. Members note the possibility to speak openly and freely at network meetings – 
apparently, this is different in other networks in the region. In the network “democracy is 
at work. The main goal of a network is changing values and mentality […]. The way the 
network is organised gives the right example.” 
 
Money is available, making possible regular meetings, activities, planning, and 
implementation in clusters of CSOs. At the same time it is felt that “we can do more for 
less money because we like our network”. Local government officials have also become 
involved. They have approached Dolina Mira for cooperation, because they know it has 
the resources to resolve the problems. The members are “real partners in daily work; 
they are working together practically.”  
 
On the negative side, Dolina Mira is heavily dependent on the funding and staff time of 
the DRC. This is not sustainable. Another negative point about Dolina Mira is that it 
works mainly at the concrete level, focusing on socio-economic projects. Some feel that 
this is not the role a network should be playing and that it should instead aim to change 
politics and politicians in the Ferghana Valley, so as to change the situation. Considering 
that authoritarian politics are closely related to many of the conflict issues in Southeast 
Asia, this is an issue that some say peace organisations and networks need to focus on. 
However, the members of Dolina Mira have low organisational capacity and prefer to 
work on small and concrete projects. They are also afraid of running risks by upsetting 
politicians.  
 
 
 
6.1.2 Categorising the networks 
 
Section 3.7 discussed several dimensions that can help categorise 
networks: their degree of cooperation and organisation, their focus and 
objective, and issues related to their accountability and exclusiveness. 
Here, I add some depth to these dimensions using findings from the field 
research, and add two other dimensions that emerged from the 
conversations held with network members, namely the mode of 
exchange and the role of the coordinating body.  
 
Degree of cooperation and organisation 
Section 3.7 introduced two extremes in the degree of cooperation and 
organisation of networks. On the one extreme, there is the ‘spider web 
model’: a strong centralised network consisting of a central board and 
secretariat, surrounded by circles of members in various levels of 
involvement from full to partial membership. At the other extreme is the 
fish-net or cell-structured network, which is much more loosely 
organised. In reality, most networks find themselves somewhere in 
between these two forms, as is the case with the peace networks 
encountered in my field research. Most have a secretariat but it tends to 
be small, under-funded and overburdened. Much depends on the 
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capacities and contributions of individual members. Many networks 
depend on a few strong member organisations to keep them going.  
 
Focus and objective 
Finding the right balance between focus on the one hand, and 
inclusiveness and diversity on the other, emerges from the field research 
as an important challenge for peace networks. The GPPAC network in 
the next chapter will illustrate this. Many of its members argue for more 
focus in terms of clear objectives, priorities and strategies, noting that 
networks working toward a specific outcome often function well, 
because they have a clear focus, their activity is time-bound, and the 
participants have an obvious common interest. A Cambodian network of 
student organisations was formed to do an interfaith project. It was 
explicitly decided that it would last only for the duration of this project. 
The network worked well280.  
 
At the same time, people see value in having a diverse membership that 
brings people with different backgrounds and points of view together. A 
Cambodian NGO staff member stated that “networking usually takes 
place among like-minded people; networks with people who have 
diverging interests often fail. However, it is precisely networking with 
people who are different that has value. People have to get out of their 
comfort zone.” 281 Such networking across boundaries may contribute 
directly to peacebuilding. Still, it is noted that diverse networks need to 
share a sense of common purpose that overrides individual 
differences.282 Formulating clear and shared objectives therefore remain 
important. In addition, various people said that good networks are built 
around an issue people are interested in and passionate about.   
 
Legitimacy and accountability 
We saw in 3.7 that the loose structure of networks raises issue of 
accountability and ownership. In response, the networks studied devise 
their own mechanisms of accountability. Often they introduce 
democratic elements, electing representative bodies of governance. 
Codes of conduct or constitutions are sometimes developed. Financially, 
peacebuilding networks are usually accountable to donor organisations 
that demand transparent practice and reporting. In many cases the 
coordinating organisation is asked to conduct monitoring and evaluation, 
                                                 
280 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian NGO and coordinator of a regional network. 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
281 Informal conversation with staff member of a Cambodian NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 23 
May 2006. 
282 Informal conversation with staff member of a Cambodian NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 23 
May 2006. 
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but the way this is carried out still depends on the cooperation of the 
partners. 
  
Formal structures do not always correspond with the actual division of 
power within a network. As mentioned, Southern peace networks are in 
many cases dominated by a few strong individuals. Often, public 
figureheads start networks. In Sierra Leone civil society networking 
starts when “powerful and well known individuals […] approach 
colleagues or other important civil society members. They tend to form 
personal alliances as a first step.” Naturally, networks quickly become 
identified with such individuals. Douma notes that “[t]his may have an 
important political side effect. Networks can easily become associated 
with a specific party or a political interest group.” (Douma 2005: 29)  
 
The influence of donor organisations in networks is often not 
immediately visible. Networks can be Northern-dominated and donor-
driven, but they can also be built from the bottom up, as a result of 
Southern organisations meeting a shared need. As one donor 
representative pointed out in a conversation, donor-initiated is not 
necessarily the same as donor-driven; what matters is who sets the 
agenda283. Indeed, some donor-initiated networks are perceived to be 
very useful by the participants284. 
 
Many networks face internal and external discussions on the legitimacy 
of their leadership and representative structures. Sometimes the way in 
which representatives are selected is subject to criticism. The position of 
network secretariats at the interface of the internal network and external 
stakeholders presents them with more general issues of legitimacy and 
representation. On the one hand they represent the interests of their 
members; on the other, they strive to maintain a particular reputation 
externally. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) can 
serve as an example: it consists of a number of national networks. These 
networks lend the WANEP secretariat its legitimacy and the secretariat 
exists to support them. However, the secretariat also demands a certain 
measure of quality from the national networks in order to maintain its 
reputation and retain donors. The national networks obtain legitimacy 
from being a part of the wider WANEP network. Ensuring quality is 
something they have to do in return. The WANEP secretariat is 
constantly struggling to find the right balance between maintaining the 
autonomy of the national networks and ensuring a bottom-up decision-
making structure, while at the same time making sure that the national 
                                                 
283 Conversation with staff members of a Dutch NGO. The Hague, Netherlands, 22 December 2005.  
284 Such as the ICCO partner network in Liberia.  
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networks live up to the quality standards and principles of WANEP.285 
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) 
of which WANEP is a part faces similar issues at the global level.286 
 
Mode of exchange 
The mode of exchange is another characteristic by which networks may 
be categorised. Most networks encountered in the field depend highly on 
more or less regular face-to-face meetings, which are considered 
indispensable to a valuable exchange of tacit and explicit knowledge. 
However, many networks at the local or national level are connected to 
regional or global ones, and although large conferences are sometimes 
organised, much of this exchange takes place via e-mail (and in one 
case, videoconferencing287). E-mail is also used in local and national 
networks for exchanges in between meetings. Some networks have e-
groups on which all members can regularly post messages. In a 
Philippines-wide network for example, one member is good at accessing 
relevant websites, which are then posted on the e-group and mailed to 
others.288  
 
The role of the coordinating body 
Network members interviewed had clear views on the role of the 
coordinating body. They mentioned the following issues. Successful 
networks need more than a few committed people and capable 
institutions to sustain and enhance the process, so that the burden is not 
borne by one institution only, as often happens. Also needed is a good 
coordinator or secretariat that people feel comfortable with. The 
coordinator should be active, have a clearly understood role, and have 
the time to do his or her job well. One network encountered had five 
people trying to coordinate it, all of whom were doing so in addition to 
their regular work. This lead to confusion and all coordinators according 
low priority to the network. 
 
A coordinating party is required for a network to function well. This can 
range from one person spending a few hours a week on the network to 
an entire fulltime network secretariat. Some networks visited are 
coordinated by a member organisation that has been assigned to do so. 
                                                 
285  Interviews with WANEP members in Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, February 2006. 
286 Conversation with staff members of the GPPAC International Secretariat. Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, 25 April 2006. 
287 The Asia-Pacific Peacebuilding Network, initiated by the World Bank, has videoconferencing 
sessions during which peace NGOs from various Asian countries exchange information and 
experiences. A number of Cambodian NGOs participates in these via videolink from the local 
World Bank office. Source: interview with director of a Cambodian youth NGO. Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, 24 May 2006. 
288 Interview with staff member of a Philippine NGO. Quezon City, 19 May 2006. 
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These organisations perform a network secretariat function in addition to 
their other activities. The coordinating party moderates online 
interaction, processes information, and facilitates direct contact between 
members by putting them in touch with each other and by organising 
face-to-face meetings. In more action-oriented networks, coordinators 
may also raise funds for the network, initiate common programmes, and 
take the lead in lobby and advocacy. 
 
The role of the coordinator is crucial. A network needs one or more 
persons who feel a special responsibility about the forum which they 
have joined or created, who facilitate exchange, organise events, and 
start discussions on governance matters where necessary. At the same 
time, the role of the coordinating body or secretariat can also be 
problematic. First of all, financing a secretariat is often difficult, because 
donors are often unwilling to provide anything other than project 
funding. In addition, it often happens that a secretariat has difficulty 
finding the right balance between the interests of the network members 
and their own organisational interest. For example, a secretariat may be 
tempted to use funds attracted for the network to implement its own 
programmes. This, we will see below, occurred at WANEP Liberia. 
Another issue may be that an organisation acting as secretariat fears 
losing its profile vis-à-vis donors and other potential partners, as NGOs 
are under continuous pressure to demonstrate their unique contribution 
to the field. (Galama and Van Tongeren 2002: 35)  
 
The selection of a coordinator may also present problems. There may be 
competition over this position, particularly when the coordinating party 
is also the recipient of external funds for the network. Experience shows 
that where an existing NGO is selected to coordinate the network, this 
organisation acquires a power position from being the recipient of donor 
funds for the network. This can have an adverse effect: the coordinating 
NGO may be reluctant to jeopardise its newfound power and start 
monopolising rather than sharing knowledge as a result. More generally, 
the position of power that individuals and organisations derive from 
being at the funding interface is recognised by practitioners289 and 
researchers (Hilhorst 2003) alike. This makes democratic governance of 
networks a priority – but not always a reality. 
 
It is important that the coordinator has the time to do his or her job well. 
A lot depends on whether this coordinator acts in an authoritarian or an 
                                                 
289 Mentioned by interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone in February 2006 as well as during a 
conversation with staff members of a Dutch NGO that supports networks (The Hague, Netherlands, 
22 December 2005). 
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empowering way. A good coordinator acts as a motivator, has an open 
mind for everyone, and ensures that everyone is heard. He or she always 
promotes the network’s cause and never forgets who his/her 
constituency is. It is difficult to find such people, particularly in places 
where authoritarian styles are common. 290 A network coordinator in 
Cambodia noted that to some degree, the networking methodology 
defies the participatory principles prevalent in the development 
community, particularly in peacebuilding.  
“Development avoids top-down approaches and emphasises 
accountability. It tries to empower people at the bottom to take 
responsibility. By contrast, networks are generally dependent on strong 
relationships and key people taking certain initiatives forward. Often 
they are highly centralised and are managed by a small group of 
people. The differences between networking and ‘regular’ 
development work should be well understood by donors.” 291 
 
 
6.2 Potential benefits of networking for peace 
 
Nearly all the SNGOs visited for this study participate in one or more 
networks. Table 6.1 shows the kinds of answers given when 
interviewees were asked about the benefits of networking to their work.  
 
Benefits of 
networking  and 
knowledge 
exchange  
Lib 
(10) 
SL 
(16) 
Kenya 
(11) 
Phil 
(10) 
Cam 
(14)  
C-
Asia 
(15) 
Total 
(76) 
Hear about other 
ways of doing 
things, experiences 
2 3 1 3 2 6 17 
Stronger together 
vis-à-vis authorities, 
international 
organisations 
 1 2 2 3 7 15 
Widens reach, 
visibility of 
organisation 
1 1 4 3 2 3 14 
Build capacity 2 1 1 1 1 7 13 
Combine expertise; 
complement one 
another 
3 6 1  1 2 13 
Knowledge creation 
through interaction 
3 5  1 2 2 13 
                                                 
290 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian NGO and coordinator of a regional network. 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
291 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian NGO and coordinator of a regional network. 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
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Learn from 
successes of others 
and avoid repeating 
their mistakes 
1 1 1 2 1 1 7 
Influence policy   2   5 7 
Solidarity, moral 
support 
 2  2 1 1 6 
Prevent duplication 1 3 1   1 6 
Build peace: change 
perceptions and 
attitudes; counter 
misinformation; 
empowerment 
through knowledge 
 3 1   1 5 
Better analysis of 
context, issues 
1 2   1 1 5 
Systematisation 
/standardisation of 
approaches; work 
towards integrated 
approach 
2 1 1   1 5 
Collaboration  2    2 4 
Keeping one’s 
knowledge up to 
date 
1   1 2  4 
Indigenous 
knowledge accessed 
and shared 
   3   3 
Access to funds  2    1 3 
Create common goal  1 1   1 3 
Regional 
cooperation 
     3 3 
Find new partners  2    1 3 
Increase 
recognition, 
legitimacy of 
organisation 
 2     2 
Informing people 
outside country of 
what is happening 
  1 1   2 
International 
partners can 
decrease isolation 
     2 2 
Provide expertise to 
external actors 
1      1 
Be inspired by 
others 
 1     1 
Intervention in 
conflict 
1      1 
Early warning      1 1 
Table 6.1: Benefits of networking and knowledge exchange according to 
Southern peace NGOs 
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The table shows that knowledge sharing is seen as the most important 
benefit of networks. It is mentioned in various forms:  
• hearing about other experiences and ways of doing things 
• combining expertise and complementing one another’s 
knowledge (particularly in West Africa this is a way of looking 
at knowledge sharing) 
• jointly creating knowledge through interaction (when people 
from different places come together and share, this generates 
new energy and ideas. A workshop with peace scholar Johan 
Galtung that was organised in Phnom Penh during my visit to 
Cambodia generated ideas for three new projects in one of the 
participating NGOs.) 
• learning from the successes and mistakes of others (for 
example, one Cambodian NGO collected the inputs and 
experiences of many other NGOs and used them for the 
development of a school curriculum.292)  
• better analysis of the context 
• systematisation and standardisation of approaches, working 
towards an integrated approach (this point, particularly in 
combination with the previous one, is important when we think 
back to the difficulties local peace NGOs have to reflect on the 
bigger picture of conflict and peace, their role in it, and the 
extent to which their work complements that of others293) 
• keeping one’s knowledge up to date 
• accessing and sharing indigenous knowledge (a point 
emphasised in the Philippines) 
• informing people outside the country of what is happening 
• providing expertise to external actors 
• exchanging early warning signals for conflict prevention. 
 
Another important benefit of networking is through the power of 
numbers. It gives individual organisations a stronger position vis-à-vis 
authorities, which may be used for policy influencing, lobby and 
advocacy activities. This point, phrased in several ways (being stronger 
together vis-à-vis governments and international organisations, widening 
the reach and visibility of an organisation, joint policy influencing, and 
having international partners, which may decrease isolation) is 
mentioned everywhere but receives particular emphasis in Central Asia, 
where civil society is generally weak in the face of authoritarian 
                                                 
292 Interview with staff member of a Cambodian NGO. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
293 See in particular section 1.6.1. 
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governments and such strategies are important prerequisites for its 
survival and impact. Other benefits mentioned include that networks 
may help build the capacity of organisations (something also related to 
knowledge sharing) and may coordinate between the activities of 
member NGOs to prevent duplication, something that is said to occur 
often. In addition, networks may facilitate NGOs linking up for joint 
projects and programmes.  
 
Some additional insights about the benefits of networking may be 
gained from the global survey294 carried out as part of the GPPAC case 
study, analysed in the next chapter. Asked what the benefits of the 
global and regional GPPAC networks had been for their organisation, 
there was little difference between the answers given with regard to the 
global and regional level. The main benefits mentioned largely confirm 
the picture arising out of the interviews. They were: 
• exchange of experiences and learning (127 people); collecting 
and sharing lessons learned and best practices 
• contacts; expansion of network and partners (89) 
• access to knowledge and expertise (83) in the field for an 
increased understanding of issues that play a role in conflict and 
peace, particularly those at global level 
• facilitate collaboration and work towards joint goal and 
strategy (75); this provides the potential for truly regional and 
global action.  
• capacity building (55), increasing understanding of the context, 
strengthening organisations, providing training 
• lobby and advocacy (38); more advocacy power through the 
power of numbers and links with influential players; bridging 
the gap between governments and civil society; lobbying with 
the UN 
• increased visibility/legitimacy/influence (26) of one’s 
organisation through the network 
• raising awareness (21) of conflict prevention, peacebuilding 
and the role of civil society  
• fundraising and access to funds (16) 
• mutual assistance (13) and practical and moral support 
• unity and solidarity of civil society (9) 
• link the global to the local (5) 
 
                                                 
294 See Annex 2. 
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Networks can also help overcome divisions within civil society. A West 
African network coordinator gave the example of Togo, where there are 
two NGO collectives, one pro- and one anti-government: 
“Well-intentioned interventions by NGOs can be counterproductive in 
such an environment because it is easy to be seen as biased. For that 
reason it is important that our national network in Togo includes 
organisations from both collectives, which work jointly to show that it 
is not a response from one side only. This increases the credibility of 
actions. Sometimes it can also be important for a neutral outsider to 
step in; this is a role often played by staff members of the regional 
network secretariat.”295 
 
Particularly in Southeast Asia, another benefit of networking emerged 
from many of the interviews held that is not mentioned so often in the 
networking literature: the sense of solidarity and moral support that 
being a part of a network provides. The Action Asia network for 
example organises solidarity events for Burma and East Timor in other 
Southeast Asian countries.296 The Mindanawan organisation Initiatives 
for International Dialogue (IID) sends a newsletter to organisations 
throughout the region informing them of developments and activities 
around conflict and peace in Southeast Asian countries. NGO workers 
that receive these newsletters say they feel strengthened by knowing that 
others face similar issues as they do297. 
 
More practical mutual support is also considered an important feature of 
networks. In addition, networks enable organisations that otherwise have 
difficulty reaching audiences to voice their issues and grievances and 
advocate solutions. Speaking as a member of a civil society network 
gives one a much better advocacy position than as an individual 
organisation. The Mindanao Peace Caucus, a network of grassroots 
organisations, lobbied successfully for an international ceasefire 
monitoring team in Mindanao. The network also contributed to forging 
the ceasefire agreement through a huge demonstration on a highway298. 
Such joint activities are another potential benefit of networks. 
 
Of course, networks do not always achieve the potential benefits listed 
in this section. For one thing, they are affected by the obstacles to 
knowledge sharing discussed in the previous chapter – as the West 
African case study further on in this chapter will illustrate. At an even 
more basic level, whether a network benefits its members and is 
                                                 
295 Interview with director of a West African NGO network. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
296 Several conversations with staff member of Action Asia. 
297 Various interviews in the Philippines and Cambodia, May 2006. 
298 Interview with chairman of the Mindanao People’s Caucus. Marbel, Philippines, 16 May 2006. 
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conducive to peacebuilding depends on the extent to which it adds value 
to activities and exchanges already taking place. If there are too many 
networks operating in a given region, then individual networks are 
unlikely to add much value. In Mindanao some people consider this to 
be the case. A donor representative noted for example that “there are a 
lot of networks in Mindanao, and there is a lot of overlap between 
them.”299 A member of Mindanawan civil society adds that  
“too often in Mindanao, networks are formed. After each conference 
an organisation is created. This results in many abbreviations [the 
names of the networks], but usually it is the same people who make up 
the network. Often the new organisational forms only add to the 
workload. If the activities aimed at could as well be carried out within 
one or more of the organisations involved then there is no need to 
create an organisation”.300  
 
 
6.3 Challenges for networking 
 
In general, the challenges to learning and knowledge sharing identified 
in section 5.6 apply to networks. In fact interviewees often mentioned 
them in the context of discussing networks. Thus, a lack of time and 
money to participate in networking, the need to adapt knowledge to the 
context, competition and distrust among actors in peacebuilding, the low 
capacity of SNGOs, imposition of ideas by donors, the lack of 
constituency of some SNGOs, the fact that the content of knowledge is 
often contested, aspects relating to power relations and inequality within 
a given country or region, constraints resulting from the difficult social 
and political situation in (post)conflict societies, cultural issues, gender 
and the fact that knowledge changes over time all play a role. In 
addition, networks face a number of specific organisational issues, 
which become clear from the GPPAC survey mentioned earlier301 that 
also asked respondents about the challenges to successful networking. 
They include most of the factors mentioned above. In addition, the 
answers included: 
• the difficulty of proving the value of the network by moving 
towards implementation and concrete activities (26 people) 
• finding a focus and developing a clear strategy (16) 
• difficulties with information flows and communication (18) 
within the network 
                                                 
299 Conversation with staff member of a Dutch development organisation. The Hague, The 
Netherlands, 19 April 2006. 
300 Informal conversation with staff member of a Mindanawan NGO. Davao, Philippines, 15 May 
2006. 
301 See Annex 2. 
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• keeping the momentum, continuity and sustainability (17)  
• low commitment (8) on the part of some members. Persuading 
people to be actively involved is a challenge. Members have to 
deal with competing demands on their time and energy.  
• governance, transparency and ownership (6)  
• becoming more rooted at grassroots level (4) 
• supporting weak members (4) 
• language barriers (4) 
 
The regular mentioning of the difficulty of moving towards concrete 
activities should be seen in the context of GPPAC. Although the 
question about network challenges was asked in general terms, the 
survey was held among GPPAC members. As the next chapter will 
show, the difficulty of becoming concrete is an important issue for this 
network. The need to find a focus and clear strategy was also mentioned 
in sections 3.7 and 6.1. There it became clear that this need has to be 
balanced against the values of diversity and inclusiveness. The challenge 
of keeping the momentum and sustaining a network over the longer term 
applies to GPPAC, as well as to many other networks in the field, 
including the Sierra Leonean WANEP network analysed further on in 
this chapter, which was dormant for several years before it was revived. 
Governance, transparency and ownership were also discussed in 3.7 and 
6.1. They are important issues to deal with in order to prevent (or 
overcome) conflicts within networks and to ensure that the interests and 
views of members are represented in decision making. 
 
Sustaining information flows and communication, particularly in 
between face-to-face meetings, is an issue for many networks. This is 
not only related to a lack of access to communication tools on the part of 
some members, but also to coordinators being overburdened and lacking 
time and capacity to pass on information. In addition, language barriers 
(mentioned separately in the above list of challenges) play a role in 
international networks. Finally, low capacity and commitment of 
members, and a lack of time to participate in networking, resonate with 
issues described in the previous chapter. 
 
 
6.4 Factors influencing network success 
 
Building on the experiences presented so far, what characteristics of 
knowledge exchange networks are found to be important for successful 
functioning? Networking is affected by the issues outlined in previous 
chapters:  
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• the organisational learning capacity of their members (chapter 
three) 
• the structural constraints posed by inequalities between North 
and South as well as among actors in (post)conflict countries 
themselves, most notably donors and recipients, and the way in 
which these determine the capacity of local actors to generate 
and disseminate knowledge (chapter four) 
• obstacles to learning and exchange such as a lack of time and 
money, limited organisational capacity and characteristics, the 
fact that much knowledge in conflict is contested, competition 
and distrust among civil society actors, power relations and 
inequality among participants in exchange, the difficult social 
and political situation in (post)conflict societies, cultural issues 
and gender divisions that need to be bridged in order to share 
and learn jointly, and the fact that knowledge changes quickly 
(chapter five) 
• the way in which a network is organised; its activities, focus and 
objective; the role of its coordinating body; its legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability; its extent of exclusiveness; and 
challenges it may face (section 3.8 and chapter six). 
 
The following pages translate all of these issues into a list of twenty-five 
factors that influence the success of knowledge networking. These 
factors relate to  
• the capacity of the member organisations 
• the relationship between members and the network 
• general characteristics of the network 
• governance, legitimacy and organisation of the network 
• coverage and inclusiveness of the network 
• the content of the network 
• the context of the network 
• the funding structure of the network. 
 
 
6.4.1 Capacity of the member organisations 
 
One basic requirement for the success of a network of NGOs is the 
extent to which the participating organisations are able to give valuable 
input and make use of whatever comes out of it. Thus, the organisational 
capacity of members (as discussed in section 5.6.2) is of significance for 
networking. As our focus here is particularly on the knowledge 
exchange function of networks, this means that the knowledge level and 
learning capacity of the member NGOs are especially important. 
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Organisations with low learning capacity will be unable to improve their 
work based on knowledge gained through networking. Networks 
themselves can also play a role in stimulating the learning capacity of 
members. This leads to the following success factors for networks at the 
level of the individual members. 
 
1. The participating organisations have the capacity to learn and 
to use the network for some purpose. They are able to apply the 
knowledge gained from network participation to their own work. 
This requires both the will and space to change work methods 
and try new things. The members also have a work culture that 
stimulates learning. The network supports learning processes 
within member organisations.  
2. The network contributes to the capacity building of its members. 
This helps to deal with issues of power and inequality and 
ensures that members can get the most out of their participation 
in the network. The network also provides room for discussion 
and reflection upon actions. 
3. Participants have time to engage in meaningful exchanges. 
 
 
6.4.2 Relationship between the member organisations and the network 
 
Earlier we discussed the need for networks to add value to an existing 
field. This leads to the following factor in the relation between 
individual NGOs and their network.  
 
4. The network has a clear added value for the members. The 
members have a need for the network and participants are 
motivated to participate actively. The network does not exist in 
isolation but has sustainable links to activities carried out in 
reality. 
 
In 3.7 and 6.1 the importance of shared objectives and clarity about its 
aims and possibilities emerged, leading us to the next two points. 
 
5. There is a clear purpose; a shared mission by all parties 
involved. This has been translated into a clear set of objectives. 
Without a specific aim, interaction quickly becomes spurious. 
However, with a too narrowly defined objective, a community 
may not survive its own success. It may fall apart once the aim 
has been realized, without making sure that the accumulated 
insight is passed on. 
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6. From the outset, there is clarity about the limits and possibilities 
of the network. There has been sufficient discussion about what 
the network can do, and expectations are not unrealistic. 
Similarly, there is clarity about the process. Lines of 
communication and dissemination are clear and systematic, but 
flexible. 
 
 
6.4.3 Characteristics of the network 
 
The organisational learning discussion, covered in chapter three, 
generates number of factors conducive to learning that can be applied to 
networks in the following way.  
 
7. The network is flexible and capable of responding to changes in 
the environment. The network is also flexible in that room is 
created for self-organisation – participants who link up can 
start all kinds of initiatives together. 
8. There is an atmosphere of safety in which to express doubts and 
criticisms and manage uncertainties; in other words the network 
constitutes a safe setting for knowledge exchange.  
 
Also part of the organisational learning literature, but particularly 
significant for our area of study, are issues of trust, openness to different 
views, and cross-cultural sensitivity. These are needed to overcome 
some of the obstacles formulated in the previous chapters, such as 
discourse dominance, contested knowledge, competition, (conflict-
related) mistrust, and cultural issues and gender.  
 
9. There is trust among the members and between participants and 
funders. Without the confidence that everyone is in it for the 
larger good there will be a tendency to withhold knowledge in 
order to strengthen one’s position. 
10. There is openness to different points of view, different values, 
and different interpretations of reality. The network’s 
knowledge exchange function is not hampered by the constraints 
of a discourse coalition or hegemonic project. The network may 
engage in advocacy but its “common voice” does not prohibit 
the coexistence of different opinions. Cultural issues are 
recognised and discussed in the network.  
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6.4.4 Governance, legitimacy and organisation of the network 
 
Power relations and inequality also emerged in chapters four and five as 
particularly salient issues that can limit the success of knowledge 
sharing and networking activities. The way in which a network is 
governed, and specifically the extent to which all participants are 
accorded an equal say, can make a difference in mitigating such issues. 
 
11. The network is democratic and inclusive. It is not controlled by 
a single set of interests. Members may have unequal capacity 
and strength but they have an equal voice. Those who 
coordinate the network are accountable to the members.  
12. The network strives to mitigate power issues. It has mechanisms 
in place that regulate conflict and prevent personal issues from 
taking the foreground. The stronger members have a genuine 
desire to contribute to open exchange and facilitate the capacity 
building of other members. They inevitably influence the 
network more strongly than weaker members do, but they do not 
impose their own views at the expense of openness and diversity.  
13. The participating organisations have a sense of ownership. It is 
their process and not something that has been imposed by 
donors or governments. 
 
In section 6.1.2, the role of a coordinator or network secretariat emerged 
as a factor that influences the success of a network, as follows. 
 
14. Facilitation and moderation: sustaining networks requires 
considerable time, effort and resources.  There should be at 
least one person who is enabled to spend time on the facilitation 
of the network. Some kind of secretariat needs to coordinate and 
organise the flows of knowledge, preventing information 
overload and scatter. It follows that funding is required. 
However, a network can also be overmoderated, if a moderator 
has a narrow view of the purpose of the group, takes decisions 
in an authoritarian way and stifles discussion rather than 
stimulating it. There is only a narrow space between 
channelling a discussion smoothly into a constructive direction 
and pressing people into a straightjacket which would exclude 
any spontaneous detours, exchanges or personal remarks. The 
role of the moderator is crucial, since all the other dimensions 
mentioned in this list depend on a moderator who assures that 
the group avoids the many possible pitfalls. 
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In chapter five a potential obstacle to learning and knowledge sharing 
was found in the fact that knowledge – particularly knowledge about 
conflict and peace – changes rapidly. Strategies working today may not 
work in a few months’ time, particularly given the dynamics of conflict 
situations. In order to deal with that problem, the following factor can be 
of importance. 
 
15. Knowledge sharing needs to occur on a regular basis, 
otherwise information provided may already be outdated. As 
explicit knowledge tends to change more slowly than tacit 
knowledge, face-to-face interaction is important for the 
exchange of the latest tacit knowledge.  
 
 
6.4.5 Coverage and inclusiveness of the network 
 
In sections 3.7 and 6.1 I discussed the difficult issue of finding a balance 
between focus on the one hand, and diversity and inclusiveness on the 
other. This leads to the following three factors. 
 
16. The right balance has to be found between inclusiveness and 
diversity on the one hand, and focus and direction on the other. 
This goes for content as well as membership, as points 17 and 
18 elaborate. 
17. Membership balance: if only people with a similar background 
participate, opinions may not differ sufficiently to generate 
creative ideas. Moreover, if only a small fraction of the 
potential constituency participates, people will turn to other 
forums where these people do meet. On the other hand, by 
asking too many people with different backgrounds to join, 
communication could also falter. The reasons are that chances 
increase that individual contributions are beyond the interest of 
the majority of members; people hesitate to engage themselves 
because they do not see a common denominator which brings 
participants together; and there may be an information 
overload – unless the information is skilfully channelled into 
different subgroups and discussion threads. 
 
 
6.4.6 Content of the network 
 
18. Content balance: if the field of discussion is too narrow, it will 
not stimulate a broad enough flow of information and 
interaction may be less creative, since creative ideas often result 
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from the combination of hitherto uncombined elements. In 
addition, a too narrow field would only attract the ‘usual 
suspects’ who already know each other fairly well; little cross-
fertilization would take place. If the field is too broad, however, 
then the interaction remains too vague and becomes 
uninteresting for serious people, and it becomes very difficult to 
arrive at common products which bind the group together. 
 
The importance for learning of exchanging both tacit and explicit 
knowledge emerges from chapters two and three, but also from the 
discussion on quickly changing knowledge in chapter five. It brings us 
to the following factor. 
 
19. Tacit as well as explicit knowledge is exchanged; the network 
brings people into contact with each other who can share 
experiences, but it also attempts to draw experiences together 
into codified knowledge that can be distributed more easily. A 
combination of face-to-face and online interaction is probably 
the best way to achieve this. 
 
Section 6.3 mentioned the importance for networks of having a clear 
aim. This is indeed something that is regularly mentioned by network 
members interviewed. Thus, there has to be some kind of result a 
network is working towards.  
 
20. Results: networks may generate ‘common products’. These 
could be joint publications containing lessons learned or 
recommendations, joint projects or programmes, the 
organisation of an event, a broadening of the community, or the 
start of a new one in a different field or region. Many 
communities are created for the exchange of knowledge and 
experience per se. But there is always an implicit assumption 
that this exchange will lead to better results, if not through joint 
activity, then through the improved functioning of the individual 
participants who are enriched by the exchange.  
 
A final thing to remember with regard to content is that a network is 
different from an organisation. As we saw earlier in this chapter, ideally 
it should be a flexible and easily changing framework that stimulates 
individual initiative rather than prescribes action. This also goes for the 
content; the knowledge that is shared. To prevent the dominance of a 
particular discourse or interest, and be as open as possible to different 
perspectives, flexibility about content and exchange is important.  
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21. The network does not strive to be an overall, comprehensive 
knowledge system, but aims to offer a stimulating framework 
that facilitates exchange and access to knowledge sources. 
 
 
6.4.7 Context of the network 
 
Chapter four has shown that each peacebuilding initiative, including 
networks, functions within a structural context. Chapter five added to 
this by discussing how the social and political situation in conflict-
affected countries influences the success of knowledge sharing 
initiatives. Thus, the context of a network is significant, and the way in 
which networks relate to this context matters for the way they function. 
This leads us to the following three factors.  
 
22. Embeddedness: any network should be linked in an appropriate 
way to a wider environment, to neighbouring communities, 
similar initiatives in other countries or regions. If this is not the 
case, a network remains isolated. Insights generated in similar 
networks might not be taken into account, resources will not be 
pooled, results cannot be compared, and ideas will remain less 
widespread. At the same time, the network should not be 
embedded to the extent that it cannot operate autonomously. 
23. The network establishes links with existing networks in order to 
prevent duplication and maximise knowledge benefits. 
24. The network operates in an enabling context. It is not 
obstructed by governments, conflict parties or other 
organisations. The basic infrastructure is present and there is 
some level of safety and security. The political environment 
fosters free speech and freedom of movement. If the context is 
not so enabling, creative ways are found to deal with 
constraints. 
 
 
6.4.8 Funding of the network 
 
Section 5.6.1 showed how important it is to have resources available for 
knowledge activities – including networking – in order to enable NGOs 
to make time for, and give priority to, these activities. At the same time 
we in the back of our minds the discussion in chapter four of the 
constraints imposed by funding regimes. A combination of these issues 
leads us to the following characteristics of successful networks.  
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25. The funding structure of the network has the following 
characteristics: 
o There is sufficient funding for networking and 
knowledge sharing activities, even if the direct impact of 
these cannot always be shown.  
o At the same time, the network is accountable 
financially. 
o Donors do not impose particular kinds of knowledge or 
particular modes of knowledge exchange. 
o The funding structure does not provide a position of 
power to one organisation at the funding interface, but 
ensures that the funds benefit the network as a whole. 
o It does not enhance competition between members. 
o Donors engage in knowledge exchange with the 
network, thus contributing to the knowledge processes 
inside it and linking it up to other networks. 
o Donors take the knowledge generated in the network 
seriously and make use of it in their policy formulation 
as much as possible. This will increase the relevance of 
the network and give participants an incentive to 
continue contributing to it.  
 
Having abstracted the above success factors from the practice of civil 
society networking peace, it is time to return once more to the empirical 
reality and compare these factors with a concrete case of a peacebuilding 
network. In the next section, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP) will be introduced, before being linked in section 6.6 to the 
factors formulated above in order to both apply and illustrate them.  
 
 
6.5 Case study: the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP)  
 
The next two sections provide a case study of the West Africa Network 
for Peacebuilding (WANEP). The network exists in fourteen West-
African countries. The data presented here are based on information 
obtained during a visit to the regional headquarters of the network in 
Ghana for an interview with its director, and on an analysis of the 
member networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone by interviewing peace 
NGO staff members involved in them.302  
                                                 
302 Out of the 24 WANEP members in Liberia, five were interviewed. This amounts to 20%. In 
addition, the coordinator of WANEP Liberia was interviewed, as well as four non-members who 
knew the network. Out of the 72 members of NCP-SL, the Sierra Leonean WANEP network, 
fourteen were interviewed, which also amounts to about 20%. In addition, the network coordinator 
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6.5.1 Foundation and development of WANEP303 
 
The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) was founded in 
1998. The process that led to its foundation began in 1990, when the 
relatively peaceful state of the West-African region (not counting 
numerous coups d’etat) ended with the outbreak of the conflict in 
Liberia. The Ghanaian Emmannuel Bombande worked with the Kenya-
based NGO Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI-Africa) in East-Africa, 
through which he met the peace scholar John Paul Lederach, who in turn 
brought him into contact with Liberian peace activist Samuel Doe. Both 
Bombande and Doe went to do a Master programme at Eastern 
Mennonite University (EMU) in the United States. They struggled with 
the best ways to apply the concepts introduced there in their own region 
and had many conversations with the faculty of EMU about this. The 
idea to set up a West African peacebuilding organisation began to form. 
The EMU faculty helped Doe and Bombande to obtain a grant from the 
Winston Foundation that allowed them to conduct research in West 
Africa in order to test and form ideas about the best structure and nature 
of such an organisation.  
 
At the time there were no organisations in the region that focused 
exclusively on peacebuilding. Many development organisations 
experienced a contradiction between their development work and the 
conflict, with development activities sometimes unintentionally leading 
to an escalation of conflicts. Latent issues emerged into violence as 
development interventions introduced new inequalities and envy. As a 
result, these organisations overwhelmingly recognised the need to deal 
with the conflicts more directly.  
 
According to the director, the various countries in the region faced 
similar problems, creating a need for a common body. At the same time 
the region was also extremely diverse, calling for a loose organisational 
form that left room for diverging initiatives and ideas. Therefore the 
form of organisation chosen for WANEP was a network. A regional 
secretariat was created and based in Accra, Ghana. Next, the new 
regional secretariat moved to create national networks in fourteen 
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo. According to the director, in retrospect this top-down way of 
                                                                                                            
was interviewed here as well, one non-member was interviewed, and a regional network meeting 
was attended in Kenema. 
303 This section is based mainly on an interview with the director of WANEP. Accra, Ghana, 6 
February 2006. 
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developing the network was the wrong way around and led to problems 
later on (see below).  
 
The Winston Foundation provided another grant, and Cordaid gave 
three-year support. There was also some EU money granted. After the 
three-year fund ended, Cordaid gave bridging funds to enable WANEP 
to restructure and to draft a new three-year plan. In the meantime 
WANEP also applied for funding from other donors. However, an 
evaluation in 2003 brought problems to light between national networks 
and the regional secretariat. As the national networks had been created 
by the regional secretariat, they remained overly dependent on it. In 
response, it was decided that the national networks should become more 
autonomous, while they should continue to recognise the overall mission 
and values of WANEP and act within these. WANEP’s regional staff 
have difficulty walking the thin line between national autonomy on the 
one hand, and stepping in when national networks do not act in 
accordance with WANEP’s vision, potentially damaging its reputation, 
on the other. Some national networks are more dependent on the 
regional secretariat than others – financially, but also for creative input.  
 
The 2003 evaluation also revealed a top-heavy structure in which the 
various regional bodies all consisted of representatives of the fourteen 
national networks. Instead, it was decided to create a professional (rather 
than representative) executive board. The professional board includes an 
organisational development expert, a gender expert, a financial 
administration expert, and two peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
experts. The annual regional meeting of country representatives 
nonetheless retained the ultimate decision-making power. The 
secretariat reports to the executive director, who reports to the 
professional board, which reports to the annual regional meeting. Each 
national network has a national board, the chairperson of which is 
represented in the annual regional meeting. 
 
The restructuring period that followed the 2003 evaluation was a very 
difficult one in which power issues began to come to the fore and there 
was a lot of mistrust about the agendas of individuals. The two founders 
of WANEP found themselves in opposing positions (with Doe more 
willing to compromise and Bombande more principled). People’s 
positions began to be more about which individual they supported rather 
than about content. Doe finally left.  
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6.5.2 WANEP objectives and activities304 
 
WANEP’s vision is “a West Africa region characterized by just and 
peaceful communities where the dignity of the human person is 
paramount and where the people can meet their basic human needs and 
decide their own direction.” In terms of objectives, WANEP seeks to 
• strengthen the capability of peacebuilding organisations and 
practitioners in West Africa to engage actively in the peaceful 
transformation of violent conflicts  
• increase awareness on the use of non-violent strategies in 
responding to conflicts in West Africa.  
• develop a conflict prevention network in West Africa to 
monitor, report and offer indigenous perspectives and 
understanding of conflicts in West Africa  
• harmonise peacebuilding activities in West Africa through 
networking and coordination of WANEP members.  
• create understanding of the impact of truth, justice, and 
reconciliation on peacebuilding in West Africa.  
• build the capacity of West African Women to actively 
participate in peacebuilding processes at all levels.305 
 
WANEP recognises that knowledge is needed to inform practice. The 
regional network uses the term ‘cross-fertilisation of knowledge’ 
between different actors that learn from each other’s perspectives and 
experiences. Each of WANEP’s programmes306 is supposed to promote 
such cross-fertilisation. The most common ways in which knowledge is 
shared within WANEP are, first, regular meetings of national 
representatives and second, workshops and seminars in the framework 
of the West Africa Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI). National network 
coordinators are regularly asked to propose people from within the 
national networks for participation in one of the WAPI workshops. 
WAPI’s facilitators, who come from various countries, try to ensure that 
knowledge is exchanged in an interactive way. Concepts are 
continuously related to their practical relevance in the different contexts 
represented.  
 
                                                 
304 This section is based mainly on an interview with the director of WANEP. Accra, Ghana, 6 
February 2006. 
305 www.wanep.org. Accessed March 1st 2006. 
306 Active Nonviolence and Peace Education; Capacity Building Program; Civil Society Policy and 
Advocacy Program; Justice Lens Programme; Women in Peacebuilding; Early Warning and Early 
Response; and West Africa Peacebuilding Institute. (Source: www.wanep.org. Accessed March 1st 
2006) 
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Enhancing indigenous knowledge of conflict prevention is one of the 
priorities of WANEP. The Justice Lens Programme, which explores 
issues of justice versus truth and reconciliation, and aims to bring 
together human rights practitioners and peacebuilding workers, wants to 
help bridge the gap between traditional and modern solutions. National 
laws in West-Africa are often drawn up inspired by Western examples 
and do not necessarily reflect common values. The peacebuilding field 
may facilitate a dialogue between laws and common values. The now 
increasingly used concept of restorative justice is an outcome of such a 
process 307. 
 
Both content knowledge (characteristics of conflicts and ways to deal 
with them) and technical knowledge (related to ways of running an 
organisation) are exchanged within WANEP. The emphasis has shifted 
recently from the former to the latter. Increasing attention is paid to 
M&E mechanisms, for example. WANEP is now attempting to better 
retain and write down its stories. It is also starting up a research effort to 
map and document conflicts and create a database of narratives. This 
would provide baseline information for interventions. The director feels 
that WANEP has been successful in some areas in building local 
capacity – the number of facilitators has grown significantly. The 
Women in Peacebuilding (WIPNET) programme in particular has 
trained many trainers. 
 
 
6.5.3 The national networks308  
 
The national network coordinators report to the regional secretariat 
quarterly and have a voice in the annual general meeting. In their view 
important learning takes place in these meetings as experiences from the 
national networks are shared. The national network coordinators are 
responsible for informing their national network members of the 
knowledge gained at the regional level by feeding reports into meetings 
held at the national and district levels. The coordinators have a mixed 
opinion of the way WANEP as whole is functioning. On the one hand, 
the network is relatively well organised and communication is efficient. 
All national networks are enabled to give input into WANEP’s strategic 
planning. The coordinators feel part owner of WANEP; their voice in 
the general meetings is heard and taken seriously. The national networks 
                                                 
307 Interview with the director of WANEP. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
308 This section is based mainly on interviews with the national WANEP coordinators in Liberia 
(Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 2006) and Sierra Leone (Freetown, Sierra Leone, 15 February 
2006). In addition, it uses information from interviews with various other WANEP members in 
those two countries. 
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have autonomy. It is also positive that they are asked regularly to 
propose members to be sent to training sessions. However, the national 
coordinators feel that WANEP needs to pay more attention to the 
capacity building and institutional development of the national 
networks. These can only start acquiring their own funds after their 
capacity has been developed. They need more money to run their office, 
afford vehicles, and pay staff. It is feared that WANEP might begin 
losing members if it does not provide more support in these areas.  
 
WANEP Liberia aims to facilitate knowledge sharing and provide 
technical assistance to individual members, helping them with strategic 
planning and finding money. The network secretariat also provides 
expertise to international organisations, giving advice, organising 
workshops, and writing manuals. In addition it implements programmes 
of its own in the areas of peace education, the training of trainers, and 
early warning. Most of the members of WANEP Liberia are very critical 
of the fact that the network secretariat implements programmes; they 
feel that it should limit itself to supporting its members, rather than 
competing with them.  
 
WANEP Liberia works on knowledge sharing through thematic 
workshops that bring together a number of members around a particular 
issue. Exchanges take place around content issues: what are we doing 
and how well are we doing it? What are the issues, and how can we best 
deal with them? The regular membership meetings of the network were 
valued for the things that were discussed. Because of a lack of funding, 
these meetings no longer occur frequently. Members also appreciated 
the newsletter and ‘from the field’ publication of the network; 
unfortunately these are no longer being produced due to a lack of 
funding. Little funding is coming from the regional network secretariat 
that wants the national network to become more autonomous and gather 
its own funds. But donors are proving hard to find except for individual 
programmes with clear and visible outcomes. At the time of the visit the 
network secretariat was financed mainly through income from 
consultancy work by the coordinator. Soon afterwards the coordinator 
became a deputy minister in the new Johnson Sirleaf government. It is 
not clear whether his successor has been able to generate a similar 
income. 
 
The Sierra Leonean WANEP network is called Network on 
Collaborative Peacebuilding Sierra Leone (NCP-SL). NCP-SL does not 
implement programmes but serves purely to coordinate and facilitate the 
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members. It focuses on five thematic areas: capacity building; 
institutional development; research309 and advocacy; early warning and 
early response; and promoting learning and sharing. Until recently the 
knowledge exchanged in the Sierra Leonean network was mostly 
content knowledge, focusing on issues and strategies of peacebuilding. 
Recently a technical component (focusing on issues such as 
organisational management and M&E) has been added. Meetings are 
open and anyone can propose a topic for discussion. At the last annual 
meeting of the national network inadequate communication was 
identified as a major issue and during my visit in February 2006 NCP-
SL was creating an e-mail group and a newsletter (to be called 
Peaceletter). It is also carrying out a ‘Mapping the Field’ exercise310 to 
achieve more clarity about the aims and activities of the network and its 
members.  
 
In 2004 and 2005 the network experienced severe leadership problems 
and was accused of mismanagement. Some board members wanted to 
use the network for their own purposes. There was disagreement in the 
board and some members resigned. It also became clear that intentions 
and expectations of members differed greatly. As a result, for several 
years the network was almost dormant. Recently, a new coordinator has 
taken office. He instituted a ‘visioning process’ in order to get everyone 
looking in the same direction again. The process created a new 
constitution and a five-year strategic plan. The constitution is to prevent 
board members from personal interference in the future. As a result the 
network is being reinvigorated. However, this new élan is only slowly 
taking root, particularly at the local level, and problems still persist. 
There is still a lack of funding for the running of the secretariat.   
 
The frequency of network meetings varies. At the national level, there is 
an annual general meeting in addition to thematic workshops every few 
months (at least in Liberia). In addition, there are provincial network 
meetings. At the time of my visit to Kenema, Sierra Leone, the network 
members in that district met once every two weeks. The time spent by 
members on the networks varies as well. At one extreme, some attend 
most meetings, exchange knowledge outside of meetings, and 
participate in joint projects. At the other, some members are largely 
inactive. 
                                                 
309 At the time of my visit (February 2006) NCP-SL was working with one of its members to write a 
research proposal on the issue if chieftaincies that have been amalgamated into larger entities (the 
number of chieftaincies went down from 400 to 49), causing disgruntlement among some chiefs and 
providing a possible potential for renewed conflict. 
310 Every member is to fill in a questionnaire detailing its expectations of the network, its added 
value to the network, its activities and recent developments. 
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6.5.4  Challenges 
 
The following challenges are identified by people involved in WANEP 
and its national networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
• At the regional level trust issues are beginning to be repaired, 
but it still takes a lot of effort to continuously make clear that 
positions and decisions are not personal but about issues. 
Avoiding internal conflict remains a priority.  
• There is a tension between the maintenance of the regional 
mission and vision on the one hand, and the autonomy and local 
flavour of the national networks on the other. Some national 
network members have taken advantage of the network for their 
own benefit, forcing the regional secretariat to intervene (this 
happened in Nigeria). It is important to keep focusing on the 
issues in such situations, instead of on the people. There has 
been a lot of unclarity about the operating space of the national 
networks.  
• WANEP invests in its staff and their knowledge. Unfortunately 
this means that they become quite sought after by other NGOs 
and sometimes leave for better-paid positions elsewhere. 
• WANEP is sometimes seen by international NGOs to be acting 
as a gatekeeper, warding off contacts with its member 
organisations. The director emphasises that this is unjustified. It 
is merely trying to coordinate, optimise contacts, build on local 
capacity, and find opportunities for synergy. 
• At the national level, important issues are the lack of funding 
and the diverging expectations of members. In addition, not 
every member is equally active, and there are also sleeping 
members. One board member of NCP-SL was recently removed 
because of his inaction. At a network meeting in Kenema, Sierra 
Leone in February 2006311 less than half of the members showed 
up.  
 
 
6.6 Requirements for successful networking applied: the case of 
WANEP 
 
In section 6.4 I formulated twenty-five factors that influence the 
successful functioning of knowledge networks. The following section 
uses these factors as a framework for analysing the information from 
                                                 
311 See Box 5.3  
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WANEP and its members in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as other 
stakeholders in those countries312.  
 
 
6.6.1 Capacity of the member organisations 
 
The capacity of peacebuilding NGOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone varies 
widely. A lack of funds plagues almost all of them. As we saw in 5.6.3, 
NGOs complain of a lack of knowledge in the areas of conflict 
transformation and the systematic analysis of conflict and there is little 
skilled manpower within organisations. The capacity building of 
members is an explicit aim of WANEP, WANEP Liberia, and NCP-SL 
alike. However, it is also an element that is much criticised by members, 
whose expectations are not being met in this area. In Liberia, the 
members are supposed to pay a registration fee of $50 and an annual fee 
of $100, but they have not been doing so recently because they feel 
WANEP Liberia has not kept its part of the deal: there was supposed to 
be a capacity building programme for members but no funds have been 
found for it. In both countries a lack of funds is given as the reason for 
the limited capacity building offered. The national network coordinators 
want more support from the regional secretariat. They argue that they 
cannot engage in capacity building of members until their own capacity, 
including the capacity to raise funds, has been built first. Although it is 
sometimes mentioned, a lack of time to participate in networking does 
not figure prominently on the list of challenges noted by member NGOs 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
6.6.2 Relationship between the member organisations and the network 
 
Despite sometimes grave criticism almost all of the members of 
WANEP’s national networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone saw some 
measure of added value in the network. This value was found mostly in 
exchanges of knowledge with other members. These exchanges were 
seen to have four main benefits for participating NGOs:  
• Better knowledge of what others were doing, and where, was 
considered important. This allowed NGOs to avoid the 
duplication of activities, identify possibilities for cooperation 
and information exchange and see ‘gaps’: areas in which no one 
yet worked.  
                                                 
312 See note 302. 
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• Practical knowledge was exchanged, ranging from security 
updates to funding opportunities (although many members felt 
that the latter should be done much more). 
• Exchanging content knowledge about peacebuilding strategies, 
and experiences with these, was found useful. “Learning from 
one another” was a phrase that was frequently used.  
• Being a member of WANEP and other networks also gives 
weight to lobbying. Being a member of a network in which 
many different NGOs working in all regions of the country are 
represented brings common strength and credibility. 
 
For the WANEP networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone, lack of clarity 
and disagreements about objectives have led to diverging expectations 
and dissatisfaction. Some members are not clear about their role as a 
member. Some are in it only as a way to get funds and have no interest 
in the objectives of the network. Through its ‘mapping the field’ 
exercise the Sierra Leonean network is trying to get these different 
expectations out in the open. The coordinator emphasises that people 
have to be clear and honest about what they are doing and must 
subscribe to the, jointly adopted, mission and vision of the network. One 
of the main issues of contention with regard to the aims and possibilities 
of the networks was whether they should engage in fundraising for its 
members. Many members expect this (quite a few interviewees 
mentioned access to funding as an important potential benefit and were 
disappointed that little had been forthcoming), but it is not an explicit 
aim of the networks. The new network coordinator organised a 
‘visioning process’ in response to diverging expectations, aiming was to 
reach an agreement on the objectives of the network. Members formed 
working groups to formulate recommendations for a new constitution 
and work plan. All of the representatives present at the network meeting 
subsequently voted on these recommendations. However, not all 
members were equally involved in this process and diverging 
expectations still existed.   
 
In Liberia there was also lack of clarity and disagreement about the role 
of the network. A few interviewees, including the coordinator, felt it 
should engage in the implementation of programmes itself, while most 
other interviewees emphasised it should limit itself to its function as 
coordinator and facilitator. WANEP Liberia does carry out programmes, 
and to most members interviewed this runs counter to its aims and 
brings it into competition with its own members. This dissatisfaction 
also relates to the way in which the network decides to take on an 
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activity: these decisions are often taken by the secretariat rather than the 
members.  
 
 
6.6.3 Characteristics of the network 
 
This section deals with the flexibility of the network, whether there is an 
atmosphere of safety and trust, and whether there is openness to 
different points of view. Regarding flexibility, the structures of the 
networks are relatively formalised (particularly in Sierra Leone) but this 
was also necessary to prevent abuse and deal with differences in 
understanding with regard to the aims of the network. Most interviewees 
consider the atmosphere in network meetings to be such that participants 
are not reluctant to raise critical points. Members tend to have an open 
mind to different points of view and values.  
 
With regard to trust, the picture varies considerably. Some network 
members claim that trust within the network is high. Others feel that 
some members take advantage of the network by benefiting without 
contributing, or that organisations participate that should not because 
they are not really peacebuilding organisations. Many interviewees refer 
to competition among NGOs over scarce funds: this competition limits 
openness of members and their willingness to share information for fear 
of damaging one’s competitive position. In response to this issue, 
WANEP’s annual meeting came up with a rule that members should not 
duplicate programmes and that the network as a whole only adopts 
programmes that no one else can do on their own.313 However, as we 
have seen, at least in Liberia this rule is not followed. 
 
Some network members voiced their distrust of other members and their 
intentions. In both countries interviewees accused other members of 
being free-riders. It was noted, for example, that at a meeting of the 
Sierra Leonean network people suddenly began paying their 
subscriptions as it became clear that only paying members could vote 
and be elected into the board. In Sierra Leone, some members pretend to 
be organisations while they are really only one person. Similarly, in 
Liberia an NGO representative claimed that some members of the 
Liberian network were not necessarily real NGOs. These organisations 
were said to have bribed their way through the government accreditation 
process for NGOs. They are members only because they hope to gain 
access to funds and opportunities, and do not really care about the aims 
of the networks. It happened that after WANEP Liberia had rejected an 
                                                 
313 Interview with director of WANEP. Accra, Ghana, 6 February 2006. 
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activity proposed by a donor because the funds allocated to it were 
insufficient, one of these organisations went to the donor and accepted 
the cheap job – going on to deliver poor results that are bad for the 
reputation of Liberia civil society as a whole. 314  
 
There are also trust issues between the national network coordinators 
and secretariats on the one hand, and many of the members on the other. 
In Liberia members complain that the secretariat in effect competes with 
them by carrying out programmes of its own instead of facilitating and 
supporting the implementation of programmes by members. In Sierra 
Leone the national secretariat has not performed up to expectations in 
the past and now has to regain the trust of members. Some interviewees 
complained that some of the network’s founding members, active and 
capable organisations, have been sidelined. They are never contacted 
when decisions are made. The board members who represent a particular 
region select provincial representatives for national meetings based 
mainly on who they happen to like. In Kenema the regional secretary 
resigned in protest.  
  
Although not many interviewees mention this explicitly, it is likely that 
all of these issues of low trust and power play are partly related to the 
legacy of the conflicts in Sierra Leone in Liberia. These conflicts have 
eroded social capital and separated communities. The sudden 
availability post-conflict of large sums of donor funds for NGOs led to a 
rapid rise in the number of organisations and contributed to discussions 
about the lack of constituency of many NGOs315 and about their 
intentions. Here as elsewhere, distrust more generally was mentioned as 
an important obstacle to successful networking.  
 
Regarding the content of exchanges, the stronger organisations, which 
have more access to training and knowledge, have a large role in 
determining the knowledge flows inside the network and the positions 
adopted by the network as a whole. In terms of discourse, some 
interviewees recognise that terminology used and even issues 
emphasised depend to some extent on the training courses and materials 
available and on the discourse and priorities of donors. Indeed, many 
NGO staff interviewed have experienced that donor priorities rather than 
the needs in the field determine the activities that are carried out – and 
as a result, the issues that are discussed.   
 
 
                                                 
314 Interview with director of a Liberian NGO. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 February 2006. 
315 See 1.6.3. 
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6.6.4 Governance, legitimacy and organisation of the network 
 
As far as their formal structure and regulations are concerned, the 
networks studied are democratic. In practice, however, some members 
raise questions about the accountability of the secretariats and boards. In 
Liberia the secretariat is criticised for starting programmes without 
consulting the members. In Sierra Leone there is some discussion about 
who decides which members get to go to national network meetings and 
training courses. At the district level existing regulations about the 
election of representatives are not always put into practice and there is 
discussion about the legitimacy of some people who are supposed to 
represent a particular region on the board of the network. Some 
members complain that there is not enough support to networking 
activities at the provincial level. The network has decentralised, but the 
structures put in place are not very clear. This also includes the criteria 
for the selection of representatives.  
 
Because power issues have played a role in the Sierra Leonean network 
in the past, developing mechanisms that regulate conflict and prevent 
personal issues from taking over is a priority of the network at the 
moment, and a major aim of the ‘revisioning process’. During this 
process the constitution was also revised in a participatory way. It 
remains to be seen in how far these changes will lead to changes in 
practice. At the level of the regions and districts, there is considerable 
lack of clarity about procedures and dissatisfaction with the 
representation of the region or district. It appears that the revisioning 
process has not yet thoroughly reached and engaged this level. This may 
simply be due to the early stage in which the process finds itself. In 
Liberia a ‘revisioning’ process would also be useful to bring to the fore 
the diverging expectations and different levels of satisfaction with the 
network, and to agree on the direction to be taken. Such a process might 
be easier in that country because the majority of peacebuilding NGOs is 
based in the capital.  
 
The creation of the networks in Sierra Leone and Liberia has been more 
bottom-up than was the case in other West-African countries in which 
WANEP networks were created, though in both countries the regional 
WANEP network played a large role. Because one of WANEP’s 
founders is a Liberian, he involved some of his colleagues from Liberian 
NGOs in the initial consultations that prepared the ground for WANEP. 
Afterwards, a Liberian information sharing group of four organisations 
was created. At some point these organisations saw the need to form an 
organisation and organised a retreat where it was decided to create a 
national network. At the retreat it was also decided to link the new 
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organisation to WANEP. NCP-SL was founded in 2001 at the initiative 
of WANEP and a number of Sierra Leonean peacebuilders. The number 
of peacebuilding NGOs was growing rapidly at that time and there was a 
need for coordination to avoid duplication of activities. The network 
started as a peacebuilding collaboration programme hosted by the 
Campaign for Good Governance. In May 2001 various stakeholders met 
and decided to make it into a network. It was decided to name the 
network Network for Collaborative Peacebuilding rather than WANEP 
Sierra Leone in order to emphasise the indigenous and bottom-up nature 
of the network. Nevertheless it became Sierra Leone’s national network 
for WANEP and was endorsed by it. WANEP provided expertise in the 
early phases as well as some seed money to set up an office. 
 
It might be expected that these relatively bottom-up processes have had 
consequences for the extent to which members feel they own the 
network. Indeed, most participants do appear to have a sense of 
ownership. When asked whether they feel responsible for the network 
and the way it develops most say that they do. Likewise, when asked 
whether they feel they are able to influence what happens in the 
network, most members answer positively. It should be noted that this 
self-image portrayed in the conversations seems in some cases to be at 
odds with the way in which criticisms are phrased, for example in terms 
of “they should” when talking about the network. Only few 
organisations actively contribute their expertise in order to build the 
capacity of the network secretariats, such as one Sierra Leonean member 
does in the area of financial management.   
 
In more practical terms, each network has a national coordinator and a 
secretariat. However in both countries there is not enough money to pay 
these people. Overmoderation does not appear to be an issue; during 
meetings participants are able to jointly determine what issues should be 
discussed. However, between meetings there is hardly any information 
flow. This is due to low capacity of the secretariats but also to limited 
internet access on the part of some members. When networks run into 
difficulties, fewer meetings are organised and networks quickly become 
dormant. Low turnout at meetings is also mentioned as a issue. After 
meetings, there is little follow-up. During network meetings plans are 
made, but not enough attention is paid to their implementation. Some 
members of the Sierra Leonean network have withdrawn out of 
disappointment. They had not heard from the network in a long time and 
felt neglected. The secretariat is not sufficiently proactive in contacting 
members and communicating with them. However, it is aiming to 
change that. The secretariat is collecting the contact details of members. 
A newsletter is in the making. 
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Many interviewees emphasise the need for face-to-face meetings to 
share tacit knowledge. This is important because of the volatile and 
rapidly changing political situations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
However, the frequency of contacts varies depending on a number of 
factors, which are mentioned elsewhere in this section in more detail. 
They include limited access to internet, the condition of roads, and 
funding issues that sometimes prevent the regular organisation of 
meetings. 
 
 
6.6.5 Coverage, inclusiveness and content of the network 
 
Many network members in Liberia and Sierra Leone point towards the 
extreme variety among network participants in terms of their area of 
work and their size and capacity. This makes effective networking 
difficult. When it comes to differences in capacity most network 
members agree that, though this is problematic, it is precisely part of the 
aim of the networks to build the capacity of members and it is an 
obligation of the stronger members to work on the weaknesses of others. 
Regarding differences in the content of work, there is less agreement. 
Some participants are happy about the diversity because it means that 
there is more for them to learn; others are of the opinion that only 
peacebuilding organisations pur sang (and not NGOs whose main focus 
is on human rights, the reintegration of refugees, or social development) 
should participate in a peacebuilding network in order to keep the 
necessary focus.   
 
As we have seen in chapter two, tacit knowledge tends to surface and 
develop only through direct and preferably face-to-face interaction. In 
the Western tradition of documenting knowledge, explicit knowledge is 
easier to come by than tacit knowledge. This is also related to the fact 
that knowledge tends to be taken more seriously when it has been 
subjected to scientific standards and written down. The situation is 
different in West African societies, which have no tradition of writing 
things down. They also have much less access to modern forms of 
knowledge dissemination. As a result, most knowledge exchange is 
verbal and face-to-face. Gaining access to tacit knowledge is not so 
much an issue here. By contrast, the need for more documentation of 
knowledge is increasingly recognised. Recorded and codified 
knowledge after all can spread more widely. Documentation can also 
help to convince donors of the reliability of local knowledge.  
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None of the networks studied come close to being an overall knowledge 
system – even if they wanted to be they would not be able. They aim 
much more at providing a stimulating framework for knowledge 
exchange and at supporting members in doing their work more 
effectively. Both at the regional and national levels the networks have 
shown some flexibility in adjusting their structures in order to better 
carry out their objectives. Issues of funding and capacity nevertheless 
limit the extent and speed with which these adjustments take effect, 
particularly at the national level.  
 
With regard to the results of networking, diverging expectations play a 
role. Some members expect concrete outcomes in the form of, for 
example, funds raised and joint programmes. Others emphasise 
knowledge exchange. The networks tend to have quite ambitious aims 
that include the exchange of experiences but also advocacy and capacity 
building. The latter outcome – capacity building – is recognised by all 
involved as an important aim of the networks. Unfortunately, it is also 
identified by most as a shortcoming in practice.  
 
 
6.6.6 Context of the network 
 
Although the political context does not obstruct the functioning of the 
networks and the security situation in both countries is improving, 
practical issues relating to poverty and bad infrastructure play an 
important role in limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone. A lack of access to internet for 
many NGOs, expensive and intermittent energy supplies (which limit 
the use of computers), and bad roads and bad (or no) vehicles all 
severely constrain interactions within the network. Illiteracy is an issue 
when knowledge gained in the network is spread in constituencies. A 
regional network meeting attended in Kenema, Sierra Leone, showed 
how members deal with constraints: a hand-written invitation and 
agenda was copied and driven by motorbike to the members. Less than 
half of the members appeared, which may have been due to 
dissatisfaction with the networks but also to bad roads or a lack of 
transport.  
 
In terms of links to other networks, the national networks in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are of course linked to the wider WANEP network. 
However, this link is not as strong as might be expected. The average 
national network member does not gain as much from the link to 
WANEP as he or she would like. They hear about others participating in 
training in Accra and wonder on what basis those people have been 
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selected. Members do get briefed on materials and knowledge that has 
been developed by WANEP, for example on M&E. However, it appears 
that they are less involved in policy making at the regional level than 
they might be. For example, not many members at the national level 
have been involved in the development of a Regional Action Agenda as 
part of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC), of which WANEP is a sub-network.  
 
The networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone work actively to engage 
governments and other stakeholders in their country. NCP-SL, the Sierra 
Leonean network, regularly organises a National Peace and 
Development Forum with network members and government 
representatives from various ministries as well as UN staff. Each person 
present reports on his or her activities and a discussion takes place. The 
fact that the Liberian national network coordinator was recently 
appointed assistant minister in the government shows that the network is 
recognised and has links with the government. In Sierra Leone the 
government does not know where to start with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
and has invited civil society organisations to help. A TRC group will be 
visiting peacebuilding organisations to discuss the recommendations and 
collect suggestions for concrete action. In the meetings of the network, 
these visits are discussed and the report of the TRC is shared. These 
links to official institutions in both countries do not appear to jeopardise 
the independence of the networks or their members, or their ability to 
criticise governments.  
 
Aside from the connection to the regional WANEP network, individual 
members also have links to other networks, ranging from networks 
created by donors to bring their partners together to local networks that 
focus on a specific issue. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone also have civil 
society forums that bring together NGOs in all fields. The national 
networks have informal links to these networks through members and in 
some cases also through the secretariat. Sometimes the secretariat is 
approached by an organisation or network and requested to provide 
expertise or consultation. For example, Amnesty International once 
needed information about the situation in particular Liberian counties, 
and asked WANEP Liberia for assistance. The network secretariat then 
put Amnesty into contact with a member actively engaged there. 
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6.6.7 Funding of the network 
 
A lack of funding severely affects the networks. WANEP regional has 
been able to secure funds from donors, but the national networks have 
not had much success in that area. Reasons given for this are both low 
capacity for fundraising and limited willingness on the part of donors to 
finance networking and capacity building activities whose direct impact 
cannot be shown. The national networks recognise that they are too 
dependent on WANEP, but they criticise the strategy WANEP has 
adopted in making them more autonomous: in their eyes WANEP is 
reducing their funding without helping to build their capacity to raise 
other funds, thereby undermining the future of the national networks. 
According to some, WANEP is also not living up to promises it has 
made to support secretariat staff by paying their salaries and building 
their capacity, so that after some time they would be able to raise funds 
on their own for the network and its members. The salaries of the 
coordinators are often paid late and the other staff are not paid at all. 
Financial accountability is something that the networks are working to 
improve, but with no funds to pay a financial officer the results are 
limited as of yet. The members have little interest in meeting the 
financial commitments of being a network member. This is a serious 
constraint. Their contributions could provide at least some funding for 
the network to move forward.   
 
To what extent do donors shape the networks? Based on the available 
information the donors do not appear to influence the mode and content 
of knowledge exchange strongly. What does have an impact on the 
relations within the networks is the provision of funding itself. As 
mentioned above, in Liberia the secretariat is seen by some to be 
abusing its legitimacy as a network to raise funding for the 
implementation of its own programmes, rather than raising funds to 
improve networking or to support members. On the other hand, the 
coordinator has also contributed income from his own consultancy work 
to the network. In Sierra Leone this issue is less prevalent, in part 
because the secretariat has not been able to raise many funds.  
 
In both countries, the network secretariat is a separately created 
organisation. This prevents some of the problems that may arise when 
one member organisation is given the responsibility to function as 
coordinator, giving that organisation a position of power and access to 
funding that it may be tempted to take advantage of. Not too much is 
known about the extent to which interactions around knowledge take 
place with donors. However, one donor – Cordaid – makes a real effort 
to establish knowledge exchange with WANEP. It regularly invites the 
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director to its Dutch office for discussion, not only over accountability 
but also around policy. In November 2006, I attended a seminar on 
peace networking organised by Cordaid, in which the WANEP director 
also took part.  
 
 
6.6.8 Concluding 6.6  
 
WANEP and its national networks in Liberia and Sierra Leone have all 
experienced distressing difficulties relating to personal, trust and power 
issues. In the case of the network in Sierra Leone, these have raised 
accusations of mismanagement and led the network to be dormant for 
some time. In particular the regional network and the Sierra Leonean 
one have taken important steps to get past these problems. But other 
problems still exist. For example, the members of the networks vary 
extremely in their capacity and put forward diverging expectations with 
regard to their participation in the networks. A lack of funding available 
for networking activities, particularly at the national level, has been 
another major problem, due partly but not exclusively to limited 
willingness on the part of donors to fund networking because its impact 
cannot readily be measured. The limited capacity of the national 
secretariats to raise funds is another reason for the lack of funding. 
There is discussion about whether the regional WANEP secretariat 
should provide more support in building this capacity, as a prerequisite 
for the achievement of more autonomy of the national networks.  
 
Despite the problems, nearly all members consider the networks to be of 
added value to their work because of the knowledge that is exchanged 
and the perception that peacebuilding NGOs are stronger together than 
they are alone.  
 
The oral tradition prevalent in Africa combined with limited internet 
access means that knowledge exchange in the networks studied takes 
place mostly in face-to-face meetings. This means that tacit knowledge 
gets more of a chance to be shared. However, it also means that 
available knowledge is documented much less, thereby limiting the 
possibilities for its wider dissemination and for its serving as ‘evidence’ 
that could convince donors and other stakeholders of the validity of local 
knowledge.  
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6.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter continued the answering, begun in chapter five, of the 
following sub-question that was posed at the end of Part One: What do 
the knowledge and learning processes of local peace NGOs look like, 
what are their strengths and weaknesses, and what are difficulties and 
gaps in their learning practice? Where the previous chapter outlined the 
variety of ways in which Southern peace NGOs try to gain, retain, apply 
and share knowledge, and emphasised once again the importance 
attached to interaction and exchange in doing so, this chapter zoomed in 
on one such exchange strategy in particular: networking. Networks are 
widespread among peacebuilding organisations in Kenya, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Cambodia, the Philippines, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Knowledge exchange is often not their only objective but is always part 
of their aims and is nearly always mentioned as one of their most 
important outcomes.  
 
In terms of the strengths, weaknesses and difficulties of these networks, 
a number of factors determining these emerged in this chapter. These 
factors, listed in section 6.4, were derived from issues discussed 
throughout the book that have an impact on learning and exchange by 
NGOs. They were grouped into the following categories:  
• the capacity of the member organisations 
• the relationship between members and the network 
• general characteristics of the network 
• governance, legitimacy and organisation of the network 
• coverage and inclusiveness of the network 
• the content of the network 
• the context of the network 
• the funding structure of the network. 
 
These factors were subsequently applied to a case study of the WANEP 
network in West Africa. Issues that emerged from that application as 
particularly significant are: 
• personal, trust and power issues among the members of the 
network in a given locality 
• the fact that members of the networks vary extremely in their 
capacity and put forward diverging expectations with regard to 
their participation in the networks 
• a lack of funding available for networking activities, particularly 
at the national level, and the limited capacity of the network 
secretariats to raise funds. 
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Importantly, however, what also emerged was that most of the people 
involved in networking within the framework of WANEP feel they have 
gained from it, not least when it comes to access to the knowledge, ideas 
and experiences of others. This is confirmed by what participants in 
other networks in various parts of the world have said in their interviews 
with me. We may conclude that despite the difficulties and obstacles to 
successful networking and knowledge sharing, it is worthwhile to pursue 
these strategies, taking into account as much as possible the factors that 
influence the success of networking as networks are being shaped and 
re-shaped.  
 
 
6.8 Concluding Part Two: Connecting structure and agency 
 
At the end of Part One the following questions were raised. 
1. What factors constrain and support the learning of Southern 
peace NGOs?  
2. How do power differences, donor relations and North-South 
dynamic influence the knowledge that is used and the learning 
that takes place?  
3. What do the knowledge and learning processes of local peace 
NGOs look like, what are their strengths and weaknesses, and 
what are difficulties and gaps in their learning practice? 
4. Given the structural realities in which they operate, what 
initiatives are undertaken to improve the learning processes of 
local peace NGOs? What can we learn from these initiatives? 
5. To what extent do these initiatives facilitate cross-cultural, 
‘third-order’ learning? 
 
Part Two dealt with all of these, although there is more to be said about 
the fourth and fifth questions. Because of that questions four and five are 
taken to Part Three as well, in order to allow more case studies to shed 
light on it.  
 
In addressing all five questions, Part Two illuminated the issues that 
shape the knowledge and learning processes of Southern peace NGOs. 
More specifically, chapter four outlined the structural aspects – power 
differences, North-South inequality in terms of knowledge production 
and recognition, and donor-recipient relations – that constrain and shape 
the possibilities for learning and exchange available to Southern peace 
NGOs and limit cross-cultural, third-order learning. Chapters five and 
six focused on the agency of local peace NGOs in developing 
knowledge strategies as they navigate within this structural context.  
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Structure and agency are not disconnected. Not only does structure have 
an impact on agency, but the reverse is also possible. Although the 
concept of a structure implies a long-lasting context that is difficult to 
change, no structure is set in stone. What, then, are ways in which the 
agency of actors can be increased, and how can they use their agency to 
help change the structure and make it more conducive to learning and 
two-way exchange? Interaction with those institutions and individuals 
that help shape the structure – donor representatives, Northern 
policymakers, researchers, and people in authority in the (post)conflict 
countries themselves – is important in order to raise the issues Southern 
peacebuilders have when it comes to the current structure in which they 
operate. In these interactions the importance of trust-based, long-term 
partnerships, of untied funding, and of programming flexibility can be 
emphasised. Best practices of international partnerships conducive to 
Southern knowledge generation, learning and dissemination can be 
quoted.  
 
Given the important (positive or negative) role of external support that 
emerged time and again in Part Two, a new question is raised: How can 
international/external/Northern actors support the knowledge and 
learning strategies of Southern peace NGOs, thereby increasing their 
agency? This question will be dealt with in Part Three. Before doing so, 
however, let us return to Figure 3.5 created at the end of Part One:  
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Figure 6.1: Knowledge flows in and around Southern peace NGOs316 
  
The chapters of Part Two help illuminate and develop this figure in the 
following ways. Chapter four added depth to this pattern of interactions 
in the form of inequalities among the actors. It shows that some of the 
actors – the Southern NGOs themselves but also other NGOs in their 
countries, beneficiaries, knowledge institutions in the South, and local 
and national governments in the South – are less able to insert 
knowledge and ideas than others – donor governments, international 
NGOs, and knowledge institutions in the North. The result is that the 
knowledge flows indicated by the blue dotted arrows are not all equally 
strong, nor do they flow equally in both directions. Schematically, this 
makes the figure look as follows.  
                                                 
316 Copy of Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 6.2: Strength of different knowledge flows in and around Southern 
 peace NGOs 
 
The pink arrows represent flows this study has not looked at in detail, 
and although hypotheses may be made it is difficult to make any 
statements about them. The thick blue arrows depict knowledge flows 
that are indeed strong. The thin blue arrows indicate weak links – and 
this is where the structural issues become clear. To a large extent they 
relate to North-South inequalities, which are expressed in the weakness 
of Southern knowledge institutions and, most significantly for the 
Southern NGOs under study, in the donor-recipient regimes of which 
they are a part. In addition to North-South issues, the weak arrows also 
show the weaknesses (or absence) of interactions within the South. A 
notable finding in that regard – documented in both chapter four and 
five - has been the lack of knowledge exchange between Southern 
peacebuilding practitioners and Southern knowledge institutions.  
 
Chapter five dealt mostly with the blue box: learning cycles within 
Southern NGOs. However, it showed that these processes cannot be 
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seen apart from flows that go outside of this Box. Interactions with 
people outside the organisation – other NGOs, beneficiaries, 
international actors – are central to the learning processes of Southern 
peace NGOs. Another thing that emerges from chapter five is that some 
parts of the learning cycle of peace NGOs in (post)conflict countries are 
stronger than others. The figure below illustrates this. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Reality of learning cycle in Southern peace NGOs 
 
In this version of the central part of the figure that depicts the learning 
processes of Southern peace NGOs, the steps in the cycle that function 
relatively well have been made green. The pink-coloured steps do not 
function so well. NGOs are action-oriented and have difficulty finding 
time and money to reflect on the implications of their work and do 
research into their own work and into the situations of their 
beneficiaries. Thus, they are unable to produce generalised knowledge 
that could be disseminated to other organisations, knowledge 
institutions, and donor agencies, and thereby contribute to global debates 
and policymaking. To some extent Southern peace NGOs are able to 
gain new knowledge and to compare their experiences with others – 
often through training programmes and through networking with other 
NGOs, and the insights gained from those activities are applied into new 
programmes. But more in-depth reflection and theorising, as depicted in 
the pink arrows, are often lacking. Chapter three theorised that 
knowledge institutions could be helpful in facilitating these parts of the 
learning cycle, functioning as ‘scaffolds’ for deeper-level learning. 
However, as mentioned, little interaction between knowledge 
institutions and NGOs takes place in the countries visited. This raises 
the question, How can knowledge institutions be better involved in 
supporting the knowledge and learning strategies of local peace NGOs 
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working in (post)conflict countries – and the knowledge base of these 
countries as a whole?   
 
Chapter six on networking dealt mainly with the box on the extreme left 
side of the picture: interaction with other SNGOs. Or should networks 
ideally facilitate not only exchange with other SNGOs, but instead bring 
in other actors, thereby facilitating all of the blue dotted arrows in Figure 
3.5/6.1? Perhaps that can only be achieved by international networks, 
not by the national and regional ones chapter six looked at. That brings 
us to a new question: How can global networks support the knowledge 
and learning strategies of local peace NGOs working in (post)conflict 
countries, thereby increasing their agency?  
 
Thus, we are left with five questions to be dealt with in Part Three: 
1. Given the structural realities in which they operate, what 
initiatives are undertaken to improve the learning processes of 
local peace NGOs? What can we learn from these initiatives? 
2. To what extent do these initiatives facilitate cross-cultural, 
‘third-order’ learning? 
3. How can international/external/Northern actors support the 
knowledge and learning strategies of Southern peace NGOs, 
thereby increasing their agency?  
4. How can knowledge institutions be better involved in 
supporting the knowledge and learning strategies of local peace 
NGOs working in (post)conflict countries – and the knowledge 
base of these countries as a whole?   
5. How can global networks support the knowledge and learning 
strategies of Southern peace NGOs, thereby increasing their 
agency? 
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Chapter 7. Running a global network 
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict317 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In order to further illustrate the dynamics of knowledge processes in 
which staff members of local peace NGOs participate, and highlight in 
particular the role of global knowledge networks and other international, 
or external, initiatives that aim to support the learning of Southern 
peacebuilders, Part Three provides two case studies. The first case study, 
in this chapter, analyses a global network of peacebuilders, the Global 
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. The second case 
study, in the next chapter, examines an international action learning 
Master programme that is offered to peace practitioners in several 
conflict-affected regions in the world: the Applied Conflict 
Transformation Studies (ACTS) programme. The case studies show 
some of the dilemmas of global cooperation to support local learning in 
the peacebuilding field, in order to provide answers to the questions 
posed at the end of Part Two. 
 
This chapter analyses a global civil society network of peacebuilding 
organisations. In doing so the chapter contributes further to answering 
the first and second question posed at the end of Part Two - Given the 
structural realities in which they operate, what initiatives are 
undertaken to improve the learning processes of local peace NGOs? 
What can we learn from these initiatives? To what extent do they 
facilitate cross-cultural, ‘third-order’ learning? An international 
network is one type of initiative undertaken by peace NGOs to facilitate 
learning and exchange and to deal with larger global issues and 
inequalities that single organisations cannot address. Thus, most directly 
this chapter sheds light on the fourth question: How can global networks 
support the knowledge and learning strategies of Southern peace NGOs, 
thereby increasing their agency?As the network described is facilitated 
by a Netherlands-based NGO, the chapter also sheds light on the third 
question - How can international/external/Northern actors support the 
knowledge and learning strategies of Southern peace NGOs, thereby 
increasing their agency? 
 
In this section, I first introduce the network and the way it has developed 
in section 7.1.1, and then explain the approach that has been taken in 
                                                 
317 In a different version, this chapter was published in Verkoren 2006b. 
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carrying out the case study reflected in this chapter in section 7.1.2. 
There, I will also outline the rest of the chapter. 
 
 
7.1.1 The global partnership 
 
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) 
is a worldwide network consisting of civil society organisations working 
in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It was initiated by 
the Netherlands-based organisation European Centre for Conflict 
Prevention (ECCP) in response to a call by UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in his Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict (Annan 2001) in 
which he urged “NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to 
organise an international conference of local, national and international 
NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the 
United Nations in this field.”  
 
Annan supported the ensuing proposal of ECCP for the formation of a 
Global Partnership which would work towards a common action agenda 
and a global civil society conference on conflict prevention. In a letter 
written in 2002 the Secretary-General stated that  
“I support wholeheartedly your initiative to organize regional 
preparatory meetings leading to an international conference of local, 
national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
the area of conflict prevention [...] Your initiative is a timely and 
important contribution to engaging civil society in the task of 
developing a culture of prevention in the international community.” 
(Annan 2002) 
 
The Global Partnership was organised into fifteen regional networks, 
each with a Regional Initiator or lead organisation, also called Regional 
Secretariat, steering the regional process of network-building. The 
global process is led by the International Steering Group (ISG), 
composed of Regional Initiators, a number of representatives of 
international NGOs and the GPPAC International Secretariat. The ISG 
meets twice a year. From its midst an Executive Committee has been 
selected which deals with the governance of the network in between 
meetings. ECCP acts as the International Secretariat of the Global 
partnership. The Regional Initiators brought together conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding organisations in their regions and formed Regional 
Steering Groups (RSGs) with representatives from the various countries. 
Each region went on to organise a conference with civil society 
representatives and, in most cases, government actors. These 
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conferences formulated Regional Action Agendas, which in turn served 
as the foundation for GPPAC’s Global Action Agenda of 2005.  
 
The Global Action Agenda focuses on promoting human security and 
making a shift from reaction to prevention through effective 
partnerships, with guiding principles and values that should be at the 
core of practice. It gives recommendations for addressing the conditions 
that give rise to violent conflict and for systems and practices to respond 
to it more effectively if it emerges. The Global Action Agenda 
concludes with suggestions for specific mechanisms, activities and 
resources needed to enhance the capacities of civil society organisations 
(CSOs)318, governments, the UN and regional organisations to pursue 
prevention and build more just and peaceful societies. The Global 
Action Agenda served as an input for the Global Conference on the Role 
of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict which took place at 
UN Headquarters in New York from 19 to 21 July 2005, in response to 
the initial call made by Kofi Annan in 2001. The conference brought 
together over 900 people from 118 countries to launch an international 
civil society movement to prevent armed conflict. It was a remarkable 
achievement and sent an important signal, even though participation by 
UN representatives was much more limited than had been hoped. 
 
The global conference and the process leading up to it gave many CSOs 
around the world an important boost; it was inspiring and valuable to be 
part of such a joint process through which CSOs hoped to be able to 
make a lasting impact on global policy and practice. CSO staff also 
gained useful contacts and knowledge about conflict prevention and the 
work of others in the field. However, after the global conference many 
people were left with a feeling of ‘now what?’. ECCP had managed to 
raise funds from many different sources for the process leading up to the 
conference, but these were beginning to run out. People felt it was time 
to begin implementing the Action Agendas, but were not sure where to 
start and how to find the necessary funds. Six months after the 
conference, many people involved felt that the momentum that had been 
so strongly felt in the run-up to the global conference had been lost. 
Since then, the Global Partnership has taken important steps, most 
notably with the development of regional and global work plans. 
Engagement with the UN has continued, and on behalf of GPPAC 
ECCP has been involved in activities such as the process around the 
creation and implementation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. 
Despite these steps, there is a sense within the network that it needs 
                                                 
318 GPPAC uses the term CSOs rather than NGOs to make clear that its membership covers a 
broader range of organisational types. See section 1.1 of this study for an elaboration of both terms.  
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further strengthening in order for it to be able to start implementing the 
plans and making a real contribution to the prevention of armed conflicts 
worldwide. 
 
 
7.1.2 The network strengthening review  
 
It was felt within GPPAC that the needed process of network 
strengthening would include activities like building the capacities of the 
Global Partnership and its regional networks to raise funds, create a 
better structure, increase skills and knowledge of networking, lobby and 
advocacy, document work, exchange experience and gain muscle for 
civil society through joint action and coordination. In order to establish a 
base-line for this strengthening process and gather the views of network 
members about the needs and priorities for that process, GPPAC’s ISG 
and International Secretariat (hosted by ECCP) commissioned a 
‘network strengthening review’ of GPPAC and its regional networks, 
which I carried out. This chapter reflects the findings of this review. It 
was carried out through a combination of surveys, interviews, 
discussions, and a literature study. The review aimed: 
• to collect and share lessons learned and best practices on 
network strengthening 
• to gather views about the state of the global and regional 
GPPAC networks 
• to gather views about the best ways to strengthen the global and 
regional GPPAC networks 
• in a participatory way, to arrive at recommendations to 
strengthen the global network and the regional networks 
• to improve the structure and transparency of the Global 
Partnership, and the legitimacy of its representation 
• to improve networking within the Global Partnership 
• to improve the support of International Secretariat to the 
regional networks. 
 
The review was carried out through a combination of a survey sent to 
people involved in GPPAC around the world, a literature study, and a 
number of case studies of regional GPPAC networks. The network 
strengthening review consisted of five main elements: 
1. a compilation of relevant theory on networking and of 
information on the functioning of other networks319 
                                                 
319 Most of the findings of that literature study have been integrated into the previous chapter 
(chapter six) on networking. Combined with general networking lessons formulated by people 
interviewed and surveyed for the PhD research and the GPPAC review, they led to the formulation 
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2. conversations with the staff of ECCP (the International 
Secretariat) 
3. a survey sent to all people and organisations involved directly or 
indirectly in GPPAC worldwide  
4. case studies of four regional GPPAC networks  
5. collecting ideas during networking seminar 
 
A number of members of the ISG participated in the development of the 
network strengthening review’s terms of reference, planning, and 
questionnaires during and after the ISG meeting in Nairobi in March 
2006. In addition, a wide discussion on an interim version of this paper 
took place during a seminar on networking that was organised by the 
International Secretariat of GPPAC. In this seminar, all members of the 
International Steering Group plus about twenty other experts 
participated.  
 
A written survey was developed in close consultation with the 
International Secretariat, in two versions: version A for people directly 
involved in GPPAC, and version B for people indirectly involved. It was 
sent to 623 people around the world. 199 surveys were returned. The 
minimum response of 25% was achieved for most regions320. The 
statistics for each region are depicted in Annex 1. Excerpts from the 
global survey report have been included in Annex 2. The complete 
global survey report can be found in the network review report produced 
for ECCP (Verkoren 2006b).  
 
In addition to the global survey, case studies of four regional GPPAC 
networks were undertaken321. The case studies consisted of interviews 
held during visits to Central and East Africa, West Africa, Southeast 
                                                                                                            
of a number of factors that influence the success of networking in section 6.4. These factors were 
taken as the starting point for the organisation of the findings in this chapter. 
320 Two regions did not meet the threshold of 25 per cent of the surveys returned: Southeast Asia 
and Latin America and the Caribbean. In Southeast Asia 24 per cent of the surveys were returned, 
which is very close to the threshold. In addition, 29 people were interviewed in this region as part of 
the case study. In Latin America and the Caribbean only two out of 87 surveys were returned. These 
two surveys cannot be assumed to be representative of the larger population of GPPAC members in 
this region. However, other information about the regional network has been consulted, notably the 
preliminary report of an evaluation that was carried out on behalf of the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) of a programme of the organisation Coordinadora Regional de 
Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES), the GPPAC Regional Initiator for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The evaluated programme, “The Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of 
Armed and/or Violent Conflict in Latin America and the Caribbean”, is essentially GPPAC Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
321 These were selected by the ISG and International Secretariat, using the following criteria: 
regional spread; the need to include both longer-established and newly created networks; and 
criterion that the regional and national initiators in the regions selected had to be willing to assist in 
receiving researchers and in finding and guiding local researchers. 
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Asia, and Central Asia322. In the case of Central and East Africa, the 
results of an earlier evaluation, which I had also carried out323, were 
used and complemented by a telephone interview with the regional 
initiator. In West Africa and Southeast Asia, the case study research for 
the GPPAC review was combined with research visits for the PhD more 
generally. Only in the case of Central Asia a separate trip was 
undertaken especially for the GPPAC review. As part of each case 
study, two countries per region were visited, one being the country in 
which the regional initiator is based. Interviews were held with the 
regional initiators, regional steering group members in two countries, 
and others directly or indirectly involved in GPPAC.  
 
This chapter presents the main findings of the survey and of the 
conversations held with people involved in the network. Section 7.2 
discusses the main functions of GPPAC, as seen by its member 
organisations. From the next section onwards, the findings of the review 
are related to the success factors that were introduced in chapter six 
(section 6.4). 7.3 starts by looking at the characteristics of GPPAC 
members, such as their organisational capacity and the time and priority 
they are able to give to the network. In connection to this, 7.4 looks at 
the way the members relate to the Global Partnership. This includes the 
extent to which they are committed to it and the added value which the 
network brings to them. Moving on to the network itself, 7.5 addresses a 
number of characteristics that affect its functioning, including its 
flexibility, the level of trust among its members, and its openness to 
different points of view. 7.6 zooms in on the structure and governance of 
GPPAC, while the content of the network – the knowledge that is 
exchanged within it – is discussed in 7.7. In 7.8, the chapter discusses 
the relationship of GPPAC to its context – to the social and political 
reality in the regions, for example, and to other organisations and 
networks in the field. 7.9 addresses the issue of monitoring and 
evaluation. 7.10 discusses the general implications of the case study for 
peace networking by NGOs and for the questions around which this 
study revolves.  
 
 
                                                 
322 Initially, two other regions were selected: Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East 
and North Africa. Unfortunately, the Middle East and North Africa case study had to be cancelled 
due to the war breaking out in Lebanon and Israel. The Latin America and the Caribbean case 
study, which was to be carried out by a local researcher, remained incomplete. 
323 As part of an evaluation of the Dutch Thematic Co-financing (TMF) scheme for the 
peacebuilding theme, ECCP, the organisation that initiated GPPAC and hosts its secretariat, was 
evaluated. As part of this evaluation a visit to Kenya was undertaken by the author to interview 
members of the GPPAC network in Central and East Africa.  
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7.2 Functions of GPPAC 
 
GPPAC’s main functions as drafted by the ISG are: 
1. Promoting Acceptance of Conflict Prevention: GPPAC supports 
regional efforts to raise awareness regarding the effectiveness of 
conflict prevention, and undertakes parallel efforts at the global 
level. 
2. Mobilising Civil Society Early Response Actions to Prevent 
Conflict: GPPAC supports civil society organisations in 
developing their capacity to contribute to early warning systems 
and to intervene effectively in impending crises/conflicts. In 
response to regional requests, the global network will seek to a) 
mobilise coordinated civil society responses, based on early 
warning of impending conflict escalation; and b) pressure 
governments, regional organisations, and the UN system to 
respond to early warning information. 
3. Promoting Policies and Structures for Conflict Prevention: 
GPPAC generates ideas for improving policies, structures and 
practices of interaction among civil society organisations, 
governments, regional organisations, and UN agencies for joint 
action for conflict prevention. 
4. Building National and Regional Capacity for Prevention: 
GPPAC strives to enhance the capacity of its regional networks 
and global mechanisms to undertake collective actions to 
prevent violent conflict. 
5. Generating and Disseminating Knowledge: GPPAC engages in 
processes of knowledge generation and exchange, by learning 
from the experience of regions and developing mechanisms for 
regular communication/exchange of such information. GPPAC 
activities aim to improve our mutual understanding regarding 
important methodologies and mechanisms for action. (GPPAC 
2006a)  
 
Although all five functions have a clear knowledge component, the last 
two in particular aim to “support the knowledge and learning strategies 
of local peace NGOs working in (post)conflict countries”, as one of the 
research questions with which I started this chapter puts it. During the 
review, the members of GPPAC in the regions were also asked what the 
main functions of GPPAC were from their perspective. Survey 
respondents and interviewees from all regions emphasised that 
generating and disseminating knowledge constitutes an important 
function of the network. This includes doing research, gathering other 
research and information, and disseminating research results and 
working methods. Respondents said the network should provide its 
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members with access to experts and expertise, but also facilitate the 
building of expertise within the members and network, and help bring 
out the knowledge and experience that exists within the network. In the 
interviews, various people mentioned that helping members build 
expertise and wider capacities include helping them gain access to funds 
and training opportunities. The network may facilitate the linking up of 
this expertise with policy formulation by donor agencies and 
international organisations. Related to this, an important function of the 
network according to its members is to facilitate the exchange of 
experiences among network members. Such experiences may include 
lessons learned and best practices. Other participants may learn from the 
successes and mistakes of colleagues and be inspired by the stories of 
others.  
 
Another common response across the GPPAC regions was that the 
Global Partnership and its regional networks should go beyond 
knowledge sharing and generation alone and engage in collaboration 
around concrete, joint activities. Collaborative activities varied and 
suggestions ranged from joint grassroots peacebuilding projects to joint 
high-level advocacy campaigns and lobby. Given the global reach of the 
network, the latter are deemed particularly important. Nearly all 
members consulted during the review felt the network should, in 
addition to knowledge sharing, focus on high-level engagement to 
change the framework for conflict prevention and peacebuilding and to 
make the voice of local civil society heard. The work with the UN (see 
Box 7.1) is considered particularly relevant. It is also important to link 
these high-level processes to actors and development at the regional, 
national and local levels.  
 
Box 7.1: GPPAC and the UN Peacebuilding Commission324 
 
In discussions of the ISG the UN Peacebuilding Commission emerged as an important 
issue on which to focus GPPAC’s lobby. One aim is to monitor the start of the 
commission and its support office. The ISG decided to focus on the link between the 
UN headquarters and the field, and on the involvement of civil society. Furthermore, 
GPPAC sees it as a task to develop proposals and updates on situations in countries 
relevant for the commission and its support office. ECCP, as the international 
secretariat for GPPAC, plays an active role in coordinating these processes, in the 
following ways. It has developed a plan together with the World Federalist Movement 
to conduct several monitoring activities, produce briefing papers and organise seminars. 
The first seminar took place in July 2006 in New York. The focus of this seminar was 
on the Peacebuilding Commission’s country-specific working groups and ways to 
promote their interaction with civil society. Also, the World Federalist Movement has 
developed, together with New York-based NGOs, a synopsis with recommendations for 
                                                 
324 http://www.gppac.org. Accessed various times in 2006. 
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civil society engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission. This input is currently 
being discussed with people involved in the Commission. 
  
Parallel to this effort in New York, GPPAC’s regional partners are engaged in setting 
up meetings with key civil society actors in countries selected by the Peacebuilding 
Commission (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Timor-Leste). The aims of these meetings 
are to discuss recommendations from civil society to the Peacebuilding Commission, 
and deliver structured input. In Brussels, GPPAC co-organised a seminar with the 
British NGO SaferWorld in July 2006 on the EU’s contribution to the Peacebuilding 
Commission. A larger meeting was held in September 2006, involving representatives 
from the countries selected by the Commission. 
 
 
 
7.3 Capacity of the member organisations 
 
In the previous chapter a number of issues were identified that influence 
the success of networking. With regard to the member organisations 
these included their organisational capacity, the time they are able to 
spend on the network, and the extent to which they are linked to 
domestic constituencies. This section looks at the role these issues play 
in GPPAC. 
 
 
7.3.1 Capacity of members and capacity building 
 
Three quarters of the respondents to the survey indicate that they have 
sufficient capacity to participate meaningfully in the network and to use 
the results of networking. As evidence they quote having knowledge of 
and experience with conflict prevention, having the same aim as 
GPPAC, having experience with networking, and being a network 
organisation or in some other way being able to mobilise other 
organisations. Nonetheless, the capacity of participating organisations in 
GPPAC is a challenge, particularly at the national level. Among the 
regional networks, the disparity in capacity levels is extreme: “in Latin 
America, [civil society] can topple governments, while in Uzbekistan, 
authoritarian regimes more or less stamped out independent activism” 
(Matveeva and Van der Veen 2005, 8). There is also much variety 
within regional networks. It is a difficult endeavour to try and bridge the 
gap between strong and weak network members. Many local 
peacebuilding organisations have little funding and little trained staff. 
Some organisations have only just picked up the theme of 
peacebuilding. Lack of infrastructure (roads, transportation, internet, 
electricity, high office rents) also represents an obstacle in many places. 
High staff turnover (see 5.1) is another issue that makes networking 
difficult, as it jeopardises organisational memory of the member NGOs 
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as well as continuity in networking and relationship building among the 
people participating in network exchanges.  
 
The Regional Secretariats tend to be strong regional players – which is 
why they were selected. Nonetheless, they struggle to deal with the 
demands that come with their position at the interface of the global and 
regional networks. They tend to have too little time and resources to 
give the coordination of the networks the attention it requires. Both 
national-level members and the International Secretariat at the global 
level complain that they receive too few inputs from the regional level. 
The International Secretariat (ECCP) itself also has limited capacity in 
terms of staff hours, experience, and resources. ECCP staff say that they 
find themselves unable to give the regional networks the support they 
need. The ambitious plans developed by GPPAC at the various levels do 
not always take sufficient notice of the limits of the capacity of the 
networks and their members at all levels. A member of the International 
Secretariat noted that while ECCP and GPPAC advocate a larger role for 
civil society, CSOs cannot always deliver due to low capacity. “A sober 
analysis of strengths and weaknesses may be a more effective advocacy 
tool than an uncritical belief” (Matveeva and Van der Veen 2005: 9). 
 
Another element of organisational capacity is the capacity to learn – 
including the capacity for research, reflection, monitoring and 
documentation. Given GPPAC’s focus on knowledge generation, the 
documentation of knowledge existing within the network (mostly in the 
form of stories of successful civil society peacebuilding activities) takes 
place. This is done mainly by ECCP and has resulted in a number of 
publications. Promoting learning and research skills among the 
membership and helping members develop M&E procedures receive 
less priority. Some of the stronger organisations in GPPAC have done 
quite a bit of work on M&E in connection to learning325, while the 
weaker network members have usually not progressed very far in 
developing such mechanisms beyond the donor accounting formats they 
have to fill out.  
 
As a result of the low capacity of many members, strengthening these 
organisations has emerged as a priority area for GPPAC. As additional 
capacity needed for organisations to be able to contribute to the network 
and optimally benefit from it, respondents to the survey as well as case 
study interviewees most often mentioned training programmes in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding methodologies. Expertise and 
                                                 
325 A notable example is NPI-Africa, the organisation acting as the GPPAC Regional Secretariat for 
Central and East Africa. See 5.4 for some of the procedures they have developed.  
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methodologies are needed not only when it comes to conflict prevention 
but also with regard to practical working skills, such as documentation, 
proposal writing, fundraising, ICT, staff development, and M&E. In 
addition to skills and knowledge, many organisations say they need 
financial support, partly in order to be able to travel to network 
meetings. Due largely to a lack of funding, in most regions GPPAC is 
not yet providing structural capacity building support. The West African 
GPPAC network (WANEP) offers training programmes for national and 
local CSO staff, but this is an exception. However, GPPAC has 
contributed to the capacity of its members by providing room for 
discussion and reflection upon actions. The GPPAC conferences tend to 
be evaluated positively as opportunities for reflection and exchange.  
 
 
7.3.2 Time for networking 
 
In order for processes of reflection and exchange to be possible and 
fruitful, participants need to have time to engage in meaningful 
exchanges. In line with the general findings of this book, many staff of 
CSOs involved in GPPAC say they do not have a lot of time to 
participate in networks. There are some organisations that see 
networking as part of the toolkit that helps their organisation achieve its 
mission. For them, GPPAC is not an ‘extra’ activity. Some interviewees 
emphasise that not only the members themselves, but also their donors 
need to be convinced to make networking a central activity so that it is 
not done in extra time, or eats up the overhead budget, but is part of 
donor grants. For CSOs and donors to prioritise networking and make it 
part of regular work, they also need to be convinced of its (potential) 
benefits. As can be read in other sections of this chapter, this is an area 
in which some work is still needed. Many participants do not yet see 
concrete benefits and call for more concrete activities. They do not yet 
‘own’ the objectives and strategies of the network and feel that more 
focus is required. 
 
 
7.3.3 Constituencies 
 
The issue of the limited constituencies of some NGOs (see 1.6.3) also 
rears its head inside GPPAC, leading one survey respondent to write that 
“GPPAC is personality-centred rather than socially or politically 
oriented” (GPPAC 2006c). However, it is also emphasised that in many 
places the members provide links to various constituencies, including 
chieftaincy, religious leaders, youth, women, human rights 
organisations, and the media. More specifically, one may ask about the 
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extent to which the membership of a network is representative of civil 
society in the regions in which it operates. During the review many 
stakeholders raised the issue that GPPAC is not sufficiently linked to the 
grassroots in the regions. In many regions the network remains limited 
to a narrow circle around the Regional Initiator. According to 
International Secretariat staff, there is a tendency among Regional 
Initiators to protect their position (although it should also be said that in 
many cases the Regional Initiators are the only organisation around able 
to carry out such a task). The limited time and resources the Regional 
Initiators have to spend on the network also play a role, as do personal 
relations. A lot depends simply on who is available and happens to have 
heard of GPPAC. In addition, in countries where conditions are 
particularly difficult it has been hard for GPPAC to find and involve 
new members.  
 
Another is issue that in many member organisations one person (often 
the director) is involved in GPPAC, rather than the organisation as a 
whole. Membership is thus not necessarily carried by the whole 
institution. This became clear during my visit to Cambodia in May 2006. 
Two Cambodian people participated in GPPAC on behalf of their 
organisations, which they later left to work elsewhere. When the 
organisations in question were visited as part of the review, it became 
clear that their current management had no knowledge of GPPAC at all, 
even though their organisations were on a list of Cambodian GPPAC 
members. 
 
 
7.4 Added value and aims 
 
7.4.1 Added value 
 
Nearly all the people involved in GPPAC see a need for a global and 
regional civil society network focusing on conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding. The main reasons they mention include that civil society 
organisations are stronger together than when they act alone. The 
conflicts they face cannot be dealt with as individual CSOs. Many 
conflict issues cross borders. Conflict in one place can have a negative 
impact on the stability of the region or even the world. As a result, a 
united, international response is needed, and respondents hope a global 
network of peace organisations may help facilitate this. Participants 
hope that the network will unite the strengths of organisations engaging 
in conflict prevention and increase the voice of civil society as a whole. 
The latter is needed to bring the issues of participants to the attention of 
global actors and to achieve successful advocacy and lobby. A large 
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coalition of CSOs has a stronger position vis-à-vis governments and 
international organisations. Stakeholders also identify a need for a 
platform in which to share experiences and learn from others. A network 
may generate ideas, exchange information and educate people in peace 
building. It may bring people into contact with each other who could 
form important partnerships, as is illustrated in Box 7.2 about the 
Departments of Peace initiative. In addition, a network like GPPAC 
might help coordinate between the activities of CSOs and facilitate joint 
projects.  
 
Box 7.2: Departments of Peace initiative and GPPAC326 
 
Organisations in the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada started initiatives to have 
Departments of Peace or Ministries for Peace established that would function alongside 
existing government Departments. These Departments would operate in the realm of 
foreign affairs as well as at home. Their work abroad would include monitoring the 
world scene for signs of conflict and taking pre-emptive measures as appropriate in 
partnership with other nations and world bodies, helping with the non-violent resolution 
of conflicts that exist, and assisting with rehabilitation and reconciliation work after the 
cessation of conflicts. Their work at home would involve fostering a culture of peace at 
all levels of the community by transforming conflict in the home, the workplace, the 
school, and in all aspects of government.  
 
In October 2005 three organisations, the US Peace Alliance, the Canadian Federal 
Working Group for a Department of Peace, and the UK ministry for peace, organised 
the first People’s Summit for Departments of Peace in London. This was done to share 
information and experience within existing groups and also to begin working with those 
considering setting up similar initiatives in other countries. Forty people from twelve 
countries attended the two day Summit. These countries were Australia, Canada, Israel, 
the occupied Palestinian territories, Italy, Japan, Spain, the Netherlands, Romania, the 
United Kingdom, Jordan, and the United States.  
 
As ECCP - the GPPAC International Secretariat – heard about the initiative, it came up 
with the idea to bring in the expertise and perspective of Departments of Peace that 
already exist in postconflict countries such as  Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Costa Rica, 
and Liberia. Through the Global Partnership ECCP was able to put the initiators of the 
Departments of Peace project in touch with relevant people from the countries 
mentioned. As a result representatives of the existing Departments of Peace attended an 
international conference on the initiative. ECCP will do research to find out what other 
similar government departments exist in the world and hopes that a government level 
network can be created.  
 
 
By way of illustration, Box 7.3 describes the potential relevance of 
GPPAC as seen in Central Asia. Similar points were mentioned in other 
regions as well. 
 
                                                 
326 Interview with staff members of ECCP. The Hague, Netherlands, 18 July 2006.  
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Box 7.3: Relevance of GPPAC for the Central Asian region327 
 
Political situation: 
• Governments do not act in many instances of local conflicts; NGOs need to 
act. 
• Because of the difficult circumstances for civil society in the region we need 
international partners. 
• Our voice becomes louder if we speak on behalf of a hundred or even a 
thousand NGOs, making it more likely that our lobby and advocacy efforts 
are successful. 
• Uzbek interviewees emphasised that GPPAC is potentially important for them 
because “it is connected to the UN institutions”. The UN is respected by the 
Uzbek government, which does not consider UN agencies to be spies or 
traitors – as it does other international organisations. GPPAC may get the UN 
in Uzbekistan to help convince the government that CSOs are important and 
necessary partners. 
 
Unite strengths and work jointly: 
• Central Asian NGOs did not have a culture of cooperating with each other 
(and with government). Now, thanks to GPPAC, they are thinking more in 
terms of partnership. People begin to see more possibilities for 
complementarity and cooperation. The Regional Initiator has begun to use the 
idea of partnership also in other programmes.  
• GPPAC may unite the strengths and resources of the organisations involved 
and help them to engage in conflict prevention activities in a coordinated or 
joint way. Now, there is much duplication of activities.  
• GPPAC may enable CSOs to jointly address common issues. Globally as well 
as regionally, conflicts are interrelated and therefore require a joint response. 
Not only do Central Asian CSOs face similar issues, they also face some of 
the same issues. Cross-border problems in Central Asia include the conflicts 
in the Ferghana Valley and religious radicalism.   
• A network could decrease competition between NGOs.  
 
Extend reach: 
• Because GPPAC is relatively high level it can increase the reach of grassroots 
networks like Dolina Mira in the Ferghana Valley and help improve their 
quality.  
• A global network may broaden the horizon of CSOs and make their problems 
known to more people. Interviewees emphasise that is important to get their 
voices heard, their issues recognised, and their lessons learned by others. 
They feel they have gained some valuable experiences, for example in the 
Tajik peace process, that others might benefit from.  
 
Access to knowledge: 
• GPPAC may provide access to knowledge and ideas. It could facilitate the 
generation of new ideas, the exchange of knowledge and contacts, help CSOs 
keep each other informed about our conflicts, and help them educate 
themselves in peacebuilding. Networks provide the possibility to combine 
grassroots experience and knowledge of local conditions on the one hand, and 
a range of knowledge, information and other resources of global scope. The 
                                                 
327 Interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 23-29 July 2006. 
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exchange of experience could also mean that strong CSOs support weaker 
ones in their development. 
 
 
The extent to which GPPAC actually meets the needs identified in this 
section, and thus provides the added value it potentially could, varies 
according to the perspective of the respondent. Overall it can be said that 
potential of GPPAC to fulfil these needs has been met partly. To the 
extent that people have gained from the network so far, it tends to be in 
the area of knowledge sharing. Strikingly, this was the case for each of 
the regions. For those who feel they have benefited from GPPAC, this 
has been through access to knowledge and expertise in the field, and the 
opportunity to exchange experiences with others. In addition, 
participants have gained contacts and partnerships with others in the 
field. It is important to know who is doing what and to identify 
opportunities for cooperation; GPPAC has begun to make this possible. 
Many people328, also across regions, add that their membership of 
GPPAC raises the visibility and legitimacy of their organisations. 
Particularly in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, members noted that the 
regional and global networks provide a sense of solidarity and moral 
support. It is also noted that at the global level, GPPAC has been 
lobbying to gain recognition for the paradigm of conflict prevention and 
the role of civil society in this. This has yielded some results (see Box 
7.4). Particularly the fact that GPPAC is working to engage the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UN PBC) and other UN bodies is 
considered important by the people who participated in the review.  
 
Box 7.4: Lobby and advocacy achievements at the global level329 
 
• A Group of Friends on Conflict Prevention was created though intensive 
lobbying by ECCP. The group consists of 31 states. It produced an input paper 
for the Millennium +5 Summit at the UN. 
• The July 2005 global GPPAC conference at UN headquarters brought together 
over 900 people from 118 countries to launch an international civil society 
movement to prevent armed conflict. This was a remarkable achievement and 
sent an important signal.  
• Making use of the global network, ECCP has contributed to the Departments of 
Peace initiative that aims to establish peace ministries in the governments of 
various countries. See Box 7.2 above. 
• On behalf of GPPAC, ECCP has been closely involved in the development of 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission, successfully lobbying for the inclusion of 
civil society representatives. See Box 7.1 above.  
 
                                                 
328 19% of the respondents of survey version A and 8% of the respondents of survey version B felt 
that their involvement in the global and/or regional GPPAC network had raised their visibility.  
329 Interview with staff members of ECCP. The Hague, Netherlands, 18 July 2006. 
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However, there are other expectations that GPPAC has not yet met. 
Mentioned most often is the need to become concrete and begin 
implementing all the plans that have been made. As a part of this it 
would be beneficial for the network to reach out to the grassroots and 
organise capacity building activities for local organisations. In addition, 
more transparency and democracy would increase the constituency 
behind, and legitimacy of, regional- and global-level activities.  
 
More concrete joint work at the various levels of the Partnership would 
increase the value of the network to its participants and contribute to 
their commitment. Such collaborative projects would also make the 
network more sustained and continuous. In addition, they would help to 
show the value and impact of the Partnership to external parties. The 
kinds of activities wanted by people surveyed and interviewed vary 
somewhat across regions, but many point to the action agendas that were 
created and make clear that these need to be implemented. Some 
common priorities for concrete activities that emerge are capacity 
building and engaging governments and international organisations 
through campaigns and lobby.  
 
Members feel that GPPAC could have particular added value when it 
engages in activities that mobilise and link the various levels at which it 
is organised. In the case of lobby, the added value of GPPAC could lie 
in exercising pressure on decision-makers from two or more sides: for 
example, governments could at simultaneously be approached by 
domestic civil society and by international organisations such as the UN, 
which are also lobbied by GPPAC. Similarly, high-level lobby in New 
York could be linked to engagement with UN offices in conflict-affected 
countries.  
 
Box 7.5: Gaining visibility: Kenya330 
 
In Kenya, being part of the network has increased the visibility and legitimacy of 
organisations. For example, for grassroots organisations like the Rural Women Peace 
Link in Eldoret, Kenya, GPPAC represented an important opportunity to gain visibility 
for the insights and results gained in their work. It is considered crucial that the voices 
of local stakeholders can be heard more widely, and GPPAC has made this possible. 
Whether this enhanced visibility has led to any concrete results is not yet so clear – but 
the women consider it quite an achievement in itself.  
 
 
 
                                                 
330 Interview with representatives of the Rural Women Peace Link. Eldoret, Kenya, 1 December 
2005. 
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7.4.2 Discussions on aims and political role 
 
The overall vision of the network – to achieve a shift from reaction to 
prevention – is adhered to by most GPPAC members (although some, 
notably in Central Asia, raise doubts about whether the prevention of 
armed conflict is not more a government than a civil society function). 
Nonetheless, beyond this vision, many people note a lack of a clear, 
shared purpose, of a focus area and set of objectives commonly arrived 
at. This was already formulated as an issue by a mid-term review carried 
out during the global conference in July 2005:  
“[n]etworking without a clear strategy and vision may become 
meaningless, distract energy and resources and undermine credibility 
of civil society in the eyes of governments and international 
organisations. […] In future, more realistic objectives should be 
established, for which appropriate capacity in human and financial 
resources is available.”  (Matveeva and Van der Veen 2005: 3, 
emphasis in original) 
 
The repeated mentioning of this issue by people consulted for the review 
contrasts somewhat with the fact that over the past year, GPPAC’s 
Regional and International Steering Groups have developed work plans 
in which objectives, planned activities and impacts are formulated. The 
fact that participants still note the absence of clear and shared common 
objectives appears to be explained by the fact that participation in the 
development of objectives and plans has been relatively narrow and 
many people feel left out of the processes; as a result, there is limited 
ownership of the plans. In addition, the aims and objectives that have 
been formulated are broad and the step from there to concrete action is 
still a large one. More focus is needed (see 7.6.6 for more on this). Some 
people are concerned about the viability of the action agendas and work 
plans, which are very ambitious. The International Secretariat makes it 
clear that it is unlikely that funds can be raised for all of the plans 
formulated. The action agendas also contain many recommendations to 
governments, on which CSOs have only limited influence. 
 
As a result, expectations vary to some extent about the kinds of activities 
GPPAC should engage in. One discussion emerged particularly clearly 
out of the data gathered for the review. It concerns the extent to which 
the network should engage in activism. In how far should a network like 
GPPAC play a politically activist role and act like a solidarity, human 
rights-oriented movement? At present only part of the ‘peace 
movement’ is interested in GPPAC because its consensus, engagement, 
relationship building approach means that it is not very outspoken. Is 
GPPAC credible if it does not take a position on the ‘War on Terror’, for 
  
374 
example? Or would taking such a position jeopardise its relationship 
with powerful governments and the UN, which is also important? Where 
is the balance between activism and building relationships with 
policymakers? In the GPPAC network in Southeast Asia this discussion 
was given a cultural dimension: people said that while Philippine CSOs 
have a political and activist tradition, Cambodian CSOs tend to focus 
more on consensus, engagement, and achieving subtle change (see Box 
7.6). In Central Asia a similar discussion takes place, but here it centres 
more on fears to make the situation of CSOs worse by upsetting already 
oppressive governments. More subtle and cooperative engagement is 
preferred by most in this region, although this risks jeopardising one’s 
principles.  
 
Box 7.6: Opinions about activism in Southeast Asia331 
 
In Southeast Asia, expectations and priorities differ with regard to the extent to which 
the network should engage in activism. The Regional Initiator is an activist, human 
rights-oriented, solidarity organisation. In part this reflects a strong tradition in 
Philippine civil society, which has long engaged in political activism. However, others 
have different priorities. In Cambodia some say that this activist, rights-oriented 
approach does not match with their own, which focuses more on dialogue and long-
term peacebuilding processes by engaging people, building relationships and finding 
joint solutions. The difference becomes clear when approaches toward Burma are 
compared: boycott and human rights advocacy versus engaging all actors to achieve 
joint transformation.  
 
This discussion illustrates an issue that has come to the fore earlier in 
this study, namely that of the extent to which peace NGOs are able to 
play a political role and address the structural, political issues that shape 
global conflict and peace. In 1.6.2 and 4.4 we saw how the funding 
structures in which many local peace NGOs operate acts as a 
disincentive for political action and how their position as implementers 
of donor policies – rather than independent actors – also means that they 
do little thinking about the way their activities contribute to the wider 
aims of peacebuilding. Some people inside GPPAC warn that becoming 
too political would risk funding by, and policy dialogue with, 
governments. It is suggested as a possible solution to divide the network 
in two: first, a loose and open People Building Peace movement that 
would provide a forum for activism and ad hoc coalitions, and secondly, 
GPPAC, which would be a professional organisation. 
 
 
                                                 
331 Interviews in the Philippines and Cambodia, 14-26 May 2006. 
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7.5 Governance, politics and power issues 
 
7.5.1 Democratic governance and ownership 
 
Formally, the Global Partnership is democratic and inclusive. However, 
there are some questions about the criteria and procedures for selecting 
representatives to the governing bodies of the network, and the ways in 
which these representatives can be held accountable by other members. 
So far representatives have been selected in a rather informal way. The 
ECCP asked organisations they were already working with to become 
Regional Initiator. In most regions, these Regional Initiators organised 
initial meetings with a limited number of organisations from their 
personal and professional network. Either all those present at these 
meetings became the RSG, or the meetings selected a number of RSG 
members from amongst themselves. In several regions, such as West 
Africa and Latin America, a pre-existing regional network became the 
regional GPPAC network; these networks kept their existing structures 
intact. For these pre-existing networks the decision to join GPPAC may 
not have been so broadly carried. For example, West African national-
level network members interviewed were familiar with WANEP but not 
with GPPAC or the Regional or Global GPPAC Action Agendas.  
 
Thus, the process through which the Global Partnership has been created 
and developed has been largely top-down. Still, people involved in these 
processes make clear that it was only natural for them that those who 
had initiated the Partnership would be asked to carry it forward. Indeed, 
it seems difficult to envision a network starting up in a more democratic 
way. However, now that the network is moving towards implementation 
people are starting to ask questions about the legitimacy of procedures 
and representatives. In particular those who do not have a representative 
position within GPPAC are increasingly critical. Their criticism also 
relates to a lack of transparency: to the extent that criteria and 
procedures do exist for the selection of representatives and for holding 
them accountable, they are unknown to most members. In recognition of 
these issues, the International Steering Group is in the process of 
drafting a GPPAC charter. Unfortunately, this is done with little or no 
input from the regional networks and few people know about it.  
 
It has only been three years since the network has begun to develop, and 
in many regions it has not yet expanded much beyond the Regional 
Steering Group and a small group of other organisations that have some 
kind of relation with one or more of its members (often mainly in the 
country in which the Regional Initiator is based). Community-level 
organisations and other grassroots actors are not yet involved in most 
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regions. All this means that the sense of ownership of the network itself, 
and of the priorities and strategies it has formulated, remains limited to a 
relatively narrow circle of people.  
 
Box 7.7: Ownership in Central and East Africa332 
 
In the eyes of NPI-Africa, the Regional Initiator for Central and East Africa, different 
levels of ownership can be distinguished. For ECCP, GPPAC is its major activity and 
ownership is therefore high. For NPI-Africa, it is one of many activities, although the 
sense of ownership is still strong. At the national level, participants often need to be 
pushed in order to act, although interest usually rises in the run-up to a major event. 
This is unless GPPAC helps an organisation meet its own objectives, as is the case with 
network organisations. 
 
 
 
7.5.2 Power, competition and conflict 
 
Inequalities, personal rivalries, competition, and power games are 
omnipresent and as we have seen they can even be found in peace 
networks. Issues that GPPAC’s regional and national networks have 
dealt with include accusations of nepotism (West Africa) and networks 
competing for the status of regional GPPAC network (Caucasus). More 
generally, many stakeholders mention competition among CSOs (over 
funding, projects, contacts) as an important obstacle to cooperation and 
networking and as creating a potential for conflicts within the networks 
of the Global Partnership. It is important for a network to strive to 
mitigate competition and to have mechanisms in place that regulate 
conflict and prevent personal issues from taking the foreground.  
 
Power relations outside of the network also shape its functioning. Where 
the political context in a region is repressive towards civil society, then 
civil society organising and networking may be seen as a threat by 
governments. In Central Asia, CSOs tend to stay out of activities 
relating to conflict because this is seen as too political and therefore as 
risking government opposition. Instead, many organisations prefer to 
carry out ‘technical’ socio-economic projects, in the hope that by doing 
so they may slowly win the confidence of governments and build 
relations with them. Through that avenue they hope to be able to subtly 
influence government policy regarding conflict at a later stage.  
 
In some places, the conflicts the networks aim to resolve themselves 
inhibit networking. GPPAC’s Middle East and North Africa network 
                                                 
332 Interview with staff members of NPI-Africa. Nairobi, Kenya, 29 and 30 November 2005. 
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consists of Arab organisations whose opposition to allowing Israeli 
CSOs to join has led to the exclusion of the latter. Among Israeli peace 
organisations, but also among members in other parts of the world, there 
is considerable bitterness about this: how can such an important conflict 
region333 have such unbalanced representation in a network working for 
peace? As we have seen in the previous chapters, conflict also presents 
indirect obstacles as it leads to low resources and bad infrastructure. 
Many national-level members in West Africa have limited access to 
internet and electricity and cannot move around easily due to bad roads 
and a lack of available cars. Finding creative ways to involve these 
members and help build their capacity will be part of attempts to 
become more rooted at the grassroots.  
 
 
7.6 Facilitating knowledge sharing  
 
We have seen that knowledge exchange is not only closely connected to 
all other aims and activities of the Global Partnership, but also 
represents one of its major aims in itself. Aspects of learning and 
knowledge sharing were mentioned most often as a function of the 
network by the members consulted for the review (see 7.2): research, 
access to external expertise and building internal expertise, 
disseminating knowledge, linking internal expertise with policy 
formulation of donors and official actors, facilitating the exchange of 
experiences among members, learning from one another’s successes and 
failures, and lending inspiration from the stories of others. In 7.4.1 we 
also saw that knowledge sharing is seen as the function that has been 
most successful so far. With regard to both of these findings (the 
importance attached to knowledge sharing as a function and the fact that 
people say it has indeed taken place) there is little variation among the 
regions. In this section and the next, we turn to the ways in which 
GPPAC facilitates knowledge sharing, learning and the dissemination of 
knowledge by its members. 
 
 
7.6.1 Knowledge sharing in the regions 
 
Between early 2003 and the fall of 2006334, the knowledge sharing 
process in the regions looked as follows. After ECCP approached a 
strong NGO in each region to help start a network there, this NGO 
                                                 
333 Important in that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a high-profile one and has an impact on 
conflicts in other parts of the world as well. 
334 After this point I have not been able to closely follow the network. 
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organised a meeting with organisations from different countries in the 
region, with support from ECCP. At these meetings an initial structure 
for the network was created (in most cases, those present at the initial 
meeting became National Focal Points and together made up a Regional 
Steering Group) and the participants went on to mobilise other 
organisations to join. Some organised national conferences in their 
countries. The outcomes of these conferences served as input for a 
regional conference. These regional conferences were presented 
explicitly as part of a process leading up to a global conference on the 
role of civil society in conflict prevention that was to be organised at UN 
headquarters. They aimed to produce Regional Action Agendas which 
could not only be of value for work inside the regions, but would also be 
compiled into one publication335 and serve as input for a Global Action 
Agenda, to be presented in New York. Regional conferences indeed 
took place in each region, and action agendas were developed 
everywhere. The ISG and ECCP were responsible for the creation of the 
global agenda and the organisation of the New York conference, which 
took place in July 2005.  
 
The regional process running up to the global conference was one with 
clear aims and a clear end point. However, after July 2005 there was a 
loss of momentum. It proved difficult to raise funds for follow-up 
processes, specifically the implementation of the action agendas. In most 
regions, the frequency of interaction decreased after this point, although 
in 2006 most regional steering groups met to turn the action agendas 
into more specific work plans which could be used for fundraising. 
Below, a more detailed account of regional interactions between 2003 
and 2006 is given for four regional GPPAC networks: Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, Central and East Africa and West Africa.  
 
In Southeast Asia GPPAC built on activities that were already taking 
place in the region. The organisation Initiatives for International 
Dialogue (IID) in Davao City in Mindanao, the Philippines, was asked 
by ECCP as Regional Initiator because of the networking it was already 
facilitating. It consulted CSOs in the region, asking whether they were 
interested in gathering their efforts under the banner of GPPAC. Most 
answered positively, although some groups were wary and feared they 
would be used by Northern interests. However, since the regional 
GPPAC conference in 2003, IID and other regional actors started to feel 
owner of the process and initially hesitant groups became more 
involved. The Southeast Asian Regional Steering Group (RSG) consists 
of National Focal Points (NFPs) and a number of regional organisations. 
                                                 
335 GPPAC 2005. 
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Some countries have one NFP; others have two or three, or none. The 
networking process inside the countries is left up to the focal points, but 
the regional secretariat (IID) provides support. This support consists of 
advice, linking with others, and providing materials; no financial 
assistance is provided. The regional secretariat also coordinates region-
wide activities such as lobbying with ASEAN. The GPPAC network in 
Southeast Asia is linked through IID and other members to other 
regional networks, such as the Asia Pacific Solidarity Coalition, which 
is more oriented towards activist pressure politics.  
 
The RSG meets irregularly, about once a year. National-level meetings 
have particularly taken place to prepare for the 2003 regional conference 
and to report back afterwards (although in Cambodia, such a report-back 
meeting never occurred). The same occurred before and after the global 
conference in 2005. In the Philippines, the NFP stated that since there is 
already so much networking taking place in the country the national 
GPPAC network does not have so much added value; she sees more 
value at the regional level336. Next to face-to-face meetings there is a lot 
of e-mail traffic inside GPPAC Southeast Asia, unlike in other regions. 
It mainly takes the form of messages sent around by IID informing the 
members of events taking place in the region in relation to conflict and 
peace in order to keep people informed of current affairs and build 
regional solidarity. These messages are much appreciated by 
interviewees.  
 
In Central Asia, the Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI), which 
had been asked to be GPPAC Regional Initiator, organised a first 
GPPAC meeting in Bishkek in 2003 with a small group of CSO leaders 
from the Central Asian countries. They distributed information on 
GPPAC in their countries and invited other organisations to join. The 
initiating organisations became selected as national coordinators. Three 
of these went on to organise national conferences at which country 
priorities were elaborated. Such national conferences took place in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In May 2005, a 
regional conference was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. During this 
conference a Regional Action Agenda was developed. The May 2005 
regional conference also led to the publication of a booklet (GPPAC 
Central Asia 2005). The regional conference in May 2005 is evaluated 
positively; it was characterised by wide participation and heated 
discussions. The action programme created was supported by all. 
However, it seemed unrealistic to the Regional Initiator who urged for 
                                                 
336 Interview with GPPAC National Focal Point for the Philippines. Manila, Philippines, 18 May 
2006. 
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some sections to be cut. The slimmed down version still has the support 
of all involved, but is yet to be implemented.  
 
All the national conferences developed action agendas in preparation for 
the regional action agenda, but some of the agendas were more concrete 
than others. In Tajikistan the national conference not only produced an 
action agenda but also led to more cooperation with government. The 
expectation in Tajikistan was that there would be a regional conference a 
few months after the national one. However, the regional conference did 
not take place until a year later, by which time enthusiasm and 
commitment in Tajikistan had already faded and people had forgotten 
about the plans developed. After the May 2005 regional conference 
there was some renewed interest but no activities have been organised at 
the national level. This is blamed mainly on the lack of funds. 
Nonetheless, a regional working group meeting with the regional and 
national coordinators was held in March 2006, and a work plan was 
developed there.  
 
Quite a number of people participated in national and regional 
conferences (most of which also included high level government 
people), but not all of these consider themselves part of GPPAC or are 
even clear about what the network entails. The General Assembly of the 
grassroots Dolina Mira network in the Ferghana Valley voted to become 
part of GPPAC after the Regional Initiator gave a presentation about it – 
but this presentation is the only experience the Dolina Mira members 
have with GPPAC so far. 
 
In Central and East Africa, the regional process started in March 2003 
with a meeting to which a number of strategic actors from the various 
countries were invited. During that meeting NPI-Africa was elected 
Regional Initiator for GPPAC, and the others present more or less 
naturally became NFPs. Some focal points organised national 
consultation conferences, other visited organisations in their country to 
discuss GPPAC, and still others lacked a significant national 
consultation process. Any organisation involved in peace work could 
join GPPAC at the national level, but not everyone was able to 
participate in the regional and global conferences due to limited funds. 
In October 2004 NPI-Africa organised a Regional Consultation, 
resulting in a press release and a Regional Action Agenda. The 
conference also issued specific recommendations that were distributed at 
the UN-African Union conference on the Great Lakes region that took 
place several weeks later. 
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Since New York, some of the Central and East African NFPs used the 
Global Action Agenda in their own countries, forwarding 
recommendations to government and getting recommendations included 
in national documents on peace and security. In addition, an RSG 
meeting was held in 2006 in which a Regional Work Plan was 
developed. The focal points consult regularly with NPI-Africa. NPI-
Africa sends them e-mails about events taking place in GPPAC globally 
in order for them to forward it to the members in their country. NPI-
Africa does not have a clear picture of the extent to which this has taken 
place; from the survey and interviews it becomes clear that not all 
participants are satisfied with the communication and information flows. 
As elsewhere, all involved are anxious to raise money to implement the 
work plan, which has not happened so far. Nevertheless, there are some 
ongoing regional GPPAC activities, including the organisation of a 
workshop on the UN Peacebuilding Commission in Burundi and the 
development of joint activities for UN Peace Day. 
 
In West Africa ECCP had cooperated with WANEP (see chapter six) 
before and since that network was already well established its secretariat 
was asked to become the Regional Initiator for West Africa. WANEP 
did not need to set up a new network as occurred in other GPPAC 
regions, but joined GPPAC as a whole. In August and September 2004 a 
regional conference was organised under the theme ‘Consolidating the 
Role of Civil Society Promoting Good Governance and Preventing 
Violent Conflicts’. By the end of the conference a Regional Action 
Agenda had been developed and n RSG, made up of representatives of 
fourteen West African countries, had been created. The Regional Action 
Agenda focused on the role that CSOs can play in different phases of 
conflict. In addition to the prevention of armed conflict, the agenda 
identified as focus areas human rights, elections, youth, chieftaincy, 
small arms proliferation, gender, religion, and the media. Since New 
York, the RSG has held a consultation meeting and developed a 
framework for ‘localising’ the Agenda in the various countries. 
Although during my visit to the region in February 2006 no national- 
and local level WANEP members had yet heard of the action agenda, 
this may have changed since then. 
 
 
7.6.2 Global knowledge sharing 
 
GPPAC members I met who attended the New York conference all 
considered it largely successful, mainly because they had gained new 
contacts from around the world and because the scale and location of the 
conference meant that it could give a powerful signal. It showed the 
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strength and unity of global civil society working for peace, emphasised 
the importance of conflict prevention, and advocated more involvement 
of civil society in achieving this. However, there was also some 
criticism, which centred mainly around two issues. First, there was little 
representation from official actors – powerful governments and the UN 
itself – which could hear the message of civil society. Secondly, as all 
attention and resources went towards the organisation of the conference, 
its follow-up received too little attention.   
 
Post-New York the global level of GPPAC has remained the most 
active. The ISG holds bi-annual meetings. Out of its midst an executive 
committee has been created, which meets even more often. In addition, 
the ISG has created several theme groups, also from its midst, which 
sometimes meet in the margins of ISG meetings. As for the content of 
such meetings, much of them is taken up by procedural issues, 
discussions about which activities and themes will receive priority, and 
planning and fundraising. However, the theme groups focus on content. 
Exchange of the experiences the ISG members have with peacebuilding 
in the regions also takes place – as much in the margins of meetings as 
during formal discussions – and this is found most useful. Several ISG 
members mentioned to me how surprised they were about the similarity 
of issues faced in the different regions. The ISG members are leading 
civil society figures from their regions and tend to be inspiring 
characters; when they meet they also inspire one another.  
 
About half of the resources that have been raised since the global 
conference are spent at the global level and go to the organisation of 
these meetings and the running of the secretariat at ECCP. Fewer 
resources are available for the maintenance of the regional secretariats, 
let alone for processes at the national or even grassroots levels. As a 
result, the knowledge that is shared and the decisions that are made at 
the global level are not always informed by the stakeholders in the 
regions, nor do they always find their way towards them. Many 
members complain that they are not kept up to date and are not 
consulted when decisions have to be made. They are also insufficiently 
aware of the structures and strategies of the network.  
 
The bottleneck appears to be at the level of the Regional Secretariats. 
They do not always forward information to member organisations in the 
regions and are not forthcoming with information towards the 
International Secretariat. For some regions, ECCP even has difficulty 
obtaining the contact details of the Regional Steering Group members. 
The Regional Secretariats consider the information they receive from the 
International Secretariat to be too much and as a result do not always act 
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upon information sent to forward it to members in the region. Regional 
Secretariat staff often spend time in the field and when they return to the 
office to find ten or twenty urgent GPPAC e-mails then they do not 
know where to start.  
 
 
7.6.3 Stimulating framework 
 
One of the conclusions emerging from the consultation of GPPAC 
members around the world when it comes to knowledge sharing is that 
the Global Partnership should not strive to build an overall, 
comprehensive knowledge system, but instead should offer a stimulating 
framework that facilitates exchange and access to knowledge sources. 
The approach towards knowledge sharing that has been decided upon by 
GPPAC’s knowledge generation and sharing task force, and later by the 
ISG, does not contradict this finding. It takes one topic as a ‘pilot’ for 
knowledge sharing, using it to develop a structure for knowledge sharing 
and collaborative learning. The topic selected is peace education (see 
7.7). A peace education reference group has been set up at the global 
level and a series of conferences and meetings has been planned. The 
aim is for this pilot process to lead to the establishment of a knowledge 
generation and sharing framework that could be used for other topics as 
well.  
 
It is considered important by members of GPPAC that such a framework 
for knowledge sharing pays particular attention to gathering and 
mobilising the knowledge that is available at the regional, national, and 
particularly the local level. Local communities and organisations often 
have unique experiences and mechanisms for dealing with conflict, but 
they have difficulty in making this known to others. A global network 
such as GPPAC is expected by its members to help achieve this.  
 
 
7.6.4 Flexibility 
 
The fact that the focus area of GPPAC is so broad has the advantage 
that, at least in theory, it makes the network able to respond to changes 
in the environment, adjusting its policy or starting new initiatives around 
these. Indeed, the ISG has the mandate to take far-reaching decisions. 
However, in practice the consensus structure and consensus-oriented 
nature of the people involved means that radical decisions are not easily 
taken and difficult choices tend to be postponed, for example with 
regard to the activism issue described in 7.4.2. In addition, 
communication in between ISG meetings does not always run smoothly, 
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with ISG members in the regions giving priority to other pressing 
matters and with the International Secretariat sending so much 
information that it becomes difficult to decide what is important. As a 
result of all this, GPPAC has not always been able to respond to current 
events. At the time of my involvement in GPPAC in 2006, for example, 
many were critical about the fact that GPPAC remained silent during the 
war in Lebanon that summer. On the other hand, where it concerns more 
gradual relation-building and lobbying processes at a high level, GPPAC 
has kept apace with new developments, mainly the creation of the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission with which it has been closely involved. In 
part this may be explained by the fact that ECCP already had 
experiences with this kind of work.  
 
Individual participants are quite passive in waiting for decisions to come 
from the centre. In theory a network is not a hierarchical decision-
making structure but a framework in which members can organise 
themselves in varying combinations around varying issues as the need 
arises. Indeed, in a region like Southeast Asia, campaigns and 
programmes carried out by the Regional Secretariat are reinforced by 
using the name of GPPAC as a way of showing the worldwide 
constituency that is behind the activity undertaken, without first 
soliciting the agreement of the ISG for doing so. That, after all, would 
take too long. In this way, participants at national or regional levels 
could pro-actively organise activities loosely under the banner of 
GPPAC. However, the amount of attention and resources going to 
organisational issues and to global-level structures may inhibit such 
flexibility. In part this is also donor-induced as donor agencies ask 
detailed work plans that require a high degree of organisation and 
counter flexibility.  
 
 
7.6.5 Safe space, trust and levels of learning 
 
All those involved agree that within the networks of GPPAC there is an 
atmosphere of safety in which people can express doubts, criticisms and 
uncertainties. Participants are not afraid to speak freely. That said, there 
is one limitation: language. Not everyone involved is fluent in English. 
At the ISG that presents difficulties for at least one of the Regional 
Initiators. At the regional level, more people experience difficulties due 
to language, particularly in the regions where English is the language 
used in the regional network. The people who are less fluent in the 
dominant language – such as the Cambodian participants in the 
Southeast Asian network - feel disadvantaged and do not speak as freely 
as others. This language barrier also represents an obstacle when it 
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comes to the dissemination of information by the International 
Secretariat. This information is usually in English, and the Regional 
Secretariats do not have budgets for translation.  
 
At the regional and global levels there is trust among the members of 
GPPAC. While attending several ISG meetings I observed that its 
discussions did not appear in any way constrained by rivalry among the 
members. Generally there is confidence that others are in it for the larger 
good. Trust is important from the perspective of creating a context for 
deeper-level reflection and learning, also across cultures, which requires 
the ability to openly question one’s assumptions and values. In a context 
of low trust this is unlikely to occur. However, at the national level 
participants note competition over funding as a constraining factor for 
networking, cooperation and sharing. In addition, the lack of 
transparency with regard to procedures and representation gives rise to 
some distrust at the national and regional levels. As we saw in the 
analysis of WANEP in the previous chapter, in some countries there is 
even some suspicion of power games, of personal disputes playing too 
strong a role, and of nepotism on the part of people claiming to represent 
the network.  
 
An interesting question is whether the different levels of trust at 
different levels of the network correspond with different levels of 
reflection and learning. It may be hypothesised that high trust and little 
direct competition at higher levels of the network lead to deeper-level 
(second- and third-order) reflection, while lower trust and more 
competition at lower levels results in more superficial (first-order) 
learning. Another factor supporting open exchange and reflection at the 
global level could be that power differences play less of a role: all 
present lend similar weight and legitimacy from their positions as 
prominent regional peacebuilders. Checking this hypothesis is not really 
possible without attending more meetings at the various levels. 
However, based on the meetings I have attended and the information 
given about other meetings, it appears to have some substance. In the 
local-level network meeting in Kenema, Sierra Leone described in Box 
5.3, exchange was all at the level of facts and developments and there 
was little reflection on whether organisations were doing the right thing. 
In and around ISG meetings such discussions do take place – although 
there, too, the majority of time is spent on practical matters.  
 
 
  
386 
7.6.6 Balance between inclusiveness and focus  
 
An issue faced by GPPAC is finding the right balance between 
inclusiveness and diversity on the one hand, and focus and direction on 
the other. This goes for content as well as membership. Many people 
involved in GPPAC fear that with too broad an aim it will be difficult to 
continue to rally people around the network and its activities. Members 
refer to other networks which they feel show that networks function best 
when they come together around a specific, concrete issue. Examples 
mentioned include the Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Campaign 
against Small Arms and Light Weapons. By contrast, GPPAC is huge, 
has a wide aim, and consists of organisations with a variety of 
specialisations and objectives. This makes it quite a challenge to come 
up with workable plans. Even the functions that have now been agreed 
on are still very broad. Many members feel the network should try to 
focus on a smaller number of achievable aims. This would make it more 
effective as its goals would be obtainable and its members committed. It 
would make the network more concrete and enable it to make a visible 
impact, leading to more motivation and commitment of members. 
Finding a focus area would also help GPPAC to find a ‘niche’ and create 
a GPPAC ‘brand’, leading to a clearer message to use in lobby and 
advocacy efforts. 
 
However, achieving such focus would not be an easy matter in the case 
of GPPAC because it would entail some very hard choices. There would 
be disagreements on priorities, and some would lose out. Some members 
may even have to be left out because they are too far removed from the 
central aims of the network, as is discussed in the next section. If 
GPPAC were to become more focused, as many members ask, it may 
lose one source of strength, namely its size and coverage, broadness, and 
general message. The question the network is faced with, therefore, is 
whether it should become more like a professional organisation, or 
rather provide a kind of general umbrella for all sorts of specific 
initiatives to emerge. If GPPAC decides to become more focused, that 
does not necessarily mean that the same focus is chosen for every 
region. Different regions may have different priorities.  
 
 
7.7 Content and outcomes of knowledge sharing   
 
7.7.1 Content balance 
 
Positively from the perspective of the call for more focus, the members 
of GPPAC identify a relatively clearly circumscribed list of issues 
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around which they would like to exchange knowledge and experiences. 
The main priorities for knowledge sharing in the network are the 
following: 
• conflict prevention and peacebuilding knowledge (research 
results, theoretical knowledge, lessons learned) and methods 
(tools, experiences, skills) in general 
• specialised issues and methods, such as peace education, human 
rights, and early warning and early response 
• experiences in the field 
• Information about GPPAC: goals, action plans, developments – 
including follow up to UN activities  
• activities undertaken by other members – it is important to know 
what others are doing because this could lead an organisation to 
identify opportunities for cooperation or to be inspired by 
activities taking place in other regions 
• lobbying and advocacy methods, in order for members and 
national and regional networks to become more effective in this 
area  
• the role of civil society: in some regions, there is a lot of 
unclarity and disagreement over the role civil society in general, 
and a network such as GPPAC, should play. For example, how 
political should it be, and how should it relate to governments? 
• networking methodologies and lessons, in order to develop and 
operate networks at the various levels more effectively 
• capacity building methods, so people within the network can 
support each other’s skills training and organisational 
development for more effective operation 
 
At the same time, as can be expected, there are also some differences 
between the priorities of regions and organisations with regard to 
knowledge to be shared. These are differences in both the knowledge 
demand and supply. Some of the regional networks possess expertise of 
a particular issue (such as the West African network does with regard to 
early warning and early response), which they could share with other 
regions that need it.  
 
The ISG has decided to focus knowledge sharing initially on the issue of 
peace education and conflict resolution in schools. It was the issue most 
‘alive’ among organisations, and indeed, many respondents in the 
framework of the review mention it. Moreover, peace education 
activities are mentioned in eleven out of the fifteen Regional Work 
Plans. In addition, as Box 7.8 shows, initiatives in this field already exist 
in some of the regions. 
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Box 7.8: Bottom-up peace education initiatives: Southeast Asia337 
 
A large conflict resolution education conference is being organised by GPPAC in the 
Balkans that will bring together civil society and ministries of education. Similar 
initiatives are undertaken in several other regions. In Southeast Asia, the Centre for 
Peace Education at Miriam College in Quezon City, Philippines is taking the lead on the 
theme. The aim is to have three or more trainers per country who would receive training 
in the Philippines, and to make this group a Southeast Asian peace education network. 
GPPAC Regional Steering group members would identify the participants in their 
countries. This would make GPPAC more alive and concrete. At present the Centre for 
Peace Education is looking for funds. The target is to have the first training in 2007.   
 
 
The idea is to use the experiences with knowledge sharing around peace 
education at a later stage when other issues are adopted. However, some 
(including several, but not all, staff of the International Secretariat) are 
disappointed with the choice. Conflict resolution education is rather 
long-term oriented and little operational. They would have preferred it if 
• more attention would be paid to urgent and concrete issues: 
what do we do about Lebanon?  
• knowledge sharing would also focus on concrete activities 
taking place in the network, sharing stories for inspiration (and 
legitimation) of the network338. 
• more generally, the wealth of knowledge inside the network 
would be better mobilised. 
• knowledge sharing with outside actors had also been prioritised. 
For example, a Secretariat staff member points out that although 
about half the members of GPPAC are also members of IANSA, 
little knowledge is shared with that network. That said, the 
group working on peace education has linked up with both the 
International Network for Conflict Resolution in Schools and 
Peace Education and the Hague Appeal for Peace Global 
Campaign on Peace Education. Both of these networks have 
representatives in the peace education reference group. 
• more thought would be given to conceptualising knowledge 
sharing and thinking about the best way to approach it. The 
GPPAC knowledge sharing task force is working on this 
through the peace education pilot, but many involved appear to 
be unaware of this. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that it may be better to allow knowledge 
sharing priorities to differ according to the region and type of 
                                                 
337 Interview with director of a Philippine NGO. Quezon City, Philippines, 19 May 2006. 
338 GPPAC’s stories database on www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/stories indeed has this ambition. 
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organisation, and that the Global Partnership could be more flexible in 
allowing for different groups and coalitions to operate simultaneously 
without deeming it necessary to get the entire network involved. This 
would make it possible to exchange around more specific issues, since 
topics would no longer have to be broad enough to be relevant to the 
entire global network. Reflecting this conclusion, GPPAC’s 
International Steering Group has set up task forces on specific issues. 
However, representation in them does not really penetrate the regions 
(the task forces are composed only of ISG members and in some cases 
outside experts) and most of them have not set concrete objectives, 
making it unclear what participants may expect to gain from the 
exchange.  
 
 
7.7.2 Outcomes of knowledge sharing 
 
An interviewee in Central Asia remarked that “knowledge exchange 
meetings can be a waste of time. Often boring meetings are held in 
which everyone just sums up what they have been doing, without a clear 
aim for something to come out of the meeting. A meeting needs to have 
a clear thematic focus, and clear objectives.”339 Participants are more 
willing to invest in knowledge sharing if it generates common products. 
Indeed, ECCP has compiled two People Building Peace340 books in 
which stories of civil society peacebuilding efforts are documented, as 
well as a number of region-specific books. The first book was developed 
before the Global Partnership came into existence, while the second was 
compiled making use of the global network to gather stories. According 
to ECCP, the second People Building Peace book has become much 
richer in terms of the range of experiences and the quality of stories it 
contains, and this is due to the Global Partnership providing access to 
people and their stories around the world. Thus, in this sense, the 
publication of People Building Peace II represents a very real and 
concrete outcome of the GPPAC network. Indeed, the book, which was 
distributed at the global GPPAC conference in July 2005, is considered 
useful by the network members, particularly for inspiration: the stories 
of others bring the moral support of knowing that others all over the 
world are working for the same goal. Recognising that translation is an 
issue and dissemination of the book a challenge - it is relatively heavy to 
send or carry - the book has been translated into French and Spanish and 
placed on CD-rom.  
 
                                                 
339 Interview with staff member of an international NGO. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 24 July 2006. 
340 European Centre for Conflict Prevention 1999; Van Tongeren et al. 2005. 
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In addition to the book, of course, there are many more stories to tell. 
Stories such as those documented in People Building Peace II not only 
help and inspire other members but are also an important external 
resource: they provide practical examples for students of peace and 
conflict studies, and in that sense can also be made of financial benefit 
by selling publications to an academic public. In addition, the collection 
of field stories helps the lobby, advocacy and fundraising efforts of 
GPPAC by providing concrete examples of what happens inside the 
network and of the positive roles that civil society organisations can 
play. ECCP would like to collect stories from the field and best practices 
on a more regular basis for the purposes mentioned above. Its staff 
regularly ask the Regional Secretariats to collect stories from their 
region. However, the International Secretariat finds it difficult to get 
people to submit stories. This may be because people are not sure 
exactly what is expected of them. It may also be due to other pressing 
issues getting priority. Supplying stories to a far-away institution 
without much certainty about what will happen to them is not first on 
most people’s to-do list. ECCP is contemplating ways to deal with this. 
Regional People Building Peace books, which may be more ‘real’ to 
members, are planned for Latin America and the Caribbean and 
Southeast Asia. Though excluding those without internet access, a 
website that documents stories may at the same time be more accessible 
to people inside and outside of the network than a book. In addition, it 
can be alive and constantly changing and growing. The website 
www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories has been set up as a tool for 
this. 
 
In addition to concrete ‘knowledge products’ like websites and books, 
knowledge sharing may lead to various other outcomes. Lobby and 
advocacy are informed by the knowledge of network members and gain 
weight as a result. To the extent that lobby focuses in achieving more 
recognition for the role of civil society in peacebuilding, the books and 
website that document positive examples of CSO activity are also 
lobbying tools in themselves. From the perspective of lobby and 
advocacy, knowledge sharing outcomes may include changed policies of 
official actors as a result of input from GPPAC. At this stage, it is 
possible to show that GPPAC has reached many such actors, but 
difficult to assess the final impact of this on their policies. 
 
 
7.8 Monitoring and evaluation  
 
As we have seen, GPPAC’s stakeholders agree that it is time the 
network starts to prove its relevance and make an actual contribution to 
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armed conflict prevention. Good M&E procedures are indispensable in 
this regard: otherwise, how can we know if GPPAC has made a 
contribution? Different planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning 
systems are in use by the various partners in GPPAC. Creating an 
alternative system for all to adopt in replacement of existing procedures 
is not necessarily the way to go. Indeed, one survey respondent wrote 
that “instead of looking to a certain model, we should see how the 
different models in use could be connected” (GPPAC 2006c). This 
might include agreeing on some kind of minimum standard. A Regional 
Initiator interviewed similarly stated that “the regions have systems of 
M&E in place that seem to work for them; these should not be replaced, 
but GPPAC globally could find the common elements of these systems 
and build on those.” 341 
 
When considering what should characterise an M&E system for 
GPPAC, various suggestions are made by those surveyed and 
interviewed. Most importantly, an M&E system for GPPAC should:  
• start by setting realistic, attainable, meaningful objectives that 
are directly related to the prevention of violent conflict 
• involve all the members to ensure ownership and a collaborative 
learning process 
• be an ongoing internal monitoring system complemented by 
regular external evaluations 
• be clear about the responsibility of the various network levels in 
monitoring 
• pay attention to building a strong capacity for M&E at all levels.  
 
The International Secretariat favours adopting the Outcome Mapping 
method (see section 5.4), at least at the global level where it could 
complement the various systems in place at other levels. Outcome 
Mapping is seen to be especially appropriate for networks because 
relationships and behaviours are central to it. The Secretariat introduced 
this method at the March 2006 International Steering Group meeting in 
Nairobi and hoped to immediately apply it to joint planning during this 
meeting. However, this went a little too fast for the ISG members, who 
had not been sufficiently consulted about this method and had various 
questions about it. In the end, Outcome Mapping was only partially used 
in the planning process.  
 
 
                                                 
341 Telephone interview with GPPAC Regional Initiator, 15 August 2006. 
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7.9 Concluding remarks 
 
What are the implications of the GPPAC case study for the analytical 
questions posed in Part Three? Global networks that link together civil 
society actors across countries and regions are one type of initiative 
taken to support the learning processes of local NGOs. They may act as 
learning ‘scaffolds’ by providing access to external knowledge that may 
help place individual activities in a larger perspective and make possible 
learning by comparison, discussion and reflection. Through discussions 
during network meetings and online exchange, joint learning is 
facilitated. In addition, a network such as GPPAC potentially gives local 
NGOs the opportunity to make their voice heard more widely, thereby 
facilitating their contribution to global discussions on peace and conflict.  
 
Given the difficulty local organisations have to influence macro-level 
issues that affect their work at the micro-level, global networks make 
possible joint action in the face of broader issues that individual 
organisations cannot deal with on their own. In the case of GPPAC, its 
lobby and advocacy work at the UN and other global forums is therefore 
deemed valuable by GPPAC members, although their input into these 
activities could be more direct. In relation to the potential cross-border 
networks have to facilitate joint thinking and action in relation to the 
bigger picture of conflict and peace, dilemmas can arise regarding the 
extent of political activism that civil society should engage in at the risk 
of jeopardising its relations with (donor) governments and its 
participation in dialogues about policy.   
 
What can we learn from initiatives such as GPPAC in relation to the 
way they may facilitate learning and make third-order reflection 
possible? First, the need to find a balance between focus on the one 
hand and inclusiveness and diversity on the other is seen very clearly in 
GPPAC. The GPPAC case shows the difficulty of finding such a 
balance, of taking clear decisions of direction in a network whose value 
is that it brings together many different kinds of people and 
organisations. Diversity is conducive to cross-cultural learning and 
being confronted with organisations from very different backgrounds 
can stimulate abstraction and out-of-the-box reflection. To make such 
processes possible, flexibility and openness to suggestions and change 
are important assets of networks. However, the need for organisation – if 
only in order to produce plans required for fundraising – is likely to 
grow as the network develops, running the risk that it turns into a 
hierarchical organisation rather than a loose structure facilitating 
individual and joint action. In response to this dilemma some suggest to 
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divide into a flexible social movement (with more room for activism) 
and a professional organisation. 
 
Particularly at the national level, conflict, power differences, and 
competition among NGOs make networking difficult in conflict-affected 
areas. The early stage in which civil society finds itself in many of the 
countries under study also plays a role. Many NGOs are highly 
dependent on specific individuals, and as a result networks can become 
either groups of friends or platforms for competition among influential 
people. To some extent, network structures and procedures can help 
mitigate such issues by providing transparency about participation, 
representation and decision making. At the regional and, particularly, 
global levels, problems relating to personal connections, power relations 
and competitions are not as strong. As a result, there may be more 
opportunities at those levels for second- and third-order learning, made 
possible by higher levels of abstraction and a setting of trust and safety 
in which to openly question assumptions and even values.  
 
What can we learn from GPPAC about the support that Northern actors 
may give to the knowledge and learning strategies of Southern peace 
NGOs and increase their agency? GPPAC was initiated and continues to 
be facilitated by an NNGO, ECCP. Its previous experience and its 
geographical closeness to potential donors and global decision makers 
puts it in a good position to support the members of the network through 
fundraising, lobby to influence the macro structures that shape the work 
of the members, and efforts to make their voices heard at higher levels. 
Such activities are likely to be more effective role now that ECCP acts 
on behalf of a global network of peace organisations, rather than itself 
alone. In terms of facilitating the learning strategies of local peace 
organisations, the funds and organisation provided by ECCP has enabled 
exchanges that are deemed valuable by the members of GPPAC.  
 
However, many feel that its enabling role ought to more strongly include 
the capacity building of members and network structures at grassroots, 
national and regional levels. It would be a remarkable achievement if a 
network like GPPAC could make it possible that training programmes 
become more widely offered, particularly at the regional and national 
levels where the content of training could be more sensitive to regional 
and local circumstances, knowledge, methods, and traditions. Capacity 
building may also help correct imbalances among members that give 
stronger members a dominating position. In part, these imbalances are 
the result of the top-down manner in which GPPAC was created. 
Connecting to organisations at the remains very problematic for the 
network. 
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Although ECCP provides funds to its partners in the network, the 
relationship it has with them is one of equals342. The network is 
governed by these partners and ECCP only has a small voice in its 
decision-making. This suggests that the networking approach is more 
conducive to equal partnership than the policy chain approach. Founding 
an organisation together with one’s partners, rather than continuing to 
work ‘through’ them, increases the legitimacy of the activities of an 
NNGO and makes them more reflective of local knowledge and ideas. 
In the next chapter, we see another example of an NNGO that has taken 
the step of creating a structure jointly with partners – one that focuses 
even more explicitly and exclusively on supporting the learning 
processes of local peacebuilders. 
                                                 
342 See the citation from NPI-Africa in 4.7.3 (page 215). 
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Chapter 8. Action learning for peace 
Applied Conflict Transformation Studies 
 
The Applied Conflict Transformation Studies (ACTS) programme is 
another initiative set up by an NNGO together with partners in various 
conflict regions. Like GPPAC, it has characteristics of a network but it 
aims more explicitly, and exclusively, at supporting learning processes 
of local peacebuilders. An interesting facet of the programme is that it 
does so by involving local knowledge institutions, something which I 
found to be rare in the countries visited. The case study of ACTS sheds 
light on all questions posed in this Part Three, giving an example of an 
initiative to improve the learning processes of local peace NGOs that 
aims to function as a ‘scaffold’ to make ‘third-order’ learning possible, 
that is supported by a Northern actor, that involves knowledge 
institutions and that brings actors from different parts of the world 
together in a network. The international Master programme for peace 
practitioners aims not only at facilitating the learning of peacebuilders 
but also at increasing their role in knowledge generation and 
international debates. The aims this initiative therefore resonate with 
many of the needs identified in this study. For that reason, it is worth 
taking a closer look at the way it is functioning to see if it is indeed an 
approach worth developing in other places. 
 
I have been able to gather information about ACTS through my own 
involvement in the development of the programme, first as a resource 
person contributing to the development of the curriculum, and later as a 
consultant whose task it has been to 
• be part of, and facilitate, a process of learning and reflection by 
those involved in the ACTS programme on M&E and the 
impact of ACTS as a whole; 
• draw together the experiences with M&E practice in ACTS and 
overall practice in implementing the course; and 
• draw together the outcomes of M&E in the regions in order to 
give a first idea about the impact of the whole ACTS 
mechanism as a vehicle for change. 
 
I am therefore not a neutral observer but have been, more and less 
closely in different periods, involved in the programme. I have tried to 
be conscious of the possible bias that this may bring and will reflect on 
it at the end of the chapter. The positive side of my involvement in 
ACTS has been that it has allowed me to attend various meetings, have 
access to internal documents, and talk to most of the main stakeholders. 
More specifically, this chapter is based on 
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• various trips to Birmingham, UK, as well as trips to Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia and Belgrade, Serbia, where I have had 
extensive conversations with ACTS staff members; 
• participation in a curriculum development workshop in 
Kampala, Uganda, in September 2004; 
• conversations with three course participants in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia in May 2006; 
• participation in a global ACTS management group meeting in 
Birmingham in February 2007; 
• various internal ACTS documents, including the recent Action 
Research Review by Diana Francis (Francis 2007), which is a 
particularly helpful assessment of the current state of affairs of 
ACTS and on which I will draw extensively.  
 
In this chapter, I will first look at the background, aims and development 
of  ACTS in section 8.1. Next, in 8.2, I will take a closer look at the way 
in which the programme tries to support the learning of peace 
practitioners, namely through the use of action research. 8.3 addresses 
the organisation of the programme, focusing on cooperation between 
NNGOs,  SNGOs and academia in making it possible. 8.4 looks more 
closely at the way the learning of peacebuilders is supported as the 
course is taught in Cambodia and Serbia. Does it indeed function as a 
learning ‘scaffold’? The section deals with the expectations, opinions, 
capacities and development of the participants; cultural issues; the 
academic aspects of the course; and the way its content is developing as 
the programme progresses. 8.5 takes a look at the documentation and 
dissemination of research outcomes that are needed to start building a 
local peacebuilding knowledge base in the regions where the programme 
takes place and to start contributing to global discussions and theory 
development. Finally, 8.6 addresses learning and M&E by ACTS itself. 
  
 
8.1 Background, aims and development of  ACTS 
 
8.1.1 Background and aims 
 
Responding to Conflict (RTC) is a UK-based NGO working on conflict 
transformation343. It was founded by Quakers in 1991. A major field of 
activity of the organisation has been the provision of training courses to 
peacebuilders from around the world. In Birmingham, various courses 
are offered, ranging from short, several week-long courses to the three-
                                                 
343 For a discussion of the term conflict transformation, see section 1.3.  
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month Working with Conflict course. Over the years a specific 
curriculum has developed. The courses are based on participatory, 
experiential learning that builds on the experiences and knowledge of 
the participants. In addition to its UK-based programmes, RTC has 
supported partners in various conflict-affected regions of the world to 
develop training programmes there. Its partners include the Coalition for 
Peace in Africa (COPA), which has its headquarters in Nairobi, the 
Nansen Dialogue Network in the Balkans, and the Alliance for Conflict 
Transformation (ACT) in Cambodia. Often, partnerships began when 
someone working for these organisations participated in the Working 
with Conflict course.  
 
During a sabbatical in 2002, Simon Fisher, the director of RTC, spoke 
with various peacebuilding practitioners in East Africa who had 
participated in RTC’s Working with Conflict course. These people 
voiced the need for more and extended training of the same kind, 
preferably linked to a postgraduate degree programme. They emphasised 
that an academic degree was an important prerequisite for getting ahead 
in many countries. For that reason, many of the former course 
participants had gone on to Bradford University in the UK or the Eastern 
Mennonite University in the US to do a Master course. These courses 
had been valuable to them – but, they said, not to the communities they 
left behind. It had been difficult to abandon their work and their 
families. The need therefore was for a Master programme in the conflict 
regions themselves, based on the practice-oriented teaching principles of 
RTC courses. As a result, the Applied Conflict Transformation Studies 
(ACTS) programme began to develop. 
 
ACTS is a Master programme for peacebuilding practitioners that is 
offered in parts of the world that are affected by conflict. It was initiated 
by RTC but developed together with a consortium of partners – ACT 
Cambodia, the Nansen network in the Balkans, and COPA in East 
Africa. In addition, universities were asked to come on board in order to 
make it a truly academic programme – something RTC and its partners 
had never done before. ACTS tries to combine academic principles and 
requirements with practice-based learning. It is based on the principles 
of action research (AR), which are elaborated in the next section. The 
idea is that by carrying out research in their own work environments, 
and comparing their findings with existing thinking in the field of 
peacebuilding, the participants will not only become more effective in 
their work but will also contribute to global theory development from a 
Southern, practitioner perspective. In this way the programme aims to 
shift the centre of gravity of the peacebuilding field from the ivory 
towers of universities toward the field, and from the North to the South.  
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More specifically, the aims of the programme are to: 
• provide accessible, affordable, relevant, high quality post-
graduate education in the field of conflict transformation; 
• create better peace practice through more analytical, reflective, 
reflexive, critical and adaptive practitioners; 
• generate theory from practice and linking practice to theory in 
order to increase the contribution of practitioners to the global 
body of theory on conflict transformation and influence 
policymakers; 
• support and promote sustained multi-level and multi-sectoral 
work for peace and justice within regional areas through 
improved skills and practice of individual practitioners, and 
thereby contribute to peace in communities. (ACTS 2007) 
 
In 2005, the first Master course began in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, with 
participants from all over Asia. Soon after, a second programme began 
in Novi Sad, Serbia, for participants from different parts of the Balkans. 
In 2006, both Centres started a second course, while the first was still 
ongoing. This time, the Centre in Serbia also recruited participants from 
the Middle East. The set-up of the programme allows students from 
various countries to attend without abandoning their work and families: 
as the course is based on research in people’s own practice, much of the 
work is done at home. Over the course of two years, the participants 
come together in the ACTS Centre six times to attend a ten-day seminar. 
During these seminars, theory is introduced and AR findings are 
exchanged and discussed.  
 
The ACTS Asia Centre based in Phnom Penh is run by a consortium of 
three partners: the local NGO ACT, which coordinates the programme, 
Pannasastra University of Cambodia, and RTC. ACTS Balkans and 
Middle East is organised jointly by the Nansen network, Novi Sad 
University, and RTC. In the coming years, ACTS is also hoping to start 
programmes for East Africa, in cooperation with COPA, and Western 
Europe, with a Centre in the UK.  
 
As mentioned, two ACTS courses are currently running in Asia and the 
Balkans/Middle East. At the time of writing344, the first cohorts are 
nearing their completion. This means that the programme is at a 
relatively early stage to discuss outcomes and impact. Nonetheless, 
some interesting lessons can already be learned at this point.  
                                                 
344 June 2007 
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8.1.2 Development and implementation of the course 
 
The curriculum of ACTS consists of six modules, taught in six regional 
seminars over the course of two years. The first four modules contain 
theory on various aspects of conflict and peacebuilding, while the fifth 
and sixth module are left open to provide room for discussion on the 
action research (AR) of the participants. ‘Core papers’ have been 
developed for each of the first four modules. They depict the main 
theories and discussions with regard to a particular topic, including 
references pointing the participant to additional literature. The core 
papers were written by people with both academic credentials and 
practical experience, and revised during a curriculum development 
workshop in Kampala in the fall of 2004, at which all of the NGO 
partners (but not the universities) were present, and which I also 
attended. The content of the first four modules, and their corresponding 
core papers, is outlined below. In addition to these four, a fifth core 
paper is used throughout the course: the one on AR as a methodology. 
• Module One is entitled Theories of conflict: Its causes and 
dynamics, and implications for addressing it. It addresses 
theories about conflict and violence, and ways of analysing and 
classifying them. In addition, it deals with various schools of 
thinking about causes of conflict – psychological, social, 
political and economic.  
• Module Two is called Conflict, power and change: Engaging 
with actors, systems, structure and policies. Its core paper 
discusses ideas and theories regarding social change, the 
constraints and opportunities posed by power and structures, and 
ways in which various actors can relate to each other to bring 
about change. In the terminology of Part Two, it deals with 
ways in which the agency of actors can affect the structure 
created by systems and power differences. 
• Module Three is named Designing and facilitating conflict 
transformation processes and maps a wide array of ways in 
which peacebuilding processes can be shaped, discussing 
various methods, designs and approaches. The core paper 
addresses the peacebuilding activities of CSOs as well as 
official actors, and includes discussion on mediation, peace 
negotiation, and postconflict strategies for sustainable peace.  
• Module Four focuses on the latter challenge and is called 
Building sustainable peace. It deals mainly with the concept of 
postconflict reconstruction, looking at various socio-economic 
and political aspects that come to the fore after violence has 
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ended and the task at hand is to build and shape political, 
economic and juridical systems that can sustain peace.345 
  
For modules Five and Six no core papers were designed. These modules 
were envisioned as follows. 
• Module Five was left open in order to make space for a 
discussion on the AR of the participants, to look at preliminary 
thesis drafts, exchange findings and experiences, reflect on AR 
as a methodology and prepare for the finalisation of the theses. 
It was also thought that this module could be used to discuss any 
content that the participants felt needed attention but that had 
not yet been addressed in the previous modules. This could 
include more region-specific issues.  
• Module Six was planned to be a larger conference at which the 
participants would present their findings. The conferences are to 
invite various stakeholders from the region – including the 
organisations of the participants, possibly some of the 
beneficiaries of these organisations, other peace NGOs, and 
academics – as well as some people from the other regions in 
order to facilitate exchange, solidarity and the building of a 
global ACTS network. The conference of Module Six is seen to 
be an important element in the strategy to disseminate the 
results of AR done in the framework of ACTS. In addition, an 
ACTS Journal is being set up in which the findings of the 
participants will be published. Section 8.6.2 discusses these 
dissemination strategies in some more detail. 
 
As the first courses progressed and Module Five came nearer, there was 
some uncertainty about how to fill it in. However, the regional Centres 
took the lead to design the fifth seminar for their region. In Asia, where 
the first Module Five was taught in March 2007, it focused entirely on 
the AR findings of the participants and their presentation. Significant 
attention was devoted to preparing the participants for the regional 
conference of Module Six. Thus, the fifth seminar included feedback on 
and adjustment of the draft Master theses and certificate papers of the 
participant as well as sessions on how to present one’s findings to a 
broader audience.  
 
The modules are facilitated by a team of three tutors. Two tutors are 
from the region and the third is ‘international’ – often a staff member of 
RTC, one of the people who took the lead in developing the readers, or a 
                                                 
345 The core papers can be found in the literature list as ACTS 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, and 
2005e. 
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staff member of one of the ACTS coordinating NGOs in the other 
regions. The tutors tend to be experienced peacebuilding trainers with an 
NGO background. Staff of the participating universities take part in 
some, but not all of the sessions.  
 
The ACTS programme aims to attract participants from among peace 
practitioners – people working for local and international CSOs in 
various countries in the region. In the first edition of ACTS Asia, sixteen 
participants from six countries346 participate. The second group consists 
of fourteen participants, again from six different countries347. The 
Serbia-based course attracted seventeen participants from various parts 
of the Balkans for its first edition. The second group, consisting of 
fifteen students, also includes people from Israel and the Palestinian 
territories.  
 
Applicants are selected based on their experience, current involvement 
in peacebuilding, and motivation to take part in the course. Given the 
aims of ACTS – to help practitioners become more effective in their 
work and to increase the voice of practitioners in global theory-
formation – academic qualifications are not considered particularly 
important, at least not by the RTC and its partner NGOs in the regions. 
However, given that it is an academic Master course, the participating 
universities have added an additional entry requirement: a Bachelor’s 
degree. When it turned out that there were many applicants who did not 
have a degree but who did seem otherwise very fitting candidates for the 
course, it was decided after some discussion to allow such people to 
participate. This group will not obtain a Master’s degree but will receive 
a certificate instead. At the end of the course they produce a final paper 
instead of a full-fledged Master’s thesis.  
 
In addition to the two current Centres in Asia and the Balkans-Middle 
East, new Centres may be created in the coming years in Africa, the 
Americas, and Western Europe. Although RTC’s partner in East Africa, 
COPA, has been involved in the development of ACTS from the start, 
the start-up of an ACTS Centre there has been delayed. The main 
problem has been to find a suitable university partner in the region348. In 
2006, talks began with the organisation Centro para la Paz in Guatemala 
to begin a centre for the Americas. This organisation is already linked to 
RTC as part of the ACTION network that RTC established in 1999. 
Since February it has been discussing the programme with a number of 
                                                 
346 Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India, Nepal and New Zealand. 
347 Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
348 Other issues affecting the programme in Africa are discussed in 8.3.2 
  
402 
universities in the region. In the UK, talks are underway with Huron 
University about the establishment of an ACTS Centre for peace 
practitioners who are based in the Western Europe.  
 
In addition to all this, ACTS has talked to various universities in Europe, 
the US and Australia about gaining global accreditation by a Northern 
university for the programme in all ACTS regions. The reason for that is 
that in most of the countries in which the participants live and work, a 
Master’s degree from a European or American institution is regarded 
more highly than one from a local university. Thus, ‘Northern’ 
accreditation of their degree, in addition to the accreditation provided by 
Novi Sad University or Pannasastra University, would be considered a 
benefit. Such accreditation could also help in the acceptance of ACTS 
research findings and their publication by recognised academic journals. 
However, universities are reluctant to accredit a practitioner-oriented 
programme that is taught abroad and that has already been developed 
before they came on board. A problem arises with regard to quality 
control, as accreditation visitation committees usually do not have the 
resources to travel around the world in order to assess the quality of the 
teaching and research taking place. As a result, the efforts to gain global 
accreditation have not yet yielded any results. 
 
 
8.2 Improving the learning of local peace NGOs through action 
research  
 
In chapter three of this study I discussed various ways, or levels, of 
learning. The most profound type of learning, according to the literature, 
was third-order or double-loop learning. To recapitulate what I wrote in 
section 3.1.2: where first-order learning uses a pre-given set of 
knowledge, second-order learning is the creation of new knowledge by 
learning in action. It is a cyclical trial-and-error process of action and 
adaptation and involves asking questions, reflecting, and adjusting while 
acting. Third-order learning, it was added, goes a step further in that it 
also includes questioning the validity of the tasks and problems posed. It 
does not take the structural framework in which the action takes place 
for granted but questions the ultimate aims and principles that underlie 
the action. Where second-order learning leads to adjustment at the 
tactical level in order to meet one’s aims more effectively, third-order 
learning may lead to strategic changes, such as an adjustment of the 
aims themselves.  
 
Third-order learning adds another cycle to the learning cycle of action, 
reflection, adjustment, and renewed action; namely the cycle of self-
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reflection that involves the questioning of underlying values. In the 
terminology of ACTS this is the ‘reflexive’ cycle. It entails asking 
difficult questions about my own role in the activity in which I am 
engaged. What implicit theories, assumptions and experiences do I bring 
to this action, and do they lead to any distortions? Should my 
assumptions be modified? Because third-order learning adds another 
cycle, it is often referred to as ‘double-loop learning’. In double-loop 
learning, the values and assumptions underlying my actions are reflected 
upon and tested simultaneously with the reflection and testing of the 
actions themselves. 
 
The concept of action learning or action research (AR) builds on this 
idea of third-order learning. Here, too, learning takes place by doing, 
reflection, and experimentation – while at the same time there is a 
reflection on the underlying implicit theories and values of the learner. 
The action learning cycle is depicted in the following figure, which 
clearly shows the double loop. 
 
Figure 8.1: Action learning349  
 
The outer circle represents the action cycle, in which an activity is 
carried out. This starts from an analysis of the situation, followed by the 
                                                 
349 ACTS 2005a: 11 
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planning of the action and the action itself. Next, a reflection takes 
place: how did I do? Do the results confirm my original analysis of the 
situation – or should it be adapted? At the same time, another research 
(or learning) cycle takes place. It begins by making explicit the 
understanding of the world (theories, values, assumptions) that underlies 
my analysis of the situation. This leads to the formulation of a plan to 
test my theory during the action that I undertake. This testing consists 
mainly of being aware of my underlying theory during the action and 
being open to the possibility that it might prove to be inconsistent with 
the events that take place as a result of my action. In the reflection phase 
I do not consider only my action and its results, but also the way in 
which they relate to the underlying theories and assumptions that I have 
made explicit earlier on in the process. This leads me to adjust these 
theories and assumptions, and a new learning cycle may begin. (ACTS 
2005a, Cummings 2004) 
 
An important difference between AR and ‘traditional’ research is that 
while “traditional academic research denies the relationships between 
the investigator and the empirical object”, AR recognises that the 
presence and actions of a researcher have an impact on the reality he 
studies, and vice versa. According to AR, “the ambiguous, dynamic and 
changing world cannot be understood from the detached position of the 
pure observer”. (Boonstra 2004: 17) Thus, action researchers do not 
strive to be objective observers who are separate from what is being 
observed. On the contrary, they study a reality of which they are part 
and explicitly take into account their own role in shaping this reality. In 
response to their growing understanding of what they are studying 
through AR, they may introduce changes to this reality in order to 
examine the results to which those may lead.  
 
ACTS aims to use AR as a way to help peace practitioners to begin 
looking at their own work in a more systematic manner, to relate their 
activities more explicitly to their aims and values, to analyse the 
effectiveness of their work and ask how it could be improved. In other 
words, ACTS hopes to create learning practitioners – and through them, 
perhaps, learning organisations as well. In addition, as mentioned, it is 
hoped that the outcomes of the AR of ACTS participants lead to the 
generation of new theories or the adjustment of existing ones in the 
peacebuilding field. AR is applied in ACTS in the following way. After 
the principles of the approach are introduced, making use of an 
especially developed reader, the participants first carry out small AR 
projects in order to experiment with the method. Next, they decide on a 
larger project – for example, to study a project they are involved in and 
find out how it may be improved. This project becomes the ‘red line’ 
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running throughout the two-year Master programme. The participants 
are expected to relate the theories that are introduced during the 
seminars to their projects of study and look for additional sources that 
may shed light on their research questions. They are asked to record 
their reflections and findings in both learning loops – so both with 
regard to the project of study and their own role and theories – in a 
journal. Aided by the journals, they discuss their reflections and 
progress during the seminars. At the end of the course, the AR projects 
lead to Master theses, which the students need to obtain their degree and 
which, it is hoped, may contain new or adjusted theories that can be 
disseminated and discussed in the wider peacebuilding field. 
 
 
8.3 North-South and academic-practitioner cooperation to 
implement the programme 
 
ACTS is implemented by a consortium of organisations, including an 
NNGO, a number of SNGOs, and academic institutions. As elsewhere in 
this study cooperation among these groups has been identified as a 
difficult issue, this section takes a closer look at how this works in the 
case of ACTS. It its NNGO-SNGO cooperation shaped by the aid chain 
model, or have equal partnerships been achieved? And given that so 
little cooperation takes place between Southern peace NGOs and 
Southern academia in general, how is this cooperation going inside 
ACTS? 
 
 
8.3.1 Global standards and regional variation 
 
At present the ACTS structure looks as follows.  
• There is a ‘governance group’ at the top of the decision-making 
structure which consists of the peace organisation partners: 
ACT, COPA, Nansen, and RTC. Recently, the participating 
universities have also been invited to nominate a representative 
to become part of this group. Its role is to act as the guardian of 
the vision, engage in risk management, keep an eye on 
resourcing, and set reporting requirements.  
• Accountable to this group is the ‘leadership and management 
group’ which focuses mainly on the course itself – more 
specifically content, delivery, quality and standards, and 
philosophy. It consists of the ACTS coordinators in the regions 
(employees of the local partner NGOs) and RTC.  
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• A third group that is in turn accountable to the management 
group is responsible for ‘on site implementation within agreed 
parameters’. Until recently the universities were represented 
only at this level. (ACTS 2006) 
 
The division of labour between RTC and the its partners in the regions 
appears to be relatively clear to most involved and to be working quite 
well. The roles and responsibilities of RTC include investigating 
possibilities for global accreditation, providing international tutors, 
organising tutor training, and continuing to develop the core curriculum. 
In addition RTC is responsible for the development of new ACTS 
centres, the provision of ongoing support and advice to the regional 
centres, and the facilitation of exchange and joint learning between the 
centres. The latter includes organising regular meetings as well as 
developing and implementing a system for monitoring and evaluation. It 
is also a role of RTC to work on the dissemination of research outcomes 
to a broader audience. Finally, RTC plays a major role in fundraising for 
the programme. (ACTS 2007b) 
 
The NGOs in the regions are responsible for the actual implementation 
of the course in their regions. This includes interacting with the local 
academic partner, coordinating the organisation of the programme, and 
recruiting participants and regional teaching teams. The NGOs may also 
develop regional course materials to complement the core curriculum. as 
required. Financially, the regional NGOs are responsible for the 
allocation of scholarships and for regional fundraising to cover local 
costs and scholarships. (ACTS 2007b) 
 
A question has arisen within ACTS about the global versus the regional 
characteristics of the programme: what aspects make up the core of 
ACTS and should be the same for all regions, and what elements may 
vary according to local conditions and preferences? In ACTS Asia, for 
example, there has been some discussion about whether the participatory 
teaching methods of RTC were appropriate in a region where people are 
much more used to more traditional lecturing. It was not suggested to 
abandon participant-led methods, but some felt these should be 
complemented by more lecturing sessions. A recent internal review of 
the way AR has so far been implemented in the programme, carried out 
by AR expert Diana Francis who also wrote the methodology reader for 
ACTS, states that one of the regional coordinators was “concerned about 
the relationship between the courses being run by ACTS Balkans [and 
Middle East] and ACTS Asia and felt that it was important to review 
commonalities and differences and what degrees and areas of difference 
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were acceptable or desirable.” The coordinator felt that more clarity was 
required about the extent or “regional autonomy” of the Centres in 
determining the content and organisation of the course, although she 
emphasised that such autonomy should not alter the “context of 
connectedness and a common frame”. (Francis 2007: 16) 
 
This implies a deeper question, phrased as follows in Francis’s AR 
Review: “[a]re we looking for a family of independent and different 
institutions and practices or for some greater degree of structural 
relatedness, common standards and systems, etc?” (Francis 2007: 23) 
All involved agree that some measure of regional variation is desirable, 
and that more regional content – like literature written by people from 
the region – would make the programmes more relevant to their context. 
After all, not only culture, but also the nature of conflict and peace 
differs between the regions. Thinking and discussions on this issue 
within ACTS do not question this, but centre on the issue of finding the 
right balance between regional variation and adhesion to the main 
principles of the course. In addition there is the issue of quality control. 
As I will discuss in the next section, ACTS hopes to acquire 
accreditation by a Northern academic institution for the whole, global 
programme. To make this possible, some common standards and content 
will probably be required. 
 
 
8.3.2 North-South NGO partnerships in ACTS 
 
In chapter four I discussed North-South partnerships between NGOs in 
peacebuilding. Despite good intentions, equal partnerships involving 
two-way exchanges of knowledge and policy ideas are often difficult to 
achieve due to the inherent inequalities of the funding chain and the 
weaker knowledge base of Southern actors that results from a lack of 
recognition of indigenous knowledge and a lack of Southern capacity for 
reflection, research and documentation. The chapter showed that where 
more equal partnerships have been achieved this is often due to trust 
standing relations that have developed over a longer period and that are 
made possible by long-term core funding rather than short term project 
funding. Such partnerships are based on the strength and contributions 
of both sides, each of which brings added value to the relationship. This 
means that they are possible mainly with stronger Southern 
organisations.  
 
The NGO partnerships in ACTS tend to reflect this second model of 
longer-term, equal partnership. Relations were not started as part of the 
implementation of ACTS, but preceded the programme. Personal 
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contact and trust had already been established and the partners had 
worked together in the past. Although the initial idea for ACTS came 
from RTC, it was based on consultations with partners and together with 
them it was further developed. RTC emphasises that it wants to avoid 
being a ‘money depot’ for the regions but strives for equal relationships 
in which each partner provides added value.  
 
There is, however, one partnership in which the issues discussed in 
chapter four do play at least some role. In Africa North-South issues 
seem to affect the relationship more than in other regions. Between RTC 
and COPA there have been some difficulties around the question how 
much freedom of operation each partner has in developing the 
programme in Africa. After negotiations with several universities in the 
region faltered, COPA decided to go ahead and start the programme 
while the search for a university partner continued. RTC disagreed with 
this course of action, which as it turned out was also not possible due to 
the terms of a major donor. However, by the time this all became clear 
(and RTC essentially pulled the plug), the organisation of the course was 
already quite far progressed and this led to some resentment on the part 
of COPA. Still, the organisation decided to go ahead with the 
development of an ACTS Centre and began talking to new potential 
university partners.  However, where in the earlier stage COPA had 
accused RTC of acting too much on its own, now, the tables turned and 
RTC feels uncomfortable with the lack of consultation of  COPA with 
RTC as it negotiates with universities. Although RTC does not want to 
impose anything, it does want to be involved in order to ensure that the 
vision and reputation of both ACTS and RTC are safeguarded. RTC 
staff speculate that the colonial history may have something to do with 
the fact that equal, trust-based partnerships prove more difficult to 
develop in East Africa than elsewhere. 
 
Another interesting episode in the context of partnership and 
peacebuilding was the interaction between RTC and COPA on the one 
hand, and a university in Uganda on the other. In 2004 the parties came 
quite close to agreeing on the terms of the joint creation of an ACTS 
Centre with this university. However, it then became apparent that the 
university only wanted RTC to help them set up the programme, after 
which it expected the NNGO to leave the programme for 
implementation by local groups. This showed that there were different 
visions of partnership. In the university’s view, development is about 
building capacity and then pulling out whereas in RTC’s view, all bring 
something different to the partnership.  
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In other regions, views of partnership correspond better with one 
another. Still, thinking takes place about the best partnership model for 
ACTS in the longer term, once the regional centres become independent 
financially. RTC speculates that at one extreme, one could conceive the 
regions becoming independent and RTC pulling out. This does not 
correspond with the type of partnership most people involved have in 
mind. At the other extreme, all three partners (RTC, local university, and 
local coordinating NGO) will continue to play equally strong roles in 
keeping ACTS running. In between, one could imagine RTC playing a 
purely coordinating role, or a role that differs depending on the phase 
and needs of the region. 
 
 
8.3.2 Cooperation between academia and NGOs  
 
As interactions between NGOs and knowledge institutions hardly take 
place in the countries analysed, the ACTS model of cooperation between 
the coordinating NGOs and the universities in the regional Centres 
provides an interesting exception. In the ACTS model of cooperation, 
the responsibilities of the local universities include providing advice and 
support to local NGO partner to ensure that ACTS meets relevant 
accreditation guidelines, providing a university course administrator, 
supporting the teaching and provide staff as and when required, and 
working with the local NGO partner on areas such as marketing, 
recruitment, assessment, teaching and learning resources (such as rooms 
and libraries). (ACTS 2007b)  
 
In both regions, cooperation among the partners has made possible the 
accreditation of the Master’s degree by the local universities. It took 
some puzzling to fit the pre-developed programme into the requirements 
the universities posed to a Master’s programme. At Novi Sad University 
these requirements include that a programme should consist of fifteen 
courses and a thesis. The ACTS programme with its six modules was 
not altered but for the purposes of the application for accreditation, 
various elements of it, such as assignments, were labelled individual 
courses. Accreditation in Novi Sad also required that three ACTS tutors 
officially became visiting faculty of the university, something that was 
also arranged. 350 
 
In Cambodia, as the following citation from the AR Review illustrates, 
Pannasastra University worked cooperatively with the ACTS tutors to 
                                                 
350 Interview with staff of ACTS Balkans / Middle East. Belgrade, Serbia, 3 November 2006. 
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ensure that the theses produced by the ACTS participants were in line 
with what the university expected of a Master thesis. 
“At the meeting we held with them, [the dean] outlined what they 
looked for in MA theses and I told him the structure and elements we 
were helping the students to plan. He agreed with me that there was a 
perfect match and assured us all that there should be no problem – if 
the students could fulfil these requirements. He most generously 
offered to look at the theses informally as they came in, giving 
feedback where necessary on what would need to be changed before 
they were officially handed in for marking, if they were to make the 
grade.” (Francis 2007: 17) 
 
However, there have also been difficulties in the cooperation between 
the NGOs and universities. In large part, these difficulties have revolved 
around AR as a methodology. It clashed to some extent with the more 
traditional research methods of university staff, who had trouble seeing 
AR as valid351. In at least one of the courses, this led to frustration 
among the students who received conflicting feedback and advice from 
the ACTS tutors and the university. (Francis 2007) The differences 
concerning methodology do not yet seem to have been resolved entirely, 
or at least not in both Centres. Suggestions are made for ways in which 
ACTS can raise the awareness of university staff of the use of the 
methodology, for example by organising a conference on AR with 
international academics. 
 
There are several deeper issues underlying this discussion. First of all, 
there is the question of whether to consider the capacity building of the 
universities – at least with regard to AR – as a positive side effect, or 
even an aim, of the programme. As the AR Review puts it, “[w]hile we 
want to ensure high standards and academic recognition for our students, 
we presumably would also want to honour and strengthen local 
academic capacities, rather than undermine them, and explore with them 
the relationship between culture and academic approach.” (Francis 2007: 
23) However, as is already implied by this citation, such capacity 
building requires openness to the ideas and perspectives of the 
institution whose capacity is being built352. This leads us to the second 
issue: that of partnership and ownership353. It is difficult for the 
universities to be true partners which ‘co-own’ the ACTS programme, 
because they have not been part of developing it.  
                                                 
351 Not all universities necessarily prefer ‘traditional’ research methods over AR. Many European 
universities in fact use AR. In the US it is less accepted. It may be that the universities in ACTS are 
modelled after the US system more than the European one. For Pannasastra this is certainly the 
case.  
352 See 4.7 
353 Also discussed in 4.7 
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One way to begin to build such ownership would be to include them in 
decision-making about the programme as much as possible. Up until 
recently the universities did not have a central position in the 
governance of the programme. This has now changed, and it remains to 
be seen what effect that will have. An RTC staff member remarked that 
although the inclusion of the universities in the decision making 
structure was necessary, it is also risky. It is hoped that university 
representatives may not push too strongly for traditional research and 
thereby jeopardise the basic philosophy of ACTS, of which AR is a 
central part. It is understandable that ACTS staff hesitate to make 
concessions on the approach that has been so carefully developed and in 
which they believe so strongly. Still, finding ways to develop a true 
partnership dialogue over content with the universities seem to be 
priorities as the programme moves forward. This could also help the 
Centres to find more regional content, achieve more academic input into 
tutor teams and the course in general, and become more familiar with 
the way Master courses are generally taught – all necessary steps 
identified by the AR Review (Francis 2007).   
 
 
8.4 Education as a scaffold: teaching the course 
 
In this section I turn to the course itself, asking whether, based on the 
limited information available at this early stage of the programme, the 
ACTS course has indeed functioned as a scaffold supporting the 
knowledge and learning strategies of local peace NGOs.   
 
 
8.4.1 Expectations and opinions of students  
 
In May 2006 I had conversations in Phnom Penh with three Cambodian 
participants in ACTS Asia. Among other things, we discussed their 
expectations of the course and the extent to which these had been met so 
far. Through ACTS, the participants expected to be able to  
• share experiences with participants from other regions 
• reflect on their work  
• learn new insights from the course 
• develop and improve their work further, and find good 
mechanisms to work towards goals 
• test their knowledge and whether they “are doing things right” 
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• obtain a Master’s degree, which means that they have something 
to show for their knowledge and are taken more seriously354 
 
At the time of the conversations, when the programme had been running 
for about six months, the participants made clear that so far their 
expectations were largely being met. They had already learned a lot 
from the course. To the extent that they were not getting out of ACTS 
what they had expected, they felt this was due mostly to their own lack 
of time to spend on it. The participants were generally positive about the 
content, method, and tutors of the course. In addition, some specific 
benefits were mentioned.   
• The most successful aspect of ACTS was considered to be the 
knowledge sharing with tutors and participants. The 
peacebuilding knowledge and AR skills were deemed very 
useful. Participants also mentioned that ACTS was helping them 
to document their experiences and reflect and learn. 
• The AR element was considered very useful because it was not 
detached from the work of the participants. One participant was 
initially confused about AR but said she had now understood 
that she was supposed to write about her own work, thereby 
improving the work itself. All three participants planned to use 
their AR project to improve the way of working of their 
organisation.  
• The course was considered time-intensive but this was also seen 
as normal for a degree programme and was to be expected. It 
was generally manageable for the participants. However, the 
input asked from them was the maximum they were able to 
give; their organisations would not allow them to do any more. 
Some participants received time off from their organisation to 
work on the reading and research; others did so in their free 
time.  
• The atmosphere among the group was considered very good and 
open. There was high trust and much sharing. People also felt 
free to challenge each other constructively. One of the 
international tutors confirmed that the issue of rivalry, which 
often limits openness in interactions among NGOs (see 5.4.4), 
plays less of a role within the ACTS courses. The sense of group 
identity during seminars appears to be stronger than 
competition. The fact that the participants are recruited from the 
wider region plays a role in this; there is less direct competition 
                                                 
354 Interviews with ACTS Asia participants. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 22, 23 and 26 May 2006. 
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over funding than between people working in the same 
country.355  
• Through ACTS the participants felt part of a regional network. 
Information was shared by e-mail about what was going on in 
the various countries and useful documents were exchanged. 
The participants really felt connected to each other and “shared 
their fears and joy”. Regional solidarity was fostered, for 
example when a Nepal solidarity event was organised in Phnom 
Penh. Participants also directly learned from each other. For 
example, an interfaith peacebuilding initiative, modelled after 
the one ACT is running in Cambodia, was being started in 
Burma. There was not yet a similar sense of being part of a 
global ACTS network, however. 356  
 
 
8.4.2 Capacities of the students 
 
In one region in particular, the academic writing abilities of the 
participants are not as good as expected. In response, a training course in 
academic writing is being organised by the university. A more general 
issue, however, relates to the basic abilities of the students to digest texts 
and understand abstractions. There is no significant difference in this 
regard between people who are eligible for a Master’s degree and those 
who are not. Since the participants are used to practical work, abstract 
thinking and discussion is difficult for some of them. The AR Review 
reflects on this:  
“[t]he vision of this MA course was to enable people doing important 
work in practice to translate their practice based knowledge into 
widely useable insights and theory. An assumption was made, I think, 
that all practitioners would be able to do this. Now we have to assess 
whether this is our experience. We are not in the business of 
encouraging people into fields where they are likely to fail.” (Francis 
2007: 18) 
 
An issue closely related to this is the language barrier. Particularly in 
Asia, it is difficult for some participants to express themselves in 
English and to fully follow the explanations of the tutors. ACTS is 
struggling with the question whether there may be a way round this 
problem. Raising entry requirements for English proficiency may close 
the programme off to some peacebuilders who could otherwise benefit 
and contribute greatly. The same dilemma applies to tightening entry 
requirements more generally in order to deal with the issue of the 
                                                 
355 Interview with ACTS international tutor. Birmingham, UK, 10 April 2006. 
356 Interviews with ACTS Asia participants. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 22, 23 and 26 May 2006. 
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academic skills of participants. On the one hand, this seems a necessary 
step, while on the other, it risks jeopardising the aim of providing 
opportunities for development and capacity building to motivated peace 
practitioners.  
 
 
8.4.3 Learning and development of the students 
 
In ACTS Asia, according to the coordinator, change at the level of the 
individual participant can be observed in many instances. In one case, 
two students from the same country but from different religious groups, 
who at first hardly communicated with each other, became enthusiastic 
about each other’s work, and even began to cooperate in their work back 
home. Another example is of a certificate student who never received 
academic education, but began to read books. In addition this participant 
actively passes the newly gained knowledge on to colleagues, even 
organising week-long sessions to report back after each module.357  
 
In the Balkans, the course coordinator also observes changes in the 
participants. They are starting to ask more in-depth questions, 
particularly regarding AR. Some participants have learned through 
ACTS to include their target groups more in their planning process. 
They are also better involving their colleagues and others in reflection, 
and they now know which questions to ask for such reflection to be 
valuable. The ACTS Balkans team has also received feedback from 
some of the organisations in which participants work, albeit only those 
organisations that are part of the Nansen network that is a partner in the 
ACTS course. Nansen management, which regularly visits its offices 
throughout the region, has observed changes in the staff that participate 
in ACTS. They are more systematic, plan better, think of things more in 
advance, connect their work with theories, put programmes in a broader 
framework, and reflect more.358  
 
These individual changes that the coordinators refer to seem to be 
closely related to the AR approach and its emphasis on reflection – both 
on activities and the theories and assumptions the participants bring to 
them. It seems likely that such reflection will lead to the kind of more 
systematic thinking and improved planning observed by the Nansen 
network. Similarly, the AR Review found after talking to students that 
AR had “become a way of doing things. It had opened the way forward 
                                                 
357 Interview with ACTS Asia coordinator. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
358 Interview with staff of ACTS Balkans / Middle East. Belgrade, Serbia, 3 November 2006. 
Interview with staff member of Nansen network. Belgrade, Serbia, 3 November 2006. 
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in conflict transformation and had made them more confident in what 
they were doing.” (Francis 2007) 
 
Despite these positive signs of learning from AR, however, there have 
also been some problems in the development of the AR skills of 
participants. The AR Review revealed these issues after attending the 
presentations given by participants on their research findings and 
looking at the first thesis drafts. This is a particularly striking finding in 
view of the enthusiasm with which the participants talk about AR and 
the fact that in one region, according to the tutors, this approach in fact 
came more naturally to the students than traditional research did. When 
in the Asian course, during an introduction of AR, tutors referred to 
traditional methods for comparison, this caused confusion among some 
students. AR to them seemed normal enough but what was meant by 
traditional research methods was not understood. Still, in both regions 
the understanding and use of AR by some of the participants has 
remained limited. The AR Review states that “the students had not 
entirely understood the way the ‘I’ not only could but needed to be 
present in the research, or that the research should be done mainly in the 
course of action rather than after it.” In addition, not all students had 
clearly understood that “it is the work they do – or some episode or 
aspect of it – that should be the focus of their action research, and that 
AR is not some kind of ‘external’ evaluation or impact 
assessment.”(Francis 2007: 5)  
 
It is possible that the universities have played a role in this by causing 
confusion about the extent to which the method was actually acceptable 
in a Master programme. According to the AR Review there is some 
indication that participants initially used the method, but back-tracked 
when they were writing their Master theses, for which they felt the 
method was perhaps inadequate. In fact, in one region the non-Master 
students were found better able to stick to an AR approach as they were 
not bogged down by what they felt were the requirements of a Master’s 
degree.  
 
 
8.4.4 Cultural issues 
 
Reflecting on the difficulties students have with AR, Francis writes that 
“there is a fundamental issue here about whose model of academic 
education we are following. Do we see our current ACTS model as 
unquestionably the one to follow?” She reflects that AR may be based 
on Western ways of thinking in the sense that “[n]ot only the kind of 
scrutiny (particularly self-scrutiny) that we are advocating in AR (as our 
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Asia colleagues have told us), but also the heavy emphasis on analysis 
that is particular to the RTC family and also to Western academia, are 
counter-cultural in many places.” (Francis 2007: 11) Although an 
emphasis on analysis is not specific to action research, it may be true 
that Western universities place more emphasis on critical thinking than 
many non-Western ones. 
 
On the other hand, the way the Asian students felt AR came more 
naturally to them than traditional research suggests that other elements 
of it may in fact be quite culturally appropriate in that part of the world. 
For example, the separation between observer and object of study that is 
central to traditional research is an alien concept to many non-Western 
cultures (see 2.5), and AR is markedly different in this regard. The 
applied nature of the programme was also applauded by the participants 
I talked to in Cambodia.  
 
 
8.4.5 The meaning of ‘academic’ 
 
Although I have not yet been able to confirm this hypothesis, some of 
the statements I have read and heard during my involvement with ACTS 
gives me the sense that there is some unease among people involved 
with the concept of ‘academic’. They are not sure what it entails and 
whether it may be threatening to their way of teaching. The picture some 
ACTS staff have of what makes up an academic course may not always 
be realistic. The AR Review for example suggests that using readers 
may be too much spoon-feeding or that handouts summarising literature 
are not fitting to an academic course. From my own experience at the 
university, readers and handouts can be very helpful in an academic 
course, as long as they are not presented as ‘the truth’, sources are 
referred to, the reading of other texts is stimulated and critical reading is 
taught. The last point, critical reading, may be an issue in ACTS: the AR 
Review notes that the readers have in some instances been used in a 
“painting by numbers way”, rather than “being understood in themselves 
and so being useful in a flexible and responsive process of research-
shaping” (Francis 2007: 5). 
 
Another example relates to staff perceptions of what defines academic 
teaching relations; some feel the relationship between students and 
teachers is more distant at universities than it is in NGO training 
workshops. However, this may be more a cultural difference: 
hierarchical teaching relations are probably more part of the academic 
cultures of Serbia and Cambodia than they are in Amsterdam or 
Birmingham. In any case, it is clear that ACTS continues to look for the 
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best way to give shape to a programme that is academic but at the same 
time integrates the positive elements from the interactive training 
experience of RTC and its partners. An interesting conclusion that 
emerges from this section, and that may help explain the findings in 
8.3.3 regarding cooperation with the universities, is that cultural 
differences may exist not only between parts of the world but also 
between academic and NGO cultures. 
 
  
8.4.6 Development of course content 
 
Over the past few years, various thoughts have been raised with regard 
to the course content and how it may be further developed. Already 
mentioned was the issue of using more region-specific content in 
addition to, or perhaps partly in replacement of, the material that is used 
in all Centres. Related is the search for an optimal balance between 
setting standards internationally and ensuring regional ownership. 
Recently this point was raised again as the Centres developed Modules 
Five and Six, which had been left largely open to fill in as the course 
progressed. The question was raised to what extent these modules 
needed to be the same in each region, and whether general guidelines 
needed to be developed at the global management level. (ACTS 2006)  
 
Another balance that staff members feel needs to be found is between, 
on the one hand, being rigorous about assessment tasks, and making this 
clear to the participants from the start, and on the other hand 
emphasising self-reflection and learning. It is difficult to assess self-
reflection and some people felt they were being subjected to psycho-
analysis. This relates to the question of how far one may invade into the 
personal lives of participants as part of the self-reflection necessary for 
AR. There are cultural differences that play a role here; Asians may be 
more private about personal issues than people from other regions. Still, 
there are ways in which self-reflection can be stimulated without prying 
too deeply, and the tutors now feel they have begun to strike the right 
balance. (Francis 2007; ACTS 2006) 
  
As might be expected, people start to see gaps in the content offered as 
the programme progresses, or perhaps more adequately, areas in which 
further development would be desirable. Different ACTS staff members 
have different priorities, including disarmament, reconciliation, 
reconstruction, and the relationship between religion and 
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peacebuilding.359 In the Balkans there was mention of the need to bring 
the development dimension in more explicitly and to address the 
relationship between conflict, peace and development.360 However, in 
Asia this feeling was not shared.361 This again suggests that it could be 
good to introduce more variation between the regions as far as content is 
concerned.  
 
 
8.5 Strengthening the knowledge base: documentation and 
dissemination  
 
As we have seen, earlier chapters identified a need to enhance the 
capacities of peace practitioners to document and disseminate their 
knowledge so as to increase Southern knowledge bases and achieve 
more equal North-South and practitioner-academic contributions to 
global debates. Indeed, as we have also seen, these needs correspond 
with some of the aims of ACTS. To the extent that any conclusions can 
be drawn at this early stage of the programme, this section looks at 
whether and how these aims are being achieved so far. 
 
 
8.5.1 Research outcomes so far 
 
In Asia, the first Master theses have been produced. The AR Review 
judges their general quality positively:  
“there was some wonderfully cogent and reflective writing in some of 
the theses, which demonstrated that bright and keen students with 
sufficient control over their working lives – or at least a match 
between their research ambitions and work possibilities – had been 
able to get all they needed from the course and related resources to 
‘run with’ action research. I am [...] hopeful [...] that most if not all of 
the theses will be adequate and that some will be excellent – which for 
a first round is a very good result. One student’s discussion of AR as 
an approach […] is so eloquent that I think it would be very useful to 
future students.” (Francis 2007: 10) 
 
Still, as was already mentioned in 8.4.4, many of the theses reflect little 
AR, and the same goes for the preliminary findings presented in the 
Balkans: 
“we could catch glimpses of the action, but in many cases that was all 
we got, and the self was hardly mentioned and difficult to detect. 
                                                 
359 This was discussed during the Business Meeting of the global management group which I 
attended in February 2007. 
360 Interview with staff of ACTS Balkans / Middle East. Belgrade, Serbia, 3 November 2006. 
361 Telephone conversation with ACTS Asia coordinator. 8 December 2006. 
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While in the Balkans plans the ‘own action’ had been largely displaced 
by interviews and questionnaires, in Asia the space was mostly taken 
either by context background or by theory, and in some cases the 
theory was largely undigested and scarcely relevant. [...] Where there 
was action, there were not often, at this point, clear cycles of 
research.” (Francis 2007: 8) 
 
 
8.5.2 Dissemination of outcomes 
 
ACTS aims to generate knowledge through AR by its participants. New 
theories are to be created based on AR results and patterns emerging – 
all from the perspective of the practitioner. One of the aims is to shift the 
centre of gravity of the peacebuilding field from the ivory towers of 
universities more toward the field. There are various potential audiences 
that could benefit from the findings. In the following figure, the cylinder 
in the centre depicts the ACTS program.362 
 
Local Organisations
Participants
RTC - ACTS
Institutional networks
Researchers
 
Figure 8.2: Audiences for ACTS findings363  
 
Ideally, the AR process itself engages the organisations of participants 
as well as perhaps the beneficiaries of their programmes and possibly 
other resource persons, and would naturally spread knowledge through 
the interactions that take place as part of the research process. At this 
                                                 
362 Perhaps it should be redesigned as different cylinders or columns which stand for the individual 
regional Master programmes so that the learning relationships between these programs can also be 
illustrated. 
363 Figure by Gerd Junne 
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stage it is difficult to say in far this is occurring at present. The ACTS 
teams in both regions would like more time and money to visit the 
organisations of the participants in order to make sure they are involved 
in the research and to build their understanding of the value of the 
programme. This would help ensure that insights and knowledge gained 
by participants are applied in their work when the course is finished. In 
addition, ACTS staff see a need to develop an alumni policy for better 
follow-up with former participants and a better tracking of the impact of 
the course.  
 
In addition to knowledge spreading informally through the research 
process, ACTS aims to actively disseminate its findings in the following 
ways. 
• As we have seen, the sixth module will be a regional conference 
at which participants present their research results.  
• ACTS aims to encourage and facilitate participation by 
participants in conferences. At the Asian Peacebuilders 
Conference in October 2006 several ACTS participants 
participated as keynote speakers. 
• It is hoped that the research findings will be fed into the Nansen 
and ACT networks, and into the Action Asia network in which 
the coordinator of ACTS Asia is involved. 
• Exchanges between ACTS regions are another way to share 
findings. Some students from Asia are intended to attend the 
Balkans conference and vice versa. Pictures and poster 
presentations are already exchanged among the regions. In 
addition, international tutors coming from the other regions also 
provide a connection. 
• Last but not least, ACTS is in the process of setting up an 
international ACTS Journal in which the research findings are to 
be published. A strategy for ensuring that the Journal reaches 
relevant audiences is being developed.  
 
 
8.6 Learning by ACTS itself 
 
8.6.1 Learning attitude 
 
A lot of informal reflection and learning takes place by people involved 
in ACTS with regard to the way the programme is going and how it can 
be continuously improved. During conversations and meetings people 
are willing to be self-critical and question the way things are going. 
Such learning takes place mainly at the tactical level (how can we do 
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this thing better?) as the following example, from a conversation Diana 
Francis had with ACTS Asia’s second batch tutors, shows:  
“The first thing I was told, with heartfelt emphasis, was how much 
they had been helped by the experience of the first batch tutors – from 
their detailed records and reflections, from their conversations, 
responses and reflections about sessions and their outcomes and 
responses, and from their materials, activities and insights – even 
photos.” (Francis 2007: 17) 
  
Such learning takes place at all levels of the programme. In fact, staff 
involved in ACTS actively try to learn from their practice. During and in 
between seminars reflection takes place and changes are made according 
to what has been learned. ACTS discusses learning points during 
Business Meetings and actively creates opportunities for feedback by 
relative outsiders – such as myself. Learning at a strategic level (are we 
doing the right thing?) is understandably more difficult than tactical-
level learning, but even there people appear open to discussion and 
reflection. However, a member of the governance group mentioned that 
during their meetings there is not so much opportunity for reflection and 
that this takes place mostly in the management team. 
 
The trouble with all this learning is in systematising and documenting it.  
This leads us to the place of M&E in the learning processes of ACTS. 
 
 
8.6.2 M&E in the regions  
 
Monitoring in the regional centres takes place mostly at the level of the 
individual participants and their learning and development. Other levels 
of impact – organisation, work, community – are considered more 
difficult to assess. It is also felt that it may be too early to look at these 
levels.  
 
In Asia it has been decided to look at impact at four (overlapping) 
levels. Indicators are being developed (mainly by the regional 
coordinator) as the programme progresses. 
• Short-term / student level: after one or two modules.  
• Indicators: 
o Are students staying in the course? 
o Use of the library 
o Assignments submitted on time 
o Quality of assignments 
o Frequency of e-mail correspondence 
o Keeping of journal (assessed through journal essays) 
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• Middle level / students when they go back home / organisation: 
after one year 
• Indicators: 
o Personal change, including: students becoming better 
able to articulate themselves, daring to speak up 
o Students starting to apply concepts in their work 
o Changes made to projects or work 
o New pieces of work starting to be developed 
o New relationships developing between students around 
work related matters 
o Meetings with organisations of students about the 
course and AR projects (does the organisation 
understand what the student is doing, is the organisation 
involved) 
• Long-term / work itself: after one course. Significant shifts in 
the way people work and strengthening of the way they already 
work. 
o Indicators yet to be developed 
• In so far as possible, impact on peace in the region 
o Indicators yet to be developed364 
 
Information about impact on all these levels is gathered and documented 
in module reports after each module, which consists of the results of 
student and tutor evaluations, a record of comments made by students 
during the seminar, and general reflections by the ACTS coordinator. In 
addition, the coordinator tries to visit the organisations of participants 
(combining it with travelling for Action Asia, a regional network for 
which she also works) to find out if any changes have taken place. 
Another way of gathering information for M&E purposes is by holding 
two evaluations after one year: one with the students and one with the 
university.365 
 
In the Balkans and Middle East programme the levels of impact have 
been formulated slightly differently. Indicators have not yet been 
formulated, but ways of information gathering for each level are being 
studied. 
• The individual level is the most developed. It has various 
elements: 
o A daily reflection during the seminar.  
o Tutor de-briefings – each day and after each seminar.  
                                                 
364 Interview with ACTS Asia coordinator. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
365 Interview with ACTS Asia coordinator. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2006. 
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o Individual tutorials – which are used for two-way 
feedback. These have proved valuable. Participants 
speak more openly in a one-on-one setting. At the tutor 
debriefings tutors discuss which issues that came up in 
the tutorials are individual issues and which are more 
general learning points.  
o At the end of the first year, a more detailed individual 
tutorial which serves as an assessment of the student but 
in which there is also room for feedback on the part of 
students.  
o Evaluation forms after each seminar – in the first year, 
forms asked people to grade various elements of the 
course. This provided clear reports with quantified 
information, but it was not so useful for the students 
themselves. Therefore, now a new form has been 
developed, which focuses on the learning of 
participants: objectives, process, group, etc. It also helps 
the students to write their learning journal because the 
questions on the form give some guidance. However, 
this kind of qualitative information is difficult to 
process into an overall report. In addition, it may be 
necessary to have a more ‘traditional’ evaluation once a 
year in order to collect information about the quality of 
tutors, materials etc.  
• The daily reflections, tutor debriefings and individual tutorials 
make it possible to apply lessons while a seminar is still 
ongoing. 
• The organisational level.  
o It is easier to follow those who are part of the Nansen 
network. For other organisations only participants’ own 
perceptions of organisational changes are available. The 
ACTS coordinators are trying to cooperate more with 
the participants’ organisations. However, obtaining 
feedback from colleagues is sensitive. They may not be 
willing to give ACTS too much credit for any 
organisational changes. They may feel that their 
colleague has participated primarily for his/her own 
benefit or wonder why they themselves were not 
allowed to participate in the course. On their part the 
ACTS participants may feel they are being investigated 
by their management and colleagues. If they try to 
introduce changes, these may meet with resistance.  
• Programme / community level.  
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o It is not yet possible to say much about this level. One 
tool at this level is the sixth module which will take the 
form of a public seminar to which colleagues, donors, 
and people from the projects and target groups of 
participants will be invited. This will also achieve that 
members of participants’ communities of work feel part 
of the whole endeavour rather than objects of study.  
o At the level of the community, the AR projects provide 
an entry point. The students are reflexively researching 
their projects and their own role in them. This will 
hopefully include the extent to which ACTS has 
improved their approach and impact.366  
 
 
8.6.3 Development of global M&E framework 
 
A global ACTS management group meeting in February 2006 noted that 
an instrument for M&E at the global level was lacking and decided to 
prioritise its development. In response, RTC contacted me to “ 
accompany” ACTS in the development of a global M&E framework that 
could draw together the findings of regional-level M&E processes 
already taking place. People involved in ACTS agree that global-level 
M&E should draw together findings from monitoring taking place in the 
region in order to stimulate cross-regional learning and begin making 
statements about overall impact. In addition it should play a role in 
structural quality control (deciding and checking standards of quality 
and making sure that ACTS is the same thing everywhere).  
 
At the time of writing the process to develop global M&E mechanisms 
that meet these aims has been ongoing for a little over a year. 
Unfortunately, it has largely remained an added activity for people 
involved in ACTS and has not become an integral part of learning and 
planning processes that do take place. It has been difficult to get people 
involved in the process. Other activities seem to have more priority. In 
addition, ownership of the process by the regions may be an issue. It is 
possible that it is seen mainly as something required by the Centre. This 
raises a number of questions: 
• how can ACTS make global-level M&E a central part of work 
rather than an added activity, that receives little priority?  
• How can ACTS create incentives for people to become involved 
in it?  
                                                 
366 Interview with staff of ACTS Balkans / Middle East. Belgrade, Serbia, 3 November 2006. 
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• How can ACTS ensure that global M&E facilitates and 
documents, rather than overlaps with, monitoring already taking 
place in the regions? 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, a lot of reflection takes place 
during various meetings and during regional monitoring around the 
seminars. The outcomes of this reflection find their way into various 
documents. In addition they do often lead to adjustment of practice – so 
learning does take place. A global framework may help institutionalise / 
formalise this a bit, identify possible gaps (areas in which no reflection 
yet takes place) and stimulate reflection on larger, strategic questions 
(‘are we doing the right thing’ rather than ‘how can we do things 
better’). 
 
Global evaluation has taken place in the area of AR through Diana 
Francis’ AR review. Global monitoring is done by drawing learning 
points from various sources together into a paper that I have produced. 
All this is considered very useful. But the attempts to systematise 
monitoring and the documentation of lessons at a global level has 
remained a little difficult. Recently it was decided to look at the three 
larger questions posed above in a small research project that looks at the 
M&E literature from the perspective of integrating M&E and learning 
into organisational processes and by gathering some experiences other 
organisations have in this regard.  
 
In addition, not much systematic thinking has yet been done with regard 
to what the most suitable evaluation methods for each aspect and level 
would be – such as participatory methods to gather the input of the 
participants and other stakeholders. When it comes to involving the 
participants (and possibly their organisations) in M&E, the AR projects 
of the participants may provide an opportunity to capture data on the 
impact the ACTS programme is having in the work of the participants. 
Intertwining M&E and AR would be an interesting experiment in itself, 
and it would bring out information on impact that we otherwise would 
not have access to. It would probably entail building specific questions 
into the research design of participants. At an even earlier stage, the 
ACTS participants may be involved in the development (and, for later 
courses, refinement) of indicators for M&E of ACTS.  
 
Another issue still waiting to be addressed is to plan for the 
documentation, sharing and utilisation of M&E results globally, so as to 
ensure that learning is combined and fed back into the programme. 
Presently learning is documented in various, somewhat scattered ways. 
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These include the reports of management group meetings, individual 
module reports by ACTS coordinators in the regions (which draw on 
evaluations by students and tutors), the reports of annual evaluations 
done in the regions with the universities and participants, and lessons 
learned papers produced by Diana Francis and myself. The global M&E 
framework is envisioned as a way to systematise and combine all of 
these. Thus, it becomes a priority to make sure that lessons learned in 
various places are fed into this framework. Technology may be helpful 
in the future in linking the Centres together through an intranet site and a 
common database.  
 
 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
 
What are the wider implications of the ACTS case study for the 
questions of Part Three (see page 354)? Here the five questions are 
answered together. ACTS is an initiative that tries to improve the 
learning processes of local peace NGOs through the participation of 
their staff members in its action learning programme. It meets a need 
voiced by practitioners in the peacebuilding field by offering practice-
based action learning Master courses in conflict-affected regions. The 
course is largely relevant to the participants, who praise its action-
orientation in particular. Information from the Balkans and Asia 
suggests significant learning by the participants, although it would be 
good to document their personal change stories in more detail. The 
feedback from Nansen also suggests that this learning is having an 
impact on the work of the participants, who are more systematic in their 
planning and reflection and placing their activities in a broader 
framework. Based on the findings of the AR Review, however, it seems 
that there is room for improvement regarding the extent to which the 
reflective and critical skills of the participants are developed. 
 
Knowledge exchange among the participants is considered an important 
additional benefit of the programme. The action research of participants 
probably facilitates this exchange as it encourages people to reflect 
explicitly on their work and draw lessons, which can then be shared. An 
important obstacle to knowledge sharing among NGO staff, mentioned 
in earlier chapters, is overcome in the case of ACTS by fostering group 
identity and by bringing together participants from different countries, 
which means there is less direct rivalry. 
 
A particularly interesting – though as we have seen also difficult – 
element of the programme is that it is carried out in cooperation with 
local NGOs and local universities. Since we saw in chapter five that 
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such cooperation between academia and practitioners, though desirable, 
is usually lacking, ACTS is meeting another need in that regard. 
However, this cooperation entails overcoming some obstacles which 
relate to issues with regard to research methodology (the universities 
involved have some trouble accepting AR) and cultural differences 
between academia and NGOs. The cultural differences are reflected in 
the fact that the NGOs view academic teaching as more hierarchical and 
formal and less participant-centred than their own approach. They have 
a rather rigid, perhaps not entirely justified perception of academic 
requirements for good teaching and research.   
 
Another need that this study has identified is to find ways to increase the 
voice of practitioners and Southerners in global knowledge development 
and exchange regarding peacebuilding. This, too, is something the 
ACTS programme aims to do. The extent to which this aim is being 
reached is difficult to assess given the early phase in which it finds 
itself. It is after all too soon to say anything about the outcomes of the 
research and the dissemination of these outcomes – required to begin 
contributing to global theory and debates.  
 
Some difficult issues remain for ACTS, which may serve as points of 
consideration for similar initiatives elsewhere. One set of issues relating 
to capacity building is the importance of building on existing knowledge 
and create ‘ownership’. The experience of  ACTS and its participants 
raises the question: should already capable individuals and institutions 
be selected for capacity building, or should the focus be on providing 
opportunities for development and capacity building to weaker actors – 
or both? Another unresolved issue emerging from the ACTS experience 
so far is the difficulty of tying the development and implementation of 
M&E processes into general learning and organisational processes, and 
how to better involve the various stakeholders in them.   
 
All of the issues mentioned here are recognised and openly discussed by 
ACTS staff members. Although M&E remains a difficult issue, the 
learning attitude of those involved in the programme is a positive factor. 
Changes are constantly made in response to observations and 
reflections. This is already a promising start. In drawing this conclusion 
I am aware that my personal involvement may colour my view. It will 
be good to compare it with more independent studies that are likely to be 
undertaken as part of M&E in the future. However, from my perspective 
both the extent to which the aims of ACTS match the needs identified 
over the course of this study, and the open learning approach with which 
those involved in the programme continue to work towards meeting 
these aims, remain highly interesting. It will be worthwhile to examine 
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the programme again in some years’ time and see what progress towards 
them has been made. 
 
 
8.8 Concluding Part Three: Global initiatives to support learning 
 
At the end of Part Two, the following questions were formulated for 
discussion in Part Three. 
1. Given the structural realities in which they operate, what 
initiatives are undertaken to improve the learning processes of 
local peace NGOs? What can we learn from these initiatives? 
2. To what extent do these initiatives facilitate cross-cultural, 
‘third-order’ learning? 
3. How can international/external/Northern actors support the 
knowledge and learning strategies of Southern peace NGOs, 
thereby increasing their agency?  
4. How can knowledge institutions be better involved in 
supporting the knowledge and learning strategies of local peace 
NGOs working in (post)conflict countries – and the knowledge 
base of these countries as a whole?   
5. How can global networks support the knowledge and learning 
strategies of Southern peace NGOs, thereby increasing their 
agency? 
 
Starting with the first two questions regarding initiatives to improve 
learning: in Part Two we already saw that networking is a strategy 
widely used by local peace NGOs. At least in theory, networks may help 
to facilitate the various interactions depicted in Figure 3.5 (page 153). 
However, the findings discussed in chapter six gave rise to the 
perception that networks at the local, national and regional levels tend to 
focus mostly on interactions with other NGOs – depicted on the left side 
of the figure. At the end of Part Two, it was suggested that global-level 
networks may be better able to cover exchanges with a broader range of 
actors – and thereby to start addressing the ‘structural realities’ to which 
the first question refers (and which have been elaborated in chapter four) 
that shape the action radius of local NGOs. 
 
This leads us to the fifth question on the potential role of global 
networks in increasing the agency for learning of Southern NGOs. More 
concretely, is GPPAC, the global network examined in chapter seven, 
facilitating all the interactions depicted in Figure 3.5? Like the national 
and regional networks looked at earlier, GPPAC focuses primarily on 
the facilitation of interactions among civil society groups – and as the 
chapter shows this can have clear added value in itself. However, the 
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network does so with the aim not only to exchange knowledge, but also 
to jointly have a stronger position in interactions with other actors, 
particularly states, regional organisations (ECOWAS, ASEAN) and 
international organisations (UN). In its more externally-oriented 
activities, then, GPPAC focuses mostly on powerful actors that help 
create and maintain the structure which shapes the agency of civil 
society. In this sense it is similar to most individual peace NGOs and 
networks, although, because of its scale, it has access to higher level 
policy forums, such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission.  
 
However, thinking back to the finding of the Reflecting on Peace 
Practice project in chapter one367 that peace NGOs need to better link 
their individual activities to the larger goals of ending war and building 
peace, this is also something that emerges as a clear issue for the Global 
Partnership. Joint priority setting, identified by members as a 
shortcoming, would require structured reflection on the larger, structural 
issues affecting conflict and peace, and the way in which the variety of 
individual activities of NGOs and networks involved in GPPAC may 
add up in addressing these issues. Thinking about individual and joint 
impact is closely tied to this. However, impact assessment, agreeing on 
priorities for action and achieving a division of labour are very difficult 
for any diverse group of organisations coming together in a network. 
 
Although knowledge generation – through the dissemination of stories 
from civil society peacebuilding practice – is a GPPAC activity, it does 
not actively engage knowledge institutions. An initiative that does so is 
the ACTS programme, analysed in chapter eight. Linking back to the 
first question posed above, this programme fits into another common 
category of initiatives to support learning: training courses. However, 
ACTS goes further than regular NGO training programmes in several 
ways. First, it does not aim merely to introduce new concepts but 
focuses on the implementation of these concepts in the practice of 
NGOs. Through action research, ACTS hopes to contribute to 
organisational reflection and learning and thereby to facilitate the 
learning cycle portrayed in the light blue square at the centre of Figure 
3.5 (page 153), as well as exchanges with others around this square. At 
the current stage of the programme it is difficult to establish the extent to 
which organisational learning cycles have improved, but some 
indications of individual learning and fruitful exchanges can already be 
observed. Space is created for third-order learning by the emphasis of 
AR on self-reflection and by the ‘safe space’ the seminars provide. (As 
is mentioned below, there is little direct competition among the 
                                                 
367 See in particular section 1.4.5 
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participants and comparing across countries makes it possible to reflect 
on a more abstract level.)  
 
A second difference between ACTS and other training initiatives for 
peace NGOs is that ACTS aims to help diminish North-South 
inequalities in knowledge recognition and generation, and strengthen the 
voice of practitioners in global debates. In this sense it focuses explicitly 
on changing structural inequalities. It is too soon to say anything about 
how this is working, except that for research outcomes to reach their 
intended audience, they need to be of a certain quality. For a programme 
that aims to help peace practitioners develop the learning capacity of 
themselves and their organisations it is difficult to set entry requirements 
to guarantee the intellectual quality of participants, while at the same 
time aiming to support those who may otherwise be marginalised. ACTS 
is searching for the right balance in this regard.   
 
A third difference between ACTS and other NGO training programmes 
is that ACTS is an academic programme leading to a Master’s degree. 
This is also where the universities come in. The cooperation between 
NGOs and universities is an interesting facet of the ACTS programme, 
because despite the potential of such cooperation in terms of developing 
the overall capacity and role of Southern actors in knowledge 
generation, it is very rare in the countries studied. In that sense, the 
ACTS case sheds light on the fourth question above: how can 
knowledge institutions be better involved in supporting the knowledge 
and learning strategies of local peace NGOs working in (post)conflict 
countries – and the knowledge base of these countries as a whole? The 
fact that ACTS has managed to involve universities in its programme, 
which they have accredited as a Master course, is promising. However, 
the case study shows that such academic-practitioner cooperation can 
also be difficult. There are differences in organisational culture between 
NGOs and academia, which lead to partly real, partly perceived 
differences in teaching and research approaches. These differences may 
help explain why such interactions are so rare in the countries studied. It 
will therefore be interesting to continue to follow ACTS to see how the 
cooperation between NGOs and universities develops.  
 
Another reason why it would be interesting to revisit ACTS in a few 
year’s time is to see in how far the action learning experience of ACTS 
participants has indeed led to better ‘third-order’ learning, reflection and 
documentation of knowledge on the part of these people and their 
organisations. Interesting in this regard is that one of the obstacles to 
learning and exchange by peace NGOs, competition and distrust (see 
chapter five), seems to have been overcome at least partly in ACTS, 
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where these issues do not play a large role due the fact that participants 
come from different countries and are therefore in less direct 
competition. In addition, participants are bound together by a sense of 
joint identity. The two-year length of the course helps to develop group 
solidarity. AR as a method may also be a binding force in that it 
explicitly recognises the knowledge people have, which may create 
mutual respect and stimulate discussion about experiences. Such an 
atmosphere of high trust and safety stimulates third-order learning, 
which involves the questioning of the assumptions and world views of 
the learned, thereby also facilitating learning across (organisational and 
geographical) cultures.    
 
In addition to local factors that inhibit learning, such as inter-NGO 
competition, earlier chapters emphasised that more structural factors 
constrain the agency of Southern NGOs as well. These structural factors 
are intimately tied to global power structures and a discourse that is 
dominated by ‘the North’, external, Northern actors need to be involved 
in changing them. Thus we are led to the third question, regarding the 
role Northern actors may play in supporting the knowledge and learning 
strategies of local peace NGOs. The case of GPPAC shows that one of 
the potential benefits Southern NGOs see in being part of a global 
network is the access that this gives them to global, and Northern, policy 
forums. In the case of ACTS, the importance of engaging Northern 
actors is illustrated by the need identified by people involved in the 
programme for additional accreditation of the Master programme by a 
Northern institution. Another illustration of the importance of linking 
initiatives in the South to actors in the North is the hope of ACTS that it 
will gain access to North-based knowledge forums and journals for the 
dissemination of its research results, so as to reach the people shaping 
discourse, debates and policy. The fact that one of the partners in ACTS 
is based in Europe may prove very helpful in this regard. As with ECCP 
in GPPAC, this Europe-based partner has also been best able to secure 
funding for the programme. More on the role of funding, and on that of 
external actors more generally, can be found in the overall conclusions 
and recommendations below. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
9.1 Overall conclusions 
 
9.1.1 The role of local non-governmental organisations in 
peacebuilding  
 
The literature on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
peacebuilding theorises that they have an added value because of their 
closeness to local communities. As a result they are able to complement 
high-level peace processes with peacebuilding and reconciliation work 
among middle-level leaders and in communities at the grassroots. In 
addition, NGOs are seen as important elements of civil society, which in 
turn is considered vital for democracy building as it organises civilians 
and acts as a check on government. From this perspective the support of 
civil society in postconflict, developing, democratising societies has 
become increasingly popular among Northern donors.368 Civil society 
and NGOs are also considered to help people develop civic skills and 
‘social capital’. Social capital comes about through increased links 
among people and leads to relationships, trust and joint action. (Putnam 
1993) All of these are important for peacebuilding.  
 
Indeed, local peace NGOs bring people together, particularly at the 
community level, for dialogue and reconciliation and in this way they 
contribute to social capital. The majority of their activities consists of 
activities like community dialogue, mediation training and peace 
education. Particularly the larger, stronger Southern NGOs (SNGOs) 
engage in advocacy and lobby towards policymakers as well. However, 
in most cases little attention is paid to thinking and work on a more 
macro and political level. Considering that many see the added value of 
NGOs particularly at the ‘lower’ levels of society this is in itself perhaps 
not surprising, but there are two problems. First, there is a lack of 
reflection on how individual activities add up and relate to the larger aim 
of building sustainable peace in a society, and this means that in the 
final instance, the work of peace NGOs may not systematically 
contribute to peacebuilding. Second, the political, pro-democratic 
‘check’ role that NGOs play according to the theory is often absent in 
reality. 
 
There are various reasons for this. In many conflict-affected countries 
governments are unwilling to give NGOs much political space. In 
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addition, the way in which SNGOs are funded plays an important role. 
Civil society support by Northern donors does not tend to stimulate an 
independent civil society that is able to play a political role. Rather, the 
funding chain through which money flows from Northern governments 
and international organisations via Northern NGOs (NNGOs) to SNGOs 
makes SNGOs implementers of Northern policy. They focus on projects 
asked for by donors and do not think autonomously about what is 
needed and how projects relate to larger aims. As SNGOs are often 
founded as a consequence of the availability of external funds for certain 
activities, rather than through a bottom-up process, many organisations 
have limited local constituencies. More indigenous, independent groups 
do exist – but the dilemma is that groups that are rooted in society are 
often also rooted in conflict and aligned with one of the warring parties. 
In response, donors have made neutrality a condition of funding. But 
this may have gone too far. Neutrality is never entirely possible, and 
building sustainable peace entails addressing unequal power structures. 
Doing so is an inherently political activity. Depoliticising civil society 
groups and forcing them to focus exclusively on micro-level policy 
implementation prevents them from addressing the wider structural 
issues that obstruct peace in the long run. 
 
The dependency of many SNGOs on short-term project funding and 
their related lack of capacity for reflection on wider, more long-term 
issues make it even more possible for them to pay attention to macro 
issues affecting conflict and peace and to reflect on the way in which 
their activities fit into this larger picture. As a result some question their 
overall impact. (Anderson and Olsen 2003) More attention to learning 
strategies – by organisations individually as well as together with other 
actors in peacebuilding – is therefore important. Such joint reflection 
could also contribute to peace directly (see below). However, it is only 
possible in a structural context that creates space for independent, open-
ended learning.  
 
Southern peacebuilding NGOs were the original unit of analysis for this 
study. However, in the course of the project it became increasingly clear 
that these organisations and their learning processes cannot be 
considered apart from the context in which they operate, particularly the 
relationship with their donors but also the structural differences between 
North and South regarding research capacity and knowledge 
recognition, and political issues both within the countries in which the 
SNGOs operate and internationally. This growing insight, informed to a 
large extent by interviewees from SNGOs who drew attention to these 
issues, contributed to a widening of the focus and needs to be included 
in future analytical models. 
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9.1.2 Forms of peace and conflict knowledge  
 
Theoretical discussions about types of knowledge distinguish between 
tacit, explicit and implicit knowledge369, between academic and 
practitioner knowledge370, and between indigenous and external 
knowledge371. This study has linked each of these to the field of 
peacebuilding by NGOs. Table 2.4 at the end of the second chapter 
mapped the forms these types of knowledge take in the field of NGO 
peacebuilding and the challenges that each form brings when it comes to 
learning and sharing. Explicit knowledge, often in the form of 
publications, websites or databases, brings challenges of access, 
translation to the context, application, and renewal and adjustment as a 
result of it being tested and of situations changing. In rapidly changing 
conflict situations explicit knowledge is quickly outdated and tacit 
knowledge is particularly important. Not all knowledge can be 
documented easily and tacit knowledge often only emerges through 
interaction –when people become aware that they have knowledge that 
others may benefit from. Tacit knowledge brings challenges of wider 
sharing, which often involves turning it into explicit knowledge (and 
requires specific strategies like networking). Implicit knowledge of 
norms and culture may facilitate knowledge sharing in peacebuilding, 
where people from various different backgrounds interact. It involves 
openness to the values and world views of others and willingness to 
question one’s own assumptions and views – in other words, it involves 
joint third-order learning. 
 
Both practitioner and academic knowledge are important in 
peacebuilding. Practitioners – NGO staff members – possess vital 
knowledge of local circumstances, of the way these change, of the way 
methodologies work out in practice, and of local ideas, priorities and 
tools for peacebuilding. Academics are able to compare such knowledge 
to knowledge and theories produced elsewhere, helping practitioners to 
abstract from their concrete experience and reflecting on larger 
questions – such as ‘am I doing the right thing’? In this way, academic 
institutions can function as ‘scaffolds’ of learning (Smid and Beckett 
(2004). However, communication difficulties exist between practitioners 
and academics. They have different organisational cultures and different 
ideas about what constitutes valid knowledge generation methods (see 
chapter eight). It is suggested that dynamic knowledge networks could 
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provide an avenue for joint academic-practitioner knowledge creation. 
(De la Rive Box 2001) I will come back to this below. 
 
Regarding indigenous and external knowledge, the theory mostly 
focuses on inequality between the two and a lack of recognition by 
Northern actors of valuable indigenous knowledge existing in the 
Southern societies in which they intervene. Such issues of recognition 
overlap with those existing between academics and practitioners about 
the validity of knowledge generation methods and the resulting 
knowledge: indigenous knowledge is often seen as un-scientific and 
therefore less legitimate. In addition, oral traditions in many societies 
mean that local knowledge is often not documented.372  
 
The Southern peacebuilders consulted for this study mainly emphasise 
the equal importance and complimentarity of both indigenous and 
external knowledge. They would like to gain external knowledge but 
stress the importance of learning in interaction and combining outside 
knowledge with their own, indigenous knowledge. In order to better do 
so, they would like to have more time and skills to do research and to 
reflect upon their practice. In this way they would generate locally 
relevant knowledge that might be usefully combined with external 
concepts and methodologies. In other words, there is a need for local 
peace NGOs to make space for interactive learning. This includes doing 
research in communities about the needs. More knowledge about the 
priorities of beneficiaries would increase the legitimacy of local NGOs 
and make projects more locally relevant and grounded. This is important 
as such legitimacy is often an issue. SNGOs financed by external donors 
are primarily accountable to those donors, not to the communities in 
which they work, and the activities they choose to engage in are often 
intimately tied to the preferences of NNGOs and their back donors – 
preferences that may flow from partner consultations but are at least as 
much the outcome of policy processes of Northern ministries and 
international organisations. In response, Southern peace NGOs want to 
be able to more strongly voice their own priorities and lessons, and those 
of their constituencies. However, they often find it difficult to formulate 
these due to a lack of time and capacity for reflection on practice, 
research, and the documentation of lessons and findings.  
 
Knowledge of a conflict is never neutral. Conflicts are characterised by 
conflicting visions of past and future. Most people identify to a greater 
or lesser extent with one of the sides, leading to bias. Even what appear 
to be neutral facts may in fact be stakes in a political struggle. As data 
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are difficult to obtain in a context of instability and violence, different 
statistics usually circulate, and estimates given often depend on the 
political programme of those providing them. Even when people agree 
about the raw data, discussions arise about how to interpret these. People 
have a need to justify the role they have played and may have an interest 
in hiding or exaggerating facts. As a further complication, trauma tends 
to warp memories and perceptions.373  
 
For Southern peacebuilders, working together on a common ‘truth’ 
about the conflict is seen as an important step towards peaceful 
coexistence. Beyond that, arriving at joint visions of peace is part of 
peacebuilding.374 However, such thinking about larger ideals and longer-
term aims does not receive much attention in most peacebuilding 
strategies. Even NGOs whose daily job it is to work for peace often lack 
an integrated vision of the kind of situation they are working towards, 
and the way in which their activities contribute to it. One of the things 
needed to achieve such visioning are better knowledge strategies on the 
part of NGOs: ways to know more about the baseline situation, about the 
needs of the people for whom they work, about the activities of other 
organisations, and about existing ideas and theories of peacebuilding. 
Improved knowledge strategies may also enable NGOs to learn more 
about the impact of, and linkages between, their activities and the extent 
to which they contribute to the overall aims of ending violence and 
building lasting peace. All of these aims are considered important by the 
staff of local peace NGOs, but at the same time these staff say they are 
not able to give learning, reflection and exchange the attention they feel 
they should.  
 
Improving learning for peacebuilding, Southern peacebuilders 
emphasise, would involve not one-way knowledge transfer but an 
interactive learning process through which people and organisations can 
jointly arrive at new knowledge that can improve their work. This 
requires time and space for research of the context, analysis of the 
results of one’s own projects, and interaction with other actors – NGOs, 
researchers, policymakers – about the way in which different activities 
contribute to the larger aim of peace. Such interaction is also important 
in order to prevent duplication of activities and ensure that different 
actors work in a complementary way towards a shared larger aim. In 
fact, to have various actors that play a role in peacebuilding agree on 
such a shared aim would be part of peacebuilding itself.  
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9.1.3 Organisational learning by Southern peace NGOs 
 
The literature on organisational learning theorises that learning can take 
place at several different levels or depths: first-, second- and third-order 
learning. First-order learning is the passive internalisation of a pre-
determined set of knowledge, while second- and third-order learning 
actively involve the learner and his experiences. These constitute 
learning from practice and take place in cycles of action and reflection: a 
person acts, reflects on how this went, may search for additional 
knowledge to compare his lessons with, then plans for renewed action. 
Such learning from practice is particularly relevant for SNGO staff who 
tend to have action-oriented learning styles and do not read much. 
Second-order learning takes place at the tactical level and involves 
asking ‘how can I do this better?’ Third-order learning, by contrast, 
takes place at the strategic level: ‘am I doing the right thing?’ In order to 
start reflection on macro issues and the contribution individual NGOs 
make to larger peacebuilding aims, third-order learning is needed. This 
includes a willingness to openly question one’s own assumptions and 
world view. 375  
 
Involving others in learning may help strategic learning, because 
comparing with external knowledge may lead to more abstraction and 
deeper reflection. Knowledge exchange meetings, networks, and 
training and education programmes may play such a role, and indeed, 
some do. However, as is discussed below, they face various constraints. 
In line with the idea of other people supporting deeper learning, 
Southern peace practitioners emphasise learning in interaction. In their 
field this usually includes interacting with people from different 
geographical, cultural and organisational backgrounds, including the 
staff of NNGOs who fund their activities and pass on policy ideas and 
preferences. Interactive learning involving people from North and South 
requires translation processes that help bridge cultures and knowledge 
systems. For this, once again, an open mind is needed and a willingness 
to question one’s assumptions and even world views – in other words, 
the characteristics of third-order learning.  
 
Organisational learning theory states that organisations may support 
learning processes, and learn as a whole, by creating space for learning 
and exchange, by rewarding learning, by being open to failure, by 
having a leadership that sets the right example, and by having a 
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cooperative (rather than competitive) culture376. How does this compare 
to the practice of local peace NGOs?  
 
As Figure 9.1 illustrates, Southern peace NGOs engage in various 
learning activities. These activities are affected and shaped by the 
structural context of the organisations. Some aspects of the learning 
practice of the SNGOs are, in reality, stronger that others. As a result, 
the model provided at the end of Part One depicting ideal-type 
knowledge processes in and around a Southern NGO is now adjusted in 
line with what has been found in this study.  
  
 
Figure 9.1: Adjusted picture of knowledge flows in and around Southern 
peace NGOs 
 
The figure shows that inside the light blue rectangle, which represents 
the Southern peacebuilding organisation, some parts of the learning 
cycle function better than others. The steps in the cycle that function 
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relatively well have been made green. The pink-coloured steps do not 
function so well. NGOs are action-oriented and have difficulty finding 
time and resources to reflect on the implications of their work and do 
research into their own work and into the situations of their 
beneficiaries. As a result, they are largely unable to produce generalised 
knowledge that could be disseminated to other organisations, knowledge 
institutions, and donor agencies, and thereby contribute to global debates 
and policymaking.  
 
To some extent Southern peace NGOs are able to gain new knowledge 
and to compare their experiences with others – often through networking 
with other NGOs and through training programmes – and the insights 
gained from those activities are applied in new programmes. But more 
in-depth reflection and theorising, as depicted in the pink boxes, are 
often lacking. In other words, strategic, third-order learning does not 
take place. This can be explained by a number of factors, including the 
difficulty of strategic reflection in a context of conflict, the lack of room 
given by donors for deeper-level learning and for thinking on the wider 
context (see the next sections), and the general lack of capacity for 
research, reflection and documentation that SNGOs face. 
 
Outside the organisation, the figure depicts knowledge exchanges with 
other actors. Interviewees deemed interactions with other NGOs, 
beneficiaries, and state and international actors central to the learning 
processes of Southern peace NGOs. However, again we can see that 
some interactions function better than others. The pink arrows represent 
flows this study has not looked at in detail, and although hypotheses 
may be made it is difficult to make any statements about them. The thick 
blue arrows depict knowledge flows that are relatively strong, while the 
thin blue arrows are much weaker. The following observations can be 
made with regard to knowledge exchange by Southern peace NGOs. 
• Other SNGOs: Interaction with other SNGOs takes place 
regularly through conferences, meetings and networks. 
Networks of peace NGOs are in fact widespread. Such 
knowledge exchange among colleagues is considered important 
and may be considered a strong point of Southern peace NGOs. 
However, as is discussed below, is also constrained by a number 
of issues. 
• Donor NNGOs: Interaction with donor NNGOs takes place but, 
given the structural characteristics of the aid regime (see below), 
the direction of knowledge flows is often one way.  
• Beneficiaries are often mentioned as sources of knowledge but 
little systematic research is done to find out about their needs 
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and preferences for action or to garner the potential of their 
traditional conflict management practices. Many organisations 
visited feel more work needs to be done in this regard. 
Knowledge also flows the other way: from SNGOs to their 
beneficiaries. These flows primarily take the form of peace 
education, mediation training, vocational training for former 
combatants and other forms of capacity building to prevent 
future conflict. In fact, such knowledge transfer is the chief 
method of peacebuilding for most NGOs working in this field. 
• Knowledge institutions: Little exchange takes place with 
knowledge institutions. Reasons for this include that Southern 
knowledge institutions are undercapacitated, that they pay little 
attention to development and peace research (or more generally 
to practice-oriented work) and that NGOs and academic 
institutions have different organisational cultures that lead to 
(perceived) contradictions in their approaches towards learning 
and make cooperation difficult. 
• Governments: The extent to which Southern peace NGOs 
interact with governments depends not only on the extent to 
which governments are open to cooperation with NGOs, but 
also on the nature of the NGO in question. Stronger 
organisations are active in lobbying and advocacy and some also 
engage in the capacity building of local and national 
government employees. Smaller, weaker NGOs are more 
localised and do not engage much in such activities. For them, 
networks are important vehicles to make their voices heard to 
official institutions as they are not able to do so on their own. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in the interviews little mention was 
made of knowledge flowing the other way: from governments to 
NGOs.  
 
To conclude, a lot of second-order learning takes place in interaction 
with colleages, beneficiaries and, particularly, other SNGOs. However, 
third-order learning is difficult due to constraints that limit the capacity 
of Southern peace NGOs have for reflection, research and 
documentation. 
 
 
9.1.4 Factors that constrain and support the learning of Southern 
 peace NGOs  
 
The lack of capacity of the SNGOs studied for learning, research and 
documentation is grounded in a number of factors. For reasons 
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explained below, often little funding is available for these activities. In 
addition, interactive knowledge exchange is inhibited by the realities of 
a conflict-affected society characterised by social cleavages and 
mistrust, low resources and bad infrastructure. Conflict also shapes the 
kind of knowledge that is exchanged: its contested and rapidly changing 
nature makes documentation and learning difficult. A context of conflict 
may be more conducive to superficial, tactical learning than to deeper, 
strategic learning that involves asking difficult questions regarding one’s 
assumptions and past actions.  
 
The sense of urgency experienced by people working for peace in 
unstable environments contributes to an emphasis on action at the 
expense of reflection. A short-term focus that results from project cycle 
funding prevents the institutionalisation of longer-term reflection and 
learning. Being open about failure is difficult in a situation where future 
funding often depends on the demonstration of ‘results’. High staff 
mobility makes it difficult for organisations to retain knowledge. 
Competition plays a role in knowledge exchange between NGOs: as 
organisations compete for the same sources of funding, they are often 
reluctant to share knowledge for fear of losing competitive advantage. In 
addition to these local factors, more structural, macro-level factors 
constrain the possibilities SNGO staff have for third-order reflection and 
learning. 
 
 
9.1.5 Power differences, donor relations and North-South dynamics 
 
At the global level, more structural issues constrain the opportunities 
SNGOs have for learning. Inequality between Northern and Southern 
societies when it comes to research capacity and the recognition of 
knowledge as ‘valid’ contributes to the difficulty Southern peace 
practitioners have in strengthening their contribution to global policy 
debates. Various factors combine to create and maintain this structurally 
unequal situation: 
• Recognition of knowledge: Indigenous knowledge in developing 
countries is often seen as less rational and scientific and 
therefore less legitimate than knowledge that fits into ‘modern’ 
knowledge systems. This lack of recognition of the potential 
value of different knowledge systems has at the same time been 
reinforced by and contributed to the erosion of traditional 
knowledge systems in the face of the ‘modernisation’ of social, 
economic and political systems of developing countries.  
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• Research capacity: There is an enormous inequality between the 
developed and developing worlds when it comes to scientific 
research outputs. This means that development and 
peacebuilding programmes in the South are most often based on 
Northern research findings and ideas. Southern research that 
does take place is often very abstract and theoretical and does 
not immediately lend itself to application. There is very little 
interaction among researchers and practitioners in the field of 
peacebuilding in the countries visited. 
• Knowledge policy: Initiatives by donors to stimulate Southern 
knowledge generation are not linked to policymaking, which 
often remains top-down. ‘Knowledge for development’ policies 
tend to be aimed at Southern governments and universities, and 
do not include practitioners such as NGO staff. The knowledge 
management policies of NNGOs are mostly internally oriented 
and do not explicitly include partner organisations in the South. 
• Donor discourse: The aid regime and dominant discourse forces 
Southern NGOs to speak the language and jargon of NNGOs 
and back-donors. They need to do this in order to get funding 
proposals and progress reports approved. This limits the scope 
for local concepts and visions to trickle through into policy and 
practice.   
• Short-term funding and deliverables: The aid regime is 
increasingly characterised by short-term funding and an 
emphasis on ‘deliverables’. These characteristics clash with the 
requirements for learning and two-way knowledge exchange 
among stakeholders, namely flexible funding that is not tied 
exclusively to projects and measurable outcomes so as to create 
space for research and learning; and long-term partnerships 
based on trust and mutual dependence. 
• Depolitisation of NGOs: The aid regime has led to an increasing 
‘professionalisation’ of Northern and Southern NGOs which 
have moved from social movements that play a political role 
towards service providers or sub-contractors implementing 
official development policy. At least in the field of 
peacebuilding, civil society support is used more as a tool for 
the implementation of policies than as a way to create an 
independent civil society with its own political activities and 
views. This denies the political nature of peacebuilding: 
achieving lasting peace often requires changing the power 
balance and is therefore not a neutral, technocratic development 
activity – in contrast with the dominant discourse which casts 
development as a neutral, value-free activity. As a result of this 
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approach, there is little attention for social, political or cultural 
peculiarities – and local knowledge – while a universal, 
technical language and toolkit are promoted. This leads to some 
tension in the field of peacebuilding, in which on the one hand 
the need to be neutral and apolitical is emphasised, while on the 
other it aims to ‘empower’ marginalised groups and thus to 
change power structures. Although even relatively technical 
development work has political components, these issues play a 
particularly strong role in peacebuilding. Indeed, many Northern 
and Southern peace-oriented actors recognise the inherently 
political nature of peace work. At the same time, however, most 
of the work of the Southern organisations visited is funded 
through the regular development chain, which is characterised 
by the apolitical discourse and service delivery chain just 
described.  
• Top-down policy: Although intentions are often good, the aid 
regime leads to donor-driven projects and top-down policy 
making. In spite of policies stimulating Southern research, this 
structural situation constrains the ability of Southern NGO 
actors for third-order learning. After all, strategic learning is 
only possible if one is able to influence strategy at all. Top-
down policy implementation also limits the possibilities SNGOs 
have for producing knowledge and contributing to international 
policy debates. Whereas needs-driven programming would 
stimulate local research into the circumstances of communities, 
donor-driven projects do not. Even well-intended capacity 
building programmes often reflect the inequalities inherent in 
the regime and have difficulty realising Southern ‘ownership’.  
 
These structural issues limit the agency of SNGOs. However, several 
kinds of initiatives may contribute to expanding their agency by 
changing these structural constraints.  
 
 
9.1.6 Initiatives to improve the learning processes of Southern peace 
 NGOs 
 
Initiatives to help NGOs deal with constraints and improve their 
learning processes include knowledge sharing networks and training 
programmes that try to build on knowledge of participants. In this study 
networks received particular attention. It is very common among 
Southern peace NGOs to form networks. Networks facilitate knowledge 
sharing and joint learning. Participants are inspired by each other’s 
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successes and learn from each other’s failures. Through networks they 
may gain access to contacts, materials, and possibilities for funding. In 
addition networks may provide a larger critical mass of organisations 
which, if they speak with a common voice, may have a stronger message 
that reaches more people – including policymakers. Organisations in the 
South with little access to Northern policy forums may be able to get 
their views across via their Northern network partners. Importantly, 
network members also note that networks have the potential to facilitate 
joint strategic thinking about the way the activities of various 
organisations contribute to larger aims.  
 
The extent to which this potential is achieved varies. Networks are 
plagued by the same limitations as the knowledge strategies of SNGOs 
more generally – competition limiting open exchange, bad 
infrastructure, and the lack of room SNGOs have for strategic thinking 
and independent action. Through joint action some of these issues may 
be overcome as networks use their critical mass to address structural 
issues. However, working for structural change would involve criticising 
and tackling existing power structures and policies – in other words, it 
would involve playing a political, activist role. Civil society 
peacebuilding networks struggle with this as they are often funded by 
the very actors that maintain current structures. More generally, some 
favour a cooperative approach and hope to achieve gradual change 
through engagement rather than activism.  
 
The success of networks in facilitating knowledge processes is 
influenced by various factors. They relate to things like the capacity of 
the member organisations, the added value and focus of a network, its 
governance structure, its context and its funding structure. Particular 
issues that emerged include the difficulty of open knowledge exchange 
in the face of conflict, power differences, and competition among 
NGOs. These issues are probably even more salient in conflict-affected 
areas than in others, thereby affecting the peacebuilding field 
particularly strongly.  
 
Experiences with the ACTS programme and the International Steering 
Group of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC) suggest that networks that bring together NGOs at a regional 
or even global level are less vulnerable to being constrained by 
competition and power issues among the participants than networks 
within a given country. Although national-level networks enable second-
order learning, global networks make possible third-order learning by 
providing a safe space for discussion and reflection – less hampered by 
direct rivalry – and because the comparison with other contexts leads to 
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a higher level of abstraction and brings in fresh perspectives. The 
funding regime also plays a role in increasing or decreasing competition 
among local actors. In addition, working on a joint identity that is based 
on an overriding, uniting goal helps to minimise competitiveness within 
networks.  
 
 
9.1.7 Global networks  
 
Thus, cross-border networks that bring together peace NGOs from 
different parts of the world have the potential to facilitate third-order 
knowledge processes. GPPAC is an interesting example that covers all 
continents. Generally it is found useful for knowledge exchange, 
facilitating reflection through discussions during network meetings and 
online interaction. Another important function of the network is that it 
gives local NGOs the opportunity to make their voice heard more widely 
and contribute to global discussions on peace and conflict. At the level 
of concrete activities participants hope that it will enable joint action in 
the face of broader issues that individual NGOs cannot deal with on 
their own.  
 
In these ways global networks have the potential to address the more 
structural issues that have an impact on global conflict and peace, 
thereby expanding the agency of individual NGOs and jointly 
contributing to the larger goals of stopping war and building peace. This 
would entail a political role for networks, in addition to their function of 
exchanging knowledge to improve the local-level practice of member 
NGOs. GPPAC has begun to do this at the UN peacebuilding 
commission and in some regions vis-à-vis governments. A network can 
be a powerful tool to carry out such lobby and advocacy work more 
effectively. It represents a larger number of people than an individual 
NGO does and can therefore have a stronger voice. Discussions within 
GPPAC show that this is not easy. Some members fear that upsetting 
powerful actors may endanger funding and other forms of support. In 
regions such as Central Asia, where political authoritarianism is a major 
issue, political activity can even endanger organisations and their staff.  
 
The conclusion mentioned earlier that peace NGOs need to better link 
their individual activities to the bigger picture of peacebuilding is also 
something that emerges as a clear issue for a global network like 
GPPAC. Joint priority setting, identified by members as a shortcoming, 
requires structured reflection on the larger, structural issues affecting 
conflict and peace, and the way in which the variety of individual 
activities of NGOs and networks involved in GPPAC may add up in 
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addressing these issues. Thinking about individual and joint impact is 
closely tied to this. However, impact assessment, agreeing on priorities 
for action and achieving a division of labour are very difficult for any 
diverse group of organisations coming together in a network. 
 
The stage and form of civil society in the countries under study also 
plays a role. Civil society is weakened by conflict and most NGOs are 
relatively new. Many NGOs are highly dependent on specific 
individuals, and as a result networks may become either groups of 
friends or platforms for competition among influential people. To some 
extent, network governance structures and procedures can help mitigate 
such issues. But there is a deeper issue at play, namely that of the 
limited local constituency of many organisations and the legitimacy of 
civil society groups that are externally driven. As mentioned, 
strengthening the downward accountability towards beneficiaries, rather 
than the currently predominant upward accountability towards donors, is 
needed. Part of this could be enabling local organisations to do more and 
better research into the needs of their communities and the impact of 
their work.  
 
 
9.1.8 Involving knowledge institutions  
 
The theory on the role of academia versus that of practice in 
development377 identifies a gap between the two fields and sees 
networks of researchers, practitioners and policymakers as a helpful tool 
for the bridging of this gap. In the Southern postconflict countries 
visited, the gap appears to be even larger and there is little interaction 
between NGOs and knowledge institutions. Few universities in these 
countries pay attention to peacebuilding and development, and capacity 
building is needed in these academic fields. On their part, NGOs could 
benefit from the involvement of universities who could function as 
learning ‘scaffolds’ and play a role in the needed research into the needs 
and knowledge of communities and the effectiveness of peace projects.  
 
In this regard, the ACTS Master programme is an interesting case. 
Through action research, ACTS promotes organisational reflection and 
learning and thereby to facilitate the learning cycle portrayed in the light 
blue square at the centre of Figure 9.1 , as well as exchanges with others 
around this square. At the current stage of the programme it is difficult 
to establish the extent to which organisational learning cycles have 
improved, but some indications of individual learning and fruitful 
                                                 
377 Rip 2001, De la Rive Box 2001, Court and Young 2003 
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exchanges can already be observed. ACTS also aims to diminish North-
South inequalities in knowledge recognition and generation, and to 
strengthen the voice of practitioners in global debates. In this sense it 
focuses explicitly on changing structural inequalities. Particularly 
significant from the perspective of involving knowledge institutions is 
that ACTS is an academic programme that leads to a Master’s degree. In 
offering the programme, NGOs and local universities cooperate.  
 
The fact that ACTS has managed to get universities involved in its 
programme, which they have accredited as a Master course, is 
promising. However, the case study shows such academic-practitioner 
cooperation can also be difficult. There are differences in organisational 
culture between NGOs and academia, which may help explain why such 
interactions are so rare in the countries studied. It will therefore be 
interesting to continue to follow ACTS to see how the cooperation 
between NGOs and universities develops. Another reason why it would 
be interesting to revisit ACTS in a few year’s time is to see in how far 
the action learning experience of ACTS participants has indeed led to 
better ‘third-order’ learning, reflection and documentation of knowledge 
on the part of these people and their organisations. The two-year length 
of the course helps to develop group solidarity. Action research as a 
method may also be a binding force in that it explicitly recognises the 
knowledge people have, which may create mutual respect and stimulate 
discussion about experiences. Such an atmosphere of high trust and 
safety is what stimulates third-order learning, which involves the 
questioning of the assumptions and world views of the learner, thereby 
also facilitating learning across (organisational and geographical) 
cultures.    
 
 
9.1.9 Ways in which Northern actors may support the learning of 
 local peace NGOs  
 
The structural aspects that limit the learning of Southern peace NGOs 
and their role in global policy debates are not set in stone. The 
relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs provides an entry 
point for a different approach that helps to increase the agency of 
SNGOs by changing these structural factors. Truly reciprocal North-
South NGO partnerships do exist, perhaps even more in peacebuilding 
than in other development sectors, because of the nature of peace work 
in which much depends on things other than money. Some NNGOs and 
SNGOs have established relatively equitable partnerships and policy 
dialogues. Northern organisations involved in such partnerships see 
them as being part of a network of equal actors. Compared to a chain 
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through which policy flows downwards and accountability upwards, in a 
partnership network both policy preferences and accountability flow 
both ways. This makes for learning by both partners, as well as joint 
learning to create new knowledge.  
 
Things that have made such partnerships possible include trust between 
partners, flexible arrangements regarding timelines and planning, and 
core institutional funding rather than tied project funding. In other 
words, two-way exchange requires a structural climate that allows for 
the development of long-term partnerships beyond concrete, output-
oriented projects. The way an NNGO itself is funded plays a role in this 
regard. If the NNGO is dependent on project funding that is tied to 
specific objectives, then it has little choice but to pass these objectives 
on to SNGOs, leaving little space for exchange over content and 
direction. Other structural factors that may play a role include the extent 
of specialisation of both Northern and Southern partners (less 
specialised organisations may leave their partners more freedom of 
action), transparency and trustworthiness on the part of the SNGO 
(increasing mutual trust and making it possible for an NNGO to be 
flexible), political factors (donor governments with a strong political 
interest in a developing country are likely to leave NNGOs and SNGOs 
with little policymaking leeway), and the capacity of SNGOs (to which I 
return below).  
 
A genuine dialogue about policy is also stimulated when NNGOs are 
willing to think out of the box and respect indigenous notions, processes 
and time frames for organisational development. On the other side of the 
partnership such dialogue is helped by SNGOs that are open to external 
ideas and suggestions for efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, space 
is made for reflection and learning when NNGOs allow for failure or 
incomplete success on the part of their Southern partners. Self-
confidence within Southern NGOs also plays a role. As we have seen, 
indigenous knowledge has been discredited in many developing 
countries for quite some time, and being familiar with modern or 
Western notions is considered to be an advantage. When Southern NGO 
staff recognise the value of the knowledge possessed by themselves, 
their colleagues and their beneficiary communities, this may give them a 
stronger position in the exchange with external actors. For this, they 
need stronger capacities for reflection and for the formulation and 
dissemination their findings. 
 
Regarding the capacity of Southern partners, genuine two-way exchange 
is easiest between relatively equal partners – in other words, with strong 
SNGOs. It is also the stronger NGOs that tend to be able to do research 
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into the needs of communities and that feel secure enough to turn down 
programmes that they feel do not meet these needs. As the majority of 
Southern peace NGOs does not fall into this ‘strong’ category, capacity 
building is an important activity – as long as it tries to take into account 
the principles of ownership and partnership. This is a bit of a ‘catch 22’ 
because these principles are most difficult to realise with weak 
organisations who may not be so certain of what they know and want 
and due to their strong dependency on donor funds may be more than 
willing to say whatever they think NNGOs want to hear.  
 
Thinking about possible ways out of this ‘catch’, our attention is drawn 
back to the importance of research, reflection, and organisational 
learning capacities. Capacitating organisations to research local 
conditions, to draw lessons from experience more consciously, to 
document or otherwise store these lessons inside the organisation, and to 
share experiences with others would strengthen the position of SNGOs 
in exchanges over policy and practice and lead to more relevant and 
effective activities. In line with theories about capacity building (but not 
necessarily with its practice), such capacity building would not start 
from scratch but aim to build on the knowledge that people already 
possess, helping them to develop this knowledge, compare it with other 
ideas, and to document and disseminate it. The ACTS programme is an 
illustration of the form that such an effort may take. 
 
Action research may be used to help peace practitioners study their own 
practice, compare this with relevant theories, exchange with others and 
develop new knowledge as a result. In this way, action research may 
reinforce the learning cycle and related knowledge interactions depicted 
in Figure 9.1. Initiatives like this have the potential of strengthening the 
voice of Southern actors and practitioners in global policy discussions. 
In the case of ACTS the fact that practitioners can gain a Master’s 
degree may further facilitate this, as such a degree may cause others to 
take them more seriously. Another interesting facet of the programme is 
that it involves local universities, thereby strengthening the links 
between knowledge institutions and NGOs and helping build knowledge 
capacities more widely than within NGOs only. Although the ACTS 
programme is still in a very early stage, and is experiencing difficulties 
in the cooperation between NGOs and academia as well as with regard 
to the application of action research, it gives food for thought about 
ways forward.  
 
In addition to learning-oriented capacity building and different forms of 
partnership between NNGOs and SNGOs, other ways in which Northern 
actors may support the knowledge and learning strategies of local peace 
  
453 
NGOs include participating in networks, helping link actors around the 
world and supporting the development of Southern knowledge 
institutions and the recognition and dissemination of Southern research 
findings. The case of GPPAC shows that one of the potential benefits 
Southern NGOs see in being part of a global network is the access that 
this provides them to global, and Northern, policy forums. In the case of 
ACTS, the importance of engaging Northern actors is illustrated by the 
need participants have for additional accreditation of the Master 
programme by a Northern institution. Another illustration of the 
importance of linking initiatives in the South to actors in the North is the 
hope of ACTS that it will gain access to North-based knowledge forums 
and journals for the dissemination of its research results, so as to reach 
the people shaping discourse, debates and policy. The fact that one of 
the partners in ACTS is based in Europe may prove very helpful in this 
regard. As with ECCP in GPPAC, this Europe-based partner has also 
been best able to secure funding for the programme. 
 
 
9.1.10 Overall concluding remarks 
 
The overall research question of this study was: What are the challenges 
and opportunities Southern peace NGOs are confronted with in 
accumulating, mobilising and disseminating the knowledge that is 
needed to make optimal policy decisions, carry out activities in an 
effective way and adjust to continuously changing circumstances?  
 
Southern peace NGOs engage in various learning and knowledge 
sharing activities. They are particularly active in organising exchanges 
with other SNGOs – particularly in their own country and region – in 
order to facilitate joint, interactive, second-order learning. Third-order, 
strategic learning – which involves thinking about wider issues of 
conflict and peace, the role of the organisation within this big picture, 
whether it is working on the right assumptions, and what else is needed 
for structural change – is more difficult. Such third-order learning would 
be helped by increasing the research done by SNGOs, improving both 
the capacity of Southern knowledge institutions and their cooperation 
with SNGOs, and interacting with people from different parts of the 
world in order to compare one’s situations with that of others and 
achieve a higher level of abstraction and learning.  
 
However, Southern peacebuilders are unable to create room for such 
strategic learning activities, due to a number of structural constraints 
factors that limit their agency. These include:  
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• Conflict, which leads to bad infrastructure, low resources, a high 
sense of urgency (leading to short-term focus and making it 
difficult to take the time to step back and draw lessons for the 
longer term), distrust among actors (which inhibits sharing), and 
a disincentive to openly question views and past actions (needed 
for deeper learning) 
• Competition among NGOs over funding, which limits their 
willingness to openly share knowledge with one another and 
which is compounded by conflict-related distrust 
• Funding regimes, in which SNGOs are often implementers of 
policy developed in the North rather than independent civil 
society actors, thereby limiting their ability to think about wider 
strategies or about the needs existing in communities 
• A weak knowledge base in developing, conflict-affected 
countries, in which knowledge institutions are weak and pay 
little attention to issues of peace and development 
• Global inequalities with regard to knowledge generation and 
recognition, in which Northern knowledge systems and 
discourses dominate over Southern ones 
• Oral traditions, in which knowledge is often not documented, 
thereby limiting its wider sharing 
• Low capacity on the part of Southern peace organisations, 
including a lack of abilities for research, documentation and 
knowledge dissemination. 
 
Opportunities for local peace NGOs in trying to increase their agency 
for learning and knowledge generation are   
• Coming together with other peacebuilding actors for joint 
reflection and strategising, which may be facilitated by networks 
• Networks and training programmes that focus on the joint 
creation of new knowledge, including its documentation and 
dissemination 
• Action research, a methodology that can support not only 
organisational learning but also the participation of Southern 
practitioners in global theory development and policy debates 
• Forms of cooperation between NGOs and knowledge 
institutions in conflict-affected countries, which can contribute 
to capacity building on both sides and increase the knowledge 
base of these societies 
• More equal partnerships with NNGOs, based on mutuality, trust 
and long-term relationships, in which knowledge flows in both 
directions and policy is developed jointly 
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• Capacity building programmes that do not transfer pre-existing 
knowledge but equip participants with the tools to learn, 
document and share. 
 
These conclusions translate into a number of concrete recommendations 
for various peacebuilding actors and initiatives. These recommendations 
are provided in the next section. 
 
 
9.2  Recommendations 
 
9.2.1 For Southern peace NGOs 
 
In order to increase the legitimacy and relevance of activities, as well of 
the strength of an SNGO in its interactions with Northern actors, it is 
necessary to pay ample attention to ‘downward accountability’ towards 
constituencies: the communities for whom projects are intended. 
Increasing the knowledge base of organisations with regard to these 
beneficiaries and their ideas and priorities is part of this. It is important 
to try to convince donor organisations of the need to make space for this 
kind of interaction and research. 
 
Southern peace NGOs need to do more explicit thinking on the ‘big 
picture’: what are the overall aims of peacebuilding and how do the 
activities of individual NGOs contribute to these aims? This includes 
joint reflection with other NGOs and non-NGO actors regarding the 
complementarity of activities. It may also entail using creative ways of 
impact assessment, building on what is already being done in this area. 
 
Southern peace NGOs may try to gain a stronger position in the 
interaction with donor agencies by 
• working for longer-term partnerships by building trust and 
continuous dialogue, keeping in mind that organisational 
transparency contributes to trustworthiness  
• strengthening the knowledge base of the organisation through 
action research into its own work and through interaction with 
beneficiaries, paying attention to the documentation of findings 
and lessons so that these may be shared with others and 
contribute to building a body of theory that is practitioner- and 
Southern-generated. Linking up with local and international 
knowledge institutions – universities – could be part of such a 
strategy 
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• connecting with other SNGOs in networks and arriving at joint 
positions and plans 
• questioning the action priorities of donors, demanding attention 
for alternative views and the local knowledge possessed by 
SNGOs and beneficiaries, and if necessary, turning down 
projects. This requires a true motivation for peace (rather than 
prioritising organisational survival or personal interests) but also 
a capacity to propose alternatives. The latter in turn requires a 
capacity to research local needs and set priorities independently 
from donors 
• last but not least, by making space for research, networking, 
reflection and documentation, all of which should become part 
of standard practice and be included in programme proposals 
sent to prospective donors 
 
In capacity building programmes (both those provided and those 
attended) priority should be given to those activities that aim to 
strengthen the knowledge generation of participants rather than those 
that merely introduce pre-existing concepts and ideas. 
 
 
9.2.2 For Northern NGOs with partners in the South 
 
In the selection of partners it is important pay attention to their 
constituency. Even if a group does not comply with the organisational 
model of an NGO it may be a suitable partner if it is rooted in local 
communities and reflects the priorities and needs of those communities. 
 
Funding regimes that enable more equitable partnerships are likely to 
lead to more locally relevant activities and ideas. Instead of imposing 
external ideas and programming priorities, two-way partnerships create 
room for local knowledge and priorities to be taken into account. In this 
way, North-South partnership in the true sense of the word can help 
prevent externally-driven peacebuilding activities and the fostering of 
organisations with limited local constituencies. This, however, takes 
time to invest in relationships and learn about the nature of the partner 
organisation. With the development of a relationship, either the partner 
is found unreliable or unresponsive to local needs, or the opposite occurs 
and trust grows, making a more equitable exchange possible.  
 
NNGOs should support the development of the learning and research 
capacity of their Southern partners, invest in ICT development and 
internet connectivity, link SNGOs up with knowledge institutions, and 
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make external knowledge available. Using networks, external actors 
may facilitate joint research projects, as GPPAC is doing around peace 
education and ACTS is doing more generally.  
 
Although building the capacity of local actors for research and 
documentation is important, another way to achieve a more balanced 
knowledge relationship is by looking for ways of knowledge 
documentation and dissemination that are less centred around written 
information – given the oral tradition prevalent in many non-Western 
societies. Making more use of tools like radio, art, video, film, theatre, 
or games in exchanges is something that could be explored much more.  
 
NNGOs may stimulate networking or other forms of cooperation among 
SNGOs through the way the funding regime is given shape. Competition 
among SNGOs over funding is an obstacle to sharing and networking. 
NNGOs may start to think about ways to offer financial aid that support 
rather than discourage cooperation among Southern partners. They may 
stimulate coordination and joint planning on the part of SNGOs, with an 
eye on the ‘big picture’ and the way in which organisations contribute to 
it. However, this is only useful if the SNGOs are given some leeway in 
setting project priorities.  
 
Part of such a strategy may be to fund networks of SNGOs, although it 
is important to keep an eye on who in the network is the recipient of 
funding and what kind of power position this accords that person or 
organisation. Emphasising participatory and accountable decision-
making structures for the partner network is therefore important.   
 
 
9.2.3 For ‘back donors’ 
 
Many of the difficulties identified in this study are related to the lack of 
influence SNGOs have on the peacebuilding policies they implement. 
This limits the relevance of their activities and is due to the chain model 
of funding and policymaking, which remains largely top-down. Back 
donors (Northern governments and international organisations that 
finance the work of peace NGOs) should think about ways to open up 
policy making. This may include thinking about alternatives to the chain 
model, such as a network model in which various actors – including 
back donors themselves – involved in peacebuilding jointly exchange, 
learn and strategise.  
 
The ‘knowledge for development’ policies of back donors should pay 
more attention to the integration of practitioners – not only industry and 
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business, but also NGOs – in these policies. This would increase the 
practical relevance of the work of knowledge institutions and build 
broader societal knowledge bases. 
 
More recognition of, and reflection on, the political nature of 
development, peacebuilding and civil society is needed. Pretending that 
these are neutral activities may be convenient from the perspective of 
preventing confrontation with powerful actors both in developing 
countries and internationally, but it does not eventually serve the aims of 
peacebuilding, democratisation and development and it constrains the 
role that Southern NGOs can play domestically. 
 
 
9.2.4 For peace NGO networks 
 
Networks of peacebuilders may pay more attention to their potential 
roles as learning ‘scaffolds’ by documenting knowledge and the 
outcomes of joint learning and by involving knowledge institutions. 
Training or action research-oriented academic courses may be built into 
such networks, as ACTS has done, in order to contribute to capacity 
building and strengthen the position of peace NGOs in global exchanges 
of knowledge. 
 
In functioning as platforms for knowledge exchange, networks should 
not try to pre-determine the content of sharing but rather provide a 
flexible framework for members to come together and share about 
whatever issue they deem most relevant at a given moment.   
 
Networks have the potential of amplifying the voice of NGOs, speaking 
on behalf of many rather than few. They may use this strength to address 
the structural constraints peacebuilders face: macro-level power 
structures and policies that maintain conflict, prevent sustainable 
peacebuilding and limit the role of NGOs. Doing so, however, risks 
jeopardising funding and more cooperative strategies vis-à-vis 
policymakers. Each network has to find its own solution to this. This 
may even include separating a network into a more activist body and a 
more professional one. 
 
In the selection of members networks should pay attention to the 
constituencies of organisations – do they work on behalf of local 
communities, donor interests, or their own organisational survival? In 
addition, democratic governance inside networks, including transparent 
procedures for admitting new members and for the selection of 
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representatives, may help reduce issues of power, competition and 
distrust among civil society actors.  
 
 
9.2.5 For training programmes 
 
Rather than transferring pre-set concepts and methods, training 
programmes for peace practitioners need to focus on facilitating 
reflection and knowledge generation by the participants. Action research 
may be a helpful tool in this. In addition, it is important for capacity 
building activities to include the building of capacity for (action) 
research, exchange, documentation, and dissemination. Thus, actors 
providing capacity building may consider moving towards programmes 
that combine elements of action research, training and networking. This 
would facilitate organisational learning and knowledge generation on 
the part of peace practitioners and strengthen their voice in global theory 
development and policy debates. 
 
Taking such recommendations and initiatives into account may help 
capacity building and knowledge exchange initiatives to be developed in 
a way that is more sensitive to the local context and that builds on 
existing expertise, while increasing the effectiveness of local actors by 
introducing access to peacebuilding knowledge and organisational skills.   
 
 
9.2.6 For knowledge institutions 
 
Southern universities may play a larger role in the knowledge processes 
of NGOs by participating in research into the needs and circumstances 
of beneficiaries, carrying out baseline studies, and developing 
methodologies for impact assessment. This should not be a way of 
‘outsourcing’ but be connected to the learning of the NGOs themselves.  
 
Universities may also play a part in the continuing education of NGO 
staff members, functioning as ‘scaffolds’ that enable deeper level 
reflection, learning and theory development. Action research and other 
methods that build on the practical knowledge of participants could be 
explored in this regard. Universities in Southern conflict-affected 
countries need to pay more attention to ‘practice oriented’ education and 
research in order to be more relevant for practitioners. This is also 
important from the perspective of conflict prevention: if education does 
not match the skills required by a society, than this can lead to 
unemployment, grievance, and conflict. 
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9.3  Follow-up and further research 
 
The following strategies and topics for further research remain or have 
emerged from the study.  
 
Research strategies that would further refine and improve the 
conclusions reached in this book include a longer-term observation of 
knowledge flows and learning activities taking place in and around a 
Southern NGO. Such observation would add to the findings from 
interviews, which are likely to reflect the bias of the interviewed, and 
may bring issues to the surface that SNGO staff themselves do not 
realise are important. An additional strategy for improving the current 
findings would be to revisit the case studies of ACTS and GPPAC in a 
few year’s time to see how they have developed would be very 
interesting. In addition, analysing other initiatives that aim to facilitate 
learning, knowledge generation and sharing would add to the picture. 
 
Research topics that remain include the following. First, researchers may 
more closely analyse the issue of how donor-recipient partnerships may 
be give shape in different ways. It has become clear in this study that 
different forms of partnership between those providing and those 
receiving funds for peacebuilding are to different extents open to the 
knowledge of recipients and conducive to joint learning. I have looked 
at this mainly from the perspective of the Southern partners at the 
receiving end of donor funding. More research on different approaches 
to partnership of different donors, and on examples of different 
partnerships, would enrich this thinking.  
 
Second, the study of learning by NGOs would benefit from more 
research about the ways in which monitoring and evaluation (M&E) can 
be used for learning. Better connecting the M&E of NGOs with their 
organisational learning would involve making M&E a central part of 
work rather than an added activity that receives little priority. Such 
integration of M&E and learning proves difficult in practice. A study 
that collects experiences organisations have gained in this regard would 
contribute to thinking about M&E and learning. It could look at 
questions such as: how to make sure that M&E results in information 
that staff members want and need to improve their practice? How to 
ensure that M&E facilitates and documents, rather than overlaps with, 
processes of learning and monitoring already taking place? How to 
reconcile the goals of accountability and learning? 
 
Third, future research may pay attention to finding alternatives to 
written documentation. In this book we have seen that the oral traditions 
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of many Southern societies limit the extent to which NGO staff 
members document knowledge, and how this in turn weakens the 
position of Southern actors in global exchanges of knowledge. In 
response a need was identified to build capacity for documentation. 
However, we may think more about the different forms that this 
documentation may take. Non-written forms, such as film, may better 
match the oral traditions of some, and new technologies may play a role 
in creating these forms. Powell (2006: 530) writes that “[w]ithin the 
foreseeable future, developments in ICT will enable a capacity to handle 
oral information that will match current capacity for the written word.” 
Researching such developments would be interesting with an eye to the 
future.  
 
Other ways in which ICT may support the learning of SNGOs represent 
a fourth topic for further research. In addition to technologies for the 
documentation of knowledge, research could also look at the way ICT 
may be used to promote the participation of all relevant parties in 
knowledge generation and exchange. This would include studying low-
cost, accessible forms of connectivity that are open source and avoid 
long-term dependence on suppliers. 
 
A fifth area for further research is what may be termed ‘knowledge for 
peace’. In this study I have noted that knowledge is part of conflict and 
that, conversely, discussing different interpretations of the conflict as 
well as of the shape peace should take is an important part of 
peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. This means that 
reconciliation has an important knowledge component. However, I have 
not really been able to find out how exactly knowledge exchange and 
joint learning processes may contribute to peacebuilding directly (rather 
than via the increased effectiveness of learning organisations). Initiatives 
such as the ones mentioned in section 5.1.1 could be studied in more 
detail: The Dialogues Politiques project by the organisation 
Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA) in 
Dakar, Senegal; in Brazil, the visioning activities of the Landless 
Workers; the Reflect Programme of Action Aid; and the Netherlands-
based Split Screen project.  
 
A final and more macro-level field of study that would merit additional 
research is the response of different countries to tensions between 
knowledge systems. All developing countries are confronted with 
tensions between traditional, indigenous knowledge and new types of 
knowledge coming from the West. Different countries have responded 
to this in different ways. Analysing these different responses, and their 
results, would be an interesting research project. 
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Whether or not it leads to such further research, it is hoped that this book 
may make a small contribution to improving the learning, and thereby 
the actions, of Southern peacebuilding NGOs, and perhaps other 
organisations as well. An effort will be made to ensure that the findings 
and recommendations of this study reach those who may put them to 
use. They will be discussed with the organisations co-funding the 
research that led to this book, with other NNGOs, with the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a ‘back donor’, and in as far as possible 
with the Southern NGO staff that were interviewed for the study.  
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Dutch summary 
 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op kennis en op vredesopbouw. Het heeft als 
doel om een beter inzicht te krijgen in de manieren waarop lokale 
vredesopbouworganisaties in (post)conflictlanden (met name Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Cambodja en de Filippijnen) kennis vergaren, verwerken, 
genereren en verspreiden om zo effectiever te worden in hun streven 
naar het bereiken van duurzame vrede – met andere woorden, hoe zij 
strategisch leren. Strategisch leren gaat dieper dan het maken van 
tactische aanpassingen in een bestaande strategie. Het houdt in dat men 
zich afvraagt of de gevolgde strategie überhaupt de juiste is, op welke 
aannames de strategie is gebaseerd, welke impliciete waarden eraan ten 
grondslag liggen, en of die aannames en waarden eventueel moeten 
worden aangepast. Dergelijke strategische leerprocessen zijn belangrijk 
voor organisaties om zich aan te passen aan de snel veranderende 
omstandigheden die een conflict met zich meebrengt en om fouten – of 
sub-optimale uitkomsten – te voorkomen. Juist in een omgeving die 
wordt gekenmerkt door (dreigend) conflict is de mogelijke prijs van het 
maken van fouten hoog en is voortdurend leren van belang.  
 
Externe actoren kunnen helpen strategische leerprocessen op gang te 
brengen. Hun frisse blik en vergelijkingsmateriaal maken het mogelijk 
om buiten denkkaders te treden en meer diepgaande vragen te stellen 
over het eigen handelen. De lokale gemeenschappen op wie projecten 
zich richten, collega’s van andere organisaties en kennisinstellingen 
kunnen ieder op hun eigen manier een dergelijke bijdrage leveren. 
Interactie is dus van groot belang voor leren, iets dat door de 
medewerkers van lokale vredes-NGOs die meewerkten aan het 
onderzoek ook werd benadrukt. Een andere reden waarom interactie van 
belang is voor leren is dat alleen op deze manier de zogenaamde stille 
kennis – kennis die niet is gedocumenteerd – naar voren komt. Vaak 
beseffen mensen niet dat ze kennis bezitten die voor anderen relevant is 
totdat ze met die anderen in gesprek treden.  
 
Strategisch leren blijkt in de wereld van de vredesorganisaties echter 
vaak achterwege te blijven. Wat met name ontbreekt is denken over het 
grotere plaatje van vredesopbouw – de weg naar het uiteindelijke doel 
van duurzame vrede – en de manier waarop de eigen activiteiten in dit 
plaatje passen. Dit kan worden verklaard door een aantal 
omstandigheden die uit de studie naar voren komen, die het moeilijk 
maken voor lokale vredesorganisaties om te leren. Over het algemeen 
hebben deze NGOs een gebrek aan tijd en capaciteit voor onafhankelijke 
reflectie op het eigen werk, het doen van onderzoek, en het 
  
464 
documenteren en verspreiden van kennis. Verscheidene factoren dragen 
hiertoe bij. Allereerst is er de lage onderzoekscapaciteit in 
ontwikkelingslanden als geheel, waar getalenteerde mensen vertrekken 
en lokale universiteiten ondergefinancierd zijn en zich bovendien 
meestal niet richten op ‘praktische’ disciplines als vredesopbouw en 
ontwikkelingsstudies. Nog fundamenteler is het enorme verschil in 
onderzoekscapaciteit tussen Noord en Zuid. Ook botsen verschillende 
kennissystemen – ‘modern’ en ‘traditioneel’, ‘extern’ en ‘inheems’ – 
binnen ontwikkelingslanden met elkaar. Daarbij is er een structurele 
ongelijkheid in wie bepaalt welke kennis als legitiem wordt beschouwd. 
Het dominante discours in de wereld van ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
en vredesopbouw wordt over het algemeen in het Noorden bepaald.  
 
Het ontmoetingspunt tussen Noord en Zuid waarin zulke structurele 
factoren tot uiting komen zijn de partnerschappen tussen Noordelijke en 
Zuidelijke NGOs, waarbij de Noordelijke NGOs (NNGOs) als donor 
optreden. Deze relaties zijn ingebed in een keten van beleid en 
financiering: de NNGOs worden op hun beurt door regeringen en 
internationale organisaties ondersteund. Ondanks de goede bedoelingen 
van donoren is het binnen deze keten vaak een éénrichtingsverkeer van 
kennis. Beleid wordt in het Noorden bepaald en Zuidelijke partners doen 
vaak weinig meer dan het implementeren van dat beleid. Hierbij ligt de 
nadruk op korte-termijnprojecten en het leveren van meetbare resultaten. 
Deze zaken laten weinig ruimte voor reflectie op het grotere plaatje – de 
plek van de activiteiten in langdurige processen van vredesopbouw.  
 
Niet alle Noord-Zuid partnerschappen volgen echter een dergelijke 
ketenbenadering en er zijn ook relaties waarbij wel tweerichtingverkeer 
plaatsvindt rond beleidsvorming. Dergelijke partnerschappen worden 
over het algemeen gekenmerkt door een langere relatie, onderling 
vertrouwen en het openstaan voor andere perspectieven. Dit gaat het 
gemakkelijkst met Zuidelijke organisaties die al een bepaald 
capaciteitsniveau hebben bereikt – die in staat zijn onderzoek te doen 
naar hun omstandigheden en resultaten, te leren van hun werk en een 
mening te vormen over beleid. Veel Zuidelijke NGOs zijn echter minder 
ver ontwikkeld. Zij zouden gebaat zijn bij capaciteitsopbouw, niet in de 
vorm van het overdragen van reeds vaststaande kennis maar door hun 
eigen leer-, onderzoeks- en documentatiecapaciteit te helpen 
ontwikkelen. Deze vaardigheden worden door lokale organisaties ook 
hoog geplaatst op het lijstje van kennis die zij graag zouden vergaren.  
 
Het feit dat lokale organisaties vooral door buitenlandse actoren worden 
gefinancierd, en aan hen ook in eerste instantie verantwoording schuldig 
zijn, roept vragen op over hun lokale inbedding en de rol die ze kunnen 
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spelen in het binnenlandse politieke spectrum. Als uitvoerders van 
donorbeleid die concrete, bijna technische resultaten dienen te behalen 
zijn lokale NGOs vaak niet in staat een politieke rol te spelen als 
onderdeel van de civiele maatschappij, vertegenwoordiger van lokale 
belangen, en controleur van de regering. Ook dit beperkt hun 
mogelijkheden om zichzelf als onderdeel te zien van het bredere proces 
van vredesopbouw, dat immers een politiek proces is.  
 
De conflicten die hun werkomgeving kenmerken spelen ook een rol in 
het bemoeilijken van de leerprocessen van Zuidelijke 
vredesorganisaties. Deze conflicten hebben vaak geleid tot een tekort 
aan de benodigde infrastructuur voor onderzoek en kennisuitwisseling, 
maar ook tot een gebrek aan het onderlinge vertrouwen dat nodig is voor 
interactie en gezamenlijk leren. Dit gebrek aan vertrouwen wordt nog 
eens versterkt door het financieringssysteem van NGOs, dat hen tot 
concurrenten van elkaar maakt. Concurrentie is niet bevorderlijk voor 
open kennisuitwisseling, omdat organisaties bang zijn strategische 
voordelen weg te geven.   
 
Ondanks de genoemde obstakels zijn de medewerkers van lokale vredes-
NGOs in (post)conflictlanden op verscheidene manieren bezig met 
kennis en leren. Een veel voorkomende kennisstrategie is het opzetten 
van netwerken waarin medewerkers van verschillende organisaties 
kennis uitwisselen en hopen te leren van elkaars ervaringen. In deze 
netwerken komen veel van de problemen tot uiting die de leercapaciteit 
van Zuidelijke vredesorganisaties in het algemeen beperken. 
Concurrentie tussen organisaties en wantrouwen tussen individuen 
beïnvloeden het functioneren van vredesnetwerken. Dergelijke 
problemen spelen echter een veel minder grote rol in internationale 
netwerken waarin mensen uit verschillende landen samenkomen. Over 
grenzen heen is de concurrentie minder direct aanwezig en lijkt men 
bovendien beter in staat om te discussiëren op een hoger 
abstractieniveau, en daarmee om strategisch te leren.  
 
Leerprocessen binnen Zuidelijke vredes-NGOs zijn veelal informeel, 
evenals leren uit interactie met doelgroepen, regeringen en andere 
actoren. Wat vaak niet gebeurt is het documenteren van de hieruit 
voortkomende kennis, die daarmee tot een kleine kring beperkt blijft. En 
hoewel medewerkers van lokale NGOs vaak kritiek hebben op beleid en 
discours van externe actoren zijn zij hierdoor niet in staat om hun kennis 
hier tegenover te stellen en op gelijke voet aan beleidsdiscussies deel te 
nemen.  
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Universiteiten zouden kunnen helpen bij het documenteren van kennis 
door onderzoek te doen in de praktijk van NGOs maar ook door NGO-
medewerkers bij te staan in het opdoen van onderzoeks- en 
documentatievaardigheden. Er is echter weinig interactie tussen 
academici en NGO-medewerkers in de bezochte landen. Eén van de 
zaken die hierbij een rol spelen is het verschil tussen de cultuur van 
academia (en hun definitie van legitieme kennis) en die van NGOs. 
Toch bestaat er een initiatief, bestudeerd in hoofdstuk acht, waarin een 
dergelijke samenwerking wordt bevorderd, met het doel NGO-
medewerkers te helpen uit de eigen praktijk lessen te trekken en die om 
te zetten in kennis die een bijdrage kan leveren aan internationale 
discussies over vredesopbouw. Actie-onderzoek naar de eigen praktijk 
staat hierin centraal. Deze methode lijkt goed te passen bij de leercyclus 
(handelen – reflecteren – planning aanpassen – opnieuw handelen) van 
vredesorganisaties. Betrokken universiteiten staan echter niet altijd even 
open voor deze methode. 
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Annex 1. GPPAC survey statistics per region 
 
GPPAC region Survey type379 Surveys sent  Surveys 
returned  
% of surveys 
returned 
A 21 12 57%  
B 36 17 46% 
Central and East Africa 
Total  57 29 51% 
A 21 6 29%  
B 35 12 34%  
West Africa 
Total  56 18 32% 
A 13 8 62% 
B 21 3 14% 
Southern Africa 
Total  34 11 32% 
A 12 2  17% 
B 8 4 50% 
Middle East and North 
Africa  
Total  20 6 30% 
A 29 8 28% 
B 28 15 54% 
Western Europe 
Total  57 23 40% 
A 11 9 82% 
B 52 9 17% 
The Balkans 
Total  63 18 29% 
A 11 3 27% 
B 0 0 - 
Western Commonwealth 
of Independent States 
Total  11 3 27% 
A 7 4 57% 
B 24 14 58% 
The Caucasus 
Total  31 18 58% 
A 0 0 - 
B 19 15 79% 
Central Asia 
Total  19 15 79% 
A 12 8 67% 
B 21 1  5% 
Northeast Asia 
Total  33 9 27% 
A 26 4 15% 
B 24 8 33% 
Southeast Asia 
Total  50 12 24% 
A 14 4 29% 
B 24 9 38% 
South Asia 
Total  38 13 34% 
A 24 11 46% 
B 12 3 25% 
The Pacific 
Total  36 14 39% 
A 16 3 19% 
B 15 5 33% 
North America 
Total  31 8 26% 
A 44 2 5% 
B 43 0 0% 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean380 
Total  87 2 2% 
A 261 84 32% 
B 362 115 32% 
Totals 
Total  623 199 32% 
                                                 
379 Version A was for people directly involved in GPPAC; version B for people indirectly involved. 
380 All were sent both versions so that they could choose which one they wanted to fill out. For the 
purpose of the calculations of totals, here the surveys sent are listed as half A’s and half B’s. 
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Annex 2. Excerpts from GPPAC global survey 
reports 
 
Version A – for people directly involved in GPPAC 
 
3. What, if any, are the benefits of the global GPPAC network for your 
organization?  
No benefits  Benefits (specify) Don’t know / 
not applicable  
7 See below 2 
• Access to knowledge and expertise (35) in the field; increased 
understanding of issues – particularly those at global level 
• Exchange of experiences and learning (32) collect and share lessons 
learned and best practices 
• Contacts; expansion of network and partners (30); partnerships; 
meeting people at conferences; links with other regional networks 
• Collaboration (24); provides potential for truly regional and global 
action. Joint projects, including peace education. 
• Capacity building (12) – strengthen organisation, provide training 
• Visibility/legitimacy (11) of our organisation through GPPAC 
• Lobby and advocacy (11); more advocacy power through the power 
of numbers and links with influential players; bridging the gap 
between governments and civil society; lobbying with UN, especially 
around the peacebuilding commission, of particular value 
• Raising awareness (8) conflict prevention and the role of civil society  
• Mutual assistance (10) and practical and moral support  
• Access to funds (6) 
• Unity of civil society (5); bringing CSOs together 
• Provides a focus on the concept of conflict prevention (4) and a way 
to both clarify and promote concrete actions and policies in support of 
that idea.  
• Create bridges (2): Link local initiatives for conflict prevention with 
(sub)regional mechanisms for influencing political decision-making 
• Acknowledgement of women’s organizations (2), sharing, 
cooperating  with women and women’s organizations working with 
1325 
• An “honest” agenda (2): “the agenda is set by the regions, through 
the ISG. I can clearly see that this agenda differs from a, for example, 
pure European agenda. The wide spectrum of opinions, cultures, and 
knowledge makes it possible to deal with such complex issues such as 
conflicts and wars in an equally complex way” 
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4. What, if any, are the benefits of the regional GPPAC network for your 
organization?  
No benefits  Benefits (specify) Don’t know / 
not applicable  
5 See below 2 
• Exchange of experiences and learning (40) collect and share lessons 
learned and best practices 
• Provide access to knowledge and expertise (28) in the field 
• Collaborative work and joint activities (22) ; provides potential for 
truly regional action. This could deepen the cultural and economic 
integration of countries and people in a region. Peace education could 
be a joint programme.  
• Gaining contacts and partnerships (18) with other players in region; 
networking   
• Lobby and advocacy (14); more advocacy power through the power 
of numbers and links with influential players; bridging the gap 
between governments and civil society 
• Capacity building (10), also increasing our understanding of the 
context in which we work 
• Coordination (6) of activities to prevent duplication 
• Visibility/legitimacy/influence (5) of our organisation has increased 
• Raised awareness (3) of the importance of working on peacebuilding 
and conflict prevention issues 
• Mutual understanding and support (3) 
• Fundraising (3) 
• Local and national issues can be raised at regional and global 
levels (2) 
• Provides a focus on the concept of conflict prevention (2) and a way 
to both clarify and promote concrete actions and policies in support of 
that idea.  
• Use of the conclusions and recommendations of Regional and 
Global Action Agenda (2) 
• Strengthening our networks (2) 
• Regular meetings (2) 
 
5. What, in your view, are the most important functions of the global 
GPPAC network? 
• Lobby and advocacy (31) towards international policymakers, 
particularly the UN.  
• Exchange of experiences (26) and information 
• Generating and disseminating information, research (26)  
• Implementing joint programmes (17) and the Global Action Agenda 
(although some feel it is too broad and needs more focus) 
• Facilitator and coordinator (16): of interaction and cooperation 
among NGOs and between NGOs, governmental bodies and 
international organisations. Facilitate meetings among regional 
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GPPAC in order to plan activities and set common agendas. 
Harmonise peacebuilding activities at global level. 
• Fundraising (14) and supporting members’ fundraising 
• Raising visibility and awareness (13) of nonviolent strategies of 
preventing armed conflicts and of the role, activities and issues of civil 
society. Linking the global to the local. 
• Partnerships and contacts (12) 
• Capacity building (11) of members 
• Acting as an interface (7) between universal civil society on the one 
hand and the United Nations and other official (regional) organisations 
on the other. 
• Building solidarity and unity (6) among the members of the network; 
form a common front. Mutual support. 
• Providing global leadership (5) – direction and guidance 
• Advisor (5) 
• Global conferences and meetings (4) 
• Political activism (2): on global issues such as War on Terror, Middle 
East, North Korea  
• Enlargement of the network (2) 
• Evaluation (2) of the results of conflict prevention initiatives 
• Bring civil society peacebuilders together (2) 
• Vehicle for developing policy and practice (2) that potentially will 
have a positive impact in emerging conflict situations. 
• Supporting the regional networks (2) 
• Connect civil society and the UN (2) in efficient, concrete 
mechanisms that can empower a global civil society network to work 
for human security.  
 
6. What, in your view, are the most important functions of the regional 
GPPAC network? 
• Exchange of experiences (19) 
• Generating and disseminating information, research (17) including 
analyses of the functioning of organizations in the field of conflict 
prevention; Mapping of conflict, actors, CSO roles and contributions 
• Lobby and advocacy (17) towards governments and regional 
policymakers; changing national legislation; establish partnerships 
with the peacekeeping institutions  
• Joint activities and campaigns (17) including the implementation of 
the regional action agendas 
• Coordinate (14): harmonise peacebuilding activities, prevent 
duplication of work 
• Connections and contacts (12) 
• Joint strategising (11) – incl. the regional action agenda and work 
plan 
• Capacity building (8) of members – esp. training. Empower civil 
society. 
  
494 
• Mobilize and unify civil society (7) and build a common 
understanding of conflict and conflict prevention 
• Building solidarity (6) among the members of the network 
• Bring to the fore regional and national concerns (5) that need to be 
addressed at the global level; provide a place for different groups to 
recruit support for their ideas  
• Raising awareness (5) of nonviolent strategies of preventing armed 
conflicts and of the role of civil society 
• Meetings (4) 
• Building relationships between civil society, governments and 
regional and international organisations (4). Promote dialogue.  
• Facilitating dialogue (3) and communication between various players 
in the field 
• Strengthen and support national networks (3) and help them to 
become linked regionally and globally 
• Fundraising (3) and helping members raise funds 
• Early warning and early response (2) 
 
9. What are the main challenges faced by GPPAC and/or the regional 
network? 
• Low financial resources (24) 
• The difficulty of proving its value by moving towards implementation 
and concrete activities (18). There is lack of clarity on way forward post–
New York. GPPAC needs to prove of practical value in actually preventing 
violent conflict—as opposed to “holding endless meetings and conferences to 
talk about it”.  
• Finding a focus and developing a clear strategy (11). Focus on a few 
achievable goals and then doing those well  
• Unfriendly political environment (9) in some regions and countries makes 
it difficult for civil society to work freely; bad governance; corruption; lack 
of political will of powerful states; lack of security. 
• Insufficient information flow / communication (8) 
• Coordination (7) 
• Low commitment (5) on the part of some actors. Persuading people to be 
actively involved is a challenge. Members have to deal with competing 
demands on their time and energy.  
• Demonstrate relevance to prominent conflicts (3) - Middle East, Iraq, 
Darfur, North Korea, war on terror - as well as less prominent conflict 
situations and trends 
• Keeping the momentum (3) 
• Little coverage (3) in the countries of the region ; enlarging the network 
• Sustainability (3) 
• GPPAC is little known (3) 
• Too few members (3); important actors left out 
• Supporting weak members (2) 
• Language barriers (2) 
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• The reality of armed conflicts (2) 
• Poverty (2) and related issues  
• Ownership and decision making (2) – lack of transparency 
 
10. What are your recommendations for strengthening the functions 
mentioned under questions 5 and 6? 
• Raise funds (22). Find more stable and constant fundraising basis. Make 
more use of the media to raise profile. 
• Improve information flows (16): establish research and documentation 
centre; regional websites; brief electronic newsletter; activate the GPPAC 
website and make it a marketplace of ideas, initiatives, projects. 
• Build capacity (13) of members; provide (online) trainings  
• Plan and implement concrete joint activities (11). Establish working 
groups to work on common activities. Start implementing the action agendas. 
• Improve democratic governance, transparency and ownership (8) 
• Strengthen global, regional and national secretariats/coordinators (8) 
• More regular meetings (6)  
• More focus (4); also in order to create the GPPAC ‘brand’ 
• Expand the network (4), engaging as many institutions as possible at all 
levels 
• Establish better links to local level (2) 
• Set up Monitoring and Evaluation methods (2) 
• Develop an early warning for early response system (2) 
• Focus on peace education (2) 
• Work in close collaboration with UN Peacebuilding Commission (2) 
• Create and strengthen secretariats at global, regional and national level 
(2) 
• Better PR (2) of GPPAC and of conflict prevention 
 
22. What are your priorities for knowledge sharing within the global and the 
regional GPPAC network? What knowledge do you think should be 
shared? 
• Conflict prevention and peacebuilding knowledge and methods (19)  
• Specialised conflict prevention/peacebuilding issues and methods: 
o Peace education (13) 
o Human rights (5) 
o The arms market; SALW; disarmament (4) 
o Early warning and early response (4) 
o Good governance (2) 
o The role of religion (1) 
o Grassroots experiences and traditions (1) 
o Postconflict reconciliation (1) 
o Link between development and conflict (1) 
o Innovative peacebuilding methods (1) 
o Types of conflict and root causes (1) 
o Human security (1) 
o Negotiation skills (1) 
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• Experiences (9) in the field 
• Information about GPPAC (7): goals, action plans, developments – 
including follow up to UN activities 
• Activities undertaken by members (8) and by the network. Information on 
how programs in various regions are carried out. Understand the formula of 
success. 
• Lobbying and advocacy methods (4) 
• Information about what is happening in regions (3) 
• The role of civil society (2) 
• Networking methodologies and lessons (2) 
• Capacity building methods (2) 
• Information about global issues and processes (2) 
• Strategic planning (1) 
 
 
Version B – for people indirectly involved 
 
9. What, if any, are the benefits of the global GPPAC network for your 
organization?  
No benefits  Benefits (specify) Don’t know / 
not applicable  
7  14 
• Opportunity to exchange experience (34) 
• Partnerships and contacts (23) - creating global connections and 
multilevel communication  
• Access to knowledge and expertise (20) 
• Growth of my organisation’s capacity (11) 
• Draws attention (10) of the world community to our conflicts and 
peacebuilding efforts 
• Facilitate cooperation and collaboration (9) of peacebuilding 
organizations within their regions and globally, between governments, 
and international agencies 
• Lobby and advocacy (8) at various levels 
• Meetings, conference (7) 
• Increased visibility of organisation (6) and more clout towards 
governments and regional organisations 
• Access to resources (4) directly or by establishing contacts with 
donors though GPPAC 
• Solidarity (4) regionally and globally  
• Joint projects (4) 
• Link the global to the local (3) 
• Partnership with UN (3) 
• Reduction of the risks of conflict development (2) in our region 
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10. What, if any, are the benefits of the regional GPPAC network for your 
organization?  
No benefits  Benefits (specify) Don’t know / 
not applicable  
12  16 
• Exchange of experience (21)  
• Partnerships and contacts (17)  
• Collaboration (12) on relevant regional peace and conflict issues 
• Increase of capacity of the organisation (11) , access to training, and 
broadening organisations’ sphere of activities  
• Receiving information (8)  
• Lobby and advocacy (5) at various levels 
• Increased visibility and credibility of organisation (4) 
• Access to resources (3) 
• Partnership with UN (2) 
 
11. What, in your view, are the most important functions of the global 
GPPAC network? 
• Lobbying (32) at different levels; advancing the interests of the 
network members and their constituencies. Liaise with the UN and in 
particular the Peacebuilding Commission 
• Information (20): Provide us with information of good quality –about 
global processes, what other members are doing, research results, tools 
and methods 
• Bring together governments and NGOs (16) 
• Sharing knowledge and experiences (14) 
• Partnerships and contacts (14) among civil society and with 
governments 
• Advocacy (14): high-level; organising global campaigns  
• Liaising with UN (14) – in the future, represent the network with a 
seat at the UN 
• Collaboration (11): coordinating joint activities and implementing 
plans. Establish working groups on different directions where conflict 
develops. Maximising resources through collaboration.  
• Awareness raising (11) among populations 
• Access to resources (11): financial as well as content 
• Build capacities (11): Training of specialists and monitors  
• Supporting the regional networks (10) 
• Develop common vision and strategy (9) 
• Mobilisation (9): Mobilise the world community, mass media, and 
international organisations in the resolution, and prevention of 
conflicts and war 
• Organise meetings (9): Participation at high level international and 
global conferences  
• Develop methods of prevention (7); introduce alternative approaches 
to address conflicts around the world 
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• Coordination (6) 
• Monitor, research and analyse conflicts (6) and their cause-
consequence relations   
• Building networks around themes (4) 
• Trust and solidarity building (3) between representatives of peace 
NGOs, grassroots peace people, representatives of UN and 
governments 
• Mediate (2) between conflicting groups, ethnic groups and the state. 
 
12. What, in your view, are the most important functions of the regional 
GPPAC network? 
• Cooperation and joint activities (27); implementing the Regional 
Action Agenda. Maximising resources through collaboration. 
• Partnerships and contacts (17) among civil society and with 
governments 
• Exchange of knowledge and experiences (16), lessons learned, best 
practices 
• Lobby (12) – national, regional and international. Promotion of 
regional interests on international level 
• Advocacy (11): Unite forces of NGOs in conflict prevention. Present 
the opinion of the public to the relevant authorities.  
• Building capacities (10): Education of our specialists 
• Elaborating norms and methods of prevention (9) 
• Keeping us informed (6): communication and provision of 
information to network members 
• Monitoring (6):  Evaluation of ongoing conflicts 
• Financial support (6) 
• Developing joint agenda (5) 
• Representing regional interests (3) and special regional issues 
• Raise the profile (2) of civil society and peacebuilding at the regional 
level 
 
15. What are the main challenges faced by GPPAC and/or the regional 
network? 
• Unfriendly political environment (11)  
• Communication (10) 
• Lack of concrete activities (8) ; no implementation yet 
• Lack of funds (8) – need to interest donors in long-term support 
• Few contacts with state bodies and regional organisations (6) 
• Maintaining the network (6); Maintain the level of attention and 
activities. 
• Enlargement (6) stay open to all organisations actively committed 
• Lack of focus (5) 
• Continuity and sustainability (5); activities have an isolated 
character, they are not systematic 
• Too far removed from grassroots (4) 
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• Governance (4): ineffective, lack of ownership, lack of transparency  
• Building coherency (4) despite the diverging issues and levels 
development of countries and regions  
• Socio-economic issues (3) 
• Reality of armed conflict (3) 
• Political realities (2): violent conflicts, US foreign policy 
• Lack of institutional support (2) to members and national 
networks/focal points 
• Politics within network (2) particularly in Middle East where Israeli 
organisations are prevented from joining 
• Commitment (2) of members 
• Language barriers (2): information is distributed in English  
• Low capacity of members (2): not enough skills in networking and 
little capacity for conflict intervention 
 
16. What are your recommendations for strengthening the functions 
mentioned under questions 11 and 12? 
• Governance (17): create clarity on structures and procedures; increase 
ownership and transparency; provide equal opportunities for all 
network members. Specify mandates and roles and address 
representativeness 
• Decide on aims and strategies (12) for the implementation of the 
Action Agendas, and do so in a participatory way. Also develop 
benchmarks.   
• Strengthen the secretariats (10) at various levels 
• Exchange of knowledge (9): Learn form others. Constant exchange of 
information among network members  
• Build capacity (7) of network members 
• Increase communication and access to information (7) possibly 
through internet and a regular newsletter 
• Organize regular conferences and meetings (7) 
• Influence governments (7): Develop a system of cooperation and 
mechanisms of influence on politicians and the state  
• Cooperate with existing networks (7), unite forces and 
methodologies with real activists and active organizations  
• Capacity building of members (6): this would also provide them 
with incentives for participation in the network, moral and material 
• Monitor possible conflict zones (4) 
• Start joint activities (4) including follow-up of conferences  
• Financial support (4): find long-term funding 
• Regular meetings (3): Organise a early global forum or  a constant 
operating network of round tables  
• Join organizations and networks that deal with security (3): UN, 
NATO, EU and other multilateral and international organizations 
• Establish ongoing relations with international institutions such as 
UN (3)  
  
500 
• Access to experts (3): Establishment of a data base of consultants  
• Internships and visiting fellows programmes(2) 
• Establish monitoring mechanisms (2) 
• Advocacy (2) 
• Intensify lobby with UN and others (2) 
